Oral History Interview No. 1

with

DONALD STONE

August 12, 1974
Washington, D.C.

Interviewer I: Alice Hoffman
Interviewer II: Greg Giebel

INTRODUCTION

Born on a farm in Wisconsin in 1910, Don Stone attended the University of Wisconsin in 1930. When he graduated in 1935, he worked in a lithographic shop in Milwaukee and then as a stripper in a lithography shop in Appleton, Wisconsin. He returned to Milwaukee in 1940 to work for the E. F. Schmidt Company and became recording secretary of his local union in the Amalgamated Lithographers of America. He talks about the formative experience of going to the University of Wisconsin School for Workers for two weeks, which was his first exposure to a multi-racial situation and to a world of social ideas.

In 1946, because of some journalistic experience at the University of Wisconsin, Stone ran for editor of The Lithographers' Journal and won the election. He moved to New York City and immediately became involved in the internal conflicts of the union. He tells the story of the growing alliance between General Counsel Ben Robinson and Edward Swayduck, Local One President, and how it affected the internal politics and structure of the union. He analyses the strengths and weaknesses of people like Ed Swayduck, John Blackburn, and Marty Grayson.

Don Stone recalls the social issues he dealt with as editor of the journal and the political strength he gained in that position. He describes the struggle in the forties for a shorter workweek and the whole craft versus industrial union issue as it affected the ALA at that time. He discusses the controversy that arose over moving the union headquarters, and he recalls details of the controversial strike in Poughkeepsie, New York, in 1954. In 1953 Stone was elected secretary-treasurer of the union.

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Interviewer I: Alice Hoffman
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INTERVIEWER I: Place and date of birth. . .

STONE: I am Donald W. Stone, born in Wisconsin on July 20, 1910. I was born on a farm in what I suppose is North Central Wisconsin in an area which Roosevelt later called a submarginal farming area. My father had gone to Wisconsin from South Dakota and had purchased this farm which never really did turn out to be terribly productive. I suppose I had the usual education background through grade school to which I walked a couple of miles and through high school to which I walked a couple of miles in the other direction.

My recollection is there was no particular discussion of social or economic issues in the family. I have little recollection of that.

INTERVIEWER I: How many Stones were there?

STONE: There are three boys and two girls living. There had originally been eight Stones. I was the youngest. My father was forty when he was married, and I was the last of eight children. So that my father was fairly old when I grew up. While I was in high school, he had a heart condition, really was unable to work. My oldest brother had long since gone to work elsewhere, working in a creamery, and my next brother went to college at the River Falls Teachers' College. As soon as he was through, he went to Janesville, Wisconsin to take a job in the YMCA where he has worked all his life, now retired, not all the time in Janesville. My next brother, virtually as soon as he graduated from high school, also went to Janesville where my brother got him a job; and he worked all his life in the Chevrolet plant, Fisher Body.

The net result of that was that I was left at home to run the farm of 120 acres without any help.

INTERVIEWER I: What kind of a farm was it? Dairy farm?

STONE: Dairy farm. I did run the farm for two or three years while I was in high school alone and two years after I was out of high school, not very happily, but that's where I was. I had a tremendous drive to leave the farm and go to college. I don't know where I got it from. I remember specifically a man who had graduated from our high school, a man by the name of Neal Stoddard, came back to deliver a commencement address, and it was from that commencement address that I got the initiative to do what I had to do to get off of that farm and go to college. It wasn't easy because my father was not well and my mother was not well and everybody in the family had decided that it would be nice if I would stay there and take care of them. I tried to work out, did work out, an arrangement whereby they could go into the village and take over my grandfather's house, and I went to Madison, to the University, really without funds. I couldn't have had more than about twenty dollars with me.

INTERVIEWER I: Did you sell the farm? What did you do with the farm?

STONE: Well, it was turned over to a brother-in-law. My brother-in-law took it over, and I went to the University. My second brother, who had gone to college, had been sent by an uncle. The uncle paid the tuition because we didn't have any money. And my brother only had to agree that somewhere he had to return that to someone else, and I was the recipient of that for one semester when I was at the University. He paid my tuition, and he paid my expenses for the first semester I was at the University. Then he got married, and I was on my own. We--myself and a few others--worked our way through school, did whatever we had to do to earn our living. I had some fair jobs. I worked at the Veterans' Hospital in Mendota, which is right across the lake from Madison. I went to school in the mornings and worked in the afternoons. That's a veterans' hospital, a mental hospital. There I did a number of things, but one of the things I did was edit a little paper and worked in the therapy department, whatever they call it, the manual therapy department, working in the print shop and various other things.

INTERVIEWER I: Now, when was this that you were at the University of Wisconsin?

STONE: I went to the University in 1930. Graduated from high school in 1928 and went to the University in 1930. I had been asked by my family and by my relatives, you know, what I was going

to study when I went to the University. They figured that if I was going to take this tremendous step, I must have some tremendous urge to do something. I said I was going to be a journalist. I'm not quite sure where that came from. But anyway, I started in the Journalism School. I was in the Journalism School for two years. I got out of the Journalism School because journalism required a flexible schedule, and I didn't have a flexible schedule. I was extremely tied down with this job at the hospital, so I went into education and graduated from the University of Wisconsin in 1935 in education, with a major in speech and a minor in English.

My schedule, as I say, was considerably restricted. I was not a great student, but I was good enough to get by and do a very substantial amount of work to earn my way and really did not build up any debt over the whole period.

INTERVIEWER I: The University of Wisconsin at this period of time was a great seed bed for the economic and social ideas of the New Deal. John R. Commons was there as Professor of Economics and Selig Perlman. Did any of these people intrude upon your consciousness?

STONE: Not really. I had very little consciousness of social problems other than the need to earn my living. I knew very little about what was going on. My job at the hospital was interrupted because I had gotten the job under a Republican who was administering the hospital, and then Franklin Roosevelt came in; and that meant I lost my job somewhere along the way. . . (Laughter). . . in I suppose the second or third year I was in college. Well, it would have been. . .when did Roosevelt come in? '33?

INTERVIEWER I: Yeah.

STONE: '32? So that ended my career at the hospital. But otherwise there was very little social consciousness. It's true that Wisconsin had a great reputation for being a hotbed of radicalism, really. I remember that one of the young ladies I met told me that she was a Communist. I think that's only the second person I've met in my life that told me they were a Communist, and they were both women, which may be interesting. But I really didn't know what that was all about. I worked at the newspaper, at the college newspaper, you know, as a proofreader and a headline writer and so on. This was when I was still in journalism. I really did not have much knowledge of what was going on. I remember Alf Landon. Alf Landon ran against Roosevelt, didn't he? When did Alf Landon run?

INTERVIEWER I: He ran in '36.

STONE: Alf Landon ran later because I was in Appleton, Wisconsin, and I remember then I was working there and reading the Appleton paper and was convinced that Roosevelt didn't have a chance. It did teach me a bit of a lesson about how you can be influenced by the media! (Laughter) And I never forgot it, either, really.

INTERVIEWER I: So that in 1948, when it was predicted that Dewey was going to beat Truman by a landslide, you were prepared not to be surprised! (Laughter)

STONE: I don't really remember 1948. Now, interestingly enough, I was, as I say, graduated in education. This was in 1935. It was a depression year, as some of us remember, or it certainly was on the tail end of the depression. Teachers' jobs were scarce, like they are today, I understand. I was unable to get a job as a teacher. My wife was trained as a teacher and probably. . .

INTERVIEWER I: You had acquired a wife by this time?

STONE: Well, not really, but the gal I was going to marry and really intended to at that time, as I recall, didn't get a job in teaching, either. She was a major in English and a minor in speech. So one of the jobs I had while I was in school was working in a photographic shop. It started out in news photography, and then the man got into commercial photography, which is making plates for multiliths, which is really a lithographic process, the beginning of a lithographic process on a press, on zinc or aluminum plates. We began to make negatives, really the beginning of the process. I picked up some skills on the camera.

When I graduated in 1935, I didn't get a job teaching and didn't have any prospects of getting a job teaching. I went to Milwaukee and got a job in a lithographic shop as a cameraman. I didn't have much experience as a cameraman, but what experience I did have was as a cameraman. That didn't work out too well. One of the things we had done in this little shop was to experiment with what was then known as strip film, which was a brand new product; and I learned to use it. I had an opportunity to leave Milwaukee and go to Appleton to work as a stripper in a lithographic plant. I very quickly acquired a skill--I really did--as a stripper.

INTERVIEWER I: How did that opportunity come about, Don, to go to Appleton?

STONE: Well, I was working in a little shop in Milwaukee, and I heard about the job probably through a salesman of the film. You know, they travelled around from one shop to another. At any rate, I heard the job was open, and got it becuase of the very limited skill that I had picked up on the use of the film; but the fact of the matter is nobody else knew how to use it, either. It was a brand new product, and I knew how to use it and became very good at it. We were doing high school annuals. We did them, you know, really for a lot of schools and worked up quite a business. In fact, finally I worked up a system for them, went out and even sold. I travelled through Iowa, you know, a very limited sales experience, but nevertheless some sales experience.

Anyway, when I had first been in Milwaukee, I had known about a lithographic shop called E. F. Schmidt Company, which was a beautiful operation. You know, some of them are sloppy, and this happened to be a nice shop. I decided that when I got a chance, that's where I wanted to work.

In the meantime, I had gotten married. Got married in Appleton, Wisconsin. I went to work there in '36 and stayed there until about 1940. I went to Milwaukee in 1940 to go to work for the E.F. Schmidt Company. This is where I got my first contact with the Union, [Amalgamated Lithographers of America]. Up 'til then I really didn't know the Union existed. I had no knowledge that there was a union in the industry. It was a union shop, and I quickly joined in 1940 and became active in the Local. Became the recording secretary of the Local. I'm not sure of the year, but in any case that began my interest in the Union.

Those were the formative years of the CIO. One of the opportunities I had when I was an officer of the Local was to go back to the University of Wisconsin to the School for Workers. The Local sent me there for two weeks, and that is really where I got my incentive. I learned something about the CIO. I was stirred, in fact, by the goals of the CIO to organize the unskilled, and I was impressed. It was my first opportunity to get into a multi-racial situation. The students at the University were from all over the country, and they were black and white and otherwise. I have often said that I got more out of those two weeks that was valuable to me and that impressed me than I ever did out of my university training. And it's true. I really was impressed.

INTERVIEWER I: That's some testimonial for the School for Workers!

STONE: [I] met some interesting people, some interesting teachers, and went back to Milwaukee and the Local with somewhat more interest than I had ever had. I still did not know very much about the International Union.

INTERVIEWER I: Well, let's back up a little bit for a minute. You said that this E. F. Schmidt Company, that when you had been in Milwaukee, you had seen the type of work they did and was impressed by it. What kind of work were they doing, and how big a shop was this?

STONE: Well, it was general commercial work, but they did it from scratch. They had their own art department; they did high-quality work where I had been used to doing relatively low-quality work. They obviously were making money at it, and they kept their plant clean. You know, just a high-quality operation. It was my first opportunity, really, to see what was happening to letterpress as compared to litho. This shop had a floor of letter presses with probably eight letter presses on it, and most of them were down, not running, most of the time. The lithographic department was busy, and I began to see what was happening to the industry--the shift from letterpress to offset lithography. So that made an impression on me.

INTERVIEWER II: Was there a Photoengraving Local there also at Schmidt?

STONE: No, no, there was no photoengraving. Strictly a lithographic shop. So I didn't know the Photoengravers at that point at all, didn't know much about them.

INTERVIEWER I: How large a shop was this, Don?

STONE: Oh, they must have had 150 employees, a pretty good-sized shop, what we would consider a pretty good-sized shop. Now, this was between 1940 and 1946 when I went to New York, during the war years. I was exempt from service because they considered me vital to the operation of the war in the industry that I was in. Some of it was hokum, and some of it might have been true. E. F. Schmidt did not have much of the war work, and I went to work in another plant where they had maps and where they had a special map set-up with secret operations of the presses and all that sort of thing and worked on highly secret stuff, I suppose, during those years.

INTERVIEWER I: But it was in Milwaukee?

STONE: In Milwaukee.

INTERVIEWER I: Now, the other thing I wanted to ask you, you had talked about this formative experience of going to the University of Wisconsin School for Workers for two weeks. Were you the secretary of the Local at the time that you went?

STONE: My recollection is I was. I'm not really sure, but I think I was the secretary of the Local at that point.

INTERVIEWER I: And what did you study at the School for Workers? I think that would be interesting. . .

STONE: Well, it was labor history. Really, I knew nothing about the labor movement. I started from scratch on the business of labor history, what it was all about. There was obviously a great deal of enthusiasm for the CIO and its drive to, you know, rejuvenate the labor movement and get away from the crafts and organize in the area of the unskilled, basically those people, I suppose, that needed unionism the most. And social issues were raised up to me for probably the first time in my life--the problems of the poor and the needy and the racial issues. I don't know whether the issue of sex discrimination was. . . I really don't recall. I suppose it was all part of the same picture.

INTERVIEWER II: But you made the decision to join the AEA, to become an activist in the union previously?

STONE: I made the decision to join the union because I had to join the union to go to work at E. F. Schmidt Company, literally.

INTERVIEWER II: But you became a secretary. . .

STONE: I became an activist very quickly. I became active, for example, in the credit union which the Local had and which I think, in fact, I was instrumental in establishing. I don't believe they had a credit union. Now, how much of that was socially oriented and how much of it was personally oriented, I don't know. Because I had a growing family and I became the best customer that the credit union ever had, I think! (Laughter) So that I don't know. You know, how do you evaluate such things. But at any rate, I was active in the Local, active in the credit union, and quickly became the secretary of the Local.

INTERVIEWER I: I don't want to put words in your mouth, but I think that there are a lot of young men and women who could have gone to the Wisconsin School for Workers for whom this interracial, organizing-the-unskilled, organizing-the-unorganized philosophy that was undoubtedly being put out there would have fallen on deaf ears, particularly because you represented a highly-skilled craft as a stripper.

STONE: Yeah, that's probably true, and probably my receptivity to such things came from my experience at the University although I was unconscious of really what was happening to me at the University. That may very well have happened in the University. Also it would be unfair not to give some credit to my family, to my father and my mother, who never showed prejudices against any segment that I ever knew of.

INTERVIEWER I: What kind of family background, church background, did you come from? The reason that I ask this is because I know that in the Midwest there was a strong. . .well, for people who had a strong kind of social commitment, the YMCA was one route to express that. I'm wondering whether that had anything to do with your brothers' motivation for getting into that kind of work.

STONE: Well, we were a church family from the beginning. My father never was, but my mother was. I didn't know much about my father's stock. I didn't really know much about his family. He was older, and I don't really to this day know a great deal about it. I do know that some of them were politically oriented. He had an uncle who was a legislator in Minnesota and so on. So there was that background.

But my mother came from aristocratic stock. Her mother, my grandmother, was from Boston, I think, and she was a snob of the first water! (Laughter) She really was. She was just an aristocrat. She had lived that way. They had some money. My grandfather, my mother's father, was a piano manufacturer. He was German--Earhuff. Came from a German family, highly skilled. He had piano factories in two or three places, had gone broke, then really didn't have any residual money. He had had at one time.

INTERVIEWER I: There's no greater snob than a person who has once had money! (Laughter)

STONE: They had lived well in their day, but it wasn't there any more. I understood that his last factory was in St. Paul. He went broke during one of the depressions, and he paid off all the debts and so on; but he didn't have much left. He didn't have any left as far as I know. So that there was no money.

(END OF TAPE I, SIDE I)

STONE: My mother was no snob at all. (Laughter) I don't think she was a snob.

INTERVIEWER I: Her family were snobs! (Laughter) You were raised, then, in a German Lutheran church in Wisconsin?

STONE: No, it was Methodist. I'm sure they hadn't been Methodist initially, but that's the only church that was there. We went to church, and we did the whole bit. So that we may have picked up something there. I don't consider the church now as a leader in the fight against discrimination; quite the contrary, and I don't think it was then, even though they preached a good. . . you know, said the right thing. They didn't necessarily do them. But in any case, there were no blacks in the area of Wisconsin and Minnesota. They're really more apt to be blond than black. So that the racial problem, as far as the Negro families was concerned, was never there. It really wasn't there as far as the anti-Semite thing, either. There just were no Jews there; we didn't have a problem. You know, that sort of thing. But nevertheless I suppose that some way I got from them. . . .

INTERVIEWER I: Some notion of how the world must be.

STONE: Maybe.

INTERVIEWER I: Yeah.

STONE: Must have.

INTERVIEWER I: Okay, well, then you were saying that when you returned from this experience of two weeks at the Wisconsin School. . . .and this was your first exposure to a multi-racial situation and to a world of ideas that you had not been previously directly exposed to.

STONE: That's true. Then I'm not sure of the timing exactly. I mean I'm not sure in what years I went to that school, but I suppose it was in 1944 or '45. The election of officers Internationally was coming along, and I had had this journalistic background and I was familiar with the magazine, The Lithographers' Journal. I suggested to the local president who was a friend of mine. . .and I really was in line for that local president's job. It wasn't that great a job, you know. Nobody was making any money out of those things. In fact, I don't think it was a full-time job, as I recall; that local wasn't large enough. But I was probably in line for it. At one point I said to the Local president, "Why shouldn't I run for editor of The Lithographers' Journal?" I knew nothing about the thing, really, but I did have an interest in journalism; and I thought I might have the qualifications. In any case, I didn't really expect to get it. The

editor of the magazine in New York was Justus Ebert; he was seventy-seven, but he had been in that job for twenty or thirty years. He ran very much of a socialist organ. He and his wife, Jennie, were both Socialists. You probably know something about them. So it's possible that influenced me. I really don't know.

But in any case, when I decided to put my name in as a candidate for the office. . .or rather the Local put my name in as a candidate for the office of editor, (That was an elective job in those days) I didn't expect to get it. Ebert was a candidate, as far as I knew, and there wasn't any possibility of beating him. So it was not an immediate issue--the question of moving to New York. But as fate would have it, Ebert withdrew from the race; and then I had another problem. I had to worry about whether I was going to have to go to New York or not.

INTERVIEWER I: Why did he withdraw? Just age or. . . . ?

STONE: I think so. As far as I know, yes, he just decided to pack it up because certainly he was not convinced that I was going to beat him. He might have been convinced that he might have opposition in the local. I don't know, but as far as I know it was just age. He decided to retire. He wasn't in very good health.

So this was 1946, and the war was over; but things weren't very good yet. It was very difficult to get anything. Housing was extremely short. Clothing! I can still remember, when I finally got the job, walking into some clothing store in Milwaukee. You know, you've got these great racks. They're all empty! There are a few coats. I needed an overcoat; I didn't have one. I was not very sophisticated. I had never ridden on a plane. I'm not sure I'd ridden very far on a train! (laughing) So the word came--I think it was on the 15th of December--that I had won; I had opposition--two candidates, one a member of Local One in New York. There really seemed to be little possibility of beating a candidate from New York. It didn't ever occur to me I would. And another candidate from Washington.

INTERVIEWER I: Washington, D.C. or Washington State?

STONE: Washington, D.C. An International representative. The word came on December 15 that I should be in New York on the 1st of January.

INTERVIEWER II: What kind of campaign would you run for an editor of the journal? Did you have to write a resume of your qualifications?

STONE: Yes, I did.

INTERVIEWER II: Was that the extent of it?

STONE: My campaign motto: "New Times Demand New Measures and New Men." It's part of the Constitution; still is, as a matter of fact. "New Times Demand New Measures and New Men. The world advances and in time outgrows the laws that in our father's day were best. And doubtless after us some purer scheme will be shaped out by wiser men than we, made wiser by the steady growth of truth. . ." So it was part of my campaign literature, as a matter of fact.

INTERVIEWER I: What was that quote from that you just. . . ?

STONE: James Russell Lowell.

INTERVIEWER I: James Russell Lowell.

INTERVIEWER II: So at your own expense you would publish campaign literature and send it out to the locals?

STONE: I think the local probably did it. I don't think it was at my own expense. The local was extremely happy that they were going to have a candidate for International office from Milwaukee. I'm sure that--reasonably sure--there was a committee, and whatever was done was done by them. I don't recall there was a tremendous campaign at all, but I do remember that was part of the campaign literature. I think [it was] something that went to the locals. Where my support developed from, I don't know really.

INTERVIEWER II: You were aware that, if someone from Local One [ALA] in New York ran, the chances of you running for the first time and winning were pretty small.

STONE: Well, they seemed small. What I didn't know was how easy it was even at that time to develop anti-New York feeling if you tried. And although I wasn't trying, didn't try in the campaign, nevertheless what's implicit in that is that, if a candidate runs from somewhere else, he begins to get support. Of course, Chicago was a big local at the time, and New York, as often happened, its leadership had developed some animosity around the country and there developed a reaction that put me in that office as editor of the magazine.

INTERVIEWER I: Now, is it true that you had not attended an [ALA] International convention prior to. . . .

STONE: Never had attended.

INTERVIEWER I: Okay, so that the first International convention you attended was as editor?

STONE: Yeah. It was very soon after I was elected. I went to New York in January and went to convention in Colorado Springs in May, 1946.

INTERVIEWER II: So you inherit with this office a very important job within the union. Did people begin to seek you out and try to suggest to you that there were political issues within the International that were going to require your awareness of, if you were going to do an effective job of informing the membership of internal affairs? How did you get wised up?

STONE: Yes, yes, indeed. Of course, old Justus and his wife, Jennie, were, as I say, deep in the socialist tradition. They schooled me because I didn't know anything about the socialist tradition. I really knew nothing about that sort of thing. I approached it somewhat skeptically, being from the Middle West. I wasn't sure that I was ever going to be a flaming Socialist. Justus Ebert had been a thorn in the side of the establishment anyway; that was his role. They--meaning the Council, the International officers and councillors--were most anxious that the new editor should not go down that road because Justus Ebert really made the magazine pretty much a socialist organ. Although there were within the organization a good many socialist-oriented people.

INTERVIEWER I: What about the president at that time?

STONE: The president was William Reihl. He literally said to me when I walked into the office in New York something to the effect, "What are you doing here?" He obviously did not believe that I had any business running for the office and was not very happy about the fact that somebody from New York didn't get it. He was cold almost to the point of discourtesy. My reception in New York wasn't very happy.

In addition, in Milwaukee we had bought a house about a year before. My wife was pregnant and ill and miserable. When she learned that I had to go to New York (laughing), she didn't want to go! I had to leave her to sell the house in Milwaukee. I had to go to New York and find one. You know, the market was terrible; it was almost as bad as it is now, I guess. So that wasn't a very happy experience. There were a good many times when I almost didn't stay. They were waiting for me back in Milwaukee, including the Company. But anyway, I did--stuck it out.

INTERVIEWER I: Why did you stick it out?

STONE: Well, what does Nixon say? "I'm not a quitter. Everything in my bones. . . . " (Laughing) Or whatever that quote was!

Why? I don't know. One of the things I learned very quickly, which I didn't know before, was that the editor made less money than I was making at the bench. (Laughter) I had to have some overtime, but I had overtime. That wasn't the problem, and literally I was getting less take-home pay in New York than I was on the bench. But that's the reason I stuck it out. I had contracted for it, and I stuck it out.

INTERVIEWER I: Hm-hm. It was just a sense of commitment then.

STONE: It got better. It got better. There were some people in New York who were pleasant enough to me, and Reihl got over his pique.

INTERVIEWER II: What kind of role did the journal play within the International? Here you are as an independently elected editor that gives you a whole lot of freedom, it seems to me, and yet you should be part of some team within the International. I wonder just how you saw your role and how you began to fit in. You really didn't come out of a particular camp in those days.

INTERVIEWER I: Right, you were neither New York nor Chicago.

STONE: No, I wasn't, and I had to begin to really develop my own philosophy of what the editor ought to be. And I did. I have gone back over my early magazines to see how they stand up, particularly editorially, because in those days the editor wrote editorials. They stand up, in my opinion, fairly well in terms of explaining and developing the goal of the International. They stand up pretty well, but that's my personal opinion.

INTERVIEWER I: What kind of editorials were you writing? You were addressing yourself to what kinds of topics?

STONE: They tended to be fairly varied, but a good many of them were social rather than organizational. I was and am--never got over it--a war-hater. I addressed myself to the war and peace issue, to government issues--you know, what was going on in the government. I became fairly quickly the COPE director, collected whatever money was collected, and so on and became fairly active in that. So I addressed myself to social issues.

INTERVIEWER I: Let me ask you a blunt question. In a lot of unions the COPE director is somebody in whom the International reposes a great deal of confidence because it's regarded as a very important job. In other unions, you might become COPE director more or less by default because it wasn't regarded as a very important job. Which was it in this instance?

STONE: Well, it wasn't considered very important. The International Union or the International officers were not involved in the political issues really at all. All we were doing in the early years, basically, was to raise money to meet our COPE quota, and that was basically to show our support, organizational support. They'd give us a quota of six or seven thousand dollars, and we'd try to raise it from members through contributions; and if we didn't raise it from members, we'd pay the balance out of the general fund. But as I say, there was no great commitment at all to political goals.

INTERVIEWER I: Now, at this time you were affiliated with the CIO?

STONE: We affiliated with the CIO in 1946. In fact, I think the Union affiliated before I went in there as editor, as I recall.

INTERVIEWER I: This was really PAC, Political Action Committee.

STONE: Yes.

INTERVIEWER II: Did you find over the years that you became aligned with any of the political factions that emerged in the International?

STONE: Well, the record shows that I worked as editor under Reihl. I think Blackburn went in as president in 1948 or '49. The question is when he took office. The campaign, I think, was in '48. I became secretary-treasurer under him in 1953. I had opposition which was appointed by Blackburn, a Rudy Harper, an International representative, appointed as secretary-treasurer in the interim when the obvious intent was putting him in as secretary-treasurer. Canary was nominated in '55 and beat Blackburn, took office in '56. George Canary and I were not buddies.

INTERVIEWER I: Well, it sounds as if you were not buddies with Blackburn, either.

STONE: I wasn't buddies with Blackburn, either. Now, the reason for that was Blackburn became a. . . those were extremely difficult years. There were great problems with the organization. Basically Swayduck was in control, Swayduck and Ben Robinson, a lawyer. New York was Blackburn's local. It was also my local, by the way; I was a member. Swayduck and Robinson together were running the organization, and Blackburn did what they wanted him to do. That appointment of someone to run against me was their idea, so I was trying to survive, I guess.

INTERVIEWER II: But you decided to run for secretary?

STONE: I decided to run for secretary-treasurer. Martin Grayson who had been secretary-treasurer had resigned to become a vice-president from the Mountain Region, and I decided I was ready to move for that job. I did not like what had happened. Rudy Harper may have been a good representative from Atlanta, but he had absolutely no qualifications to be secretary-treasurer and no ability along that line, as a matter of fact. He had nothing that would have given him a leg up in that job, and I decided to run against him, and I beat him.

INTERVIEWER II: So you had a large reputation at that point, having been editor for a period of years.

STONE: I did. I had political strength of my own as editor of the magazine. When they challenged me, they knew they had taken on something. It's true.

INTERVIEWER II: Who else would you then go to speak to? Obviously, you're now seen as a non-Local One. Even though that's your local, they're nominating someone to oppose you. Who else do you have to then turn to, or are you strong enough to do it yourself?

STONE: Well, I didn't have support from the next largest local--Chicago--where the next president came from. Although before Canary got into office, the fact of the matter is Chicago and New York never lined up against me. They didn't trust each other, either, and they were not going to line up against me. I had support out of Chicago; I didn't have support out of New York, although until 1959 in Portland I always got a nomination out of New York. That year I did not, and in the next election I had opposition from New York. But they supported me, basically, I think because I had some political strength. You know, an editor of a magazine develops such strength. His name was well known, and the members, as opposed to the local officers, you know, knew me better than they knew anybody else, knew the name, read the magazine, and so on.

So the answer, I guess, to your question--where did I go for political strength--I really went finally to the members. Because, you know, I had officer support in a good many of the locals, but I also knew that. . . . I also was convinced that, if Local One and Chicago ever lined up against me, with their satellites, then I was in trouble; but it never happened.

INTERVIEWER I: Why not?

STONE: Well, as I say, they didn't trust each other.

INTERVIEWER I: I see. In other words, they couldn't unite with each other and. . . .

STONE: Yes, it's not really that simple; obviously, it's not that simple. But Swayduck is--you've heard the name before. . . .

INTERVIEWER I: Yes! (Laughing)

STONE: He's a very charming guy, but very difficult. You know, he's got to be top dog all the time, and he survives in his own local by running everybody else down. It's a characteristic of New York, I note. But you know, he'd stand on the platform and justify everything that he did by the fact that nobody else had done as well and blast Chicago or anybody else that happened to be handy. He's a great guy for taking somebody on. That's the way he got his strength.

INTERVIEWER II: Were there issues involved, or was it just simply a question of who people had alignments with? Were there issues which. . . .

STONE: During those years there were a number of issues, aggravating issues. There was a series of merger talks going on with the ITU*and the IPP & AU** which were aggravating all the time. Jurisdiction was an aggravating problem all of the time with those two unions. There was the question of moving the office, which came almost at the beginning of Blackburn's. . .at the time that he took office. All during those years. . . .

INTERVIEWER I: Moving your office from New York to some other place?

STONE: From New York, moving the office, yeah, probably somewhere else, although moving it even within New York became an issue. That was always a divisive problem.

INTERVIEWER I: Why? Why did anybody care where the office was, whether it was in Brooklyn or Flatbush or Manhattan?

STONE: Well, let's talk about later, in 1955. Canary was nominated and became president. He didn't want to move to New York, and he didn't move to New York. He had his office in Chicago, and I had mine in New York. And there was an initiative, which you may be familiar with, that Chicago started, to move the office to Chicago, which I opposed. It was publicized in the magazine. I

*International Typographical Union
**Printing Pressmen & Assistants Union

was, I suppose, a front man. The officers in New York didn't want the office moved, and some others didn't want it moved, either. So there was an initiative that went on and was conducted and lost. In the meantime we purchased a building in New York, and I was the guy that, you know, went out and did it, bought the building. Of course, I had support. I had support from the New York people now and a lot of others. And George Canary signed the contract; he didn't have any choice.

But I mean, there were lots of issues. There was this Poughkeepsie strike, which became a serious issue during those years. That was what? In 1954?

INTERVIEWER II: Can you describe that strike a little bit for us? Or is that too much on that?

STONE: Well, I'm not, I suppose, that familiar with it, but Ed Stone had been elected as a vice-president in the Atlantic Region. Previous to this--and this was in 1954, I think--previous to this the International president served as the vice-president of the region. He handled it.

There was no vice-president elected in the region. Then Ed Stone was elected. Ed Stone was a member of Local One, a very vocal gentleman, a real champion of the people. That was his campaign, you know; he was not of the establishment. He became pretty much of a thorn in the side of the local officers who didn't like that sort of thing developing, didn't want him to get political strength. This may be unfair, but I suspect that they moved him upstairs and then attacked him there because it was easier than attacking him at the local. Ed Stone was elected as a vice-president of the region. His immediate campaign was to get the same conditions throughout the region that they had in New York.

(END OF TAPE I, SIDE II)

STONE: Ed Stone went into Philadelphia to a local meeting, and they almost threw him out, literally. Then finally let him stay if he kept his mouth shut.

INTERVIEWER I: When was this?

STONE: This was in, I believe, in 1954, the early fifties. So one of the strikes he called was in Poughkeepsie at the Western Plant. Poughkeepsie had a unit of lithographers, and they also had a unit of bookbinders, a fairly substantial unit of bookbinders. I'm not sure at the moment whether those bookbinders

were members of the union or not; I think they were not. But when the strike was called and the craftsmen went out, the bookbinders went out with them or were supposed to; and some of them did. The strike became extremely difficult and abrasive. The company was not about to settle with the whole unit presumably; they were not about to settle with the unskilled bookbinders. Whether they were about to settle with the skilled is a question I don't really know the answer to, but in the final analysis, after a long struggle, the International Council voted that the craft should sever its relationship with the unskilled, that we should make a deal with the company for the skilled.

INTERVIEWER I: This is while you were still affiliated with the CIO?

STONE: This is while we were affiliated with the CIO. Stone, Ed Stone, refused to go along with that.

INTERVIEWER I: What about you? How did you feel about that?

STONE: I really didn't know enough about it. I wasn't close enough to the situation. The representatives got together. There were at least two of them. There were two or three of them in there, and they opposed the Council position. One of them lost his job afterwards, and another one almost lost his job. Ed Stone was really a victim of that strike. He had a heart attack shortly afterwards. That strike was very much an issue. It was very much an issue in the loss of Blackburn's job, as a matter of fact.

At some point during that strike, (there was no settlement). I recall calling councillors and urging them to call a meeting of the International Council, which they did. It could be done. A meeting of the International Council could be initiated by the president or by a number of members of the Council. I've forgotten how many--four or five. I solicited letters from the Council to call a meeting. It was called. It wasn't very productive. . .you know, the settlement finally was a disaster anyway for years. I think it's still true, as a matter of fact. Half of the people in the pressroom didn't belong to the union. I don't think they do yet. They have very little strength there.

But the basic issue in that strike--I don't know about the issue between the company and the union--but the basic issue within the union, the divisive issue in the union, was the question of whether we should continue to support the unskilled, who had voted, as I recall, by a very shaky vote in support of the strike. I don't know what the vote was, but it wasn't very strong. The whole thing was a disaster.

INTERVIEWER II: These were semi-skilled people in the bookbinders. . . .

STONE: Yeah. You asked me what my reaction was. Well, my gut reaction was the same as Ed Stone. My gut reaction was that those were the people that needed our support. But it was extremely difficult to get a coherent story on what the issues were, why it couldn't be settled.

INTERVIEWER I: Well, now, I was just checking here to check my own memory because I recall that Munson in his book on The History of the Lithographers Union[1] does talk about this Poughkeepsie strike, and he characterizes this, in the words of Martin Grayson, as how not to conduct a strike. But he also says that he thinks that there was at this time a real problem in the lack of coordination bargaining, that is, that Racine was going off on its own little path and Poughkeepsie was going off on another and a third vice-president was going off on still a third path. I wonder if you agree with that assessment of Munson's or whether. . . .

STONE: I think that's true. It's still true, as a matter of fact. You know, we had a strike in Hannibal, and the company finally closed that plant down. But when we tried to get support in Racine or Poughkeepsie or St. Louis with the same company, we couldn't get it. More recently we had a strike in Mt. Morris at Kable Brothers--that's a Western Printing Company plant--and the same thing is true--we can't get support from other locals. So that's what he's saying there. The situation was the same then as it is now.

INTERVIEWER II: Has the merger been any help, or will it be any help as you get common language in contracts around the country?

STONE: Well, I think the answer's no in that specific situation because right now at Kable Brothers, Bill Hall is working with them on that strike and has tried to get supporting picket lines, for example, in the other situations, and he hasn't gotten it.

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[1]Munson, Fred C., History of the Lithographers Union (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Wertheim Committee on Industrial Relations, 1963), pp. 279-283.

INTERVIEWER II: Well, I guess to digress a bit further, what was his motivation? Was he strictly a real strong Lithographer or was he in the enviable position of having to be the president of the dominant local in the printing industry, the lithography printing industry? He's criticized, probably unjustifiably, by some people as having interests that were political outside of union concerns. You were close to him in New York at that time in terms of having a chance to view him. How did you view the situation?

STONE: Well, you say interests that were political outside. He certainly had interests that were financial outside. He was a man who was a respecter of power. He knew what it could do, but Swayduck in his earlier years, I am sure, was a dedicated Lithographer, interested in advancing the welfare of a lot of members. I knew from a good bit of experience as editor of the magazine and elsewhere that Swayduck did indeed have financial interests, which he cultivated through his strength as president of the local. He earned a fairly substantial amount of money that had nothing to do with his office except that he used his office to place people in the shops to purchase materials and so forth from which he could gain a financial interest. As I say, I was editor of the magazine for years, and I heard that over and over all the time.

INTERVIEWER I: Did the union have an ethical policy statement about such things? Or did they at that time?

STONE: No, they did not.

INTERVIEWER I: Do they now?

STONE: They do now. We have a code of ethics, but that wasn't part of the picture at that time.

INTERVIEWER I: So that at this particular point in time this kind of behavior would be contrary to that code of ethics.

STONE: Well, it's contrary to any code of ethics anyway. There's always an unwritten code of ethics, and nobody believed that that was a proper way to operate. We had a very strong feeling. . . . the pension fund of Local One became a pretty substantial fund. I don't know what the reserves are now, but they'd have to be in the neighborhood of one hundred million; and even back in the days before he withdrew from the Amalgamated in '64, they were in the neighborhood of forty to fifty million. With that kind of a fund you have a lot of friends; and there was a very strong feeling that, when Local One finally withdrew from the International, it had a good bit to do with the control and use of the fund.

(END OF TAPE II, SIDE 3)

Interview resumes on August 14, 1974

INTERVIEWER II: And that would have been. . . .

STONE: Right, in May of 1946. (Continuing a subject discussed off tape) I had taken office in New York as editor of the magazine in January, January 1, 1946. The officers were busily getting ready for the convention so that that was my first convention. Bill Reihl was the president, and Robert Bruck was vice-president and secretary-treasurer. Bill Reihl had been elected as president of the union following the death of Andrew Kennedy. Andy Kennedy was the president in 1939, which was the last convention the union had had. Of course, those were war years, and no convention had been held. Andy Kennedy was, I suppose, the officer of the union that was most beloved and respected in the whole history of the Lithographers; but history seems to say that he literally worked himself to death. He was president during the depression during some very difficult years when the union was fighting the employers' attempts to roll back the wages. However that may be, Andy Kennedy did die shortly after the 1939 convention.

Bill Reihl became the president. He was an artist, by no means a young man. He took the job when nobody else wanted it. Those who were looking for a president of the International wanted Bob Bruck to take it. He felt he couldn't do that, so Bill Reihl was elected. He had some weaknesses, but he knew his weaknesses; and it was really during those years that Ben Robinson, who had worked for the NLRB, or whatever its predecessor was in those days, came into the union and became virtually the president of the union. He really, you know, did what had to be done. He did Mr. Reihl's correspondence.

INTERVIEWER II: Do you recall the circumstances under which Mr. Robinson came in, who attracted him?

STONE: Well, he, as I say, worked with the War Labor Board, wasn't it? I have forgotten the exact title. And it was through those operations that he came into contact with the union. Of course, this is before my time, and I don't remember the circumstances exactly under which he came with the union; but he was put on retainer some time in the early forties, as I understand it. Robert Bruck had his office in Chicago. He was vice-president and secretary-treasurer. Bill Reihl had his offices in New York, and virtually the operation of the union was done by Mr. Reihl and General Counsel Robinson.

There were four vice-presidents of the union at that time:

Robert Bruck in the Central Region, Fred Rose in the Mountain Region, A.W. Brown in the Canadian Region, and Pat Slater in the Pacific Region. There were, of course, at the time five regions. The Atlantic Region did not have a vice-president. The president who was from the Atlantic Region--he served as a vice-president for the region.

Robert Bruck died. I think it was in 1946. I remember the first air-plane trip I ever took was the trip to his funeral. My recollection is it was in November of 1946 in Chicago.

INTERVIEWER II: This was very sudden?

STONE: Yes, it was. He had a heart attack. I'm trying to think of who took over from him. I believe it was Oliver Mertz elected to that job of the vice-president in the Central Region. He became then the secretary-treasurer and vice-president in that region.

There were at that time six international representatives. As I recall, the convention was called in May, which was not the time of year in which such conventions were supposed to be called. It was called really as soon after the war as it seemed practical to do so. Pressures began to build up in New York and elsewhere for a convention since none had been held for seven years, and one was set up in May of 1946. The New York Local had negotiated a shorter workweek in early 1946. It was in the process of being negotiated when I first went into New York. There was great tension around, as I recall. Edward Swayduck was not yet the president of the New York Local, but he was the prime mover in the drive for a shorter workweek. The local president, John Blackburn, and the International president, Reihl, were, as I recollect, not necessarily in sympathy. But this was Swayduck's first drive for strength in the local.

In fact, they did negotiate, I believe, a 36-1/4-hour workweek in New York. One of the reasons for the pressure for a convention in May of '46 was to support that shorter workweek. It was important to the New York local that that should become International policy and be negotiated around the country. Otherwise, New York was very much out on a limb on the shorter hours. That was a major issue at the convention. Not all locals were convinced that this was any time to go for a breaking of the hours. As I recall, there was a running fight in the magazine between the Milwaukee Local and New York. A Milwaukee member, John Doerfler, was writing in the magazine and taking the position, obviously with the support of his local, that the New York

Local had no right to violate International policy by going for a shorter workweek. The constitution still called for a forty-hour workweek.

I think that the argument was wrong, but nevertheless that was the argument and it became a great issue at the convention.

INTERVIEWER II: Well, are you saying that the argument was wrong because the time was right to move to a shorter workweek or the argument was wrong because New York should have taken the right on themselves, moving separately on what would be International agreement to move for a shorter week?

STONE: Well, I don't believe the constitution should prevent a local from winning whatever gains they can make. The constitution is not supposed to be a limiting--I don't think it is--not intended to be a limiting document on gains for members, just because a shorter workweek had never been negotiated. It's possible that it would have been desirable, more desirable for a debate at a convention and a decision of the International that shorter hours should be negotiated as a major objective of the International. But in any case, that didn't happen. New York went out on its own and got a shorter workweek, and it became an abrasive issue in the union, particularly because New York drove very hard at the convention and before the convention and after the convention to make sure that other locals were fighting equally hard for a shorter workweek. A shorter workweek didn't come easy to a great many locals. That is my recollection of the major issue at that convention.

Since there had not been a convention for a long time, there were a tremendous number of resolutions dealing with all kinds of things, constitutional changes, some of which were important and some of which were minor. But there was a very substantial document that went out to referendum after that convention. And there were many issues that, it was felt, were not dealt with as they should have been. There wasn't time. So there was agreement that there should be another convention in 1947, September of 1947, and that convention was scheduled in Biloxi, Mississippi.

At the convention in 1946 the Amalgamated received its charter from the CIO, and that was an issue, although it had been approved by membership and so on, which was not necessarily popular with all the locals. As I recall, that was a major issue of debate.

INTERVIEWER II: How did the debate center in those days? What was the issue--the craft-industrial question?

STONE: Very much, very much. The Lithographers had always been pretty much a craft union. It had some orientation that was away from the craft. The editor of the magazine, before 1946, before I took over, was, you know, a socialist and very much sympathetic with the unskilled. So that it wasn't entirely a craft union with a craft orientation, but generally it was so; and this was a new departure for this craft-oriented organization to go into the CIO. It was, as I recall, an interesting debate on it. That's a long time ago, and I don't remember that. . . .

INTERVIEWER II: The advantages of joining the CIO would have been you would be affiliated once again with a larger federation which could lend strength perhaps when you needed to draw. . . .

STONE: That's right. That was the philosophy, the reason, for joining; and yet the jurisdiction, the craft unit, was at that time and really for many years after that the basis for the organizing within the Amalgamated. Under the guidance of General Counsel Robinson, who developed the pattern of the defense of the craft unit and fought it through the Labor Board and the courts and wherever it needed to be fought, we stayed with the pattern of carving out our unit, our lithographic unit. And that really meant not organizing the unskilled at all. So it was a bit of a dichotomy, I guess, that this craft oriented union should be affiliated with the CIO.

INTERVIEWER II: Was there any unspoken recognition of the fact that these large industrial unions would be willing to allow you to carve a craft unit out of their newly organized. . . .

STONE: Very much so. That was part of the picture, and I suppose part of the reason that we went into the CIO. There were statements in writing and verbally from the president of the CIO, Phil Murray, and from Jim Carey, who was the secretary-treasurer, who addressed our convention at that time, that the CIO would in fact recognize our unit. I'm not sure of the language, but it was generally understood that we should be able to organize craft units within the industrial segment.

INTERVIEWER II: Did any of that happen? Were you ever given that kind of support when in fact you went to a large industrial union, requesting permission to carve out a unit?

STONE: Well, when we went to the Board, to the Labor Board, we did secure recognition for our unit; and in many cases these were carve-out situations. But in fact, what the CIO officers said

and what the officers of some of the affiliates said were two different things; they really couldn't speak for their affiliates. In practice we ran into great difficulties with a carving out without going to the Labor Board for the unit, recognition of the unit.

INTERVIEWER II: What other issues do you recall having been important in the Biloxi convention other than CIO affiliation?

STONE: Well, I was talking about not the Biloxi convention but the '46 convention. That's when the charter was presented from the CIO.

Then going to Biloxi, I recall that political action for the first time, it seems to me, became a convention issue. We were now affiliated with the CIO; they had their Political Action Committee. Support of that committee became a major program at the Biloxi convention. Other than that, the Taft-Hartley Law was very much an issue at the Biloxi convention. The unions, of course, took strong positions against the Taft-Hartley Law. For the first time employers could under the law bring unfair labor practice charges against the unions. The unions were extremely concerned that the law was strictly anti-union and would hurt us. One of the provisions of that law, as I recall, was this anti-Communist affadavit thing; and we considered it an unnecessary intrusion into our freedoms. That business of signing a non-Communist affadavit became a great issue.

INTERVIEWER II: Did you have to sign as an officer? Were you an officer? The editor of the paper, was that considered. . . . ?

STONE: I was an officer of the union. I don't recall. I know that we resisted it for a long period of time, and I don't recall whether we finally capitulated or not or whether it just washed out as an issue. I tend to believe that we never signed the non-Communist affadavit. I don't believe we did. It became a matter of principle, and we refused to do it.

At that convention President Reihl stepped down. That was when Blackburn was nominated and elected. At the same time the office of vice-president, secretary-treasurer was separated. The office of secretary-treasurer was re-established, and Martin Grayson was nominated at that convention for secretary-treasurer. In that election Blackburn had oppositon. Ed Swayduck ran against him. My recollection is that Grayson had opposition as well but was elected. And that really was a new ball game for the organization. Blackburn had been opposed in that election by Swayduck from Local One, and Swayduck was in opposition to President Blackburn really, sometimes overtly and sometimes covertly, but he was always there. He pretty much called the shots on what Blackburn could do and what he couldn't do.

INTERVIEWER II: He couldn't win the election, but he could be a veto to. . . .

STONE: You bet he could; you bet he could. Every officer knew it. Every officer really across the country knew that if Swayduck took off after them one way or another, he could dictate an election. Swayduck knew it, and they knew it; and that had a profound effect.

Now, at the same time, you know, during these years, General Counsel Robinson became more a supporter of Local One than he did of the International president. That was recognition of power as well. He recognized where the power lay, and he knew that Blackburn didn't have the kind of political strength that, in fact, Swayduck and Local One had.

INTERVIEWER II: So a marriage is in a sense created out of Robinson's need to have a political base for his continued effect on the union's development of jurisdiction and craft and the kind of role he was playing. He needed to have support.

STONE: Yes, he did, and that's the way he got it. Robinson was a bright lawyer. I suspect he had a good deal of feelings for the union. Robinson had worked with Andy Kennedy back in 1939. [He was] not on the payroll, as I recall, but had worked with him in a good many of his cases before the Government and had developed great respect for him, and, as I say, had a great feeling in the early years, I am sure, perhaps in the later years as well, for the union. But it became an alliance between this major local and Robinson. . . .

(END OF TAPE III, SIDE I)

STONE: . . . . who looked to a political base during President Reihl's occupancy of the presidency. Local officers with problems made calls directly to the General Counsel's office, received their advice and counsel from General Counsel's office, and Robinson really had a stronger political base than Swayduck as president of Local One, had ever had or ever would have. And yet Swayduck, as the president of the largest local in the country, had a powerful base as well. I'm sure that President Swayduck considered himself as a kingmaker, and between the two of them they pretty much directed the activities of the International.

INTERVIEWER II: Now, Swayduck is interesting as a power figure because at no time did he ever have a majority,

even though he could get Local One to vote ninety-five percent or ninety-eight percent for a particular issue. Not that he could get that to happen, but that's what did in fact happen in terms of voting returns. Yet he was always able to find, out among smaller locals, an allegiance to Local One. Now, was that because he was a shrewd politician or because he did in fact have something to offer to Pittsburgh or another local? Where exactly did he get his power? How was he able to have such a strong influence?

STONE: Swayduck is and was an extremely dynamic individual, not terribly articulate, but a scrapper from way back. His local did in fact initiate most of the advances that were taking place in the organization, and then he moved vigorously to get support throughout the organization. He was known as a real dynamo. He did a great deal in fact for the union. He was the initiator of programs where no one else really was initiating programs. The first example, of course, is the shorter workweek, but there were many others as well.

INTERVIEWER II: Pensions. Didn't he have a pension program?

STONE: Yes. Swayduck in his local started a program, a so-called Taft-Hartley Program, because it was not joint trusteed at the time and that was because of the law. It was an employee-contributed plan of five percent, but Swayduck started it; and it spread later in the form of an Inter-Local Pension Plan that started out in the Midwest. But that program was initiated by Swayduck. He was an International Councillor and president of the New York Local. He believed in the promotion of union label and developed aggressive programs for the union label. He developed aggressive programs for organizing. At any convention, almost any convention, he was the supporter of organizing programs, an initiator of actions and jurisdiction. He did a great many things for the union. He was known as the guy who got things started and fought for them.

The union needed to develop an organizing program, particularly starting really with that 1946 convention because there hadn't been organizing. There hadn't been money to support an organizing program. Right from that first convention he started on the business of putting on more staff, more representatives. We were always, almost every convention, going in with a very small gain in the general fund or a deficit in the general fund. That meant an increase in per capita to support any new program. But programs went ahead to put on more staff, and Local One under President Swayduck always became the leader in these programs to support those per capita increases and to bring in more money in the general fund. He was without question a leader in the organization.

INTERVIEWER II: He was also a victim--maybe very incorrectly by some of his critics--of red baiting, was he not, during this period of Taft-Hartley and the consciousness about. . . .

STONE: A victim of red baiting?

INTERVIEWER II: I don't know whether that was substantial. . . .

STONE: I think he knew how to use it. That's not what you're saying. He could do a little red baiting himself. I think he used it more against others than it was used against him. That's my feeling. Swayduck was pretty invulnerable to such charges of red baiting within our organization. He had pretty much control, political control, and it should be clear that his political control came from first the major local that he was the president of and a very influential president. Within his own local he had great power which he very carefully organized and kept. Because of his contacts with the lawyer, who had a very substantial political base all by himself, there was a very strong political power there, control over elected officials.

INTERVIEWER I: Were there ever any allegations that Robinson was a red by any important source in the union or outside of it in other printing unions?

STONE: I don't really have any recollection of that sort of thing going on. Of course, you know, it was easy to do that sort of thing. They were both Jews, and they used to say that all Jews were red; but, you know, we really didn't pay much attention to that sort of thing. (Laughing) I can't think for a moment where red baiting could have been used against him in any sense. No, I don't; I don't.

Now, on the other side of that coin, there were some officers who might have been considered fairly left wing who came out of that local, and I think there was some red baiting against them. Swayduck was not averse to using that sort of thing.

INTERVIEWER II: Okay, so now Blackburn wins the office of the presidency over Swayduck and has a great deal of trouble developing a base of power that allows him to move independently of that opposition. What do you remember about Blackburn's reign? Was he an effective president, given the limitations of not having strong support? Or was he basically ineffective in spite of that?

STONE: Well, I didn't consider Blackburn a strong president. I didn't consider him strong enough.

He was in an extremely difficult political position, and you would have to be extremely competent to work your way through to a position of leadership in your own right. Blackburn didn't have it; he was basically not very well educated; he was a fairly competent speaker, but it didn't come out of any great depth of understanding or conviction. This is my assessment of Blackburn. He'd go into a local and deliver a tremendous speech, but he really had to do some homework to do it; and it didn't come out of any great conviction about the labor movement. He did not have any. He came out of a shop without a lot of. . . .well, he'd been president of the local in New York. He didn't have the ability to cope with what he had to cope with. He never became, in fact, his own man. He tried. He knew what he was up against, particularly in the later years, and knew that he wasn't calling the shots; they were being called by Local One. He had to support whatever positions they developed--they meaning Swayduck and his lawyer.

INTERVIEWER II: Was calling the shots typical of the way that the reduced working hours was effected by Local One, that they went out and negotiated something and then went to the International and demanded to get support for that. Is that what was the pattern?

STONE: Very much so. But I mentioned the other day when I was talking earlier that this business of purchasing a headquarters. . .there was discussion in the International. I believe it began as early as 1947 convention; there was discussion of moving the office from New York. Or there was discussion in any case, whether we moved from New York or not, there was discussion of moving the office within New York and, you know, buying a building and so on. And I said then that I spent a great many hours with Blackburn, investigating buildings in suburban areas, and Blackburn had sketches made of a building to be built and presented proposals to the Council. I thought then that I understood that this could never happen, that Blackburn wasn't about to be given permission to move the office, in spite of the discussion that was going around. Blackburn was never going to be permitted by that International Council to build such a building; it just wasn't in the cards. That's what I mean by being his own man; he was unable to really initiate. He was not a great initiator of programs in the first place, and he simply couldn't initiate anything. The initiation of programs came out of Local One.

INTERVIEWER I: I think it might be worthwhile to pursue this a little bit, Don, because, as you yourself have alluded to the fact, this whole business of moving the headquarters was perhaps the symbol

of larger issues. Now, would it be fair to say that the people who wanted to move the headquarters out of New York City wanted to in effect move the control of the International away from Local One?

STONE: I think that was true. It certainly became true later when George Canary was the president. After 1955, even before that, the pressure to move the office to Chicago, for example, was very definitely an effort to get it out from under the control, at least partly, the control of Local One.

INTERVIEWER I: What about the motivation for moving it within the city of New York?

STONE: Well, the facilities were simply not adequate. We had to move. After Grayson became the secretary-treasurer, we did. I think we moved in 1951 finally into space up on 51st Street, but before that even took place there was substantial discussion about building a building and having our own building.

INTERVIEWER I: Why didn't Swayduck want that to happen? Why did he oppose it?

STONE: My belief is that he didn't want Blackburn, as the president, to have that kind of a . . .

INTERVIEWER I: Feather in his cap?

STONE: Yes, a monument. Didn't want him to have it.

INTERVIEWER II: I guess in some ways that takes care of the 1947 convention. Unless you can think of something additional, maybe we should look at the 1949 convention in Twin Cities.

STONE: In 1947, following the convention, Martin Grayson was appointed as a representative. Martin Grayson was active in Local One. He was appointed as a representative and then was a candidate for the office of secretary-treasurer and won that office. Martin Grayson was an extremely competent man. He, as was characteristic of some other officers, quickly got himself into trouble with his own local. They began to criticize his activities, and he got into a dispute over the shorter hours thing. I can't recall, but I do know that he wrote an article in the magazine which became an issue, which later became part of the reason why he moved out of the secretary-treasurer's job in 1953 into vice-president in the Mountain Region.

INTERVIEWER I: Yeah, as I recall, he wrote something in which he used figures from three different cities; and

INTERVIEWER I: Swayduck countered with figures from three other cities to use as a base.

STONE: I really can't reconstruct now what the issue was. I do know it became a major issue.

Now, my point is the fact that Grayson was appointed as a representative because from that convention in '47, a referendum was developed to re-establish the office of secretary-treasurer. Now, Grayson was appointed as a representative in '47 to give him a leg up on the election, I suppose, a practice that is a fairly common one. It happened in 1953 when the office of secretary-treasurer was open, when Grayson moved to the Mountain Region, resigned from the secretary-treasurer's job. That job was open, and a representative was appointed to the job. My impression was that that was to give him an advantage in the election, but I opposed him and won. It didn't make me too popular in some circles.

INTERVIEWER I: So that Grayson was Blackburn's man; Blackburn wanted to see him in that position. Is (that) what you're saying?

STONE: I don't know that he was Blackburn's man. I don't think he was. He was Swayduck's man.

INTERVIEWER I: Right.

STONE: He was the man out of Local One appointed to move into that job and did an extremely competent job at it. Now, he was a man with a good deal more on the ball, in my opinion, than Blackburn, more aggression, more guts, and more initiative in terms of developing programs than Blackburn ever had.

The Convention was in St. Paul. At that point, of course, Blackburn was the president, and Grayson was the secretary-treasurer. There were a number of representatives named, which indicates there was great concern for organizing and building the union. One of the issues again was this moving of the office. I have a note (that) this was the year of the strike in Canada where the International spent some million dollars, and my recollection is that some of the representatives--I don't know about some of the officers--a number of them left the convention and went to Canada to get involved in that situation there because the whole of Eastern Canada was struck, an extremely difficult strike. I don't have any great recollection of the issues in St. Paul other than that.

INTERVIEWER II: This should have been the time that the CIO internationals were expelled by the CIO and Phil Murray. You mentioned previously that the ALA didn't take a position on that and

didn't sign affadavits to your recollection. Do you remember anything at this convention surfacing that would perhaps give us some more clarity?

STONE: No, I don't; I don't. It doesn't mean it didn't happen.

INTERVIEWER I: What was your reaction to the expulsion of the so-called communist-dominated unions. If you can recall your reaction at the time.

STONE: Well, I think it was one of great confusion, as I recall. I had had some experience in New York with unions that were considered communist dominated.

INTERVIEWER I: Like Mike Quill?

STONE: Not particularly with Mike Quill but the Newspaper Guild, the Leather Workers, and so on. I was convinced that the Newspaper Guild was communist dominated; I didn't think there was much question about that. I didn't have, you know, a lot of knowledge about some of the others; I didn't know. And I suspect that. . .I think we had to say that the CIO didn't move very quickly against such things. They probably moved with great reluctance in any case, and I suspect they knew what they were doing when they finally did.

INTERVIEWER I: So it would be fair to say that you were willing to follow Phil Murray's leadership on this?

STONE: Yes. I don't think there's any question about it. We all did that.

INTERVIEWER I: I gather you've already discussed the whole question of compliance with the Taft-Hartley affadavit.

(END OF TAPE III, SIDE II)

STONE: The 1951 convention was in Dallas. I was not there; I had to go home because of illness in the family. Again I have little recollection of the issues before the convention.

INTERVIEWER I: One of the issues apparently was the pension plan.

STONE: The one in Local One or. . . . ?

INTERVIEWER I: Well, my notes say that Harry Spohnholtz launched into a considerable discussion of the pension fund in various locals, the status of the pension funds in various locals.

STONE: What are we talking about? 1951.

INTERVIEWER I: Yes.

STONE: The Inter Local Pension Fund was established in what year? It was considerably later than that, as I recall.

INTERVIEWER I: I think so.

STONE: 1956.

INTERVIEWER I: Yeah.

STONE: But I think that, you know, they might very well have been. . .there might have been a good bit of discussion of the pension programs. There's nothing in the propositions that went to the members after that convention that indicates discussion of pension; but if it was only exploratory, there would not have been. There was a move to establish an office of international vice-president for the Atlantic Region. I should say that during all of these years there were moves to develop the International, develop the influence of the International, in negotiations, in coordination of negotiations, to give the International some strength. Those discussions went on really through all of these conventions. Finally culminated. . . . at that time in 1951 we had regional vice-presidents, and those regional vice-presidents were finally eliminated. That was relatively recent, however.

INTERVIEWER II: Was the selection of regional vice-presidents simply to try to draw attention to regional differences that existed? Regional vice-presidents were elected nationally, is that correct?

STONE: Regional vice-presidents were elected nationally. There were often moves at the conventions to get them elected regionally, but that never really went anywhere. They were considered vice-presidents of the International and therefore elected nationally, but in practice there was among. . . . Well, among the vice-presidents I'm not sure they weren't happy with that arrangement. But in the International office, where the president and the secretary-treasurer had to deal with national issues and disseminate information nationally and so on, the policy developed by the International Council, we just found that what happened in the regions depended on the vice-president. You know, you could

disseminate your information to the vice-presidents, but what they did with it depended on how they felt about it. Really, it became more and more clear, I think, that the vice-presidents ought to be international officers of the organization, not regional officers of the organization, and finally that change was made.

This move went on all the time. For example, there were regional conferences, and again the international officers, the president and the secretary-treasurer, who were really the only ones that were administering the organization, literally the only ones who were administering the organization, found they were more and more cut off from locals because their contracts were through the international vice-presidents. The representatives who were appointed were named by the vice-presidents and had their loyalties to the vice-president and not necessarily to the international organization as we conceived the international organization. It was difficult to develop any kind of international control of negotiations with this kind of a regional setup. There were moves away from it. There were moves away from the regional conferences. Canary was elected in. . . . I guess he took office in '56; and he was at the conference in Cleveland, which was a national conference, not a regional conference. They had moved by that time, before that time, to national policy conferences, I guess they called them, and away from the regional.

INTERVIEWER II: Well, was the growth of the regional concept a move away from the centralization of power that could be dominated by the New York Local? Was this a factor in the move towards regionalization?

STONE: I don't know. It was a move away from the crafts because the International Council initially was composed of, you know, craft representation. Then it became regional representation. But those regions have existed for, well, I think almost from the beginning of the organization. You can go way back in the constitutions of the Amalgamated and find the regional setup. I don't know exactly when it did start.

INTERVIEWER I: I notice that there was a resolution at the '51 convention to strive for national contracts--it sounds rather modern actually--with all lithographic companies that operate on a chain basis. I don't know what they meant by a chain basis.

STONE: Well, owned by the same company. That really isn't too radical.

INTERVIEWER I: No, if that's what they mean, it's a little bit behind the times.

STONE: That's what they call a chain shop. It's what they're talking about--companies that are owned by the same management. We still don't have any such contracts except the one with Printing Developments, Incorporated. It's the only national contract we have.

INTERVIEWER I: So in other words, what you're saying is that there really is no such thing as national bargaining.

STONE: Not in this union.

INTERVIEWER I: No. There's nothing in. . . .

STONE: In Canada there's something that approaches it. The six eastern Canadian locals coordinate, negotiate, bargain as a group and vote as a group.

INTERVIEWER I: But it's really very far removed from the kind of thing that you have in the steel industry, for example, where the wage policy is set and negotiations are undertaken with a group of people representing really the entire steel industry, with the exception of a few "me too" companies who come along later.

STONE: Yeah, very far removed.

INTERVIEWER I: Very far removed from that.

STONE: And although this kind of thing has been discussed many times, what usually comes out of it is there is no employers' organization that can speak for any substantial segment of the country.

INTERVIEWER I: So you're in a very different pattern than lots of other industries because you really are not talking about national coordinated bargaining.

STONE: In many of the cities, we're not even talking about city-wide bargaining, as I'm sure you know. In some cities there's an employers' organization, and some of the employers belong, and you can negotiate with them as a group; but in some cities, say like Baltimore, my understanding is there is no employers' group, and they're always bargaining with some shop.

INTERVIEWER I: What would you say is the effect on patterns of collective bargaining of that pretty major difference between yourselves and other industrial unions?

STONE: Well, of course, this union has moved to greater and greater coordination of negotiations. In this last round of negotiations in the major cities, five or six of them, the Lithographers met and coordinated and established a goal, but they all had cost-of-living plans already, for example, they'd all picked up fairly substantial increases from their cost-of-living plans; they had substantially the same language and conditions and so on. So among them they agreed on a package and agreed who would be the first to negotiate. Then it spread; it spread pretty much in those cities, the same pattern. Now, that's not in practice too far from an industry bargaining.

INTERVIEWER I: No, but one of the effects that I would guess, as an outsider, is that you have a situation where it's still very possible for industry to flee from one community to another. For example, Milt Williams talked about the loss of new printing enterprises in the city of Philadelphia, a city that was at one time a considerable center for printing, and how he feels that this has gone to Chicago or to St. Louis and moved to other places. So that kind of flight from one place to another is still possible, and some of the reasons for it might be lower wage rates in one place as opposed to another.

STONE: Well, your choice of cities wasn't great, though. You don't move to Chicago to get lower wage rates. You do move to "Sore Knee, Idaho," which is Ken's favorite phrase. I mean, you move out of the major cities and into nonunion areas basically; that certainly can be done.

INTERVIEWER I: But you don't think there's been a pattern of moving from one union city to another union city?

STONE: No.

INTERVIEWER I: No.

INTERVIEWER II: Well, there has been a movement away from New York.

STONE: But not necessarily into another union city because they have lower rates. The pattern generally is to go out into . . . . there's certainly been a pattern of moving away from New York, but

often into the New York suburbs, where New York Local One still has jurisdiction. They aren't necessarily able to follow the contract to that shop, but, you know, there's been a general move away from the problems that New York offered, to suburban areas.

INTERVIEWER I: You know, Don, this is a pretty important thing to establish and to get into the record because there's a great deal of discussion in the city of Philadelphia right now, for example, about the fact that unions ought to be "cooperative" because, if they insist upon maintaining high wage levels, industry will flee. And there's been a good bit of discussion, you know, as to whether that's why industry really flees, and some of the various community groups have said industry flees to places where there are better schools, for example, where the terrible problems of urban blight are not so severe. In other words, various liberal groups in the city are trying to say there are other reasons why industry might flee a city like Philadelphia or like New York. You know, it's not a one-to-one ratio between the wage rates in those cities and the patterns of industrial enterprise in those cities. So that, if what you're saying is true--and I'm convinced that it probably is--then it's probably pretty important to document it for the record that your experience is that industry is not fleeing New York to go to St. Louis because of the wage factor, whereas you point out, industry did flee to a certain extent from New York to Chicago; but there was no wage differential there that would explain that flight.

STONE: No, but there's a central distribution argument. You can see it. Just look at the map.

INTERVIEWER I: Right.

STONE: There's a space argument. New York has become extremely difficult to operate in. How the hell do you move a six-color press into some of those areas, and the answer is you just can't.

INTERVIEWER I: It's simpler to build a building around it on Long Island.

STONE: Yeah.

INTERVIEWER II: Yeah.

STONE: No question about that. I would think that any argument that industry moves because there are better schools is whistling "Dixie." (Laughter) I don't think really that happens. I believe it's economic. I think we ought to be careful to establish that economics is not necessarily just wages or, you know, conditions.

It has a heck of a lot to do with that. And that means things like, you know, manning of a press; it means. . . . Greg and I were talking at lunch about some of these shops where the union members have become pretty militant and pretty aggressive and think they own the shop; they make it extremely difficult for it to operate and certainly to operate competitively. Under those circumstances companies move, and they don't necessarily move into nonunion areas. There are other places to go as well. But there are a lot of things that lead to a company moving, and I would think that the ability to operate. . . . and I'm not necessarily talking about the employees at the moment but just the business that we were talking about--the space and trackage and distribution--have a good deal (to do with) where they're going to. . . .

INTERVIEWER I: Transportation facilities and so forth.

STONE: Transportation, absolutely. It makes a lot of difference. Getting trucks in and out of New York is extremely difficult, and that's true really with any major city. Printing--I suspect a great deal of it is sent by trucks these days--has to look to the business of how easy it is to get things delivered both ways, in and out.

INTERVIEWER I: Right. New Yorkers pushing those little hand carts around is not very impressive!

DON STONE #I

Index

SECOND Oral History Interview

with

DON STONE

October 3, 1974
Washington, D.C.

Interviewer: Alice M. Hoffman

INTRODUCTION

Don Stone begins Interview II by tracing the background of the issue of the union label and jurisdiction which led to the withdrawal of the Amalgamated Lithographers of America from the AFL-CIO in 1958. He reviews the move to get away from gegional conferences and regionally-elected vice-presidents in order to create more central control in the union. He discusses internal union politics during the fifties and analyses his own relationship to them. He recalls especially the Poughkeepsie strike in 1954 and the effects it had on union leadership. He describes how the administration of the International office fell completely into his hands in New York City in 1955 when President George Canary refused to move from Chicago and how he (Stone) chose to play a conciliatory role when Canary resigned in 1958.

Stone then begins to trace the move toward graphic arts unity, and he gives his opinion on President Ken Brown's decision to reaffiliate with the AFL-CIO.

Second Oral History Interview

with

DON STONE

October 3, 1974
Washington, D. C.

Interviewer: Alice M. Hoffman

INTERVIEWER: October 3, 1974. Don, you were saying that you did not attend the 1951 convention in Dallas, Texas. I think your wife was ill at that time?

STONE: Yeah, when I was called back.

INTERVIEWER: . . . . seems to cut across a number of these convention proceedings at this particular time up to 1958 when you withdrew from the AFL-CIO on the business of the label. I wonder if you would want to discuss some of the background of that, leading up to the withdrawal. There seems to have been, in 1951, '52, '53, '55 various discussions about the trouble that you were having with the label, well, really from 1946 on, after you affiliated with the CIO, more or less continuously. I'm wondering if you want to kind of trace that through. I know you had some meetings with Phil Murray about it; Marty Grayson, and I think you, were involved. In a way--and we've talked about this before--it was somewhat of an anomaly for your union to be in the CIO which purported to be an organization with industrial unions, and you were certainly a highly craft-oriented union in the first place. But from the very beginning, as we talked about before, when Jim Carey came to address the convention at the time of affiliation, he made certain promises with respect to being able to carve out a lithographic jurisdiction; and those promises, I gather, were really not realized. Or were they realized in some places with some unions?

STONE: Well, yeah, I think they were realized in some cases. We carved units out of the Steelworkers. I think in most cases the CIO really couldn't deliver, you know. They can agree we can carve out a unit, but you either have to get the approval of the union itself. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Now, your concern with the Steelworkers was primarily in the can industry.

STONE: Yes.

INTERVIEWER: And where were you successful?

STONE: Oh, I'm not sure that I can. . . . We have American Can, and we have Continental Can that we have units in. And nationally those are the big can companies. Basically we have those plants; there are some of the plants that we're not in; but we have most of the can plants.

INTERVIEWER: Then it's patchwork. There are places where you don't have them and other places where you do.

STONE: Yeah. But we negotiated, "we" meaning Ed Donahue, who is our officer right now who deals with the can plants, meaning that hopefully he has a relationship with officers on the national level; and when we have a problem in any of the areas, he is involved in a settlement.

INTERVIEWER: Certainly it would appear to be that it would be to the benefit of the individual guy working in a can plant to be represented by your organization because I would guess that the rates must be much higher.

STONE: Higher rates. That's right.

INTERVIEWER: Hm-hm.

STONE: And we did a lot, carving out units at that time. That really became Robinson's, you know, wedge. Jurisdiction became Robinson's baby; the pure unit and the preservation of a pure lithographic unit really became his baby, which he guarded pretty jealously. Nobody else knew anything about it; I mean, none of the officers really knew anything about it. If any of them tried to learn anything about it, he tried to divert them from such activity. You know, Jack Wallace was always a fairly bright guy, and it was the technique of the lawyer to make sure that bright guys didn't get involved in such things.

INTERVIEWER: So you're saying he deliberately tried to shut Jack Wallace out. . . .

STONE: That was always my impression, yes, always my impression, that he kept anybody in the union from having any great familiarity with the jurisdictional problem, the lithographic unit problem. That was always his baby.

INTERVIEWER: I notice that in 1958 one of the issues that you became involved with apparently was a resolution of the International Council to hold a national policy conference, in place of the regional conference. There's some issue there that's not clear to me! It looks a little bit as though this was designed to maintain the leadership of the national organization rather than an adherence to various kinds of regional subdivisions, and it looks a little bit to me, as an outsider, as if it's the same kind of issue as national voting for regional councillors rather than regional voting for regional councillors. Now, is that a misreading of what was going on in that discussion?

STONE: No, there were constant efforts to give the national union some power, because the International officers really didn't have it. It was Blackburn and myself for those few years in the International office, and we were really administrators of that kind of thing. The Council set the policy, and the vice-presidents in their regions implemented that policy as they saw fit. There was no central control at all.

When the Council met and made some determination of policy, we really had no idea what the locals understood about that policy. It depended on what the vice-president of the region wanted to say about it. The International officers, the International organization presumably had a staff; in fact, they were staff people who were working for vice-presidents. They were appointed by the vice-presidents; their loyalty was to the vice-presidents; their assignments were taken from the regional vice-presidents; there was precious little direction from the International office as such. So this had been going on really for a long time, and it was supported by local people to the extent that they were organized. They knew really that that's the direction we ought to be going in. Finally this organization has become a highly centralized union, probably more than. . . . I think you'd be hard put to name one that has the same kind of really International control. The business of getting contracts in here before they're negotiated and analysing them and sending them back with recommendations for their improvement before they go to the employers and then to have International approval of the final contract and International men in on every strike situation, theoretically in on every contract, is, I think, pretty unusual. I don't think you find that kind of thing.

So you know, that whole move was first to get away from the regional conferences, (which were in themselves somewhat divisive, became political arenas) to a national conference and get away from vice-presidents elected by region. You know, this move was going on all of the time. I'm not sure of the dates or when finally the vice-presidents became national vice-presidents without a region. They became first, second, third, and fourth,

and so on. I don't remember what the date was, but it was there in the early fifties, I think, that that was finally done.

Now, you can talk about the resolution in 1951. There was no vice-president in the Atlantic Region. That move had been made a few times and didn't pass to have a vice-president named. The first vice-president in the region was Eddie Stone, I guess.

INTERVIEWER: From Local One.

STONE: Yeah. First vice-president in the region.

INTERVIEWER: Okay, well, now, we move up to 1953, the Twelfth convention in Toronto, Canada. As you have pointed out, kind of as a background for this were various sniping attacks on Blackburn throughout this period. I wonder if you can remember in what ways that might have manifested itself at that time. For example, one of the issues about which there was considerable discussion was the appointment of an educational director, as to whether such a person should come from the ranks or be hired as a staff person.

STONE: The '53 convention. Do you have a list of the. . . well, I think the appointment of anybody tends to be political in a political organization. The argument of whether he should come from the ranks or be a staff person. . . . (Interruption and pause: must be reading the notes). . . .

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, that was one big discussion. "Martin Grayson explained the Council's thinking in submitting this resolution. A motion was made and carried to send it back to the resolution committee, so no action was taken. . . ." (reading from the proceedings)

STONE: What was the position of the Council?

INTERVIEWER: "The position of the Council was that they should be able to appoint anybody. The main issue seemed to be appointing a union member exclusively rather than getting the best man for the job, regardless of membership in the union. And there was some heated discussion on this between Stone, Blackburn, and Swayduck. The motion finally carried to give the president and Council authority to appoint someone in or out of the union." I guess Swayduck must have been arguing that they should appoint somebody from the ranks.

STONE: I don't remember, and I can't figure out why that should have been such an important thing. I assume

the reason it became an important issue was that everybody had somebody in mind! (Laughter)

INTERVIEWER: Well, let me put it this way: Was an educational director appointed?

STONE: Well, yeah, but I don't remember when. Our first educational director was Bill Schroeder. I don't remember. I assume that must have been done. . . . he was out of Chicago. . . .

INTERVIEWER: And of course he was really appointed from the ranks.

STONE: Yeah. I don't.. . . .

INTERVIEWER: You've never had an educational director who was a so-called "pork chopper."

STONE: No, we never did. There was no educational director during Canary's time. Bill Schroeder was named by Brown, which meant it must have taken into. . .what would you say. . . .1958, did he become president? '58 or '59?

INTERVIEWER: Yes, well, the time he was acting president, '58 or '59.

Well, the other thing about this convention of 1953, of course, that there's got to be a certain amount of maneuvering because by the next convention you find that George Canary appears as the president of the organization. So, while it's not directly reflected in the convention proceedings, of course. . . .

STONE: In '55 he was nominated, Canary was nominated.

INTERVIEWER: Right, and I'm just wondering if in '53 there was a certain amount of maneuvering with respect to replacing Blackburn. I mean, it's not reflected in the proceedings, but then one wouldn't expect that it would be.

STONE: I would guess that the reason for the debate was that there were some very strong suspicions that those who wanted to appoint a man from the ranks particularly were trying to put somebody in position, in position to cut Blackburn's throat. That's about the size of it.

INTERVIEWER: Right, so that this is really the same issue; this is the struggle. . .

STONE: One of Swayduck's ploys.

INTERVIEWER: . . .to kind of retain power in the largest local of the organization.

STONE: Yeah, it's all part of that battle which went on all of the time, went on all of the time.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, essentially, right. It's really amazing when you stop to see all of the good work and progress that was being made in these years kind of in spite of it. That is, your financial reports indicate each year that the union is in better financial condition, that more members are being organized, etcetera.

STONE: That's right. And there were staff people going on all of the time. There was a tremendous organizing drive going on; no question about that. From that point of view, Swayduck and Local One did a great job for the organization. Of course, their argument was that they were always in the lead on economic conditions and that the only way they could maintain that lead was to have organizing go on and negotiating go on. In other words, develop around them support for their position around the country; it was sound, no question about that, and one that they had to support. If they were going to take the strong position that they were in the lead, then they had to also take a strong position that we needed to organize constantly. And staff people were going on. I'm sure you've followed that history. Frequently Council voted to put on representatives, additional representatives, even when the budget just didn't support it. They were, you know, going out on a limb a good many times, no question about that, and Local One took great leadership in doing that. They pushed hard and delivered themselves a tremendous vote but also helped drum up a vote around the country.

INTERVIEWER: Well, now, another thing which is perhaps reflective of the same kind of pulling and hauling was this resolution that in any region entitled to more than one councillor, no more than two shall come from any one local. Now, Swayduck obviously spoke vehemently against that!

STONE: Yeah.

INTERVIEWER: However, somebody in the debate pointed out that at the Colorado convention of 1946 he had spoken vehemently in favor of it! Consistency was perhaps not one of his strong points.

STONE: No, never. He had a very flexible mind! (Laughter) It depended on what he wanted to accomplish.

INTERVIEWER: At that time were there, in fact, more than one representative from Local One? In other words, were you in fact talking about disenfranchising one of his people. Not disenfranchising exactly, but. . . .

STONE: Well, but you're saying that two. . .or one?

INTERVIEWER: No more than two shall come from any one local.

STONE: Well, during this period Swayduck and Hansen were on the Council.

INTERVIEWER: That's Ed Hansen?

STONE: Ed Hansen.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah.

STONE: I don't remember there being more than two although there might have been. Allen Olmstead was on the Council and others. Whether there were three from New York. . .evidently there must have been. There must have been more than two; otherwise it wouldn't have been an issue.

INTERVIEWER: Well, unless it was kind of a theoretical issue to try to prevent his accretion of power. That would be interesting to look up, to see whether there were more than two at the time.

STONE: Yeah. Council minutes. . .and what year would we be talking about?

INTERVIEWER: 1953.

STONE: (Long pause, probably checking records)

Sandy (calling to secretary), the Council minutes--you'll find them in Brown's office. Would you take a quick look. What we want to know is how many councillors were from New York for the old ALA. Yeah, something just occurred to me. Let's see if I can find a list of the councillors in the minutes of the convention. Yeah! Take a look at those, will you? I couldn't seem to get a hold of Edith (must be another secretary). I don't know if she's not there or what. Okay, thank you.

Now, there ought to be a listing of councillors in this record somewhere (going through records). I'm afraid I was secretary-treasurer at this time, too.

INTERVIEWER: Pardon me?

STONE: I'm afraid I was secretary-treasurer at this time.

INTERVIEWER: Yes, you were. Because Marty Grayson was vice-president, regional vice-president.

STONE: Well, I only became (secretary-treasurer) in '53, and these minutes are '51; so these are not my minutes. (Laughter) Oh, how hard we labor to justify the fact that we didn't do something. If we worked half as hard to be positive. There doesn't appear to be a listing.

INTERVIEWER: Well, in any case that resolution was defeated in that year.

STONE: It was defeated in that year. There was no limitation on the number of. . . .

INTERVIEWER: That's right, that's right. It was defeated in that year. Did it come up again, is what I'm wondering?

STONE: Well, the answer's yes because presently we have such a limitation.

INTERVIEWER: Hm-hm. Another issue that was up in that one which maybe appeals to me or catches my attention more because I've been involved with Steelworkers' history, I don't know. This is one of the questions I'm asking you. But that is the issue about the roll-call vote and what is required to get a roll-call vote. This, as you may or may not know, is a continually terrible issue in the Steelworkers' conventions. My attention is therefore directed to it when I see it coming up in a much smaller union where, after all, a roll-call vote is not really quite as much of a harrassment as it is in Steelworkers' conventions.

STONE: You mean it doesn't take as long?

INTERVIEWER: Right! (Laughing)

STONE: That's probably true.

INTERVIEWER: It's possible to have a roll-call vote in the old Amalgamated whereas it's almost impossible in the Steelworkers, but there was a move to liberalize the provision that one representative from each local demanding a roll-call. . . . Let me back up a bit. "A roll-call may be demanded by five or more representatives, but

not more than one representative from each local demanding a roll call, who shall be so recorded upon the minutes of the convention; and the convention voted to reject the resolution." Then there was further discussion, and Swayduck made a motion to the effect that the International should come back with a belated resolution. And a lot of people got up and screamed about how come we're always tabling things! (Laughing) I'm just wondering why was it such an issue? Is it the same kind of thing again? In other words, ...

STONE: You know, that sort of thing is too easy. The roll-call votes, you know, even in a small union, are time consuming, no question about that; they're a pesky nuisance. And to have them approved by five delegates, that's too easy, in my opinion. I don't even know, you know, what the requirement is at the moment--do you?--in our constitution for a roll-call vote. It's got to be more difficult than that, and I'm sure that that was the reason for the objection. The general feeling was that Swayduck liked to have people on the record, especially if he was supporting the issue; then he liked to have people on the record.

INTERVIEWER: So he'd know how to prepare his_____better.

STONE: Since he was reasonably sure that nothing was going to get to a roll-call vote unless he supported it, then he was willing to go along with that kind of. . . .let's see if we can figure out what. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Right, but the convention rejected this resolution. But it sounds as if there again the convention, Blackburn or somebody in the convention, is trying to prevent one local from being able to demand a roll-call vote because the issue here was that no more than one representative from each local demanded a roll call. So in other words, what the officers were apparently trying to do was to prevent Swayduck or anybody from any big local from being able singlehandedly to demand a roll-call vote.

STONE: I guess it was on a percentage basis of membership and previously, you know, people representing a proportion of the members; and perhaps that was the thrust--to get more locals at least involved. You know, it's pretty hard to organize on the floor. (Reading from the proceedings) "Convention shall be in executive session. . . request of twenty percent of the members. . . . A roll-call vote shall be had upon request of any twenty delegates." Now, that generally has got to spread it somewhat although. . . .

(END OF TAPE IV)

INTERVIEWER: From any one local at this present time. So that as a maximum you would have to have that demand from two locals.

STONE: Right. As a minimum.

INTERVIEWER: Right. All right. Well, one of the other issues that we've talked about a little bit--I don't know whether you were privy to this meeting; I'm very much interested in it--and that was this agreement that we referred to before with the CIO. Apparently some of the CIO literature did not carry the ALA union label. They used--I don't know--the ITU label or Allied Printing Trades label?

STONE: Allied.

INTERVIEWER: It was Allied. And so there was considerable discussion at the convention about a resolution to demand that all CIO literature must carry the ALA union label. The officers considered that too strong. Apparently in the face of this agreement that had been made with the CIO and the AFL to stop raiding the members of each other's union, I'm just wondering if you would talk a little bit about this agreement and why it was apparently coming apart at the seams somewhat, the agreement, that is.

STONE: The agreement with the CIO?

INTERVIEWER: Yes.

STONE: In the first place, you know that the issue of union label is always a highly emotional issue. If you want to get delegates all whipped up, you can do it easily on the business of the label. I would guess. . . . I don't really know what the agreement was with the CIO on the label, but there were other CIO affiliates who were in the printing business; and I think the CIO was reluctant, as the AFL-CIO is now, to tell one affiliate which is in the printing business that their label can't be used on the stuff they do, regardless of what they might have agreed to do about the use of our label. Again, you know, it's what you say, and implementing that kind of rule is not so easy. Affiliates, I'm sure, for example, the Rubber Workers, have shops organized. I don't know about the Steelworkers, but the. . . . .

INTERVIEWER: Paper Makers? Were they involved at that point?

STONE: Yeah, the Paper Makers. . . .the one I'm thinking of is Retail Wholesale had shops and still have shops that are printing shops, and they use their label now. I think that probably was the issue:

The CIO simply couldn't deliver what they might have said they would demand of their affiliates. If they ever said that they would require or, you know, insist on the use of the Lithographers' label, I doubt very much if they could deliver on that with some of their affiliates.

INTERVIEWER: So in other words, what we're seeing here is that the Council and the officers are taking a somewhat more realistic approach on this, and somebody from the rank and file is sort of whipping up the troops.

STONE: It's a highly emotional issue, and it's a great issue to get on if you want to whip up the troops; and that's what was happening.

INTERVIEWER: Right.

STONE: It still is, by the way, you know, the business of the label, the business of the GAIU label versus the Allied Printing Trades label. A highly emotional issue. The GAIU, and before it the LPIU, and before it the ALA, were. . .or the LPIU was active in promoting its own label. The ALA spent a lot of money, and it was one of Swayduck's big issues, on promotion of that label. Now, when we merged with the Bookbinders, the Bookbinders have been very strong supporters of the Allied Printing Trades label; and Executive Vice-President Connolly is chairman of the Board of Governors of the Allied Printing Trades. They can get very upset when work turns out with the GAIU label on it as opposed to the Allied Printing Trades Council. Yet, you know, our tradition was to promote our own label; our tradition, meaning the LPIU tradition or the Amalgamated, was to promote our own label. The Photoengravers used their own label a great deal.

INTERVIEWER: Right. All right, well, now, going into 1955, this was the convention at which George Canary was nominated for president. Right?

STONE: Yeah.

INTERVIEWER: I wonder, what the position of someone like yourself was in the International office. Did that mean that you were kind of removed from this backstairs maneuvering that was going on? Or were you very much aware of. . . . ?

STONE: No, I never was. . . .you know, I survived a few presidents, which really meant that I was not involved in what was going on. I was not consulted. I had a fair idea. . .this business of

what happened to Blackburn. We mentioned earlier that there'd been sniping at him on a lot of things--meeting with the employers--but one of the basic issues finally used against him was the Poughkeepsie strike. The Poughkeepsie strike was responsible for the demise of a few people in the union. It was a terrible experience for the union. Blackburn was very much involved. When the strike was finally lost. . .although, you know, the whole history of it was a sad, sad experience for the whole union. Don Robbins, who was a representative, lost his job as a result of that strike; Ray Dunn who was a representative almost lost his; Eddie Stone was a vice-president and had a heart attack during that strike; Ollie Mertz as a vice-president had a stroke during that strike and, you know, not unconnected with it, because the Council was trying to find somebody to. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Blame it on.

STONE: Well, but to handle it, you know. Maybe to blame it on, but to handle it. Eddie Stone was involved initially; he called that strike as a vice-president of the Atlantic Region. He was removed from it. Well, as I say, he had a heart attack; but before he had the heart attack, he had been roundly abused by the Council for his handling of it. Oliver Mertz was brought in as the Central Region vice-president. They had the big shop in Racine, Western plant. He was brought in, and he was supposed to negotiate a contract. Then he had a stroke, and two of his representatives, Rudy Harper, I think, and Gus Petrakis, were left to work out that thing in Poughkeepsie. It became a struggle between the skilled and the unskilled. The Council finally directed the officers to negotiate a contract with the skilled for the skilled people and in effect abandon the unskilled. And that's where Robbins and Dunn got involved because they refused to go along with that.

INTERVIEWER: It was really an ideological dispute.

STONE: Yeah, right. It became ideological, and everybody was caught up in it. I think, as a matter of fact, you asked me last time how I felt about that. In any case, at one point I remember soliciting councillors to call a Council meeting because the strike was going absolutely nowhere. Blackburn was involved in the ideological aspect of that thing as well. Blackburn came from a relatively--well, he was a feeder--came from an unskilled branch; his sympathies lay there. The representatives that were involved were Blackburn's supporters, and ideologically he supported the position that we should negotiate for everybody or get a contract that covered everybody. Finally Blackburn himself was one of the victims of that thing at that convention. It was only one of the issues. There were a lot of them, but that was one of them.

INTERVIEWER: Well, Munson has characterized this Poughkeepsie strike as. . . . His heading in his book, I believe, is "How Not to Run a Strike."[1] And what I'm not sure about, after talking with Gus Petrakis about this this summer and so forth, is whether there were forces there that were. . . . You know, in other words, what I'm asking is do you think that someone who had exercised more wisdom and worked harder at it would have been able to conclude the Poughkeepsie strike successfully? In other words, do you agree with Munson that it was badly managed and badly handled and that that was the cause of the disaster? Or do you see some other contributing factor?

STONE: Well, good question, but we're still dealing with Western, the same company, and we're not having any better luck now than we had then.

INTERVIEWER: Right. In other words, you think that the employer intransigence and opposition was just overwhelming?

STONE: I think that the strike could have been settled if there had been strong leadership. I unquestionably blame Blackburn for that; I blame him for it. Blackburn was never really the kind of a leader that could take on and manage the problems he had, including the political problems. He just wasn't that sharp. And he got caught up in some crosscurrents that he just simply was unable to handle, and then he got turned off so that he was not about to follow through. He figured he couldn't win in any case, I guess, and he let various people come in when he never should have. Various people came in to handle that strike when they never should have. The buck really did stop with him, but he didn't take, in my opinion, the responsibility.

INTERVIEWER: So he wasn't giving any strong direction.

STONE: That's right. Now, the strike could have been settled on what basis? Well, strikes are always settled. Strikes are usually settled is, I guess, what I should say. They're usually settled with an agreement. It's not necessarily the kind of agreement that we might want, but I think it was badly handled; I do indeed. It was a strike called by a vice-president who was being kind, was inexperienced; and I know a lot of people in the organization that characterize him somewhat more strongly than that! (Laughter)

INTERVIEWER: All right. Well. . . .

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[1]Fred C. Munson, History of the Lithographers Union, p. 279.

STONE: Which is by way of saying [that] right there Blackburn should have been in on it. You know, the strike shouldn't have been called by any vice-president with the International president being sort of outside of the move. There was too much willingness on the part of some people to let some people swing slowly in the wind, as that expression goes, meaning basically Eddie Stone. There was nobody. . . .you know, his local wasn't in support of him, and by that time he was going up and down the East Coast. His objective was great, and that was to get contracts that were as good as New York's all up and down the East Coast in places that simply weren't going to pay the kind of wages and have the same kind of conditions as New York in any case. The competition was completely different and so on. Nobody was at that point very willing to help Eddie Stone out. This is kind of a Monday morning quarterbacking thing, but I think they weren't very sympathetic with Eddie Stone and were willing to let him get crossed up, and it got out of hand.

INTERVIEWER: Well, now, out of this, I gather, comes this resolution regarding recall of International officers. Interestingly enough, considering the way things turned out, Spohnholtz spoke, arguing for caution in this action and spoke about, you know, the need to recall an officer and the need for locals to know the situation; and there was a floor discussion. I get the impression that the activities of Blackburn precipitated the resolution, but it doesn't sound as if the Chicago local was supporting this. Now, am I right or wrong?

STONE: I don't think the Chicago local was supporting it. I don't specifically remember that business of the recall of International officers being a major issue; maybe because I wasn't particularly involved.

INTERVIEWER: Okay, well, what in your view explains how lightning struck George Canary? I mean, how did the convention revolve on him the choice to sort of set the house in order?

STONE: Well, the king-makers chose him because he could be elected. George Canary was a father-figure type, in his way as paranoid as Richard Nixon, suspicious of everybody, a Midwestern anti-communist figure, which really means that he was prepared to see a communist in anybody on the East Coast or at least a subversive element in anybody on the East Coast. The Midwest was to him God's country, and he ran that local in Chicago with a steady hand. He wasn't the great leader, wasn't a great innovator, but he was a steady man; and, you know, he was greatly respected around the country, not because of any great leadership on any

issue, but he always came through at the conventions as a strong, pleasant gentleman. He had back of him in Chicago an ambitious man who was willing to support him for the International president's job for God-knows-what reasons.

INTERVIEWER: Spohnholtz?

STONE: Yes, Spohnholtz. He was interested in the local job, and that would give him an opportunity. I don't think he ever considered Canary as a great leader of the Chicago Local. I don't think he was. And as I say, [he was] never an innovator. He went along with things that he thought he had to.

INTERVIEWER: Whereas Spohnholtz really was an innovator.

STONE: Spohnholtz was. Spohnholtz was a bright man with a. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Working hard on the Inter Local Pension Fund. . . .

STONE: . . . . .with a good deal more on the ball than Canary ever had. And of course Swayduck and Robinson chose Canary because he was well respected around the country, well thought of around the country. He was not politically dangerous, and I'm sure they thought they could manage him. That's really what was in it. And besides, they could get him elected, and they'd worry about what they were going to do with him afterwards. They had the support of Chicago on that; they had the support of Spohnholtz on that or the Chicago secondary leadership on that, and they talked Canary into it. They made him some promises, including, among other things, the moving of the office, which, by the way, during this whole period was a big issue only in terms that it took up a hell of a lot of time. I personally spent an awful lot of time on the business of the moving of the office, and Blackburn spent a lot of time on the moving of the office. The whole thing was an exercise in futility, and I knew it. I don't think Blackburn did. He spent an awful lot of time locating places and making recommendations and visiting places outside of New York.

INTERVIEWER: You mean an agreement was made with Canary with respect to his not moving to New York?

STONE: Well, yeah, I'm sure it was. In fact, that didn't happen. He didn't move to New York. He established an office in Chicago. Now, I suspect there was also, if there was no agreement, there were implications that the office could be moved to Chicago, You know, he was promised a lot of things, if not directly, then indirectly. He believed--I'm sure he believed--that, you know, given time, he would move the International office to Chicago.

INTERVIEWER: Now, what did this mean in terms of communication between the officers once he was elected? Did you find yourself having to go to Chicago a great deal? Or did communication just kind of break down?

STONE: Communications broke down. Canary was not a man who was much interested in detail, administrative details. You know, the office ran, and I ran it. That's really what happened. And as long as it was going all right, he didn't want to be involved.

My wife likes to tell the story that at one of the conventions Canary was the president, and on Thursday he asked her where the office was, the convention office. He'd never been there. He had no communication with the staff; you know, it wasn't his staff, it was my staff.

INTERVIEWER: Hm-hm. He asked her directions as to how to get there, in other words! (Laughing)

STONE: To get to the International office. He didn't know; he hadn't been there. And she never really forgot that, but that was typical. He didn't worry about those things. He'd let somebody else handle the details, and he dealt with. . . .

INTERVIEWER: The big issues! (Laughing)

STONE: The big issues! But the answer to the question: I didn't go to Chicago. There was nothing for me to go to Chicago for. The administration of the office was entirely in my hands; he had nothing to do with it, literally had nothing to do with it. He always went into a Council meeting unprepared. He had no program and, as I recall, no agenda. His theory was, you know, the councillors will raise issues, whatever is on the hopper; you know, they'll bring it up, and we'll make a decision on it at the Council meeting. Then, if the Council votes for it, we'll implement it. But he, to my knowledge, never went to the Council with a program, except to move the office to Chicago, which he got beat on.

INTERVIEWER: Well, I see that this business of regional conferences comes up again, and this time Marty Grayson is in favor of them rather than opposed to them.

STONE: Regional conferences?

INTERVIEWER: Yes.

STONE: Marty Grayson having moved to a region.

INTERVIEWER: Having moved to a region, right.

STONE: Yes, but Marty Grayson--I'm not sure of the year--requested permission to extend his regional conference, the Mountain Region conference, to five days. So at that we went to Estes Park and had a good meeting, but the business of five days, my recollection is that was really the testing ground for a national conference. It gave an opportunity to bring in people to speak who were really national figures, and it really set the tone, I think, for a national conference. We had, as I recall, a good conference. Marty Grayson was an organizer in the first place, had some great talent there. And what came out of it was you ought to have everybody involved in this kind of thing. It's not the sort of thing you can put on in every region. It was a test, and really I think he presented it that way to the Council.

INTERVIEWER: Right, as an education program.

STONE: Yeah. And from there we went to national conferences. I don't know whether it was the next year or not, but I suspect it was. Our first national policy conference was in Cleveland. That's the one where Canary resigned.

INTERVIEWER: Right. Well, I see that I have a list here of International councillors, which will enable us perhaps to tell. . . .

STONE: I wonder whatever happened to Sandy (secretary).

INTERVIEWER: . . . .whether they were from more than one local.

STONE: (probably reading from the list) Swayduck, Cook, and Hansen--there are three.

INTERVIEWER: Well, there were three from New York. What about in Chicago? Are those four people all from Local Four?

STONE: No, Spohnholtz is the only one from Chicago. Of course, you know, Spohnholtz took the position that he didn't want any more than one from a local.

INTERVIEWER: He was going to be it! (Laughing)

STONE: Well, not only that, but as a matter of principle. He thought they ought to scatter representation. You know, Swayduck wouldn't take that kind of a principle position, but Spohnholtz would.

INTERVIEWER: Well, let's, just for the sake of the tape recorder that can't read: In the Atlantic Region there was Arthur Willis, William Holton, Edward Swayduck, George Cook, and Edward Hansen. And the three that are from Local One are Edward Swayduck, Edward Hansen, and. . . .

STONE: George Cook.

INTERVIEWER: And George Cook. Whereas from the Central Region from Local Four in Chicago there is only Harry Spohnholtz. The rest of them are from other locals.

STONE: Right.

INTERVIEWER: Right, okay.

STONE: What convention is that? Or what year is that?

INTERVIEWER: This is the Thirteenth Convention in Boston in 1955.

STONE: Right. So it was an issue with Swayduck.

INTERVIEWER: It was an issue in 1953, and it was an issue with Swayduck at that time.

STONE: He objected to the business of limiting the representation to two from any local on the grounds that they had a very substantial membership and ought to be represented by a substantial number of people.

INTERVIEWER: Well, I also see that there was some discussion about a contest for the position of secretary-treasurer in that Eddie Donahue was nominated but withdrew. And I would imagine that there is a story there! (Laughing)

STONE: Well, finally there was a contest for secretary-treasurer, but you have to understand that during all of this time my relationship with Local One was tenuous. I was not their boy, and they knew it; but by the same token I was never an aggressive fighter against them.

INTERVIEWER: You weren't politicking against them.

STONE: I was not! And they knew it, and I think they. . . . Later on at the Portland convention, which was in what year?

INTERVIEWER: 1959.

STONE: 1959. At the Portland convention the New York Local did not nominate me. That was the first convention at which they. . . .

(END OF TAPE V, SIDE I)

INTERVIEWER: Somebody else nominated you, in other words.

STONE: Yeah.

INTERVIEWER: Well, we're jumping ahead of ourselves a little bit.

STONE: Okay.

INTERVIEWER: But since you brought it up, it seems to me that in the 1959 convention, Local One seems to have had it more or less all its own way, their failure to defeat you perhaps being the one exception to that. For example, that was the year when they made Ben Robinson an honorary member of ALA. That was the year when they successfully replaced George Canary with Pat Slater. And just, you know, as a casual outsider reading the convention reports in 1959, maybe that's wrong; maybe you don't think they did have it all their own way that year.

STONE: Well, I think on the Pat Slater thing. . .who was chairman of that convention?

INTERVIEWER: Chairman of the convention?

STONE: Who was chairman of that convention? Slater was chairman of the convention at the time, wasn't he? Didn't Canary resign, as I recall, during the year finally. . . .

INTERVIEWER: After Apple Valley in 1958.

STONE: Right. And Slater took over for the balance of that term.

INTERVIEWER: Right.

STONE: And named Brown as his assistant, and there was never any intention that Slater would run. So it wasn't at that convention that they replaced Canary. That was the only point I wanted to make. Technically it didn't quite work out that way. He was already out.

INTERVIEWER: Well, Canary resigned.

STONE: Right.

INTERVIEWER: Right. And Slater was just an interim president. Okay. One other question I wanted to ask you was, was Eddie Donahue being talked about as a part of a slate that would include George Canary to run against you and Blackburn? Was that the strategy?

STONE: I don't remember, you know, how Donahue got in there at all, really.

INTERVIEWER: Well, then, we'll ask him! (Laughter)

STONE: Yeah! Eddie Donahue and George Canary were about as far apart ideologically as you can get, and I can't imagine that there was ever any intent of a slate. I don't think that the king makers were ever supporting Eddie Donahue. He came from left field. Somebody nominated him.

INTERVIEWER: Right. Now, you said you did have opposition, however, at that convention.

STONE: Which one?

INTERVIEWER: It doesn't look to me that you were. . . .

STONE: Not in Boston I didn't.

INTERVIEWER: No, you were elected by acclamation.

STONE: Yeah. No, I didn't have any opposition.

INTERVIEWER: Well, starting earlier than 1955, really in 1953, there begins to be this thread about graphic arts unity. I wonder if we want to sort of break off from our chronological discussion at this point and take that up because there are conversations about unity with all kinds of people--with the Guild, with the ITU, with the Printing Pressmen. . . .

STONE: Starting with which year?

INTERVIEWER: '53.

STONE: Yeah, there were talks being held I think probably most seriously with the. . . .well, there were talks with the Photoengravers. There were talks with the Typo's. There were talks with the Printing Pressmen.

My position in all of them, you know, although I was a great supporter of merger, I knew, or I thought I knew that, as long as Blackburn was the president, there was not going to be a merger with anyone.

INTERVIEWER: Why not?

STONE: Well, because it's really all part of that pattern. We said earlier that Blackburn was being harrassed in various ways, and one of the ways he was being harrassed, as a matter of fact came up occasionally, was that he was meeting with some of these officers. The fact of the matter is Swayduck and Local One and their supporters. . . .you really need to mention Robinson because Robinson and Swayduck operated as a team, and Robinson generated a great deal more support outside of New York than Swayduck ever could have, you know, so that Robinson became extremely well known around the country. He spoke at every convention; he wrote articles for the journal; he had direct contact by telephone with a great many locals on jurisdictional questions; he generated a great deal more respect, as I said a while ago, than Swayduck did. But as a team, with Robinson generating the respect and Swayduck and Local One delivering a very substantial vote, it was a very powerful influence in the organization.

I thought I knew that, as long as Swayduck and Robinson were not necessarily opposed to merger, although I think basically they were--I think even then they were opposed to merger--but in any case they weren't going to let Blackburn. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Get the credit for it.

STONE: Yeah, basically that's what it was. They weren't going to let him take the lead in that sort of thing. It just wasn't going to happen. So that I remember sitting in on meetings, meetings with the Photoengravers in Chicago, although that was later. That was in Canary's administration when, you know, I just sat there and said, "This is just an exercise in futility. Nothing's going to happen anyway." And it was true then. It was true; until we got strong leadership from the International office, it was never going to happen.

INTERVIEWER: By which time, however, somewhat tragically, a lot of opportunities had passed by.

STONE: No question about it.

INTERVIEWER: On the whole question of jurisdiction I notice that what seems to me--and please contradict me if I'm wrong--that by 1957 at the Chicago convention there is a resolution to organize all

lithographers under the ALA label whether or not such organizing is approved by the AFL-CIO, a kind of declaration of independence or maybe of war, depending upon your point of view! (Laughing)

STONE: What year was that?

INTERVIEWER: '59 [She means '57] That resolution was proposed by Local One and "Whatever action seems desirable to our International Council with respect to continuing our affiliation with or disaffiliating from the AFL-CIO and the Canadian Labor Congress." (quoting from the proceedings) The resolution was referred to a referendum vote by action of the convention. What I don't know is what happened to the referendum vote. I can only assume that it passed. . . .

STONE: Oh, I'm sure it did.

INTERVIEWER: . . . .in view of the fact that the next year you in fact withdrew.

STONE: Yeah, I could get you that fast. What are we talking about? '59?

INTERVIEWER: Hm-hm.

STONE: (leafing through papers) Interesting ballot. That's the one on the initiative, on the move to Chicago. That was in '58.

INTERVIEWER: Growing out of the Apple Valley Convention or Conference, I guess, not convention.

STONE: (still leafing through papers) '59 convention. I guess it would have been in '60.

INTERVIEWER: No, I guess we're talking about '57. Excuse me. The '57 convention in Chicago.

STONE: (searching papers) Jurisdiction. I don't know whether we have a vote on it, but I'm sure it passed. I'm sure it passed overwhelmingly. (Reading from proceedings) "This convention reaffirms all possible emphasis. Job security and living standards of our members demand, irrespective of cost or sacrifice, shall organize, whether or not such organizing is approved by the AFL-CIO." I'm sure that passed overwhelmingly. I could get a vote, but I don't think there's any question about it.

INTERVIEWER: Milt Williams talked about a meeting--I guess it must have been a councillors' meeting--that was

held in Philadelphia where the entire Council went in buses up to Unity House in the Poconos where George Meany was holding an Executive Council meeting, and George Canary started to read some kind of resolution with respect to disaffiliation. Were you there? I wonder if you could describe that whole scene from your perspective.

STONE: (Laughing) It wasn't a very happy scene. Actually we went in with a position, with a paper which in effect said we were disaffiliating.

INTERVIEWER: Now, George Canary was not still president at that time. It was Patrick Slater. . . .

STONE: What's the date? Patrick Slater, I think.

INTERVIEWER: Well, the withdrawal was in '58. So it depends upon whether it was before Apple Valley or after. I don't know.

STONE: Let me see if I can remember. I think George Canary was at Unity House. . . .

INTERVIEWER: As I recall, Milt Williams described George Canary reading this paper. . . .

STONE: I think he was. We really, you know. . . .George Canary started to read the paper, and Meany cut him off and really read him out fast. And we went out really with our tail between our legs! Because there wasn't anything we could say after that. In fact, he just literally threw us out. It wasn't very happy.

INTERVIEWER: What was your intent? Were you trying to have an exploratory meeting? Or were you trying to make a statement of disaffiliation?

STONE: If we were trying to have an exploratory meeting, it was very badly handled. In retrospect, it would appear that we didn't have to do what we did at all, and we could have accomplished what we were after. But it's true we did have a paper with us. I don't think the intent was, as I recall, to go that far. It was to get the AFL-CIO to take some kind of a conciliatory position. As I say, in retrospect that was just badly managed. We were before the wrong forum if we expected George Meany to take a conciliatory position. It was his forum, and he really laid it into us.

INTERVIEWER: Well, the way Milt Williams described it was he didn't even let him (Canary) finish reading the paper.

STONE: No, he didn't. He did not. Just broke in and. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Milt's memory of it was that at the end of your statement there was room for conciliation and accommodation but that your president never got that far.

STONE: I think that's right. Badly handled. Of course, again, why was it badly handled? Because the president wasn't taking a strong position. It was a lawyer's position. A lawyer was dictating to us what we were going to do.

INTERVIEWER: And Ben Robinson was really the architect of this entire jurisdictional resolution.

STONE: Yeah, without any question.

INTERVIEWER: Well, of course I know you don't know what is in another man's mind, but it seems a strange position to me because, you know, you could have made war without declaring war.

STONE: That's right.

INTERVIEWER: And I can't see any rational motivation for deliberately precipitating the crisis.

STONE: Of course, you know, that had been really done by this jurisdictional resolution that we sent to the membership for approval.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, that was really enabling legislation; that enabled you to withdraw if you decided to withdraw.

STONE: Well, that's true, but, you know, it was pretty loaded. We organize regardless of whether the AFL-CIO approves. It was a declaration of war, and we just simply took that position to the AFL-CIO Executive Council; and they simply told us to go to hell in just about so many words. You know, who do we think we are?! (Laughing) It was not a very happy experience, as I recall.

INTERVIEWER: So I guess we've come to the point where one really ought to describe this Apple Valley. You know, sometimes, when I talk to people, they're not aware of how things look in the record. The way the record looks is that the following year in 1959 there is a good bit of discussion of the tragedy at Apple Valley or the atrocity at Apple Valley and so forth. Everybody knows what it is, you see, nobody bothers to explain in the record what that really was. So I guess we really do need to get down on the record, you know, what in the world was Apple Valley?! (Laughing)

STONE: Well, when was the policy conference in Cleveland? What do your records show? 1958?

INTERVIEWER: Uhhh, let me see. . . .

STONE: It couldn't have been '56. That's too soon. The one that stands out in my memory more than Apple Valley is Cleveland. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Which would have been . . . .

STONE: . . .National Policy Conference at which George Canary. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Resigned.

STONE: Well, it was my impression as well. Did he resign and then we talked him out of it? Is that the general idea? I think that's what happened. And he agreed to stay on. Yeah, I recall distinctly his saying he's not going to be an office boy for forces in New York and so on. So there was that resignation. What I'm trying to get clear in my memory is how long between that and the Apple Valley thing when he really made it stick, and Francis P. Slater took over as the president. The Apple Valley was where he finally submitted his resignation.

INTERVIEWER: Resignation in 1958.

STONE: In 1958. And the Cleveland Policy Conference then must have been. . . .

INTERVIEWER: October of '58. The National Policy Convention in Cleveland was in October, 1958.

STONE: Well, then when was the Council meeting at Apple Valley?

INTERVIEWER: That was earlier, I think, in the spring.

STONE: It couldn't have been because the resignation was final in Apple Valley. That's what you're saying.

INTERVIEWER: That's right. That's right. So it had to be after October.

STONE: Yeah. I don't have those records here.

INTERVIEWER: This was the first national policy conference of the ALA in Cleveland, October 20, 1958. At that point they made reference to Apple Valley, the International Council meeting in Apple Valley, of which we do not have the minutes and proceedings, incidentally.

STONE: We don't have?

INTERVIEWER: No. And apparently at the National Policy Convention, which I do have the minutes of, they refer to the Apple Valley meeting. Spohnholtz says, "The Apple Valley meeting was the most distasteful thing that I ever sat through."

STONE: Well, perhaps we've got it wrong then. Perhaps the Apple Valley meeting was the one at which Canary resigned and he was convinced to stay on, and then. . . .

INTERVIEWER: He was convinced to stay on. Yeah, because "George Canary relinquished the gavel to Earl Kinney and proceeded to attempt to answer the many questions and accusations that had been hurled at him."

STONE: What are we talking about now? Apple Valley?

INTERVIEWER: We're talking about the Cleveland. . . .

STONE: Yeah, right.

INTERVIEWER: "Canary reported having been told that he was asked to run in order to 'get Blackburn.' Somehow the purchase of a new building in New York and Canary states that this whole thing was put over on him. He accused Local One of dictating policy to the journal editor."

STONE: He didn't mention my name, huh? Because he thought I was very much involved in that. By "that" I mean dictating policy to the journal editor, yeah, because in fact the building appeared on the cover of the magazine. The building that we had purchased appeared on the cover of the magazine with "Amalgamated Lithographers of America" across the front. Now, the building was there, and we had purchased it; but there wasn't any sign on it. So the whole thing was retouched, and the editor went along with that; and that appeared in the magazine, and the magazine got out, surprisingly, just when the referendum hit the membership, and it was early. So that there's no question about the fact that Pat Donnelly, then the editor of the magazine, was. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Was involved.

STONE: . . .was involved, being pressured or cooperating or whatever with the members of Local One, with

Swayduck and Robinson. Now, you would never convince George Canary that I didn't know what was going on. I had been fairly close to the magazine, and he never believed or appeared never to believe that I didn't know that that whole thing was being maneuvered. I did not; I knew nothing about it.

INTERVIEWER: He wasn't in a position to know because he wasn't there.

STONE: Well, that's right. He wasn't in a position to know, but I was. Nobody was taking me into their confidence, and all of a sudden the magazine came out with that picture of the building on it. Now, I was involved in the purchase of the building. The building was in fact purchased while the initiative was being processed. George Canary came to New York, and he signed the contract. But I handled the deal, got agreement with. . . .

INTERVIEWER: What would you have done if the referendum had gone against you?

STONE: We would have had a building!

INTERVIEWER: (Laughing) In which you could have taken up residence!

STONE: And I did take an active part in that business by writing an article in the magazine, opposed to the move to Chicago. I couldn't see how it could possibly do any good for the union. It seemed to me that George Canary did not have a strong following. He's going to move the office to Chicago and become the International president with the office there, and he's going to have very strong opposition on the East Coast to the whole business of an organization just split right down the middle in terms of support. I couldn't see it. We had a staff functioning in New York, and I thought it was a good staff, and I just couldn't imagine how he could work it out in Chicago under the circumstances. You can always do it if you've got leadership. We moved to Washington, and we didn't have any problem; but that's a different story.

So evidently, then, George Canary's resignation became effective as of the Cleveland Conference. That's when he really resigned and Pat Slater took over.

INTERVIEWER: That's right. But he had talked about resigning at Apple Valley.

STONE: In fact he had resigned, and I remember having a meeting later of the Council; and that was a shock as well. But we did have a meeting of the Council at which he was then--I'm not sure who it was

chaired by, probably Slater--at which he was convinced to reconsider. And those minutes we could get, and I should have if I'd have had more time. I'd have taken a look at them. But the Apple Valley Conference we should have examined.

INTERVIEWER: Where is Apple Valley, by the way?

STONE: It's a nice place. It's about a hundred miles from Los Angeles out in the desert, and I recommend it to you. (Laughter) We went there when we developed the constitution for the merger of the Lithographers and the Photoengravers. A committee spent a week there. Karl Slater was there with us, and we had a secretary. It was Ken Brown and myself and, I think, Gus Petrakis. And we whipped up a constitution. (It was) a great week, one in which we just took it from scratch and redid it. Of course, we had to get it approved later, but we redid it.

INTERVIEWER: Maybe we ought to look up those minutes before we proceed.

STONE: Well, we aren't having any great luck. I can't imagine what the hell Sandy's (secretary) doing. Maybe she didn't understand what we wanted. (Interruption in tape, presumably to look for the minutes to the Apple Valley Conference.)

INTERVIEWER: You are referring there to the minutes of the Apple Valley Conference?

STONE: Apple Valley Council meeting, held May 12-16, 1958.

INTERVIEWER: Right.

STONE: At that Council meeting President Canary on Friday, May 16, submitted the letter of resignation.

INTERVIEWER: Effective immediately?

STONE: I don't see a date in it. One of the reasons he gave for that was that the Council had directed him to close the president's office in Chicago, and the second reason he gave was that he had never had to work before with officers that didn't have faith and confidence in each other. He cited the statement by an International councillor that the International president has done nothing constructive since he has been in office as a for instance. He did not give a date for his resignation. The Council accepted the resignation at that time and advised the referendum board to meet on July 1, 1958, to send out a call for nominations for the office.

INTERVIEWER: Now, your memory is that he was talked out of this resignation, and he must have been because the following October in Cleveland he is still functioning as the International president. Who talked him out of it?

STONE: Well, I remember a meeting of the Council or of a committee of the Council--it's not clear to me--that discussed the question with President Canary. My recollection is that he withdrew his resignation at that time.

INTERVIEWER: Now, who would have been trying to talk him out of it? Certainly not Swayduck. Did you try to talk him out of resigning?

STONE: Well, I certainly did. (Reading from the minutes) "Secretary-Treasurer Stone in his statement suggested for the Councillors' consideration the following program: 1) request President Canary to reconsider his resignation for the best interests of the Amalgamated at this time, 2) seek the withdrawal of the initiative referendum on the moving of the International office, 3) reconsider the motion made by the Council to close the Chicago office, 4) proceed with negotiations for the purchase of a building."

INTERVIEWER: So obviously you were trying to play a conciliatory role.

STONE: That's what I was trying to do, and I don't at the moment see. . . . (Reading again from the minutes) "Secretary-Treasurer Stone expressed the opinion there is no possible reason for a move to Washington which would justify breaking up an entire staff with long years of experience."

INTERVIEWER: So in other words, at this time a compromise suggestion was made. . . . . .

(END OF TAPE V, SIDE 2)

STONE: (Reading from minutes) "After discussion of that program General Counsel Robinson suggested that the following points be considered: 1) the Council request President Canary to withdraw his resignation, 2) President Canary and Councillor Spohnholtz will seek the withdrawal of the initiative referendum on moving the building, and 3) President Canary will close the Chicago office."

"At an evening meeting on Friday, June 20, at a special International Council meeting, President Canary presented the following statement to the Council: 1) I will do my best to prevent the initiative from going through, 2) the Chicago office is to remain open, 3) my resignation will be withdrawn, 4) the meeting today cleared the air on many operations of the ALA, 5) that the International rent space or stay put but not purchase a building."

INTERVIEWER: So in other words, he remained adamant in his decision. He didn't accept the compromise that you offered.

STONE: There was discussion of that. The Council voted to proceed with the purchase of the building.

INTERVIEWER: Right. And what about the move to withdraw the initiative?

STONE: Wait a minute. I'm not sure. There's no indication that that motion was approved.

INTERVIEWER: But in any case the initiative did go forward?

STONE: The initiative went forward. The purchase of the building went forward. A resolution was presented to the Council, resolving that the International Council unanimously requests President Canary to withdraw his resignation. President Canary reconsidered, and the Council accepted the withdrawal of the resignation. The office in Chicago was to be continued. There was no decision as to whether the initiative would be withdrawn, but in any case it was agreed that, if the initiative to move the office to Chicago went forward, the International Council would include with that initiative a statement of its opposition to the initiative to move the office.

So at that point the resignation was withdrawn.

INTERVIEWER: Fine. Now, in other words, Canary got the Council's permission to keep the office in Chicago, but the Council moved forward with plans to purchase a building in New York; and no decision was made about the initiative going forward. So the initiative went out. The initiative, I gather, was initiated by Canary and Spohnholtz.

STONE: Yeah, the initiative was started by Chicago.

INTERVIEWER: And was defeated.

STONE: And was defeated soundly. Then obviously, after that was done, Canary finally submitted his resignation to the Cleveland Conference in. . . what's the date of the Cleveland Conference?

INTERVIEWER: October, 1958.

STONE: In October, 1958. And at that point the resignation stuck.

INTERVIEWER: By October you had the results on the initiative?

STONE: We probably had them a lot sooner than that. The date of the initiative ballot was July 30, 1958. So that that then would have been completed in September, and at the October policy conference President Canary. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Why wasn't this initiative withdrawn? I mean the Council didn't make any decision about it one way or another. They just sort of let it hang there. . . .

STONE: Well, the Council couldn't withdraw it. The initiators had to withdraw it, and they decided not to.

INTERVIEWER: And they decided not to withdraw it. Okay.

STONE: Harry Spohnholtz at that point was the president of the Chicago local, and I really don't know how strong his support of the initiative was. I can't remember. It may not have been as strong as it could have been.

INTERVIEWER: At least he didn't go out and campaign for it.

STONE: I'm not sure he wanted the International office, in Chicago. That's frankly what I'm saying.

INTERVIEWER: One thing that comes up that really puzzles me--and I suppose we'll have to ask Robinson and Swayduck themselves about it--but at this National Policy Convention in Cleveland Robinson gives a long talk detailing the history of jurisdictional disputes, an attempt, I think it would be fair to say, to put the fears of the members at rest on disaffiliation, saying, you know, that it doesn't mean we can't organize, it doesn't mean that the Amalgamated label is no good, and so forth. Now, what puzzles me, however, is that at that same policy conference Swayduck takes the members of the Executive Board of the AFL-CIO over the coals and makes some very biting remarks about every one of them. He is

terribly resentful of these men who were responsible for the ALA disaffiliation. What's a little peculiar is what seems, on the surface at least, to be a difference between Swayduck and Robinson with respect to whether disaffiliation is desirable or undesirable or neutral, and it may be that he's simply trying to go on record as saying the disaffiliation is all. . . .you know, the fault for it lies entirely with the Executive Board of the AFL-CIO.

STONE: Well, I think Swayduck's position is basically political, blaming somebody else for what happened. Because I'm not sure there was among the leadership, local officers that were present at that meeting, great support for, you know, what had happened, for our disaffilation. (Interruption in tape)

INTERVIEWER: Canary, in response to Swayduck really, says, "Whatever I did at the AFL-CIO Council Board was absolutely wrong. Is there any man in this room who hasn't done something wrong? We've all made our mistakes; everybody here has. However, do you take time out to criticize on paper? Well, that's what Ed wanted. To me, of course, that is crucifying. Of course, all the time Ed Donahue and these other individuals have been on the Council Board and also while I have been president, I could have made notes. I could have been looking for things to write about, and I am sure that I could have found many things to write about."

What's puzzling me is, I think the record will fairly show that Ben Robinson was sort of the architect of this disaffiliation. Local One initiated the resolution to declare war on the AFL-CIO. Now, having done so, they're apparently very critical of something about what Canary did at the AFL-CIO Council Board meeting in the Poconos. So there's a piece of the puzzle missing.

STONE: Yes, there is. I think you probably have to go to somebody other than me. Somebody must remember with more detail than I do what happened because apparently George saying, "Whatever I did. . .." must have meant that <u>his</u> approach was wrong to Meany. I don't have any recollection of that; I really don't. I'm not really very good at those kind of details.

INTERVIEWER: Well, I imagine that the people that you really have to ask at this point are Robinson and Swayduck.

STONE: Well, maybe not. There were a lot of other people there as well on the Council, not too many of which are still around, I guess.

INTERVIEWER: Ed Donahue is still around.

STONE: Ed Donahue was there, and Ed Donahue will remember, I suspect. He remembers those things. (Laughter) I suggest you discuss that bit with him. By the way, I'd like to know what his answer is! (Laughter)

INTERVIEWER: Well, I think maybe. . . .

STONE: Because I would like to know what his recollection is of that meeting.

INTERVIEWER: I think maybe this is a good stopping point, Don, because thereafter, of course, Ken Brown becomes president; and we start the whole business of your memories with respect to merger discussions and so forth. But I would like you to put down your off-the-cuff memories and reactions to what was going on at Apple Valley and this National Policy Convention in Cleveland. I mean, this was a pretty bitter kind of a business with Canary turning over the chair to Earl Kinney. . . . .

STONE: Yes, it was.

INTERVIEWER: . . . .and accusations and counter-accusations are flying through the air.

STONE: There was the general feeling that, if Canary had been prepared to follow up on that, he really could have literally taken over, I mean if Council had little support at that meeting. Now, where you go with that I really don't know. That's why it never excited me as much as some others because practically so he would have taken over. So then what? You know, where do you go from there? It's true that he probably had strong support if a vote was taken on any issue. But, you know, what issue was it going to be at that point? What kind of an issue could he raise?

INTERVIEWER: Except that he didn't really survive the initiative on moving the office to Chicago. He didn't have support for that.

STONE: Meany could have at that point raised questions, you know, brought up that issue again. His basic point that he was misled, he was led down the garden path, as they say, that he had been lied to when he was talked into taking the job, and then every move he would make or try to make was managed for him, dictated to him, and so on, you know, I was sympathetic to that position because I think that was true. I think it was all true.

INTERVIEWER: But on the other hand, your feeling was that he couldn't really do anything about this as long as he tried to do it from Chicago.

STONE: That's right. What I'm saying is that at that conference he had strong support. It was an extremely emotional issue. The delegates to that conference in a majority were prepared to turn against Swayduck, Robinson, and the "managed" Council, and there was no question about the fact that it was politically kept. They were a little like the Congress under Richard Nixon and some of the late Presidents. They really haven't been doing what the hell they were supposed to be doing. Well, neither had the Council; neither had the Council. The Council was a political creature. The councillors were in Swayduck's pocket; the majority of the councillors and officers were in Swayduck's pocket. They got their jobs and kept them only because they had support from Swayduck.

I was in a little bit different position than that because I really never had. . .as editor of the magazine I had a large popular base, and there wasn't a local that really could get at me. I knew that. I also knew that once Swayduck and Spohnholtz, once New York and Chicago teamed up against me, I was sunk for re-election. There was no question about that in my mind.

INTERVIEWER: So you maintained a neutrality.

STONE: Yeah. Then they never did line up against me.

INTERVIEWER: Plus it seems to me that, in your reports in the Journal and in your reports to the convention, you pretty much stuck to business and talked about the finances of the organization over this period.

STONE: Yeah, I had to. I had to. I was smart enough to know that! (Laughter) I was not in a position to take political positions because they would have chopped me apart, and I knew that.

INTERVIEWER: Well, a lot of people who might have known that didn't, though, apparently!

Let me ask you one other question that relates to this issue which we need to get on the record to kind of clean it up. What do you think was the realistic result of disaffiliation? Did it hurt you? Or did it not have much effect?

STONE: I don't think it had much effect. I think internally this kind of thing going on kept our organization a good bit more alert and informed, and we got some unity out of it, on whatever issue, that you just can't get if you don't do anything. Now, in hindsight, I suspect that that's one of the things that's made our union a fairly viable one, and it still is, regardless of what the hell else we say relative to. . . .

INTERVIEWER: What was the point, then, of reaffiliating under Ken Brown's presidency when you reaffiliated?

STONE: Ken Brown is ambitious. Well, I suppose most of us are ambitious for something. That's oversimplifying, but one of the reasons we reaffiliated is that Ken wanted his organization to be part of the mainstream of labor, whatever that means. I always really supported that as well because I have a great belief, as I think most of us do, that the labor movement plays an important role in this country and that we ought to be part of it, in the political action field, as an example. I've always been fairly close to that COPE [Committee on Political Education] thing since I became secretary-treasurer. I believe they play a substantial role. I think we have to play our role in it.

INTERVIEWER: So in other words, what you're saying is disaffiliation had very little effect with respect to negotiating contracts with bread-and-butter issues of the life of the union, but you supported Ken Brown in his move to reaffiliate for other more ideological, rather than strictly trade-union issues.

STONE: Absolutely. I think the other thing is probably part of it. You see what's happened to Local One. They always were pretty well isolated in the labor movement, and they became more isolated from the labor movement when they withdrew from the International. Well, we really were in pretty much the same kind of a fix. We really were, as an organization, terribly removed from what the hell was going on and had little voice in anything. We wanted a voice, and I think that's fine.

I think the other business of Ken's interest in being part of the labor movement is that he is ambitious, and where else do you go except in the AFL-CIO. He has tremendous potential for taking a real leadership position in the organization. He works at it sometimes, but most of the time he doesn't. He's not doing what he has to do if he's going to be a politician; you know, he doesn't really. . . .

INTERVIEWER: If you're pursuing mergers also, then its important to be inside the House of Labor rather than outside.

STONE: That's right. So I have never had any question in my mind that that's where we belong. On the other hand, I think there was some basis for making a move. I think it's fair enough that you make your protest known when you really think you're getting screwed. You can always revise it.

INTERVIEWER: In other words, it's important on some occasions to say, "If you push us too far, this is what we'll do."

STONE: That's right. I think so.

(END OF INTERVIEW II)

DON STONE #II

Index

Third Oral History Interview

with

DON STONE

October 22, 1974
Washington, D.C.

Interviewer: Alice M. Hoffman

INTRODUCTION

In Interview III Don Stone goes into more detail about the disaffiliation from the AFL-CIO in 1958 and then moves to the subject of efforts that have been made over the years with respect to merger, federation, or amalgamation with such unions as the IPP &AU, the Newspaper Guild, the Paper Workers, the ITU, the Printing Pressmen, the Stereotypers-Electrotypers, and the Bookbinders. He talks about how, out of all the efforts to stress unity themes, especially the theme of one big union, came the settlement with the Photoengravers Union. He elaborates on the problems that arose--problems with the pension funds, the defense fund, officer structure--and the internal union politics that complicated them, culminating in the withdrawal from the International of Local One, New York.

Don Stone goes into the logistics of putting two organizations together and how he became recording and financial secretary with the change. Later, when merger with the Bookbinders was completed, Stone became recording secretary. He describes the circumstances that led to moving the International headquarters from New York to Washington in 1971 and reflects on the nature of Ken Brown's presidency.

Third Oral History Interview

with

DON STONE

October 22, 1974
Washington, D.C.

Interviewer: Alice M. Hoffman

INTERVIEWER: Okay, Don, why don't we start that way. I have in my hands the History of the Lithographers Union by Fred C. Munson. This was published by The Wertheim Committee on Industrial Relations at Harvard University and also published for the Amalgamated Lithographers of America, which would indicate that it was, in some sense of the word at least, what we call a history done for the union or commissioned in some way by the union.

STONE: What's the date of the book?

INTERVIEWER: The date of the book is 1963.

STONE: It was a history commissioned for the union and done by Munson on the Wertheim Fellowship thing. Munson, at least in theory, insisted that. . . . in fact, I think. . . .that's Harvard, isn't it? Harvard University?

INTERVIEWER: Yes, it is.

STONE: They insisted that the author be free to say what he wanted and so on. There would be no censorship of the book or no deletions of things which he might report that the officers didn't agree with. We subscribed to that kind of control and commissioned . . . as I recall, we didn't specifically commission Munson; we sent the fee to the Wertheim Foundation, and Munson did the book under the Wertheim Foundation's direction.

My reaction, along with some other officers. . . I'm sure we didn't study it in detail really; we were all part of that history. My reaction, and I know some of my fellow officers--Vice President Wallace was probably the most articulate--

objected to the fact that we really got very short shrift on our role as officers, which I think had to be a bit of a mistake. I personally had been secretary-treasurer of the union through a lot of years and a few presidents. When I went into the New York office, Bill Reihl was the president; and he was followed by John Blackburn, and he was followed by George Canary, and he was followed by Pat Slater, and he was followed by Ken Brown. All of this time I was the secretary-treasurer, and much of that time. . . .well, of course, I was editor of the magazine from 1946 until '53, but after 1953 I ran the New York office. While Blackburn was there, why, then there was a president, but in 1955 it was a separate office established in Chicago. The whole administration of the union was in New York, and I ran the thing. You'd have some difficulty learning that from Fred Munson's book. There had to be some continuity of an organization, and it certainly wasn't carried on through George Canary's office in Chicago.

INTERVIEWER: Did he interview you in writing this book?

STONE: No.

INTERVIEWER: That's significant in itself.

STONE: I don't know whether I really can say that or not. There was no formal interview, and yet we knew Fred Munson. He'd been around a bit, had written another book on the bargaining history for his thesis and so on. So we had talked to him; you know, we'd met him and knew him and so. But basically his information didn't come from me. Most of his information, it seems to me, came from Robinson's office and Swayduck's office.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah. Well, to get into some details, one of the problems that I have with the book, while it contains a great deal of information about the union, it's not always presented in such a way that an outsider is able to understand it very clearly. That is, if you already know what the issues are, then there's a great deal of material in this book which illuminates those issues. But if you don't know what they are, then you're often very mystified.

In his chapter on jurisdictional disputes, which I think is kind of where we left off with our last interview, he characterized a dichotomy between General Counsel Benjamin Robinson and President Canary with respect to various kinds of unity efforts, vis-a-vis organizing efforts; and he says that President Canary was actively trying to work out agreements with the ITU and the IPP & AU and with the United Paper Workers. Then he says (quoting), "The basic problem was in strategy not tactics. One group of officers did not want jurisdictional claims to hinder unity efforts; another group of officers did not want unity efforts to restrict organizing activity." This is a quote from page 260.

Now, first of all, Don, I'm wondering if you saw a dichotomy of that sort. And if you did, who was on what side?

STONE: Well, President Canary was a supporter of merger, and Munson is correct when he says he spent a lot of his time trying to work out an agreement with one of those unions. President Canary, on the other hand, suspected or thought, I believe, that a lot of jurisdictional squabbles were unnecessary and perhaps they were Robinson's special field. He might have felt that Robinson perhaps worked a little too hard at the business of maintaining a strictly litho unit. So that Canary would definitely have been the one that Munson refers to as one of the officers who felt that jurisdiction shouldn't interfere with unity. I assume that he is talking about those officers led by Councillor Swayduck and his legal advisor and whatever officers were supporting him, that jurisdictional issues were much too important. The preservation of separate jurisdiction was much too important to endanger it by merger with any other organization.

INTERVIEWER: Right. On the other hand--and this is what is somewhat mystifying about this--at the time of the merger of the AFL with the CIO, the AFL-CIO accepted the status quo with respect to jurisdiction with an agreement that. . . .

(END OF TAPE VI, SIDE I)

INTERVIEWER: . . .(in midsentence). . . .right then at the time about the Amalgamated's ability to stay in the merged organization. And those questions were very seriously being raised in '56, '57, '58 by Robinson. He's on record at the convention as having said, you know, "We'll have to be ready to disaffiliate."

STONE: Yeah.

INTERVIEWER: Except that in 1958 at the famous Apple Valley Council meeting and later in Cleveland it sounds to me as though George Canary is being blamed for the disaffiliation from the AFL-CIO, and that doesn't exactly make sense. There's a degree of inconsistency there.

STONE: And I tried to establish. . .you will recall we talked a little bit the last time we met about the Council meeting at Unity House, and George Canary in fact stated later that he erred in his

presentation. I was trying to find out from someone who would remember. I thought Ed Donahue would remember exactly what that error was. He doesn't. He was no more helpful than I was on what actually happened.

I think, although we did have--"we" meaning the International Council of the Amalgamated--had a paper with us which was in effect a statement of disaffiliation. My recollection of it, which is a little vague, is that President Canary read that statement much earlier than it was anticipated that he would do; so that his presentation to President Meany and to the Executive Board of the AFL-CIO was abrupt and really set President Meany off. President Meany was armed with information, as he usually is, about our record in organizing where we were in fact raiding under their rules. We were raiding. And President Canary made some statement, as I recall, which indicated we had made some progress on that kind of thing. We were in fact picking up members from other unions. They were anxious to be represented by the Amalgamated. President Meany hauled out a file in which he reviewed case after case after case where we had filed for elections to carve out units from other jurisdictions and had failed. It was a record that didn't really look very good, and he had it cold. I think it was that that George Canary later referred to as his error in the presentation. He stated he was wrong. That is as near as I can remember.

INTERVIEWER: That he was wrong to have read the statement?

STONE: That he had erred in his presentation to Meany.

INTERVIEWER: Milt Williams remembers the incident in that, when he started to read what was in fact a resolution of disaffiliation, that Meany didn't even let him finish reading it.

STONE: That's true.

INTERVIEWER: And that at the end of the statement there was some area for accommodation but that George Canary never got that far because Meany said, "Well, if you disaffiliate, you disaffiliate!"

STONE: Yeah, well, I think that's probably accurate, probably accurate.

INTERVIEWER: Who, as far as you can remember, was the author of this piece of paper that George Canary was reading?

STONE: Robinson, same man that authored most of the stuff we were dealing with those days.

INTERVIEWER: So that we then find him at Apple Valley--or not him so much, but Swayduck--forcing George Canary to apologize for having made a tactical error, which was in fact, at least partly, Local One's tactical error.

STONE: Well, the fact that we went there with a disaffiliation paper in the first place. What you're saying is part of it was it was badly written. But it's true that President Meany didn't permit; he just said, "Get out!" And we left rather dejectedly, as I recall. I don't think that we really expected that to happen, and in retrospect, you know, a lot of people have told us it didn't need to happen. We just didn't do it right.

INTERVIEWER: Right. Well, it might be useful to start looking at the various efforts that have been made over the years with respect to merger or federation or amalgamation. In this paragraph that I just read, it talks about various kinds of discussions that were held with the ITU over the years. I wonder if you just want to talk about some of the background of that.

STONE: Well, I think I mentioned earlier that I sat through a lot of merger discussions during those years, always conscious of the fact that in fact merger would never, never work out, meaning that even then it was pretty obvious who was in control and those who were in control were not really interested in merger. So that the talks that Blackburn had as president with the Printing Pressmen and others, and the talks that President Canary had with the ITU and others, really weren't going anywhere, and I knew they weren't going anywhere. That was just a sense of who was in control, who was in the saddle. An agreement was worked out--I believe this was when George Canary was president--where fifty thousand dollars of money from each of the organizations, the ITU and the Amalgamated, was supposed to be put into a fund and was supposed to be kept there for organizing purposes and common organizing goals and so on. And it appeared as though some progress was being made on merger with the ITU. The problem was always the problem on the jurisdiction; you know, how did you finally resolve who got what members, how was organizing to be carried on, and so on.

INTERVIEWER: Who was on this joint. . . .I notice that there was a joint coordinating committee. Do you remember?

STONE: Well, Jack Wallace and Ken Brown, I remember, met with the ITU officers. They would come for a long discussion where they were trying to reduce something to paper. I remember that they

would come back terribly frustrated. They could get agreement on issues; but when they tried to reduce it to writing, it was impossible to do that. The ITU was unwilling to reduce to writing what they seemed to be agree ing to. And there was great frustration on that basis. I don't know whether that's the committee. . . .

INTERVIEWER: How would you account for that rejection?

STONE: Well, the ITU has always been extremely high and mighty. They still are. They consider their union as the only democratic union in the world in the first place, and they had this strong membership support. They also have within their organization a political party; they have a two-party system within the organization. One of the problems of having such a two-party system is that the officers are reluctant to move on paper; they're reluctant to move away from anything that isn't the book.

INTERVIEWER: Because it can be used as a. . . .

STONE: Yeah. Can't make judgments. As soon as they do and put it on paper, then the opposition party takes it.

INTERVIEWER: Opposition party moves in.

STONE: That I think is a basic reason why the officers of the ITU don't depart from anything that isn't in the book.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, that's an interesting observation. Well, apparently this memorandum of agreement that was worked out during George Canary's administration worked in some places and not in others. It apparently worked in Buffalo, New York, but can hardly be said to have worked in British Columbia. . . .

STONE: No, it certainly did not.

INTERVIEWER: . . . .where there was a big strike over this very issue of who was going to get what.

STONE: Yeah.

INTERVIEWER: Isn't that what the Vancouver strike was about?

STONE: Well, I think so. I recall Earl Kinney, who was then a councillor and president of the Vancouver local, coming into New York and arguing his case before the ITU executive board and arguing it well. When I say "his case," I'm not that clear as to the issues; I don't recall them that well. But it was that basic problem of

trying to resolve who would get members. You know, we talked about joint organizing drives, and some joint organizing drives were conducted; but then you know what happened. There are lithographers and there are typographical people. How are they divided up? As I recall, the ITU was unwilling to give up platemaking jurisdiction. They were writing language all that time which covered our jurisdiction basically and we're negotiating all over the country.

INTERVIEWER: I think that leads up to the point in time where George Canary does, in fact, resign and Patrick Slater agrees to finish out his term of office. Could you say something as far as your observations are concerned as to what was going on behind the scenes? Did Patrick Slater, by the way, move to New York for that brief period of time?

STONE: Yes, he did. He lived in the hotel right across the street from the office. I think his wife was there with him, as I recall. They had a room, a suite.

INTERVIEWER: They were from. . . .

STONE: They were from San Francisco.

INTERVIEWER: Right.

STONE: Patrick Slater was not the least bit reluctant to take that office. When President Canary resigned, Patrick Slater was eager to move into his chair and take the gavel.

INTERVIEWER: Oh, really? That's interesting because Munson certainly indicates that he was perhaps reluctant and the only person they could find who was interested in moving to New York even temporarily. Did Slater see himself as a temporary officer?

STONE: Yes, he did. That was part of the agreement. There was an agreement. Who all was involved in it I don't know, but it was clear that Slater had agreed to take over, that Ken Brown would be named as his assistant and Slater would be president for only a year and that Ken Brown would be the next president or at least the next candidate, the next candidate with support. So that had all been worked out. Now, it would be hard to say at what point that was worked out, but I think after President Canary had submitted his resignation the first time and then had rescinded his resignation, a series of things really happened after that. The initiative to move the office to Chicago failed. The office was not going to be moved. The Council took action to close the

Chicago office. I think that was rescinded, too, as a matter of fact. It seems to me we talked about that the last time we were here. We checked it. The office in Chicago was not closed, but there was great feeling that it ought to be. President Canary was feeling very substantial pressures; he was being attacked from a good many sides for lack of action, for not having a program, for being in Chicago when he should have been in New York, a lot of things. Finally the pressure built so he submitted his resignation in Cleveland. As I say, Patrick Slater was ready to take the office. This had all been obviously worked out.

INTERVIEWER: Well, did Patrick Slater see himself as a compromise candidate between Chicago and New York? Or was he clearly identified with New York?

STONE: Patrick Slater saw himself as having a chance to be president of the International for a year.

INTERVIEWER: For however briefly! (Laughter)

STONE: No matter what side he was on, he was going to go along with the New York group. No question about that. That's where he came down--on that side. So, at the beginning, of course, did his assistant.

INTERVIEWER: Was there opposition to him from Chicago?

STONE: No, no. Any agreement that had been worked out to fill the office after President Canary resigned included Ken Brown as the assistant to the president with the support of Chicago and the support of Chicago in the next election as well.

INTERVIEWER: So what you're really saying is that Ken Brown was the compromise candidate.

STONE: Yeah. Pat was simply. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Warming the chair.

STONE: He was a figurehead for awhile.

INTERVIEWER: Warming the chair for Ken.

STONE: Yeah, that's what it really was.

INTERVIEWER: Well, in Munson's summary he talks about the definition of a successful trade union leader continually changing. In good times he is imaginative and daring; during a depression he

is cautious and conservative. When the trade is stagnant, he protests the members; when the trade is growing, he goes for unions, so forth. These skills are only rarely found in the same person, that is, the ability to be one thing in times of inflation and another in times of stress. It sometimes happens that a trade union finds itself with a leadership out of step with the times. This clearly was true for the Lithographers for much of the postwar period.[1]

Now, I gather that that paragraph is kind of a summary statement, at least in your view, of Ed Swayduck's way of looking at it. And yet, even though you might have a different emphasis, I wonder whether you would agree with that. In other words, that from Reihl to Blackburn to Canary, you've had three presidents who weren't quite able to provide the leadership that the union required? Or whether you would instead put the emphasis on the internal problems within the union that it made it impossible for them to be what the union required.

STONE: No, I would put the emphasis pretty much where Munson puts it.

INTERVIEWER: On the former.

STONE: Yeah. Blackburn prepared to be somewhat more aggressive than Slater or Canary, but not really having the ability to back it up. He didn't really have the capacity.

INTERVIEWER: All right. Well, now, when Ken Brown moves into a position to exercise power, first as the assistant to the president, but really, I gather--and correct me if I'm wrong--acting president. . . .

STONE: He was acting president.

INTERVIEWER: . . . .all these various kinds of merger discussions received a considerable shot in the arm. Maybe it would be useful to summarize. We're talking about the five Allied Printing Trades. We're talking about IPP & AU, the Guild, the Paper Workers; all of these unions are unions where. . . .

STONE: Don't forget the ITU,

INTERVIEWER: . . . .and the ITU. . . .where feelers towards some kind of cooperative effort have been made over the years.

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[1]Fred Munson, History of the Lithographers Union, pp. 306-310.

STONE: There was a good deal of talk about "one big union." That had been talked for a long time. Sometimes it's only convention talk; it's the sort of thing you go to. . .you know, tell your members that everybody's in favor of merger, one big union. In my opinion, to talk about one big union is to talk about merging two unions. It's unlikely that one big union is going to happen. If you start talking about two unions merging, that might happen. I think, for example, our New York local was willing to talk about merger as a concept; but when it became likely that it was going to happen, they hadn't really anticipated that; and they reacted against it.

INTERVIEWER: Well, what were the most serious efforts prior to Ken Brown's. We've talked about the ITU. But there was, wasn't there, some efforts or discussions held with the Electrotypers and Stereotypers prior to Ken's presidency?

STONE: Well, I don't remember that far back. I don't think so. With the Electrotypers and Stereotypers? I don't really think so. There were with the Printing Pressmen, serious discussions with the Printing Pressmen that broke down. These discussions with the Pressmen had been going on--I'm not sure of the dates--but they really progressed fairly well. But the progression was made, I think, on a false assumption, and that is that. . . . this, of course, is after Ken Brown is president. Some of the officers were assuming that DeAndrade, then president of the Pressmen, would somehow be willing to take a secondary office and permit Ken Brown to be the president. DeAndrade [Anthony J.] had been named vice-president of the AFL-CIO; we supported him in that position. We labored under some delusions. He was getting on in years, and we thought that he would be willing to give that position up. There were some indications that he might. In the final analysis the Amalgamated was never going to permit DeAndrade to take over as the president and put Ken Brown in a secondary position. There was nothing to justify that. DeAndrade hadn't done that great a job, hadn't shown that great leadership, etc., etc. and wasn't that strong in his own union.

Now, maybe we're talking about a little later. The dates I'm not great at, but that was, of course, after Ken Brown was president. Following that, the meetings with the Stereotypers-Electrotypers, which came very close--I think you know--to a merger. All the documents were drawn and so on, and in the final vote the merger agreement passed in both of the unions, the Stereotypers-Electrotypers and our own, then the LPIU. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, this was in '65.

STONE: . . . .but when it came down to the constitution itself, the Stereotypers and Electrotypers needed a two-thirds vote, which they failed to get. So that merger didn't come off.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, okay, well, if we're talking about 1961, the Lithographers were asked to join in a working group to discuss unity among unions in the graphic arts. And the Guild was apparently active. At least I see that the meetings were held at the Guild headquarters.

STONE: Yeah.

INTERVIEWER: And some of these meetings were in fact called by the Guild.

STONE: Yeah. Wickersham [Leon] was a part of that committee; I believe, Henry Dillon. And those unity committees were really aimed at one union. They were going to merge everybody. By the way, John Connolly, our executive vice-president now, has always been, as president of the Bookbinders and chairman of the Allied Printing Trades, an exponent of one union and was an exponent of one union when the LPIU talked merger with the Bookbinders. And we had some problem getting him to deal with the issue of the extreme difficulty--the concept is okay--the extreme difficulty of merging, you know, three, four, five unions. It's difficult enough, we pointed out, the Lithographers and the Photoengravers had been able to merge, but that was on a one-to-one basis. That's difficult enough. Merging more than two unions at a time, we said, in our opinion, was extremely unlikely to happen.

INTERVIEWER: Just because of the administrative difficulty. .. .

STONE: That's right.

INTERVIEWER: . . .of absorbing that many administrative entities.

STONE: Yeah, and getting agreement to go along with that sort of thing. There are too many compromises that have to be made. How do you get that sort of thing to happen? And it didn't happen.

INTERVIEWER: Well, now, the Guild, as you pointed out, was interested in one big union, too, as was Connolly and the Bookbinders.

STONE: Yeah.

INTERVIEWER: So that is it fair to say that, if it wasn't going to be one big union, then the Guild lost

interest? In other words, what I'm asking is, here at the beginning of these merger discussions when Ken Brown becomes president, the Guild is in fact calling the meetings, is provided a great deal of impetus for them, and then that breaks down. I mean, when the merger with the Photoengravers and subsequently with the Bookbinders actually takes place, the Guild's not there.

STONE: My impression is--was and is--that the Guild is an extremely diversified, independent group of people, individuals.

INTERVIEWER: Prima donnas might be the word you're looking for! (Laugh)

STONE: Although their officers may have been and still are supporters of merger with someone,. . . . .

(END OF TAPE VI, SIDE 2)

INTERVIEWER: In other words, what you're saying is their officers were acting as enablers or facilitators. . . .

STONE: I think so.

INTERVIEWER: . . . .but that doesn't mean that the Guild would actually ever necessarily have been there.

STONE: That was my impression.

INTERVIEWER: Why don't we talk then about how, out of all of these efforts to stress unity themes, this talk about one big union and so forth, how did it finally settle on the Photoengravers?

STONE: Well, I think it settled on the Photoengravers because they were willing to merge. Out of those unity discussions one of those unity discussions--and they were called by the Newspaper Guild--Wickersham remembers talking to representatives of the Photoengravers, probably at that time Bill [Wilfred] Connell or Ed Nyegaard from New York.

INTERVIEWER: Another name which is sometimes mentioned is Walter Risdon.

STONE: Walter Risdon. That was the committee at the time, the first merger committee was those three men. They were fine men, and they were all sold on merger.

INTERVIEWER: Where were they from, Don? Where was Edward Nyegaard and Walter Risdon from?

STONE: Ed Nyegaard was from New York, the Photoengraver local in New York, and Connell was the president of the Photoengravers in Boston. That, by the way, was a split-office situation, too. The president was in Boston; the secretary-treasurer was in St. Louis. Walter Risdon was from, well, I think, Washington, where he later was. I think he was from Washington.

INTERVIEWER: D.C.?

STONE: Yeah.

INTERVIEWER: What were Nyegaard's relationships like with Local One of the Amalgamated?

STONE: I doubt very much if there was any relationship at all to speak of. I can't really say that. I don't know how they operated on a local level. Local One of the Lithographers was always very much its own entity and still is. It doesn't participate in the labor movement; it doesn't participate in unity efforts. It goes its own way. It did and does. So that I really am not familiar in any particular way with the relationship, but I think it was a distant one.

INTERVIEWER: All right. Well, both Nyegaard and Risdon died while these talks were in progress. Is that right? The reason that I say that is that I have a note in my research that in March, 1963, Nyegaard died.

STONE: Yes.

INTERVIEWER: And I guess what I'm really asking is what effect did that have on merger, if any?

STONE: Before that, before Nyegaard died, what concerned us greatly was that Bill Connell, the president of the Photoengravers, was defeated by Bill Hall. It is a matter of record that, although Bill Hall might deny it, his campaign against Connell was based in part on the fact that he was a supporter of merger. He might have hedged it a little, you know, as is so frequently done by saying, "What's the hurry?" You know, that sort of thing--why all this pressure--that sort of thing. But it nevertheless was an appeal made to members by Executive Vice-President Hall, which, if it wasn't to stop merger talks, it certainly was to delay them and slow them down and so on. So that we were much concerned, I recall, when Hall defeated Connell, that that would be the end of the merger

In fact it was not, because Executive Vice-President Hall, now Executive Vice-President Hall, quickly took a stand in favor of merger.

Ed Nyegaard died during those talks. Walter Risdon, you know, didn't die during the talks. He died after merger.

INTERVIEWER: Oh, I didn't realize that.

STONE: He died after merger. I think he was part of the merger committee to the end, and I've forgotten who went on as the third person.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. Well, I'd like to separate out two issues. One, before we get into the convention in 1963 where all hell broke loose with Local One. . . . and there is documented there some of the issues that were causing some trouble in the minds of some of the delegates about merger in regard to the Inter Local Pension Fund, the Lithographers Pension Fund, the discussion about tax situations, and, as you point out, why all this hurry--these kinds of issues that came up on the floor of the convention of 1963.

But to move back to the period of 1962 in the merger discussions, what were some of the things that needed to be ironed out? You know, we read various headlines: "Photoengraver Merger Talks Progress." Well, what did that really mean?

STONE: Well. . . .

INTERVIEWER: In other words, I guess what I'm asking is were these things like the pension--at that time in 1962--were these stumbling blocks to the talks within the committee itself?

STONE: I don't recall that they were. There was a fairly substantial difference between the funds. The defense fund was really a major problem. We wanted to combine the defense funds, and we worked out a proposition where the Photoengravers would continue to pay the assessment so that they'd bring their per capita equity up to the same as the Lithographers and so on.

The first thing that always has to be done is to get over the business of the officer structure. That is paraphrasing by saying that first you have to get commitment to merger. You don't get commitment to merger until you know what's going to happen with the officers. That was the big thing. Once that's been done, the rest of it is really mechanics, and we really took that position. You know, you've got travel cards and transfer cards--those are all details--the differences in

procedures, the differences in the funds. The Photoengraver death benefit was in trouble. We knew it at the time. We didn't merge the funds in any way, or didn't attempt to. We merged the defense funds because that really is a key, and we merged the general funds.

INTERVIEWER: Why do you say that is a key?

STONE: Well, we didn't do it when the Bookbinders merged. But, you just have to, because you can't be paying different benefits to people within the same union. We're doing it now, but you know, it'll work about so long. It isn't going to work any more. Our referendum now that's out to the Bookbinder members is to change to bring the same pay in and the same pay out in the defense fund. Well, I think it is a key because that's where your strength is.

INTERVIEWER: How had that been handled in the Amalgamated? If you were on strike, what kind of benefits did you get and under what circumstances?

STONE: Well, it was, I think, at the time fifty dollars a week. There were strike, lockout, and sacrifice benefits in the Amalgamated. If a strike was approved, the members who were on strike would get fifty dollars a week. The lockout business was new to the Photoengravers, as I recall; we paid benefits if, in fact, a plant was shut down by the strike of another union.

INTERVIEWER: And you also paid benefits to an individual who might have been unemployed for. . . .

STONE: What we call sacrifice benefits.

INTERVIEWER: Right.

STONE: Those perhaps were different in the Photoengravers. I don't remember the details any more. But in any case, we worked out one fund and didn't have any problem with that. We didn't work it out on the death benefit, didn't do anything on the pension. They kept their pension plan. In fact, you asked if the Inter-Local was a problem in the negotiations, the Inter-Local Pension Plan, and the answer's no. We simply kept them separate. I don't think that was ever a major issue. It might have been on the convention floor, but on the convention floor. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, right. The point is you already had some three or four different pension plans in the Amalgamated itself.

STONE: Yeah.

INTERVIEWER: Local One had its own pension plan; there was the Inter Local Pension Fund; and then other locals had still other plans. Isn't that correct?

STONE: Some of them had individual local plans.

INTERVIEWER: Yes. And all of these were separate.

STONE: Yeah.

INTERVIEWER: Okay, well, maybe we ought turn the discussion to 1963, because there were letters read on the convention floor from various lawyers and actuaries, in which they stated that this would be a problem if these funds were not merged. (Interruption in the tape) This relates to this question of merger of the pension funds, where Councillor Hansen read a letter from Robert Andoin, Counsellor at law, Lexington Avenue, New York. The letter was addressed to President Swayduck, in which he says that he met with some people from the Technical Rulings Division from the IRS. (quoting from Convention Proceedings) "We discussed in a general way the possible application to the Pension Fund of the broad tax exemption for labor unions under Section 501 (c). . . and other matters. . . . All three conferees agreed that a change in the Constitution and By-laws to permit the Pension Fund to exclude from participation the members of the Photoengravers Union after they became members of a local, would constitute a material change in the circumstances that would require a new ruling in order to maintain continued qualifications under Section 501 (c)."[1]

STONE: Well, that recalls for me the legal controversy, but I think we have to bear in mind that Local One was opposed to the thing in the first place. They were not on the record as opposed to it, by the way. All through the Council meetings that were held, President Brown was very careful to make clear what was happening, what we were doing, in getting a vote of support. The councillors in New York were all lined up in support. But the legal issues that were raised, there was always a big question about how legitimate they were, whether they were diversionary tactics designed to. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Well, let me ask you this. When you did merge and various locals merged without merging the pension funds, did you in fact have any kind of difficulty in clarification with the IRS?

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[1] Convention Proceedings, Seventeenth Biennial Convention of the ALA, Montreal, Canada, September 9-13, 1963, p. 168.

STONE: No. I think we did have to, as I recall, go to IRS for a reinterpretation, but that wasn't a major problem.

INTERVIEWER: It was a question of filling out a form and not. . . .

STONE: That sort of thing, yeah.

INTERVIEWER: All right, in this 1963 convention that was held in Montreal, Canada--correct me if I'm wrong--Local One held some kind of rump convention at the same time.

STONE: They were holding meetings, yeah; they were holding meetings across the street, at which Robinson was present.

INTERVIEWER: Now, who is "they"?

STONE: Local One.

INTERVIEWER: Exclusively or did they have people like Ted Meyers and. . . .

STONE: Yes, they did. Ted Meyers and a man from Seattle and. . . .

INTERVIEWER: You mean Eugene Macellari?

STONE: Yeah. Eugene Macellari and a couple of others, some were listening in; some were participating. But those meetings were going on in an effort to, basically, solicit support for what they were going to do later on, which was to walk out if merger became a reality.

INTERVIEWER: And you were aware that these meetings were going on?

STONE: Yeah, we knew they were going on.

INTERVIEWER: Well, what was your response to this?

STONE: Robinson, of course, was Local One's lawyer at that time; he was not the lawyer of the International.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, he had been let go.

STONE: Well, let's say he made a mistake. . . .

INTERVIEWER: In other words, he had been told he couldn't wear both hats.

STONE: That's true and then made the decison to go with Local One.

INTERVIEWER: When was that?

STONE: The date?

INTERVIEWER: Hm-hm. Do you remember when that was?

STONE: (leafing through papers) Robinson went out with the statement that. . . . At the Council meeting in Mt. Gabriel, Quebec, August 6, 1962: "A motion was made that the Council Board establish a policy for the International that the Legal Counsel of the International should be independent and not legal counsel for any other local of the Amalgamated. Robinson stated that the Board had adopted a policy; and since he was in conflict with that policy, he did not want to presume the right to speak on behalf of the organization 'unless you specifically authorize me.' President Brown pointed out that nobody had terminated his services. Robinson stated, 'I would not leave the organization in the lurch any more than I would ignore some bum on the street that asked me to help him.'" (Laughter) And it was then that Robinson submitted a statement which said he was through. He would continue to serve, not leave the organization in the lurch, to serve but only as a lawyer on the cases that had already started. That was his point.

INTERVIEWER: Right. So who did you hire then to be the General Counsel to the Union?

STONE: We went to Dilson and Gordon. I'm reasonably sure of this--they've been our lawyers since then.

INTERVIEWER: All right. Well, what was the lineup in the Council in making this decision that Robinson couldn't wear both hats, that he couldn't be the lawyer for both. . . .

STONE: The vote was (looking through papers). . . .I can go to the Council meeting and probably find it. The vote was eleven to four. The four would have been Swayduck and Hansen and Meyers and I don't know who the fourth might have been. I think Meyers was on the Council at that time. Let me see. . . .(membling). . . don't have a list of the councillors. . . .as I say, we can go to the Council. . . .let's see, we had Hansen, Swayduck, Theodore Meyers. . . . A likely candidate might have been George Cook for that fourth vote.

INTERVIEWER: Where was he from?

STONE: He was from the Atlantic Region. Buffalo or Rochester, Buffalo perhaps. In other words, he was pretty much dependent on support from New York City for his job, and he might have been that fourth vote.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah. Let me ask you this. When you proceeded against Robinson in this way, did you anticipate that it might drive Local One out of the organization?

STONE: Oh, no, I don't think we had any idea. I remember telling Ken Brown on the eve of the day they left that they'd never do it! So I wasn't a very good prognosticator. No, we did not anticipate that. That, I think, came as very much of a shock. I don't think Ken Brown had any idea that it was ever going to happen.

INTERVIEWER: Why did you think that they would not do it?

STONE: Because I didn't see why they should. They had a great deal to lose. I had no idea. . . .the officers had supported merger all the way down the line; they really had. And as I said before, Ken Brown was very careful to make sure they were on the record. There had been, you know, some threats, and there had been a great deal of irascibility. These Council minutes which I have been looking at indicate some of the areas in which there were aggravations between Local One representatives and President Brown, between Swayduck and President Brown. But I had no idea that they would pull out. There was an awful lot to lose there for the local officers and their members. I couldn't believe they'd do that.

In fact, their arguments against merger were, from our point of view, absolutely phony. They just weren't there, but they convinced their members that they were there; and that's what they had to do.

INTERVIEWER: Well, there was a special Council meeting called on October 8, 1963, in New York to discuss the secession of Local One, and you apparently had been to a meeting of Local One on which you were reporting at that special Council. Is that correct?

STONE: Could be. I was going to those meetings as a member until I got thrown out.

INTERVIEWER: Yes, hm-hm. When did you get thrown out?

STONE: Well, I don't recall the date. Phil Zeiger and I were physically barred from a meeting of the local at one point, and I was attacked from the podium verbally for keeping notes because I have notes of some of those meetings at which Swayduck, you know, attacked everybody from the International and so on. He could see me taking notes and challenged me on my right to take notes, saying I'd be thrown out if I didn't quit.

INTERVIEWER: Now (laughing), what kind of response did he get from his own local? I mean, that's a little bit surprising, you know, that he would attack a guy. . .You were a member of the local, right?

STONE: Yeah.

INTERVIEWER: All right. And you were sitting there taking notes. Well, why not?

STONE: That's a good question, but Swayduck always had. . . .the control he had in his local was always unbelievable to anybody from outside. He had it organized, and he had teeth in it. He policed the shops; he had his own people as the shop delegates. He put them in there; and if they didn't behave themselves, they. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Could be removed?

STONE: Yeah, not from office but from their job! You know, he had job control he had unbelievable job control, and that's where his strength came from. Now, on the floor, he had always had his buddies around and support, and then he had a lot of people who wouldn't dare stick their heads up on any occasion. Yeah, nobody protested that sort of thing. Nobody would dare.

INTERVIEWER: Well, now, one of the things that came out of your report that amazed me was that you reported some effort or some approach by Swayduck to merge with ITU at this point.

STONE: Yeah, well, in fact that happened.

INTERVIEWER: Locally?

STONE: Local One is an affiliate of the ITU.

INTERVIEWER: Oh, really? I didn't know that.

STONE: It's a bastard affiliate, but it's an affiliate. They pay a dollar a member, and they have since right after merger.

INTERVIEWER: In other words, he did make some kind of an agreement with ITU.

STONE: Yes, he did; yes, he did.

INTERVIEWER: That sort of shuts off any more merger talks with ITU, doesn't it? (Laughter)

STONE: Not necessarily, not necessarily, because he doesn't swing any weight there, I don't think. A dollar a member is what they pay.

INTERVIEWER: And at least it keeps him from being so far out in the cold.

STONE: Yeah, well, it gives them the right to use the label, gives them a label. But they have no voting rights; they don't vote in the ITU.

I understand he has been to some of their conventions, but he doesn't have any standing there.

INTERVIEWER: Right. Well, one of the issues that Local One was raising, then, that people like Hansen and Meyers were raising, was this question that we've already talked about--the merger of the Pension and Mortuary Fund. What I would like to get on the record: in your merger discussions, had anyone ever considered merging the Pension and Mortuary Fund? Because what I find Swayduck saying is that, while they're not going to merge the Pension and Mortuary Fund now, they will; and then you will be in great trouble.

STONE: Well, that was a political argument, you know. The fact of the matter is we weren't going to do any such thing anyway until all the members agreed. You know, you had to take votes to do that. So the whole argument was really just something to get the delegates excited about.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. Well, how much did it cost you to lose Local One? How much did per cap go down versus how much it might have gone up because of the merger?

STONE: It went down $40,000 a month, as I recall, which was a lot. And then what happened. . .and they had been withholding their per capita for a period of months. They were delinquent, actually, when

they went to the convention. They had been withholding their. . . well, that probably is not true, that they were in good standing when they went to the convention and they withheld their per capita afterwards because the merger took place in '64. When was their actual date on which they withdrew?

INTERVIEWER: Well, it must have been prior to October, 1963, so it must have been between. . . .

STONE: Prior to?

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, I think so because that special Council meeting was called to discuss the secession of Local One. So they must have. . . .

STONE: And that special Council meeting was when?

INTERVIEWER: October 8, 1963. The convention was in September, so it must have been within a matter of a week or so after the convention.

STONE: Right. And they seceded formally. They had withheld their per capita, I think, for a matter of three months. As I recall now, they only sent in their per capita, enough per capita to get them by the convention, just to be in good standing. There are certain rules and, as I recall it, three months delinquency. So that that money was lost.

We were badly in need of money; we had to have some money to run. We worked it out at the Council meeting. . . .

(END OF TAPE VII, SIDE 1)

STONE: . . . .(in mid sentence) . . . .Mortuary Fund. And Swayduck moved into the courts to get an injunction against us, so we could not borrow from the Mortuary Fund; and we really were in tough shape. That's when we went to the members for a special assessment of five dollars a member per month for three months, as I recall, a fifteen-dollar assessment.

INTERVIEWER: And your membership supported you on this?

STONE: Yeah, to get us over that kind of a hump. This, of course, was immediately before merger with the Photoengravers.

INTERVIEWER: That's pretty incredible! (Laughter)

STONE: Yes, it is. We were impressed!

INTERVIEWER: Yes, I think you were! You had good reason to be.

STONE: We were impressed. It was a hell of a job down there, too. A lot of work went into that.

INTERVIEWER: Five dollars a month is quite a personal investment on the part of each and every member.

STONE: Yeah. And particularly under those circumstances. You're now going to work out a merger with another union? You know, why shouldn't they pay? All those questions can be raised. Why shouldn't they pay it, too? Is this what the merger's going to cost us? And all that sort of thing.

In spite of all the questions that might have been raised, it was passed by a good vote, as I recall, and done with a tremendous effort, too. The members had to be informed what the issues were, and they were.

INTERVIEWER: All right. Well, after the merger became official, there was the question of merging locals. I'm wondering, from your position, kind of looking at it on the overview, if you feel you're able to make some generalizations about pre-conditions of merger. That is, Hawaii was the first merged LPIU local, why Hawaii? Why were mergers able to go forward fairly easily in some places and in other places we've yet to see merger?

STONE: Well, Hawaii got the first charter as a 500 Series merged local. In fact, they're not a merged local at all because there was no Photoengravers local in Hawaii.

INTERVIEWER: Oh, I see. That made it easy! (Laughter)

STONE: That makes it easy. Our local was organizing in all areas then and still is. We were organizing photoengravers. The answer is there was no Photoengravers local in Hawaii, and so you have no problem. And yet all the local had to do was to commit itself to organizing across the jurisdiction, lithographers and photoengravers.

INTERVIEWER: Any photoengravers that might appear.

STONE: And they got that label. Now, that is not true in most of the others. The answer to your question--why is it easy in some places and not in

others?--is because the officer structure can be determined in some locals and can't be in others. Philadelphia's a typical example. You've got tremendous conflict between the officers; nobody's going to give up their position there. Certainly Milt Williams, as president of the Lithographers, is not going to take second place to some of the others.

INTERVIEWER: To Alan Page.

STONE: Yeah, to Alan Page, who in his opinion hasn't done anything--in his opinion and mine as well--to justify his being the leader of that local. As long as that situation exists and the members in each local support their officers. . . .you know, there are a lot of them--Chicago. Well, the Lithographers and the Photoengravers merged in Chicago, but they haven't in. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Pittsburgh.

STONE: . . .some other cities. Not in Pittsburgh. Not in Appleton, Wisconsin, which happens to be. . . you know, there should be a three-way merger there, and all the three local officers want the job. Until that can be resolved, either through the officers changing their minds or the local members insisting that they change their minds. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Or attrition. Somebody gets old and dies!

STONE: . . . .nothing's going to happen. That's really the answer to that. Back to the question of what you have to work out first. You've got to work out your officer structure.

INTERVIEWER: So that you think that these personal or personnel--either way you want to pronounce it or spell it--are the critical things, rather than the realities of organization or. . . .

STONE: Always, always. Once the commitment is there. . . . and you know, that's a fancy phrase for saying once the commitment is there to the extent that the officers who really have to make the commitment are willing to work out an officer structure, then the rest of it is mechanics. You can work those out.

INTERVIEWER: Well, in the fall of 1964 there seems to have been considerable petty activity with respect to. . . . I gather that to say that the officers of the LPIU looked at the world and said, "Today the Photoengravers; tomorrow the world. . . ." Because Ken Brown was talking about graphic arts unity; the Guild is again calling

meetings; merger talks are going on with the Printing Pressmen; the Stereotypers urged unity with all speed; Bookbinder leader urges unity. What happened?

STONE: Well, I think we reviewed what happened with the Pressmen. And we reviewed what happened with the Stereotypers. We did move very quickly and came close to merger with both the Printing Pressmen and with the Stereotypers and Electrotypers. We were in fact convinced that we should not be talking with both of them at once, and we really kept them aside, kept the Stereotypers and Electrotypers at arms length until we had worked out our business with the. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Absorbed the Photoengravers.

STONE: . . . .Well, with the Pressmen. When we came to the end of that road with the Pressmen and we didn't appear to be going anywhere, then we started our talks with the Stereotypers and Electrotypers. Now, who else was involved? We really at that time were not talking with the Bookbinders, as I recall. We have always had the conviction that the important merger for us is with the Printing Pressmen. We haven't been able to work it out, and we still don't know how we can work it out; but we still believe that that's the one that makes the most sense. But we're committed to the business of one union, and we're committed to merging with any union now that we can work out a merger with on the road to that one union.

Now, there are some problems that are arising. I'm not sure that our Council Board is so ready right now to take on another merger, that they'll find some reasons why we couldn't if the officers proposed it.

INTERVIEWER: Do you think that was a tactical error to hold the Electrotypers and Stereotypers off if they were hot for merging, that maybe it might have been a better idea to go ahead. . . . ?

STONE: No, not really.

INTERVIEWER: No.

STONE: Not really. Their officers, in the final analysis, really didn't sell it or they could have gotten a two-thirds vote. They just weren't that great leaders if you come right down to it.

INTERVIEWER: Hm-hm, yeah, because they did present it to the membership for a vote and then received a majority vote but not the requisite two-thirds vote.

STONE: That's right. They didn't sell it. These things are not easy.

INTERVIEWER: By the way, was that a majority vote of those appearing at the convention, or was that a referendum vote?

STONE: It was a referendum. They were both referendum votes.

INTERVIEWER: It was a referendum. Well, what kind of unity is there today in terms of organizing? I gather from some things I read that in Canada there are certain unified organizing campaigns that were going on at least four or five years ago. Is that. . . . ?

STONE: I think there still are, but I think they're very limited, very limited. It's a rare city where the unions have really gotten together. In most cases the officers don't even know each other, in more cases than those in which there's a relationship.

INTERVIEWER: I know I asked John Connolly this question because he has been active in the Allied Printing Trades Council, and there are cities where the Allied Printing Trades Council is very much of a power, like in Boston, where they do in fact know each other. What strikes me as strange is I can't see a pattern that in Boston this is more likely to occur than in Philadelphia where the Allied Printing Trades Council is not the same kind of entity.

STONE: You mean a pattern as to why it occurs?

INTERVIEWER: No. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't see more coordinated activity going on in Boston than in Philadelphia.

STONE: No, I don't think there is, either. I think everybody's on their own now. You know, the Allied is a very specific label-oriented thing which doesn't necessarily relate to organizing. It's true they know each other.

INTERVIEWER: No matter how much the Union Label Department tries to tell us that it is! (Laughing)

STONE: It's true they know each other. And it's only through the Allied, I suppose, that they really do know each other to the extent that they get together in the Allied, some of the officers, you

know, the representatives to the Allied, but not usually the local officers anyway. They often relegate that to some eager, not too bright guy!

INTERVIEWER: Right. Now, the other generalization that I would be inclined to make is it seems to me the IPP & AU organizes pretty much of anybody. For example, they're trying to organize newspaper reporters in New Jersey, and that clearly would be the Guild jurisdiction except that the Guild is apparently not interested in it.

STONE: No.

INTERVIEWER: If a merger had been successful with the IPP & AU, what effect do you think that would have had? Or is that no longer really characteristic of the IPP & AU?

STONE: What, that they'll organize anybody?

INTERVIEWER: Yes.

STONE: Of course, the GAIU will, too, you know! (Laughter) And does and is.

INTERVIEWER: Right, so you're saying that wouldn't have been a problem because it would have been a merger of two. . . . (Laughing). . . .

STONE: I wouldn't think so. I mean we don't organize Guild people, for example. We happen to think the Pressmen are pretty unscrupulous, and we hope we're not that unscrupulous. . . . .

INTERVIEWER: Well, what would be your. . . .

STONE: . . . .but we are organizing typesetters in government printing in the government printing office and elsewhere as well. In Vancouver, you know, Earl Kinney organizes everybody and has for a long time. Now, the ITU, of course, is out of the AFL-CIO and therefore are not subject to the same sanctions. We're not subject to the same sanctions because we organize the Typographical Union members that we would if we were organizing any other area, but, you know, that's not necessarily a very honorable position. It's a very unprincipled position. Presumably the Typographical Union's entitled to organize the people, and we're trying to take them away from them. Just because the AFL-CIO is not going to slap our hand if we do is no real reason why we should.

But the answer to your question is, if the GAIU and the IPGCU.. . .that's a new name, you know; it's not IPP & AU anymore.

INTERVIEWER: What does it stand for?

STONE: International Printing and Graphic Communications Union.

INTERVIEWER: Yes, okay, that's reflective of their wider vision!

STONE: Yeah. If we had merged, I assume our jurisdiction would be pretty wide.

INTERVIEWER: All right. Well, in conversations with Bill Moody, he seems to think that after 1967 all of this kind of died down. He called it "the big pause" from 1967 until the merger with the Bookbinders gets underway seriously in late 1968. But he didn't say what he thought caused a "big pause." So number one, I'm asking you do you think merger plans were more or less set aside there for a period of time? And if you do agree with that, why?

STONE: Well, I think it's the business of trying to work out the mechanics, too. Unions merging is not easy. It seems to me it was about that time that we went to the computer. We had to combine all the records. Just the whole business of getting the organization functioning again as an entity has to lessen your enthusiasm for merger for awhile. I mean, we're in another period where some of our people are saying, "For God's sake, not again!" (Laughter)

INTERVIEWER: Well, why don't we spell out a little bit more specifically. You say the business of merging the pensions was not really a big problem. The business of tax status was not really a very big problem.

STONE: I don't think that business of tax status was a big problem. I think it was made to be a big problem for some political reasons.

INTERVIEWER: Okay.

STONE: Now, you know, it's true that those exemptions for pension plans and so on are rather sticky things, but you never know how much lawyers take out of those things, either. So I don't know. (Laughter)

INTERVIEWER: They tell you it's going to be a big problem so you'll digest the fee more easily.

STONE: I don't think that was really a major item.

INTERVIEWER: Well, why don't we spell out a little bit more specifically what are the major items. Now, you alluded to the fact that you computerized your records, and just the business of having to deal with putting two organizations together was a problem. In what way?

STONE: Well, it's always a problem in absorbing officer duties.

INTERVIEWER: Your own role changed in the course of this. . . .

STONE: It did.

INTERVIEWER: We'd better say on the record just how it did.

STONE: My own role, we'll start with the change in the title. First I was the secretary-treasurer of the Amalgamated Lithographers, and in the first merger I became recording and financial secretary. The secretary-treasurer was Ben Schaller of the Photoengravers. His office was in St. Louis.

INTERVIEWER: I see. Now, he died fairly soon, didn't he?

STONE: He died fairly soon after that. And that office stayed in St. Louis, and the physical problem of trying to work out a bookkeeping operation between St. Louis and having your major records in New York was really a tremendous one. In fact, I really don't know how it would ever have worked out. We were struggling with it when Ben died. Perhaps that was partly responsible for his death. I don't know. But anyway, I really don't know how it would have worked out. Everybody was fighting for a position. I'm not saying I was, but I'm saying my staff was. The bookkeeper in the New York office was damned anxious to protect his jurisdiction. In fact, he had to. I mean, that's where the whole operation was, and we had to duplicate all records to send them to St. Louis. It really was very difficult.

INTERVIEWER: How did that get resolved?

STONE: Well, Ben Schaller died, and Dan Streeter was appointed, as I recall, and then elected with the understanding that he would come in. [to New York] We just simply closed the office in St. Louis and combined the office in New York, and then there was really no problem. But the combining of the records, you know, that was our department, and that's a fair job. But it's mechanical again. But the problem of the duties of the officers and the staff, you're now trying to integrate two groups of officers and two groups of representatives, and the question is

who negotiates and who handles grievances and so on. That's a difficult job because the Photoengraver locals are saying, "We want a Photoengraver," and the Lithographic locals are saying, "We want a Lithographer." Sometimes they're negotiating at the same time to get two men in the same city, and some of them have to travel a long way. All that sort of thing. So you move as quickly as you can to. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Just logistics, in other words.

STONE: Yeah. You move as quickly as you can to get your people trained to handle the other. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Now, how are you doing that? Are you actually having classes for staff people who have been servicing Lithographic locals; are they actually being trained in some way in Bookbinder techniques, problems, etc.?

STONE: Not really, not really, except that there are seminars through the Educational Department which may help some. But basically that's not so. We're assuming that the same process goes on in negotiating. Now, it's true that a Lithographic representative is not going to know all the machines that the Bookbinders work on and what the manning requirements are and all that sort of thing, and vice versa. So that there's got to be some problem, but we believe that basically the negotiating techniques are the same and that those representatives working in a city can be filled in on the details, the mechanics of the machines and so on, by the local people who know the machines well. They work with a local committee who briefs them on what the problems are. And basically nowadays they're beginning to. . .anybody handles any assignment. That doesn't mean that all locals accept that.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. When the Bookbinders merged, did your title or duties change again at all?

STONE: My title changed, and my duties changed. I was recording and financial secretary in the LPIU, and Dan Streeter was the secretary-treasurer. When we merged, the secretary-treasurer's job and title was taken by a Bookbinder, Wes Taylor; Dan Streeter became the financial secretary; I became the recording secretary. And in fact my duties have changed because I have very little to do with the finances anymore. I did enough, and Dan Streeter and I were the financial officers. Now I have very little to do with the financial thing at all.

INTERVIEWER: Now you are primarily taking care of the minutes of the Council meetings, the referendums, this kind of thing.

STONE: Yeah, and I've been rather busy at it!

INTERVIEWER: Yeah! (Laughing)

STONE: Especially that last referendum of the Bookbinders. I seem to keep busy. I do most of the writing and most of the memos of the things that are done. I do a good bit of the correspondence on records, not on financial matters, but on records, dealing with withdrawal cards and that sort of thing. A great deal of that.

INTERVIEWER: Well, I guess the time has come to ask you what have we failed to cover adequately?

STONE: Oh, heavens, I don't know whether we've failed to cover anything. We really haven't talked at all about President Brown and his operation.

INTERVIEWER: All right.

STONE: I don't know that we should, but we haven't! (Laughter)

INTERVIEWER: Well, that's up to you! Whether you can talk about that or not! (Laughing)

STONE: You quoted, earlier, Munson on "it's not always easy to find a man who adapts to good times and bad times, etc."

INTERVIEWER: Right.

STONE: I suppose perhaps the implication is that now the organization has found such a man. If that's not the implication, it ought to be because. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, well, I think it was.

STONE: . . . .because Brown came in from Canada as the assistant to President Slater for one year and then as the president of the organization. He had a lot to learn about the International. I suppose, perhaps, because he was a Canadian, he had even less contact with the International than most local presidents; and most local presidents didn't have very much contact with the International at that time. The whole structure of the organization has changed under President Brown, meaning that there were regional vice-presidents, for example, and that has been eliminated so that the vice-presidents now are purely International, working on International programs. And Brown has been responsible for centralizing the operation of the union to the extent

it never was before. That really necessitates. . .he's ready to take on the responsibility of a centralized union because it puts a hell of a burden on the president, and he was and is capable.

At any rate, he came into the organization without a lot of knowledge about the International, which almost anybody would have done coming in from a. . . .

INTERVIEWER: And was immediately faced with two strike situations, one in San Francisco and one in Miami.

STONE: Yeah.

INTERVIEWER: That must have been. . . .

STONE: The one in San Francisco was very, very difficult because the people are very difficult there. That was a militant crew, where, as I recall, he had the responsibility of bringing them down off the ceiling and getting them to accept a contract.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, it didn't seem to me that he immediately takes on the responsibility in San Francisco. One would have thought he could have had considerable advice, that Slater could have been much more involved there than he was. After all, that's where Slater came from. But I don't find his footprints in terms of settling that strike.

STONE: No, you won't find many footprints of Mr. Slater, and of course that was one of the reasons Ken was brought in. He was brought in as an extremely capable and smart guy. No question about that. I've never really been convinced that Local One didn't have in mind that they could somehow control him, and he quickly moved to be his own man. He did it with considerable finesse, as a matter of fact. He was and is a smart fellow, a capable politician, one who knows where his strength is. . . . .

(END OF TAPE VII, SIDE 2)

STONE: . . . . .long to figure out that Robinson was in fact controlling the organization, and it got to the point where I recall going to conventions after Ken Brown got his feet on the ground. He believed it was the responsibility of officers and the International Council to go to convention with a program on issues

which we felt needed to be changed. Resolutions were written, done by the lawyer, drafted by the lawyer after consultation with Ken and often with the Council.

INTERVIEWER: This had not been characteristic of conventions prior to that?

STONE: Well, it's true. Yeah, that's true. But then we found ourselves with a lawyer writing resolutions for the local in New York to go to convention which were often contrary. . . .

INTERVIEWER: To established policy.

STONE: To the resolutions we were taking from the International Council. That's where the conflict of interest came in, one of the ways the conflict of interest came in. It became so obvious because we had controversial issues. As we got closer and closer to merger with the Photoengravers at least, controversial issues came up. And there were really controversial issues all the way through. There were the issues of moving the building; there were the issues of Secretary-Treasurer. Don Stone was getting into some trouble with the New York local; and a few things.

INTERVIEWER: Well, we didn't talk about moving the headquarters from New York to Washington.

STONE: No, we didn't. If we did, I would only brag about it, anyway. (Laughter)

INTERVIEWER: Well, otherwise the record is left hanging there in the air, you know, with this big issue as to where the headquarters are going to be. They were in New York after merger?

STONE: Yeah.

INTERVIEWER: What made you suddenly decide to pull up stakes and move to Washington?

STONE: I suspect it was a decision made basically by President Brown, but he got support for it.

INTERVIEWER: When did you move, by the way?

STONE: We moved in '71, May 10. I remember that day very well! (Laughter) Ken and I really worked our ass off on that business of moving that office. You know, once the decision had been made, we bought the building. We worked hard on finding the building in the first place. Ken and I worked very close together on it.

I made an awful lot of trips to Washington. We got our building; we bought it from Cafritz (they discuss the spelling), and they were to manage the building. They were prepared to do that. They managed a lot of buildings in the place, and they happened to own this one. There were about seven owners of the place, and they were anxious to get rid of it because it wasn't rented. The real-estate market was pretty bad about that time in Washington, and they had a couple of floors that were open and some other space as well. We were fortunate in the first place to get the building. And then having gotten it, we set a date; and Cafritz was going to do the work. We just kept on at them, and we made the date that we set, which I think never happens! We actually moved! We said we were going to move on the 10th of May, and the 10th of May we moved; we were here. A hell of a lot of work went into it, and I put in a lot of it myself.

INTERVIEWER: What are the advantages to being in Washington, Don?

STONE: I think there are advantages--I don't question that--advantages from a trade union point of view because we're close to the AFL-CIO and we have an opportunity to meet the officers and establish a relationship with the officers of a lot of the unions. I think that's important. I think it shows up in our relationship in the various local situations; you know, we're not exactly unknown.

We never really had any ambition to operate in isolation; unlike our New York local, we really don't want to operate in isolation. We really want to be, and have always believed in being part of the labor movement, part of a philosophy, and this is really where we can be. Some of the internationals have talked about this business, have had headquarters. . . . the Printing Pressmen, for one example, had headquarters in Happy Valley, Tennessee--Pressmen's Home, Tennessee.

INTERVIEWER: Kingsport, Tennessee.

STONE: Yeah, close to Kingsport, Tennessee. Pressmen's Home is actually a town.

INTERVIEWER: Oh, is it?

STONE: Yeah. They owned it, but it was still a town. We've never had any ambition to do that. In fact, we pressured them to move, and I think we had some impact on them. The Typographical Union has an office out in Colorado Springs; they have no business. You know, there's no reason, in my opinion, for a labor union to be isolated, away from activity. In the first place, it's expensive. You really need a transportation center because our people travel all the time.

But anyway, we had established an office in Washington years ago. Jack Wallace, Vice-President Wallace, was our first legislative representative, and that was in the early sixties, I think. He was playing sort of a dual role here because we were trying to work out some problems with the Government Printing Office and the Government Workers and so on. Jack became responsible for that and then was our legislative representative if we had one. But anyway, we'd talked about that sort of thing since the first convention I ever went to in 1946, talked about COPE and. . . .

INTERVIEWER: And you were heavily active in it.

STONE: . . . .became part of it and tried to raise some money at least within that and become active in the legislative process. And this of course gets us into the legislative process to an extent we never have been and couldn't possibly be if we were in New York.

INTERVIEWER: Right. That leads me to ask you a question. You were one of the few international unions that bolted from the Meany position with respect to endorsement of the candidacy of George McGovern. Has that position isolated you to some extent? Or has it not?

STONE: (chuckling) What it may have done is to have set back President Brown's opportunity to become a member of the Executive Board of the AFL-CIO for a period of time. In fact it hasn't isolated us at all. As a matter of fact, it has called attention, I suppose, to the Graphic Arts International Union, which we couldn't have earned any other way.

INTERVIEWER: In other words, a fellow like Joe Keenan became aware of you and worked with you in a way that he wouldn't have otherwise.

STONE: That's right. And right now the GAIU is involved in this delegate selection bit for the Democratic party. Vice-President Ed Donahue was over there representing Ken Brown in discussions with George Meany. They're trying to work out some kind of an accommodation where Meany doesn't go off one way and a lot of the other major unions go off in another way. Now, on the business of the delegate rules, which really created a problem in Kansas City at the convention recently, was largely responsible for the problem in Chicago. . . .

So anyway, the answer to your question is it hasn't at all isolated us. In practice I think it's going to

put us in closer contact with some of the unions, and increasingly more of them, I think, are going to rebel against George unless George Meany changes his position. He really appears to want to, or at least his henchmen did, want to go back to the old political control of the machines and get away from the delegate selection rules which really gave women and Blacks and some other people. . . .(knock on the door). . . .Come in!

DON STONE #III

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