An Interview with

William Schroeder

March 7, 1973

Washington, D.C.

Interviewer: Alice M. Hoffman

INTRODUCTION

Born in 1918 in Chicago and beginning his career in lithography as a dot etcher, William A. Schroeder became a member of Local 4 of the Amalgamated Lithographers in 1942. He describes the local union during the period of the forties and fifties: his service on the Referendum Board and the Pension Trustees; jurisdictional problems; problems caused by technological change; education problems and the creation of the Chicago Lithographic Institute at which Schroeder was an instructor; and significant strikes during that period. Schroeder reminisces about such union personalities as Fred Zeitz, Harry Spohnholtz, and Charlie Timmel. He also describes the craft of dot etching.

In 1960 Schroeder turned to organizing in the Chicago area and describes the nature of his work in that respect. He goes on to talk about his activities on the International level and his impressions of people like Ed Swayduck, Ben Robinson, Ted Brandt, and Ken Brown. He discusses the merger with the Photoengravers Union, of which he was a strong proponent--who urges it, how it came about, its difficulties and values, how it affected the powerful New York Local One. He offers insights into the rivalry felt by Swayduck and the New York Local One and the intrigues in the 1963 convention in Montreal.

In 1964 Schroeder was asked to make a study of web offset presses and to evaluate their possible impact on his industry. As "Special Assistant to the President," he traveled all over the country, visiting plants and questioning employers and conducting seminars to emphasize the need for improved education. In 1966 he took over the job of Education Director. He describes the unique program he adopted and speculates on the future of educational programs. Finally Schroeder became vice president of the union and chairman of the Education Committee. He outlines the system of selecting vice presidents, how they are elected in the merged organization, what their duties are, and the politics behind the elections of Ted Brandt and Ed Donahue to that office.

One of Schroeder's jobs as vice president has been setting up a cooperative program between the Union, the companies, and the government ot study the effects of the environment in occupational situations (in this case, of graphic arts employment)--the National Institute on Occupational Safety and Health.

ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW

WITH

WILLIAM SCHROEDER

Interviewer: Alice M. Hoffman
Place: Washington, D.C.
Date: March 7, 1973

SCHROEDER: My name is William A. Schroeder. I was born in Chicago, on May 11, 1918.

HOFFMAN: I understand you found first employment in February of 1936?

SCHROEDER: That's right.

HOFFMAN: Had you graduated high school?

SCHROEDER: Oh, yes.

HOFFMAN: You had graduated from high school in Chicago?

SCHROEDER: In Chicago.

HOFFMAN: You father was a bookbinder?

SCHROEDER: Right.

HOFFMAN: So, therefore you naturally sought some kind of employment in the printing trades?

SCHROEDER: There was no relationship between the fact that he was a bookbinder and I got into the trade. How I happened to get in there was that one of my school chums got a job in that same plant as a lithographer; I didn't even know what a lithographer was. But I knew that it involved some art ability, and I had ideas of being a commercial artist at that time. So I went over there and I had to submit sketches that I had done. They put me on for a week, on a trial basis--at no pay.

(Interruption on tape)

HOFFMAN: Well, you were talking about your first job in this company that made postcards, which was a non-union shop. You had mentioned that they offered you a job and told you [that] you could work on a trial basis for one week with no pay.

SCHROEDER: Right.

HOFFMAN: So, what did they start you doing?

SCHROEDER: Well, the first job I had was sharpening slates. That's something you don't even see. They were slate sticks about four or five inches long and about one-fourth inch square. They were used to make corrections on press plates. You'd sharpen them on sandpaper. So, in addition to making color separations for postcards you had to make press plate corrections. The first job was sharpening slates for all the other fellows that did that. The other thing was to rub tusche, and that was a job every Monday morning. You'd take tusche--it was manufactured by Korn and made from vegetable oils--you'd rub this bar, black in color, and about four inches long, about one-and-one-half inches wide and about three-eighths inch thick, I'd say, you'd rub that into a bowl, a regular soup bowl, add a little water at a time, rub it with your fingers, and turn the bowl, keeping enough water in there to keep dissolving the tusche until you had it all dissolved. Then you'd pour it into the individual bottles. They'd use India ink bottles for the tusche. That would be the substance which you'd use to work on plates with a pen or a brush. You could use Korn's crayon directly on plates, or you could use this tusche on the zinc plates. We didn't use stones anymore; we used zinc plates. But when you'd rub that tusche, you couldn't have any bubbles in; if you got any bubbles in they'd throw it out and you'd have to start all over. It would take about four hours to rub one of those bowls, and your fingers would be all shriveled when they got out of the water, you know. (laughter) So that was the first job.

HOFFMAN: They must have been pretty heavy, though.

SCHROEDER: The plates?

HOFFMAN: Yes.

SCHROEDER: No, they weren't. They were around 16/1000th thick, so they weren't really heavy. A lot heavier than the aluminum plates that they make today, but they were small. These plates were small that we worked on. There would be four latent images on the zinc plates that they'd put on there, and then you'd work by a system that could be compared to the number system that you have today.

HOFFMAN: Paint by number?

SCHROEDER: Yes, but not with paint. This vegetable compound was greasy, and that's what would create the printing image on the plate. You would also use crayon, and something I didn't mention before, and that is a system called Ben Day, which used films mounted in frames. The films had raised dots and were rolled up with ink and then transferred to the plate.

I gradually worked with the journeymen. Incidentally my first boss is now out in California, and I saw him the last time I was out there. He was my foreman at that time. He's a dot-etcher out in California and a member of Local 280--Kurt Brenner. So it was a real "kraut" joint. In fact, when they hired me, because of my German name, they thought I could speak German. Then, after they hired me, they found out I couldn't, and I was in a bit of trouble because they spoke so much German.

HOFFMAN: In the shop? Well, what were conditions like in this non-union shop?

SCHROEDER: Miserable! Miserable! As an example, there were no holidays, no vacations. I remember one of the conditions--you had to punch in ten minutes before eight o'clock or else they'd dock you fifteen minutes. So it wasn't a case of punching in by eight o'clock; you had to punch in ten minutes prior to. They had rules, shop rules, that you wouldn't believe today! I've forgotten a lot of them; I guess time must make you forget. But it was really a miserable condition.

I remember one time when Roosevelt was running for election and I had a Roosevelt button on. They made everybody take off their Roosevelt buttons, and I refused to do it. They were going to fire me, because I wouldn't take off my Roosevelt button.

HOFFMAN: Was this in 1936 or 1940?

SCHROEDER: I think it was 1936. I was standing by the time clock and the boss, Curt Teich, Jr., was standing there, and he said, "I don't want to see you with that button on tomorrow!" But I wore it anyhow, and he didn't say anything. But those are unbelievable things that would go on. One of my associates, for instance, was making $17.00 a week at that time. I don't know exactly what year it was, but I remember the incident. In making a correction on a press plate, he ruined the plate. He was making $17.00 and they deducted $14.00 out of his pay. So these are the things that went on.

At Christmas time, they would traditionally give out a $5.00 bonus. They'd use that bonus to ply information from people, get them in the office and actually bait them with that $5.00 just to find out what was going on. The employees in the shop tried to form their own bowling league and immediately when the company found out about it, they switched half the guys to nights so they couldn't have their own bowling league.

HOFFMAN: Because they were afraid they would discuss something other than bowling?

SCHROEDER: Right! That's right! So they had to keep the force divided. It was a pretty miserable situation, and fellows drifted away from there. They did organize the shop ultimately. I believe it was organized after the war. It wasn't organized during the way. It was after the war before it was actually organized.

HOFFMAN: Well, your unhappiness there caused you to look for employment elsewhere?

SCHROEDER: Well, there was talk in the shop there about unionizing the plant, but I could see that it was such a slow process, and there was so much fear. I must admit, at that time I didn't understand a lot of the things about the trade union movement in the shop, how to go about it. There wasn't the direction from the union then that you would get at this time. When I think of how we organize shops today compared to then. . . . If you were interested in the union, "fine, great, now go organize the shop," but they didn't know anything about it. There were no organizers, so it was a case of somebody who didn't know anything about the union trying to organize other people who also didn't know anything. (laughter)

HOFFMAN: So you began to seek some kind of employment where there was union representation?

SCHROEDER: Well, I went to the union office. I had been there before when I spoke to Fred Zeitz, who was president.

HOFFMAN: Who was the local union president, yes.

SCHROEDER: At that time we went into the back room, in the Council Board room, and called in George Canary, who was then the financial secretary. He told George, "Send this fellow over to Edwards & Deutsch." They called Edwards & Deutsch right from there, and I started to work the following week at Edwards & Deutsch, in 1942.

HOFFMAN: What kinds of constraints were there on you in leaving the job that you had?

SCHROEDER: Well, I became a probationary member of Local 4. I didn't know as much as I thought I knew about the trade, and as a result I had to actually. . . .

HOFFMAN: You considered yourself a dot-etcher?

SCHROEDER: We didn't call it a dot-etcher at that time. We didn't actually work on glass. At that time it was called a process-artist, a color artist, or a lithographic artist. There were a number of varied titles that people gave that particular job. But when I went to Edwards & Deutsch, it was really as a dot-etcher. I really didn't know as much as I thought I knew, and as a result I went back to being an apprentice. I got two years credit toward a journeyman's card, but [during] the two years of time I served as an apprentice at Edwards & Deutsch, I never was a full-fledged member. I was a probationary member.

HOFFMAN: Did this mean that you took a cut in pay to go to Edwards & Deutsch?

SCHROEDER: No. No, I got a good increase, because the wages were so bad at Curt Teich--I started there at $8.00 a week in 1936, and in 1942 when I left I was up to $35.00. It was $35.00 and I went to $45.00, so I got $10.00 more when I went to Edwards & Deutsch.

HOFFMAN: I think for the benefit of the recorder we better spell Curt Teich and Company.

SCHROEDER: C-U-R-T and the last name T-E-I-C-H, and Company.

HOFFMAN: Well, you had mentioned in a previous conversation that you risked the possibility of being drafted into the Army in 1942 in making this change.

SCHROEDER: Well, yes. I was deferred at Curt Teich because they did a lot of classified work such as aerial charts. At that time they were actually experimenting with flourescent inks, so the pilots could read the aerial charts in the cabin with a low volume of light, so I was deferred there. I was married in the fall of 1941 not too long before Pearl Harbor, but I was deferred because of the work. When I quit the job, the company threatened me with induction into the Army. I told them that I'd rather be in the Army than work for Curt Teich! But, lo-and-behold, I went over to Edwards & Deutch to find they were doing the same kind of work, and as a result, I had the same kind of deferment.

In fact, one time I was about to be inducted, because every six months they would review your classification, and they pulled me right out of the induction and sent me back to the plant, because there was a need for workers doing that kind of work. Most of the fellows who were drafted were put into Army and Navy units doing the same kind of work they were doing in the plant.

HOFFMAN: So you began to be active in Local number Four even though you were still on probationary status? Did you attend local union meetings at that time?

SCHROEDER: No, you couldn't attend the union meetings as a probationary member. I remember one time that I went to the meeting; I didn't even know that you couldn't attend. I went to the meeting, and they let me sit through that one meeting, but that was it. (laughter) Not until you're initiated!

HOFFMAN: What's the initiation like?

SCHROEDER: Oh, it's an oath of initiation. It's basically the same today as it was then. Of course, journeymen in the shop always made a big deal and exaggerated what was going to happen to you upon initiation, you know. You expected something horrible to happen.

HOFFMAN: A kind of hazing?

SCHROEDER: A kind of hazing, prior to initiation. They were great guys, but they kidded a lot and tried to work up an element of fear. (laughter) They don't do that today anymore, but that was the standard practice at that time.

HOFFMAN: So initiation was really kind of a big experience?

SCHROEDER: Oh, it was! It really was! You were put before the executive board and they questioned you for a long time about your attitudes. It wasn't an easy thing. I can still remember that interview where you were put in front of the whole executive board. These were all old-time journeymen and they had gone through strikes and they had gone through a lot of hard times to bring the union to where it was at that point. They were guarding their union quite jealously, so when you got into the union, you had to cross those hurdles before you had. . . .

HOFFMAN: What sort of questions did they ask you, Bill?

SCHROEDER: Oh, they wanted to know how you conducted yourself in the shop; how you felt about certain things about the union; what your attitudes will be in the future; how you will conduct yourself as a union man; that sort of thing. In other words, everybody, every member of that council board, or at least most of them would have some favorite questions to dig out and try to extract from you some of your inner feelings about trade unionism and about their union in particular.

HOFFMAN: That's interesting. Well, once you had gone through this probationary period, then I gather you did become active. It sounds as if you were sort of anxious to become active, if you went to a meeting and. . . .

SCHROEDER: Well, I enjoyed being a part of the union, but I can't say that I was really active in the union other than just attending the meetings and having an interest in what was going on. I was initiated in 1944, and I believe it was 1950 or 1951 when somebody nominated me. It was a union meeting that I didn't attend, in fact. Somebody nominated me for the Referendum Board, and I was elected. So that was the start. Then the following election I was re-elected to that and also elected to the Board of Pension Trustees. Now, that had to be in 1950 that I was elected to the Pension Trustees, because I was on the first board of the Pension Trustees when the Interlocal Pension Plan was founded in Chicago. It was a local board of trustees. So it must have been before 1950 or 1951 that I was on the Referendum Board. It must have been 1949. They must have had some election in between there. I can't figure out how that could be, because I know I was on the Referendum Board first and then on the Pension Board. I was at Newman Rudolph when that took place. I left Deutsch's and went to Newman Rudolph in 1949.

HOFFMAN: What was the job, being on the Referendum Board?

SCHROEDER: Strictly counting ballots. The office always mailed or sent the ballots out to the shop stewards--we called them shop delegates--and the ballots were distributed by the shop delegates to the members in the individual plants. They collected the ballots, turned them into the office in a sealed ballot box. It's still the same ballot box, by the way, that they had in Chicago. As progressive as Chicago is, they still have that same ballot box! Big wooden box. They'd deposit the ballots in there and the Referendum Committee, which was ten members, would sit down and count the ballots, physically count them. At that time it wasn't too big a job because there were somewhere around 2000 members, or something like that.

HOFFMAN: But these would be ballots on all sorts of issues?

SCHROEDER: Oh, yes. Every issue. Every referendum and election. You had the International elections; you had the local elections; any issue that came up that went by ballot, the Referendum Committee handled.

HOFFMAN: Well, why don't we try to develop a picture of Chicago Local 4 in this period of time, say from 1949 to 1959. I know in our previous conversation you had mentioned that probably the membership in this early period of time was what? only about 2,000 members?

SCHROEDER: The figure 2,000 stands out in my mind, but we'll have to check that figure. It seems around 2,000 members. I would say at the time of the end of World War II, I don't think it was more than 2000 members.

HOFFMAN: And with how many companies would this have been that you have had contractual relations?

SCHROEDER: I really don't know. I would guess that it would be somewhat less than a hundred.

HOFFMAN: So that many of these were very small shops.

SCHROEDER: Relatively so, but I would say that the major shops were organized. You had some good-sized shops--Edwards & Deutsch, Newman Rudolph. Edwards & Deutsch at that time had 175 members, somewhere around that. Today that is still a good-sized shop in our industry. Talking about the attitude of the local at that time, I would say that like most locals of that period, they were very provincial. There was a great feeling, a very great demand, for local autonomy. (laughter) Working for the International was not looked upon as any kind of an honorable position.

HOFFMAN: (laughingly) It was a sell-out if you went to work for the International.

SCHROEDER: No, I can't say that. It wasn't looked on as really any advancement. The local union was the thing.

HOFFMAN: And they were strongly craft-oriented?

SCHROEDER: Oh, very much so. And as we stated earlier, the affiliation with the CIO. . . . I can recall when we withdrew from the AFL. . . . Now, I don't recall that year. It was after the war.

HOFFMAN: I think it was 1948, wasn't it?

SCHROEDER: Must have been, must have been somewhere around that. I'm quite positive that the average member would have been absolutely content to be unaffiliated, really didn't see any need for joining any parent organization, but the local leadership saw the need. While I would say the average member didn't have any strong feelings in favor of the CIO, they accepted such an affiliation on the advice of the leadership, based upon the need for a parent organization.

HOFFMAN: What was the situation with respect to jurisdictional problems with Local 4? Were they involved in the same kinds of disputes that they were in other places with Photoengravers and Pressmen?

SCHROEDER: Chicago had an interesting arrangement with the IPP & AU [International Printing Pressmen and Assistants Union], one that didn't exist in other cities. Actually, the leadership of the union, Fred Zeitz, had really taken the Printing Pressmen over the hoops on that arrangement. Letterpress was still the foremost process, and there were a couple of shops that the Printing Pressmen had organized as IPP & AU shops that were actually litho shops. One was Ace Offset. I remember that so well; they had organized that one, but then Fred Zeitz got together with the Printing Pressmen --that was Joe Seppi--and they worked out an arrangement: "Look, you stay in your backyard and I'll stay in my backyard. We'll just organize lithographers; you just organize letterpress." They stuck with that arrangement. In fact, when the members used to talk about Ace Offset, organizing Ace Offset, George Canary, who followed Fred Zeitz, honored that commitment and would never go after Ace Offset, because that was considered IPP & AU ground. That was an arrangement, a gentlemen's arrangement, not to step on their toes there. So we never really had problems with the IPP & AU until the fifties, some time in the fifties when the specialty workers came to be a factor.

HOFFMAN: What are specialty workers?

SCHROEDER: It's a division of the IPP & AU, and they're a catch-all group. While they organized pressmen and craftsmen of the same type that we would organize, they also organized the janitors and everybody that was left over.

HOFFMAN: So it was the District 50 of the Pressmen?.

SCHROEDER: Right. The wage rates for speciality workers, including the people who ran presses, were far inferior in wages, hours, and conditions, and to this day it's that way. Wherever the printing specialties organize and sign contracts, they're inferior contracts and work to the detriment of our organization.

HOFFMAN: Also the problems in the fifties must have been in response to the technological revolution whereby lithography became much more important.

SCHROEDER: Right. Well, it was growing. Lithography was growing in the Chicago area like it was elsewhere. I'd say more so in Chicago. Chicago today is the largest center for printing and lithography in the country. When I say Chicago, I'm really including the entire metropolitan area.

HOFFMAN: What were the primary technological changes that caused lithography to be growing kind of at the expense of letterpress?

SCHROEDER: The presses, what comes out, what the customer buys, determines the product, really, the method by which it will be produced. They were able to produce press plates quicker and cheaper than you could produce them by letterpress. Press speeds were improved. The make-ready time on litho presses was far quicker than on letterpress, particularly when you got to the bigger presses. When lithography advanced to web offset presses, litho really jumped ahead. That really was the springboard for lithography. Now, there were web presses that date back all the way to before World War I. In fact, when I did the web offset study in 1964, I found press data, or information, about a press in Paris that was still running that was built in 1915.

HOFFMAN: 1915?

SCHROEDER: Right! So it's not a new process. It was just that they had to develop it and improve it, improve the engineering in it. And it wasn't really until the mid-fifties where there was really any kind of advancement in web offset. In 1958 there was a surge ahead, but from 1960, it really jumped; it advanced tremendously from that time on.

HOFFMAN: What was the response of Local 4 to this technological change?

SCHROEDER: I can't think of a technological change that came around that the Local didn't gladly accept. They were very forward thinking, very progressive in their thinking in regard to technologcal change. There was always the attitude that you can't stop progress and you're better off to see that you can control the new process rather than to try to retard it. So that was the general attitude, and I would say that there was always an attitude of indoctrinating the membership with that idea, as long as I can remember.

HOFFMAN: Didn't they also, though, feel that they were going to have to emphasize some kind of an educational program?

SCHROEDER: Well, they were educationally oriented there because of the school that they had, dating back to 1924. They had the little school in the back of the union that they developed to meet the challenges that resulted from the development of photo-mechanical press plates rather than hand-transfer plates.

HOFFMAN: I think the point that I'm asking you is: had the school begun originally as a response to technological change?

SCHROEDER: Right. That's correct.

HOFFMAN: I'm just wondering, when these changes came about in the fifties, if this made for an expansion and a greater reliance on the school as an important element?

SCHROEDER: No question. I don't think there's any question about that. That's correct. There was a great reliance on the school and they saw the school as a medium through which they could enable the members to keep their jobs and not be fearful of technological change.

HOFFMAN: Now, at first this school was operated by the local itself?

SCHROEDER: By the local itself.

HOFFMAN: It then moved to being a joint operation with an employers' association?

SCHROEDER: Right.

HOFFMAN: When did that take place?

SCHROEDER: That was in 1946. In 1946 it became a joint operation. Prior to that it was the Local 4 school; in 1946, it became the Chicago Lithographic Institute.

HOFFMAN: What were the circumstances surrounding this change?

SCHROEDER: Well, they saw there was a big job to be done in apprenticeship and retraining with all the returning servicemen. While it started in 1946, actually the talk about starting the school took place in 1945. But the school actually started, as I recall, in 1946. But they saw such a massive job in that it was going to take the cooperation of both the employer and union if they were going to get the job done, because there were a number of factors to be considered. One, the man would have to have the time off in the evening in order to attend school. If he was working in the daytime, he'd be free to attend in the evening. The school was going to run both day and night since night shift workers would go during the day. Now, I'm not sure at this time whether it was operated in the daytime in the first instance. But it was obvious in any case that there had to be a great area of cooperating in order to make the school successful.

HOFFMAN: So that the employers' motivation for participating in this joint effort was the tremendous need for skilled workers?

SCHROEDER: Right.

HOFFMAN: How was the school financed?

SCHROEDER: Through tuitions. Each employer, as he sent an apprentice to the school, paid a tuition for that employee. I forget what the tuition was; I haven't the vaguest idea anymore, I don't recall. But if you trained apprentices, you paid a tuition for each of the apprentices that you sent. That proved to be a weak point in the early stages of the school because some employers found that they could save money by not training apprentices and simply wait until some apprentice would come out of his time, and then pirate him by paying him a few dollars more in premiums, above scale. So then he [the employer] didn't have to train apprentices.

As a result of that experience, the trustees of the Chicago Lithographic Institute developed a formula under which each employer would pay 50 cents per week per employee to the trustees of the Chicago Lithographic Institute. Now I say it was 50 cents a week, but if I'm not mistaken I think it was two dollars a month at first. Then it went up to $2.50 a month, and

it's up to $5.00 a month now in Chicago. But they paid that per capita payment directly to the trustees of the school. Now, that covered all their apprentices. If a journeyman wanted to attend, he had to pay. It was a very low tuition fee, but it was just that he had to pay something. It contributed to the income of the school, which was, I think, the major reason for it. As small as the tuition was, I don't think it was just to put a burden on the guy.

HOFFMAN: How were the trustees selected for this school?

SCHROEDER: Well, the union appointed theirs and the employers appointed theirs.

HOFFMAN: Were they equal in number, from the union and from [the employers]?

SCHROEDER: Oh, yes. Then they alternated, from one year to the next, who would be president. One year the president would come from the union; the next year it would be from the employers.

HOFFMAN: And the president was what? A kind of director of the school?

SCHROEDER: No. They hired a director. The director was actually an employee of the trustees. At this point it would be good to point out that that set-up, as developed with the per capita payments, is the formula by which, and the basis upon which, we founded the entire international educational program and set up all the various schools we now have.

HOFFMAN: So it was a very significant pattern that was developed here. I wonder if you would want to say something about your relationship with some of the important figures in this local, such as Fred Zeitz and Harry Spohnholtz and Charlie Timmel.

SCHROEDER: Well, Fred Zeitz was the president. I don't recall how old he was at that time, but he was a very mature man, I'd say in his fifties. I'm guessing now! I never had any close personal relationship with Fred Zeitz. In later years I developed a close relationship with George Canary, but that was not until the mid-fifties, early to mid-fifties. Of course, Harry Spohnholtz came into my circle of friends in 1942 when I went to Edwards & Deutsch where he was my assistant foreman and shop steward, which, as we said in our earlier conversation, is a unique arrangement, whereby a man

would be an assistant foreman and shop steward at the same time. But he was the shop steward for the entire plant. And Charlie Timmel was a dot-etcher in the same department. So the relationship with Spohnholtz and Timmel has always been good throughout my life. I had some difficulties with Spohnholtz because I was pretty pushy when I was a young guy, and I was dissatisfied with being a probationary member. I wanted my full membership and I'd be bugging him all the time about it, and he used to get irritated with me. But I think we always got along quite well.

HOFFMAN: I think it might be useful to say something about the craft of dot-etching at this point, because I know in my tour that I took of the Philadelphia school, I was interested in being told that dot-etching is one of the few remaining places in the trade or in the craft where there is the opportunity to exercise some kind of what you might call 'artistic judgement.' You know, where a guy's capacity as a good workman or a bad workman is still an effective element.

SCHROEDER: Yes, that's right.

HOFFMAN: So I think it might be useful to say something about it.

SCHROEDER: Well, I would say the aptitudes for the job today are somewhat different than when I started, because you wouldn't think of putting on a dot-etcher or a color-correction artist years ago without having some basic artistic skills. Today, I don't think that's necessary. I think that it's color judgement that's more important today, just the sense of color, a good eye for color and good judgement and ability to make decisions. But you actually had to have artistic skills when I started out. Practically everybody, I'd say virtually every color correction artist or dot-etcher, or whatever you wanted to call him, did art work as a hobby, either oil painting, or watercolors, or charcoal. Many of them would go to art school at night as a pastime or hobby or just for the love of it.

HOFFMAN: So that many of them were like yourself--people who had thought in terms of being commercial artists.

SCHROEDER: Right. But didn't have enough ability to be a commercial artist. I recognized that I didn't have enough ability to compete in the world of commercial artists. Although I didn't realize what I was getting into when I first took the job at Curt Teich, when I recognized what it was, I saw that this was a good outlet for what artistic ability I had.

Actually a dot-etcher--the name dot-etcher is a misnomer, really a bad title. The job really involved creating four separate color separations that are in balance to provide the colors as required on the copy provided. In other words, there is a ratio of yellow--for any given color there is a ratio--or of yellow toward the red, the blue and the black. We always talked when I started, in terms of yellow, red, blue and black. Now they talk in terms of yellow, magenta, cyan, and black. But it was just plain blue and plain red. It's a case of determining how much yellow, what percentage of yellow is in a given color, what percentage of red, what percentage of blue, and what percentage of black to arrive at a given color. And a good part of it is judgement. I can't think of anything that is more necessary than the experience to develop good judgement.

I can remember when I worked at Edwards & Deutsch how I used to admire the fellows that had a lot of experience, particularly Charlie Timmel, who I think was one of the finest dot-etchers that I ever say. He could relax and do his job and I'd be struggling every minute of the day, you know, trying to come to a good job, create a good job. Charlie could just relax. He used to tell me, "You know, it takes about ten years before you can really say that you've made the circle of problems, after which you'll feel comfortable and be able to have confidence in what you're doing." That was true. Suddenly I found myself just as relaxed as he had been, but it took a long time.

HOFFMAN: Well, I notice in the shops today they have these big charts up on the walls with little squares of every conceivable color you can possibly imagine.

SCHROEDER: Color charts.

HOFFMAN: With values of the various primary colors.

SCHROEDER: Right.

HOFFMAN: Did you have that sort of thing available to you then?

SCHROEDER: Oh yes, oh yes. You would use that as a key, a reference point. In other words, when you would use your own judgement, from time to time you'd pull yourself back by resorting to a chart. It would keep you on the track. It took a long time, but once you got there it was a delightful job, an interesting job, and you'd take great pride in it.

HOFFMAN: You moved from Edwards & Deutsch to Newman Rudolph in 1949?

SCHROEDER: 1949.

HOFFMAN: What occasioned the move?

SCHROEDER: Well, I wasn't going to get anywhere at Edwards & Deutsch, I recognized that. They had a process there, while it was a dot-etching process, it was not as advanced technologically as the processes used in other plants. And I recognized that.

HOFFMAN: Why not? What made the difference?

SCHROEDER: It was a process that the patent was owned by the foreman of the dot-etching department and it involved coating glass with asphaldum.

HOFFMAN: With what? A-s-p-h-a-l-d-u-m?

SCHROEDER: Yes, right. And you would bake the asphaldum under arc lights in contact with a negative. Then you'd develop that with a benzene, and you'd have a positive that you would etch with benzene and turpentine and benzol. The benzol would etch very fast, and benzene would be a slow etch. You'd have to be very careful; it was very sensitive. It was really not an up-to-date process.

HOFFMAN: Pretty slow.

SCHROEDER: Where I learned that it wasn't an up-to-date process was at the union school, because I went to the union school as an apprentice. I had to pay my own tuition, by the way.

HOFFMAN: Even though you were an apprentice and not a journeyman?

SCHROEDER: Oh, yes, because it was a union school. It wasn't jointly operated, and I recall that I paid $50 for the course.

HOFFMAN: So you mean there were two schools operating in Chicago simultaneously?

SCHROEDER: No, no. Remember I said the school went into limbo during the war?

HOFFMAN: All right.

SCHROEDER: But occasionally they would run a course when they could get six together, and I was one of those. In one of those cases I was able to take a course, and I paid $50. There I saw the difference in what was being done in other shops, compared with what was going on at Deutsch's. So I thought: as soon as I can, I'm going to learn as much as I can at Deutsch's, and then I'll get out and get into another shop. So that's exactly what I did. I went to the union and asked for a change of jobs. Boy, you could go anywhere and get a job! There were so many, you know, they needed dot-etchers so badly. So I went for interviews at different shops, and I selected Newman Rudolph. I went to work there, I believe, it was July of 1949 for $10 over scale.

HOFFMAN: I guess one of the things we ought to catch up on in this story of Local 4, before we move into your activities teaching at the school and subsequently your involvement with the International, is what were the significant strikes that Local 4 had to contend with during this period of time?

SCHROEDER: Well, there had been a strike in 1927 and there was never another strike in Chicago from 1927 until 1960-something. It was in the sixties when they had that big strike in Chicago that lasted two or three weeks. There was the occasional strike in an individual plant, but there was never a city-wide strike in all of that time in between. So they had excellent relationships with the employers and at the same time making some very significant advances.

HOFFMAN: They were organizing all through this period of time?

SCHROEDER: Oh yes, oh yes. It was a well-organized town.

HOFFMAN: What about relationships with the rest of the labor movement in Chicago?

SCHROEDER: Very weak. Again a case where we were pretty much isolated. [We] didn't have much of a relationship with any other union and there was a kind of attitude that we were better than anybody else, just about like that. We were a labor union, but, "We're not Teamsters, we're not Bakers, or Butchers, or Carpenters--we're Lithographers!"

HOFFMAN: Skilled craftsmen.

SCHROEDER: Yes, "We're skilled craftsmen."

HOFFMAN: I'm wondering, when I think about the preeminence of the Steelworkers in Chicago, as far as the Chicago labor movement is concerned, when the ALA moved into the CIO, did this cause problems in terms of the Steelworkers with respect to attempting to have the lithographic work that's done on cans, for example?

SCHROEDER: Oh, you mean jurisdictional?

HOFFMAN: Yes.

SCHROEDER: Well, I really couldn't answer that because I wasn't too active at that time, but I do know that we had the metal decorating presses organized and there were some problems involved, but what they were I really couldn't say, Alice, because I wasn't that active in that area. I do know that some of the benefit programs that we have with the metal decorators, or had at that time, were more or less geared to what had existed with the Steelworkers. In other words, in order that the conditions would not be too varied with those that existed with the Steelworkers.

HOFFMAN: What percentage of metal decorating on cans today is done by Lithographers rather than by Steelworkers? That is, by members of the Lithographers Union?

SCHROEDER: Oh, I would say that the bulk is done by members of our union. We have more. That situation is in trouble now, there's no question about it. Again, technological change is playing a part. In a discussion with the Rutherford Machinery Company in Rutherford, New Jersey, they stated that twenty percent of the beverage can market had been converted to production lines, including in-the-line printing equipment.

HOFFMAN: Right. It's all done right on the p.m. line.

SCHROEDER: And that they were going to take over more and more of that as time goes on. Ultimately the sheet-fed lines are going to lose a relative share of the market. While the volume of work may go up, the share of the market will diminish. I can't see the complete elimination of sheet-fed metal decorating, but I can certainly see how it's going to diminish.

HOFFMAN: Well, I was interested. I was talking to a fellow who was showing me a can that had been decorated in that way and a can that had been decorated by Lithographers, and he was telling me, "Look at this terrible job! Look how awful this looks." (laughter)

SCHROEDER: But see, there was such great pride in our trade that people actually believed that the quality alone would convince people to do it their way, not taking into account the economics of the situation.

HOFFMAN: Plus not taking into account the fact that the consumer maybe is not really all that turned on by how beautiful the can is!

SCHROEDER: That's right. A Schlitz can that's turned out on a cylindrical metal decorator and a Schlitz can that's produced on a sheet-fed line, if you put it across the room, you can't tell the difference.

HOFFMAN: Right.

SCHROEDER: When the beer drinker has his fist wrapped around the can, you can tell it even less! (laughter)

HOFFMAN: Okay. Well, then you moved from Newman Rudolph into John Ollier Engraving Company?

SCHROEDER: John and Ollier. That's an old, old company in Chicago that made one venture into an offset trade shop and failed and then started again in 1952. I went to work for them in 1953.

HOFFMAN: What were the factors that caused you to move over from Newman Rudolph?

SCHROEDER: Well, Newman Rudolph. . . . I had a very good job there. In fact, I moved very rapidly there pay-wise. I was still working on the bench, but there were thirty-five dot-etchers in that one department. That was the largest art department or dot-etching department in the city at that time. I was one of six dot-etchers who did the center spreads and covers for magazines, and all of us were getting the same amount, which was around $35.00 a week over scale. So I'm guessing now that I was probably, in 1953, getting around $160 a week, something like that. I may be off on that, but I was $35 a week over the scale.

But the company was sold; the old Newman Rudolph company was sold to Poole Brothers. A fellow by the name of George Poole was the president of the company, and he was a socialite and a friend of Gaylord Donnelly. As I understand the story, he thought he was going to show that he could also operate a major printing concern. Frankly, if he hadn't been rich, he'd have been called 'nuts.' But he was wealthy, so he was eccentric. (laughter)

So he initiated all kinds of new rules in the plant. They were gradual, but I could foresee what was going to happen to the company, so I decided to bail out early.

We had an agreement among the dot-etchers; we were getting over the scale, and the six of us were making the top rate in the plant. If we were going to go for a raise, all of us would go for a raise at the same time, so we had a union within a union. We said, "Well, let's go for more money." But this one fellow--quite elderly--said, "No, I don't want to do it." I said, "Fellows, I'm going to have to go for more money on my own, because I think this is the way I'll get out of here, because they'll probably turn me down and I'll quit. And maybe I'll help you guys show them that we don't like what we're doing." I knew there were all kinds of jobs available. So I asked the company for a raise. They turned me down, and so I quit! A lot of the fellows couldn't understand why I quit because it was a good job, but signs were there that the new management was not going to keep the place in the same manner that the old company did. That's why I went over to John & Ollier. And, incidentally, I didn't go for more money. I went for the same money that I made at Newman Rudolph.

HOFFMAN: And you were there only a short time when you were asked to teach?

SCHROEDER: Very short time, yes.

HOFFMAN: Who was the director of the school at that time?

SCHROEDER: Al Brown.

HOFFMAN: Al Brown. And he came to know you through. . . ?

SCHROEDER: George Gundersen. George Gundersen was a photographer. He was a cameraman, color cameraman. He used to shoot. . . when I say shoot, he used to make the negatives and the positives for the work that I did in the dot-etching department, so he knew the kind of work that I did.

HOFFMAN: He was at Newman Rudolph?

SCHROEDER: Right. George Gundersen. So he suggested to me that I become a teacher, and he arranged the interview with the director of the school. An interesting thing about the school, as I mentioned in the previous conversation, you were always invited. You didn't apply for a job there as an instructor, you were invited. So I

became an instructor strictly on the basis of the idea that it would be good and interesting, not knowing that I was going to be paid. Three months after I was teaching--I taught one night a week--I got a check in the mail. It was only then that I found out you received $10.00 a night for teaching. (laughter) That was the system they used. They would never tell anybody that they were going to receive pay for teaching, for fear that there would be people who would take it just for the money. The instructors themselves didn't even talk about it to other people. They kept that as kind of a system so that you didn't have that problem.

HOFFMAN: Well, then, when did you take on the task of doing organizing?

SCHROEDER: In February of 1960.

HOFFMAN: And that required, then, that you give up the teaching?

SCHROEDER: Oh yes. That was a requirement. The trustees said you couldn't have an organizer teaching in the jointly operated school. (laughter)

HOFFMAN: Well, that's not immediately obvious, but . . . . Why don't you describe organizing at that point in the Chicago area, in 1960?

SCHROEDER: The first assignment that I had was to attempt to organize the Schawk Lithographing Company. This was up on Kedzie & Montrose [Streets] in Chicago. It was a non-union operation that was raising havoc with union trade shops--underselling and so on, selling their work for just peanuts compared to what our union shops were getting for their work. There were about forty-eight people employed in the plant and it was really a challenge for a first assignment.

There was no real instruction or training program to become an organizer. You just became an organizer and applied the knowledge that you'd gained as a craftsman and the knowledge that you'd gained in working for the union in a part-time capacity as a committeeman. As I said, I was chairman of the Fishing Contest Committee, and I was the Referendum Chairman; I was on the Pension Trustees; and I became a councillor representing the artists on the Chicago Local Council of the union, or the Executive Board, as some locals call them. Based upon that experience, I became an organizer.

HOFFMAN: Now, you were an organizer for the local or for the international?

SCHROEDER: For the local. It was simply a case of telling what you knew about the union to other people to convince them to become union members. It wasn't based on any sophisticated program of organizing. Simply applying what you knew and trying to convince other people. So it was house calls, development of letters, getting mail to the people that you come in contact with. During the time that I was an organizer, I felt very good that we did accomplish an awful lot. It was the first time we had any real system to the organizing efforts of the Chicago Local, where we kept records and had file cards on as many non-union people as you could find, and we had systems of getting names of people who were working in non-union shops.

HOFFMAN: What were they? How did you find these people?

SCHROEDER: Well, we had varied systems. Let me point out a couple of different ways: We had a lot of people who would come into the office, seeking jobs in the trade. Some had experience, some didn't. But we had employment requests, and they'd fill out a form.

HOFFMAN: They would come from another town or something?

SCHROEDER: Or in the city. A guy out of work and he had looked for a job, he'd stop into the union. We'd never turn our back on a guy. Even though he wasn't a member, we'd say, "Look, we'll do everything we can to help you." We had an officer in charge of employment in the preparatory department, and we had an officer who was in charge of the pressroom employment. If he could get him a job in a union shop, he'd do it. If we didn't have an employment problem, we'd actually put the guy to work in a union shop, in some capacity. But more likely than not, we would give this guy some information about non-union shops where he might be able to get a job. But we'd tell him: "Now, if you get a job in that non-union shop, keep in touch with us. Let us know."

Now, of the people who would go in the non-union shops only a small percentage would ever come back to tell us that they got a job in a non-union shop. But we would transfer the information off of these employment requests onto file cards and we kept a file on them and they'd pop up somewhere. In organizing a shop, we'd meet somebody and say, "Who works here?" Then, all of a sudden, bang!! there comes that one guy. You'd look through your cards, and there's that guy, so you'd have an address on him. So that was one method.

We would handbill shops. Put handbills on cards, under windshield wipers. We didn't do too much of that. Most of it was by a lead man in a shop. You'd get one guy in a shop. Sometimes a union member would take a job in a non-union shop.

HOFFMAN: When you began as organizer, roughly what percentage of the potential did you have organized in Chicago?

SCHROEDER: Oh, Alice, that was one that was bandied around, lied about more than any other. (laughter) Asking a local president how well his city is organized is like asking a man how much gas mileage he gets on his car.

HOFFMAN: Right. Or how long it takes him to drive from one spot to another.

SCHROEDER: Right. But I would say it all depends on what formula you would use, what you would include in the industry. For instance, if you went through the phone book and looked at all the print shops and lithographing companies, you'd say, "Gee, you're only about ten percent organized." But so many of those shops are little multi-shops, one little multilith, maybe what we call a "Ma & Pa" shop, lettershop, mimeograph shop. So you couldn't really count those. But, still and all, when people would try to attack the union and say how poorly we were organized, they'd use that as an example. But if you looked at the shops that actually competed in the markets that we were involved in, I would say that we were in about 85 percent, which I thought was very good. I would say very good. But always new shops kept coming, and for a period of time we were losing ground by virtue of the expansion of the industry in Chicago. You know, new shops developing and young people working in them and training their own people.

HOFFMAN: Your organization wasn't really keeping up with the expansion of the industry.

SCHROEDER: It really wasn't, really wasn't! They put on their first organizer in 1956, and that was Ben Waskin. Now, George Canary resigned as International president in 1958, I believe it was. When he resigned, he came back to the Chicago Local and became an organizer, along with Ben Waskin. So in 1960 George Canary became the administrator for the Inter Local Pension Plan, and I stepped into his spot as organizer.

HOFFMAN: I see.

SCHROEDER: But I had a lot of my own ideas about the way an organizing department should be run, and I initiated a lot of those in Chicago. Nobody kept permanent records prior to that. They had records, but no real system. We did an evaluation in Chicago that was the basis for organizing efforts. We did something that they didn't think would work,and I had some doubts myself, but it did work--calling non-union shops on the phone and talking to the management. Harry Spohnholtz was the president of the local union, and I told him what I was going to do. He said, "You're nuts! It will never work!" I said, "Let's try it." He said, "Okay," so he sat in the room and I called up the first employer on the phone and introduced myself. I said, "I'm from the Amalgamated Lithographers of America, Local 4, and we're doing a study of the equipment in Chicago, of lithographic equipment in the city of Chicago. We recognize that there's going to be a great growth in this industry, and we really don't know what the manpower needs are going to be. Unless we really know what equipment exists in the city of Chicago, we'll never be able to train enough people. So what equipment do you have in your shop?" And the guy would tell me! (laughter) Of the plants I called --and I called all kinds of plants, little plants, big plants-- we found out that we weren't so well organized. Only two plants, of all the plants I called, only two plants turned me down. Imagine that!!

HOFFMAN: That's incredible!

SCHROEDER: Yes, and they would tell you just like that.

HOFFMAN: We have this many, and this many. . . . .

SCHROEDER: "What kind of presses? What kind of presses? What make are they?" They'd tell you down to the last detail. "How many cameras do you have?" Then we made up cards on every plant and settled down to organizing. You know, they never really caught on to what we did, because there were so many, and there were only so few that we really picked as organizing targets. They didn't relate the survey to our organizing drive, not to our knowledge, anyhow. So it was a highly successful venture. Spohnholtz never got over that. He thought that was so funny! (more laughter)

So then we developed a file on each shop, showing what equipment was in it. As we gained information as to who was employed in the shop, we kept those cards in there too. Every scrap of information we got on a person appeared on that card and remained on it. We had signals on the cards, for instance, that told what branch of trade he was in, whether

he'd ever been a union member before, if he was an expelled member, whether he was a member now, if he had signed an authorization card, the dates of interviews with him, and so forth. We had accurate information as to address, telephone number, attitudes, etc.

HOFFMAN: Well, that's very interesting. I think we ought to talk about the beginnings of your activities on the wider scene of the International. You said the first convention you went to was the Portland Convention in 19. . . ?

SCHROEDER: 1959.

HOFFMAN: 1959, right. Is that where you first met local union president [Ed] Swayduck?

SCHROEDER: No. I had met him in Chicago when he attended the convention in 1957. That was the only time previous to that, but the relationship between Swayduck and the Chicago local deteriorated terribly between 1957 and 1959. Canary was very, very bitter, and he was a delegate to the convention also in 1959.

HOFFMAN: Yes. Now, Canary had been forced to resign in this period of time.

SCHROEDER: Right. That's right.

HOFFMAN: And Swayduck had played a very important role in that?

SCHROEDER: That's right. And the role of Ben Robinson as general counsel for the International Union was a bitter pill for Chicago; they couldn't stand Robinson, and I couldn't either.

HOFFMAN: Why not? What was he doing that bothered Chicago?

SCHROEDER: Well, as an attorney, he was not a member, but he ran the union behind the scenes and everybody recognized that. Prior to the convention, delegates would meet. Canary would say, "Well, Bill, when you go there, you'll hear Ben Robinson give his state-of-the-union address, and what he's doing for the union." And that was pretty much the way it was. I took an instant dislike to Ben Robinson. Of course, I had been indoctrinated pretty well in advance, I must admit that.

HOFFMAN: Well, now, you had your own legal relationships in Chicago.

SCHROEDER: We had our own attorneys in Chicago, but we didn't use attorneys very much in Chicago. There was a strong feeling that the officers should run the union, not the attorneys, and that still exists.

HOFFMAN: Well, what I mean to say is that when you had problems where you needed legal advice, you didn't seek out Robinson?

SCHROEDER: Oh, never. Never!

HOFFMAN: You sought out your own relationship that you had formulated with some local attorney.

SCHROEDER: Right. Never sought out Robinson. In fact, he was persona non grata in Chicago.

HOFFMAN: Was that typical, or did Robinson have legal relationships with other locals around the country?

SCHROEDER: Oh he did, he did. A number of different locals that he had. And controlled them!

HOFFMAN: I was thinking, for example, of his relationship in the Foote-Davies case in Atlanta. Obviously he moved right in there.

SCHROEDER: Well, an attorney had a lot of influence and control over many locals. Cincinnati was one through Will Porter; another was Detroit through C. James Williams.

HOFFMAN: These were attorneys, you mean?

SCHROEDER: No, no. They were the local presidents.

HOFFMAN: Oh, the local union presidents who sought him out. I see what you're saying, right, okay.

SCHROEDER: He controlled them pretty much. So there was not a good relationship. When I went to the convention in Portland, I was on a committee, it was the State of the Association Officers Report Committee and the State of the Association Committee. Ted Brandt was the chairman of the State of the Association Committee, and I recall vividly sitting in at that meeting. Ted Brandt is running the meeting, and along comes Ben. . . .

HOFFMAN: Ted Brandt was what, a councillor?

SCHROEDER: He was a vice president.

HOFFMAN: Oh, a vice president.

SCHROEDER: Ted Brandt was seated up at the table, and Ben Robinson came in and sat down beside him and took over the meeting. Just literally took over the meeting! He chaired the meeting the rest of the way! Didn't ask Ted, he just took over. I thought that was awful. The attitude that we had in Chicago of running your own union was completely contrary to ever permitting an attorney to sit up there and take over your meeting. So it was everything that Canary and the other officers of the local had said about the guy, so I resented it.

At the convention I went up to Spohnholtz and said, "Look, I resent that attorney taking over the State of the Association Committee meeting." So he made a point of it to the officers of the International. Ken Brown, at that time, had just taken over as president. I got the State of the Association to include in its report to the convention a recommendation that the State of the Association address should be given by the president. That's what it was--he'd just become president. Now, let me get that straight. . . .

HOFFMAN: He wasn't doing Wickersham's job at that time?

SCHROEDER: No. No, I'm sorry, he wasn't the president. He was assistant to the president. Pat[rick] Slater was president, but he [Brown] ran a good part of that meeting in Portland. Ben Robinson handled most of it really, I felt, anyhow. But the point was made to Ken Brown that we didn't like the idea of it. I remember that because it was at the reception--Chicago ran a cocktail party--on a Thursday night. I may be wrong on that Thursday, but nevertheless it was one night during the week, and it was at that cocktail party that the point was made to Ken Brown, and to Teddy Brandt, "I'm a member of a committee and I sit in . . . and you permit the attorney to take over the meeting."

HOFFMAN: Was Chicago the second largest local?

SCHROEDER: Yes.

HOFFMAN: It was at this Portland Convention then that. . . .

SCHROEDER: Ken Brown was nominated for the. . . .

HOFFMAN: . . . for the presidency. And at that point Swayduck and Robinson had no idea of the direction that Ken Brown might take?

SCHROEDER: I'm sure he didn't have an inkling. (laughter)

HOFFMAN: Did you?

SCHROEDER: Yes, kind of. I'd say that we had quite a lot of faith that he was not going to be wishy-washy; he was not going to permit Swayduck to do the things that we didn't like.

HOFFMAN: Now, what kind of an issue was merger in all of this?

SCHROEDER: At that point merger wasn't even thought of as far as I was concerned. I never gave merger a thought. In fact, in 1953, I worked at John & Ollier Engraving Company, and most of the employees of the company were members of the Photoengravers Union. Now the Photoengravers Union in Chicago and the Lithographers Union in Chicago had a tremendously good relationship, but there was no talk of ever getting together as one union. In fact, there was an attitude among the Photoengravers that they were even more craft-oriented than we were. You know, they were the elite and it was recognized, more or less, that they considered themselves the elite. They weren't aware of what was happening to them at that time. We could see it, though. We could see the diminishing role of the photoengravers in the printing industry at that time, but the photoengravers had blinders on. Either they didn't want to see it or they didn't see it.

HOFFMAN: Well, particularly I would imagine in your activities with the pension, where the average age of the photoengravers was so much older.

SCHROEDER: Well, you could see it. All you had to do was walk into a photoengraving plant, and it was apparent--the age difference. We had a lot of young people in the Lithographers Union. The attitude was different, and with the litho process they moved out work a lot faster than the photoengravers did.

HOFFMAN: Well, it's my understanding that very shortly after Ken Brown became the president, he began to initiate various conversations about a merger.

SCHROEDER: Yes. Well, it was 1963.

HOFFMAN: Right.

SCHROEDER: They were working at it, [but] not for long. I must admit that I hadn't given any thought, in 1960, to merger. But the Council Board did, and the talks went on and developed into very serious talks.

HOFFMAN: Who was the power behind this? Was it Walter Risdon?

SCHROEDER: At the merger talks?

HOFFMAN: Yes.

SCHROEDER: No. Actually Ken Brown was the one who really did it. And, of course, through the years, Ben Robinson had made speech after speech where it would be important for the Lithographers to merge with the other unions, with the Photoengravers. He had said that. I know that, but I don't think anybody really took it seriously. But Ken, I'm sure, with the foresight that he had, considered it seriously. Apparently Ben Robinson found it a good talking point, but not really something that he ever thought would come to pass. That's my personal opinion, from what I'm able to deduce from the information available to me.

HOFFMAN: Were you at the convention in 1961?

SCHROEDER: Oh, yes. The fur really flew at that one. That's where we really had a blowup, at that one!

HOFFMAN: Was that in Miami?

SCHROEDER: Yes, that was in Miami. There was a meeting between the Portland Convention and the Miami Convention that is quite important. That was a Policy Conference, held in Atlantic City. I attended that, and the officers of the local did. I must have been an organizer at that time already, because that was in the summer or early fall and I went on as organizer in February. The rivalry and the antagonism in regard to Swayduck was very apparent. He was playing games at that time which we didn't approve of.

HOFFMAN: What sort of games was he playing, Bill?

SCHROEDER: Well, for instance, one of the projects he had was the development of a fund to be used strictly for public relations. It would be the emergency fund--tape the emergency fund for public relations. Then, when it would go down to a certain point, you automatically put on an assessment. But everybody in Chicago, and other people around different parts of the country, always felt that Swayduck had his little operation going there in New York and that he was

taking kick-backs and getting all kinds of money out of the projects that he was launching in New York. Nobody trusted him. So we went into the convention in Miami with that as one of the major issues--that his resolution to amend the constitution to permit the emergency fund to be used for public relations and advertising projects, organizing, and just an open-end . . . just pull money out of it and then assess the members . . . we were really organized to fight him that time.

The International Council had approved of an exhibit that he had designed; it became known as the glass house. It was actually a booth or a "glass house." I would judge it to be about 30 x 30 or something like that, and it housed a press. But just at that time that doggone building cost the International Council $40,000! Nobody could understand how that thing could cost $40,000! It was put on display in the lobby of the Deauville Hotel, and it became just more or less the symbol of . . . just cut Swayduck's water off, you know, and that was it! If you're going to spend money like that . . . . The only place it was ever used was in the Grand Central Station in New York. If anybody else wanted to use it, they'd have to pay for the shipping. Well, hell, there wasn't another local in the whole International that could afford to have that thing shipped out and use it. So it was a ridiculous thing.

He also made a move, and he was on this Mike Wallace show, and that was a big thing, too. That thing couldn't be used anywhere. You wouldn't want to use it. He looked ridiculous in the thing. But he thought--ego as big as a house, you know. Well, we just shot at that ego all week and we defeated him on that issue, which worsened our relationship more than ever.

HOFFMAN: Well, now, it was at that convention where the basic merger resolution was made. Did Swayduck fight it at that time?

SCHROEDER: No. Not at all. In fact, he made all the gestures at being in favor. When we went to the next convention--that was in Montreal--he walked out! But, backing up a little bit, I was again on the State of the Association Committee, and Ted Meyers was the chairman of the committee. I was the secretary of the committee and wrote the report, which Teddy Meyers had to approve, to be read to the members. Well, I wrote some stuff into that report questioning the prudence of those responsible for spending large amounts of money for programs that had very localized and limited use. Teddy, I don't think, really understood how it was going to irritate Swayduck.

HOFFMAN: Where's Teddy Meyers from?

SCHROEDER: He's president of the Pittsburgh Local. Still is. I remember the words, and this was concerning the use of funds, any appropriations made by the Council, and this was in regard to the appropriation for the film and the appropriation for the glass house. The review by the committee was that in the future the committee recommend the International Council be more prudent in their use of International funds.

HOFFMAN: This was in 1963?

SCHROEDER: 1961.

HOFFMAN: Oh, in 1961 still.

SCHROEDER: When I read the report, which I had cleared with the full committee, and when I read the word "prudent," Swayduck shot out of his seat like he was shot out of a cannon and attacked the committee and said we were shooting at him, and it was really directed at him. He really made a fool of himself. In my eyes, people recognized him more and more for what he was. He lost a lot of popularity as a result of this. That's only one instance. Other people did other things that irritated him.

HOFFMAN: The committee report was accepted by the convention?

SCHROEDER: Oh yes, it was approved. It's a matter of record now, if you look back at the convention minutes. So when we went to the convention in 1963, just prior to that . . . now, I'm not certain about the timing on this, but there was an International Council meeting held up in Quebec. Ben Robinson was fired as general counsel because he was counsel of the New York Local and also counsel of the International. So the International Council said, "Take your choice. One or the other. You can't be general counsel for the International and also be the attorney for the New York Local." So he stuck with the local. He resigned as general counsel of the International.

So when we went to the convention in Montreal, word was that Robinson was in town at another hotel; he was at the Laurentian Hotel and the convention was at the Mount Royal. So they were conducting meetings over at this other hotel, and we had our own spies attend their meetings to find out what was going on, and among them was John Stagg. John Stagg had a fabulous memory, you know. He remembered down to the most minute detail what went on at those meetings. He came back late at night and sat down in the middle of the floor, and all of us stood around him and sat around the room as he reported back on what had taken place at these meetings, with Robinson to defeat merger.

HOFFMAN: Now, why was Robinson trying to defeat the merger at that point?

SCHROEDER: Well, I've got my own opinion, not based upon facts, but based strictly upon opinion, things that I believe. With Robinson, there's an element, I believe, of ego; he didn't want to see someone else control the International, and he saw, by a growing organization, that he was going to be less and less a factor. Swayduck was the same way. He could control the ALA, but he couldn't control the growing organization as Ken Brown was projecting it. I firmly believe, in my mind, that there was money, [that] there was a hell of a lot of financial factors involved, personal finances involved. That's just my own opinion, not based upon any fact or any evidence that I have. Just by the signs, you know, the signs were there. His control of their pension funds, the way he conducted himself, the way he lived, the things he did just indicated to me that everything was not open and above board.

HOFFMAN: Let me ask you this: As all this merger discussion begins to gain momentum, and we had talked about the fact that it really wasn't very much of a factor in Chicago, because you had worked things out pretty happily in Chicago between your turf and the Photoengravers' turf, but in your own mind, how did this begin to grow and take on importance?

SCHROEDER: In Chicago?

HOFFMAN: For yourself, personally, first of all. And second of all, what role did you play in talking to local people in Chicago about it?

SCHROEDER: Well, as the talks got on, I saw the value of merger; I recognized that. As an organizer, I saw the difficulties we were encountering with the Photoengravers. Where we didn't have jurisdictional strife before, we were developing it. The Photoengravers were losing jobs, and they were attempting to organize and to develop litho trade shops in the Chicago area in conflict with our plants and in competition with our plants.

HOFFMAN: What did you feel about these abortive discussions with respect to merger with the Pressmen?

SCHROEDER: Well, we had had some talks with the ITU [International Typographical Union] before, and nobody took that seriously; the people that I had discussions with never really took it seriously. It was nothing more than a gesture.

HOFFMAN: You mean the Chicago people didn't take it seriously or the International?

SCHROEDER: The ITU. I don't know if the International did or not, but I'm talking about the circle of people that I was in contact with.

HOFFMAN: Yes. Okay.

SCHROEDER: The attitude in Chicago for merger was never really serious until the Photoengraver merger was discussed.

HOFFMAN: Okay, that's important.

SCHROEDER: You mentioned earlier, and I wanted to get back to a point, you asked about who was the motivating factor. Ken Brown was the motivating factor without question, but you had to have somebody on the Photoengraver's side who was receptive. There was the president of the New York Local, [Edward] Nygaard, who was very sympathetic toward merger, very receptive. Then there was this guy [Wilfred] Connell from Boston who was very high on merger. But Connell died, or he was defeated by Bill Hall.

HOFFMAN: And Nygaard also died.

SCHROEDER: And Nygaard died. When the merger talks were going on, an interesting thing was that when Bill Hall was the president of the Chicago Local, he was not too favorable in his attitude regarding merger. I first came to learn that when I attended a meeting in Chicago--it wasn't a meeting, it was a Labor Day Mass. When they were talking about merger and working toward the development of the merger document, the Chicago Local, in conformity with the policies of the International at that time, said, "Let's move some of our programs and get together on different occasions." The Photoengravers always participated in Labor Day Mass at Holy Name Cathedral, so they asked for a couple of guys to go in this ceremony at Holy Name Cathedral. Since I was Catholic, I was the logical one. So Charlie Timmel and I went to this Labor Day Mass. After the Mass they had a breakfast in the courtyard there at Loyola University's downtown campus. I had a discussion with Herb Fabrey and Bill Hall, and their attitudes were anything but receptive to merger. "Boy, this isn't going to go at all!" Because they made comments like, "You got to watch that Brown, he'll steal the teeth right out of your mouth." You know, that kind of stuff. (laughter)

HOFFMAN: When was this?

SCHROEDER: It had to be around 1963.

HOFFMAN: 1963? That late?

SCHROEDER: I'm guessing now, because it all depends when Bill Hall became. . . . No, it had to be 1962, because Hall was International president in 1963. So I was wrong on that date. But in talking to the officers in Chicago, I predicted that when Hall would move to International president, his attitude would change because of the different political situation that he would have. Because the Photoengravers were elected every year, and number one, he would have the advantage of having a lot of people on the Lithographer's side keeping him in office by virtue of an incumbency. And sure enough, as soon as he became International president, he was pro-merger. (laughter) Fortunately!! But the thing that was very apparent to most of us was that the Photoengravers were much more politically oriented than we were as Lithographers.

HOFFMAN: No wonder, if they had to be campaigning constantly!

SCHROEDER: Yes, right. You'd have to say that among the Lithographers generally, at least locally, you did your job and there was never any campaigning. Never. I can't think of a time when anybody campaigned for an office in the local union in Chicago. And it's still that way, you know. In most of the Lithographer locals it was that way. The Photoengravers would really put on a spirited political campaign. Not that there's anything wrong with it. It's just the difference in the operations. But Hall became a great proponent of merger.

HOFFMAN: I think we better pick up on this web-study. You were asked by the International to conduct this web-study in 1963?

SCHROEDER: 1964. When I was working as an organizer, I did these studies, like the one I told you about on the phone. Electronic scanners were beginning to move, and I did some studies for the local to look, in depth, to find out if they're going to have any impact on the members. Such studies were not done on the telephone as you might naturally understand.

HOFFMAN: Now these were what? Electronic color scanners?

SCHROEDER: Electronic color scanners, yes. So I did some research in that area, and between Spohnholtz and Gundersen they must have talked to Brown and worked with Brown at the conventions. He knew me somewhat,

but not really well. They proposed that I would make this study on web offset presses.

HOFFMAN: Now, why did they want a study done at that particular time?

SCHROEDER: Well, Spohnholtz was the guy that was really pushing for the study in the first place, I should point out. In the late fifties he wanted this study conducted because he foresaw the impact of that equipment on the industry. He didn't know what it was going to do, but he knew it was going to do something. And whatever it was going to do, we better know.

HOFFMAN: He was the vice president at that time?

SCHROEDER: No, he was the president of the local in Chicago [Local 4]. He was the president, and an International councillor.

HOFFMAN: Oh. Okay.

SCHROEDER: So he finally convinced Brown to spend some money and conduct this research. So they said, "Well, go to New York and talk to Brown about it." He gave me all the information, and I talked to Brown on the phone. He told me what it would involve and it sounded interesting. He said, "We figure it should take about six months." He painted an interesting project, a lot of travel, see a lot of different cities you'd never seen before, different plants. It did sound like a hell of an interesting thing. So Spohnholtz said, "Go think it over. Take a week or so, and think it over." I went home and talked to my wife, and the following morning I came in and said, "Harry, call Brown and tell him I'm going to do it." "You better think about it," he says, "You'll be gone a lot." But I said, "If I don't do it, I'll go out of my mind." Because it was kind of a challenge; it would be interesting.

So I did it. On the first of March, I flew out to New York and met Brown in his office. We laid the plans for the program. I had given it some thought, what to do, and we had to figure out a title. [He said] "How you going to open the doors?" I said, "Well, one of the things that I know in the experience that I've got is that employers are very title conscious. Unless you give it some kind of elevation, you know, you're not going to get anywhere." So Wickersham thought of the title: Special Assistant to the President. That really opened the doors, helped open doors.

So I thought out the things, and I devised a series of questions that I felt had to be answered if we were going to get the information that we needed. But I resolved in my mind that you couldn't go in with a questionnaire and get the answers, because they'd be too cagey. So I memorized them all, and I never carried a pad of paper with me or carried a tape recorder (laughter) and I just engaged them in conversation. I put these questions within the framework of the conversation.

HOFFMAN: What sort of questions, Bill?

SCHROEDER: Well, "Gee, you've got a nice plant. How many presses do you have? What size presses?" And I'd usually tour the press room and see the operation. And, "Has the size of your presses being installed changed in the past few years?" If they had a web offset press, "When did you get it? Has it changed the type of work that you're putting on your sheet-fed presses? Are you having any trouble keeping your sheet-fed presses operating? Do you produce any work on your sheet-fed presses that is used to complement the work being produced on the web-press? Why did you buy that size press? What do you see wrong with web offset? What markets can you compete in?" That's the type of questions. Then I'd leave the plant. I'd go to the car, and I'd write furiously. Just write down everything that I could remember.

I remember one day it came to me that I'd reached the end of the rope. I knew that I'd covered enough ground when I could walk in the plant and without asking the guy, I had all the questions answered just by observing the operation. I could walk through the press room and tell what the condition was in the plant. One of the things that was developed out of the study was that sheet-fed presses in between 38-inch presses and 77-inch presses would become more and more obsolete.

I remember the time, and it was up at Krieger Company in Milwaukee, I walked in the plant and I saw presses there, 45-inch presses with tarpaulins over them, you know, and that kind of thing. That was one of the few plants that lied to me about what they were doing. I asked them if they had any trouble keeping their presses . . . "No, why should we have any trouble?" I said, "Well, I saw tarpaulins over your 45-inch presses, and our studies tell us that those presses are obsolete." Then they admitted it. So I knew at that time that I had gotten enough information, enough to make the study meaningful. I wrote a report and gave it to Brown. When Brown got the report, he saw the value of putting it in a booklet form. So I drew the sketches that we needed and obtained all the photographs and put the book together. And that changed my whole life! (laughter)

HOFFMAN: How did it change your whole life?

SCHROEDER: Well, because instead of going back to work in Chicago after the six months--the study actually in the field was, I think about four months, and then two months digesting the material and developing the report--we went on a series of seminars around the country, talking about web offset and talking about the need for education to bring the membership up to date with the changing technology. There was Ken Brown, George Gundersen, who was chairman of the Education Committee, myself, and Jack Wallace. We had a couple of other fellows: Henry Dillon went with us and Bill Hall went. But we had, I believe, twenty weekend that we went to different local areas and drew the people in, the leaders in that section of the country, to talk about what we had uncovered in the study.

But then they asked me if I would do a study on the Preparatory Department, the changes that were occurring in the Preparatory Department. That was in 1965. So just about the time I completed that, the educational amendment to the constitution was passed by the convention in 1965, and they were going to hire an education director. A lot of guys had put in for the job, but they came to me and asked if I'd be interested in becoming the education director. I really didn't want it.

HOFFMAN: No? Why not?

SCHROEDER: Well, by that time I had become involved in the politics of the organization, and in the policies. Interested in seeing that there was the correct policy for the organization, and I really didn't like the idea of becoming an employee of the union. I wanted to be in the policy development end of the organization.

HOFFMAN: Was it at this time that you ran for office?

SCHROEDER: No, I didn't run. I didn't run. On one of these seminars--we were still conducting these weekend seminars--it was in Portland, Oregon, Gundersen was twisting my arm to take the job, so he and Brown worked on me at that seminar. We went for a couple of days to a little spot on the ocean near Portland and talked about the educational program and well, I weakened.

HOFFMAN: They softened you up! (laughingly)

SCHROEDER: They softened me up. Then we went on another seminar down in L.A. [Los Angeles]. We stopped at another place, and that's where I made the decision that I was going to do it. But one of the things that

troubled me was that I saw--the respect that I've got today for Brown, yes--but he was so far advanced from any of the other people in the organization and from other union leaders I had seen, that I was fearful that he wasn't going to stay with the organization. I thought somebody else would pull him away. So one of the conditions that I had to have from him was that he was going to stay with the organization, because I wasn't going to move to the International if he wasn't going to be there.

The final meeting took place in New York. I had given a tentative "yes" when I was out on the West Coast and went to New York to either "nail it down" or go back as an organizer in Chicago. I was up at the Tappanzee Motor Inn, and we were sitting there by the fire--they had a cocktail lounge, and sitting there by the fire--and there weren't many people there, and we were just sitting there and I finally took the job. I said, "Okay, I'll take it if you tell me you're going to stay with the organization." Of course there was some negotiating for money, you know, for wages. We got that squared away and I took the job. But I had to have the assurance that he was going to stay because that was really a major concern to me.

HOFFMAN: Where did you think he really might go?

SCHROEDER: I thought he might go to the AFL-CIO, that's what I thought. I really thought that's where. I couldn't imagine his staying with our organization. I just thought it was too good to be true for him to stay.

HOFFMAN: So in 1965 you took over, then, as educational director?

SCHROEDER: Actually in 1966. The program became effective in January. I went on, I think, in February. February is a significant month in my life, it seems.

HOFFMAN: And you developed, then, all of these programs patterned after the Chicago Local?

SCHROEDER: Used that as a model. We had the International educational fund where every member was paying twenty-five cents monthly of his dues to the International Fund. That was to be used to assist locals, you know, myself going in and physically helping them develop programs, give them guidance, show them how to go about it. The other area that the money was to be used for was the development of the actual training materials--curriculum and actual text materials.

HOFFMAN: Now, did you begin to develop these collective bargaining relationships with employers at this time too, in addition?

SCHROEDER: Well, I didn't do that. I stayed completely out of the bargaining area. That was an arrangement that we had agreed upon, you know, that I should stay completely out of the bargaining area, that I should be just recognized as an educator. The other area where the money was used for was international educational seminars. We started work in January and at that time there was considerable interest on the part of many locals to develop programs patterned after Chicago, so when I went on the job, in addition to Chicago, we had Philadelphia, Twin Cities, St. Louis already with operating programs. But very rapidly we developed these other programs; and when I left as educational director we had fifty-two.

HOFFMAN: Now, you left as educational director to run for your present office?

SCHROEDER: Yes. Well, I was still educational director while I was running. I left the job as educational director on February 15th--February again!--to be sworn in as the vice president.

HOFFMAN: I think it would be useful, Bill, since this is one of the first interviews that we've done, and since this union is somewhat unique in terms of the way they elect these vice presidential offices, if you would describe the electorate. How are the vice-presidents divided up? And how are they elected?

SCHROEDER: Well, under the old ALA there were four vice presidents. When we merged with the Photoengravers there were four vice presidents from Litho and two from Photoengraving and that was to remain for ten years under that condition. Years ago we used to have a regional system for vice presidents, but they changed that some years back--I don't recall the year--even prior to the merger with the Photoengravers.

HOFFMAN: Do you recall why?

SCHROEDER: Yes. Because the presidents used to develop little kingdoms of their own. You had the Pacific Coast vice president, and that was his bailiwick and he almost ruled it like a president in that area.

HOFFMAN: So it made for a weak president.

SCHROEDER: Yes. Right. So they did away with that and instead of having regional vice president, they had vice president A, B, C, and D, just for the sake of election. But actually their duties were the same and international, not regional.

HOFFMAN: But they were elected by the total membership?

SCHROEDER: By the total membership. Right. Elected by the total membership. An interesting thing, that in the fight with Swayduck . . . .

HOFFMAN: Wait a minute, let me get this straight. They were elected by the total membership, but they still had a geographical responsibility?

SCHROEDER: Nope. Oh, no. Years ago they did. [Then] they were elected by the total membership, but they had a regional responsibility.

HOFFMAN: Okay. But when the change came, they were elected by the total membership, but had an international responsibility?

SCHROEDER: But there were no regional lines; international responsibility. Their duties were given to them by the president, so they became chairmen of various committees. Like I have the Education Training and Retraining Committee, technological developments in education training and retraining. I also have the Label Committee. I'm on the Legislative Committee. I've got various other duties. John Gabbard is chairman of the Subsidy Committee. So that these are assigned by the president. All assignments to the vice presidents are given by the president.

But what I wanted to call attention to was that I was asked by some locals to run for vice president in 1966, for 1967. The election would have been in 1967, I guess, yes. How that came about was [that] when I gave the report, Eddie Donahue said, "I'd like that guy to run for vice president." And there was a lot of talk; this was at a council meeting and I felt I was out of my element at that time, to run for vice president. While I was flattered, naturally, I didn't feel I was really qualified. Besides, at that time, Teddy Brandt had been defeated in really a conspiracy conducted by Ed Swayduck. He had controlled that vote. Are you familiar with how he knocked off Ted Brandt in the election?

HOFFMAN: No. I just know that there was a contest there.

(END OF SIDE I)

HOFFMAN: You were talking about this conspiracy on the part of Swayduck to eliminate Ted Brandt.

SCHROEDER: I guess conspiracy is the wrong . . . there was conspiracy involved, I suppose, more or less, but if I could put it in more plain terms, it was just and out-and-out gimmick to get rid of Ted Brandt. He was going to knock off some people. And Jim O'Neill ran for vice president against Ted Brandt, and somehow or other Swayduck would always turn out about a 95 percent vote, about 99 9/10 percent in favor of the way he wanted it to go. It was remarkable how he could turn out the vote. So there was no question--and I don't mind saying it, I said it from the very beginning--it was a crooked election, and Ted Brandt was defeated.

After two years Jim O'Neill resigned. There was a lot of pressure on him. Everybody realized how he'd gotten in, and they resented Jim O'Neill terribly for what he had done and the conspiracy with Swayduck, and Ted Brandt was again elected to the vice presidency. That's how Teddy Brandt got back. I always felt that was a crooked vote that came out of New York.

HOFFMAN: But nevertheless, this affected your own feelings in terms of running?

SCHROEDER: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. And I became more active politically in the organization as a result, you know. I was damn strong, you know, very firm in my feelings about what should be done. I became a great proponent of merger and saw the advantage of merger. All the things that we accomplished as a merged organization, I always thought--and feel to this day--we would have been able to accomplish had the New York Local been a part of the merger, because Swayduck would have been using his same old tactics and frustrating everything that was being done, fighting on the executive board, etc. He was a showman; he was a great B.S. artist. I'm always copying a term that Ken Brown used himself: "Swayduck was a great guy for form without substance." (laughter) A big ballyhoo, a big balloon, a big ballyhoo about something, but if you looked underneath, there'd be nothing there. When we developed the educational program and things were going well, Ken used to say, "You know, in spite of all the people who say we should publicize it, we're not going to publicize it, because we're going to let it develop. And there'll come a time when people will be coming to us for information."

HOFFMAN: Wanting to know how it was done.

SCHROEDER: And that's just what happened.

HOFFMAN: And here we are! (laughter)

SCHROEDER: Yes. As a result it got all kinds of publicity. And that's what Ken said was "form with substance."

HOFFMAN: Yes.

SCHROEDER: You could really talk about something that you really did. So I really believe that that guy would have frustrated this program had he been in it. We had an educational program in New York and, as I understand it, a good one, but their attitude there seemed always to be [that] what they had was good for them and "we challenge you to do as well." Whereas, in other parts of the country, locals would say, "Well, look what we've got and we'll share it with you." That wasn't the case; it wasn't that at all. The attitude of Swayduck was that when a local was in trouble, he'd come to their aid with a big check--"I've got a million dollars here"--but you wouldn't dare cash it, you know. (laughter) So there's that form without substance. He'd be there for the big show.

HOFFMAN: If you could promise three media, T.V. networks. . .

SCHROEDER: Yes, right.

HOFFMAN: Well, were you involved in these various abortive unity discussions throughout 1966 with the Stereotypers & Electrotypers and the Pressmen?

SCHROEDER: No, not at all. Never took part in any of the discussions. I met some of the people at that time. In fact, Jim Samson, the president, is somewhat of a friend of mine. I got to know him quite well because his son and my son went to school together.

HOFFMAN: Of the Stereotypers?

SCHROEDER: Yes. So we had many talks about the unions and so forth, but in formal discussions I never had any. . .

HOFFMAN: Well, now let's go back. One thing you said that interests me is that you campaigned, and previously you had said that campaigning was something new to you, coming out of Chicago.

SCHROEDER: Oh, yes [there was] no campaigning in Chicago at all.

HOFFMAN: Did the merger with the Photoengravers make campaigning more of a necessity?

SCHROEDER: Gee, I don't know. I don't know if that was it or not, Alice. I really don't know. I think it probably had some influence. I think the size of the organization was somewhat of an influencing factor in itself, and the attitudes maybe of new members. I must say, all in all, I think one of the finest things we ever did was to merge with the Photoengravers. They had many, many good ideas, you know, and a greater militancy than we had ever had as a union.

HOFFMAN: As trade unionists?

SCHROEDER: As trade unionists, yes. Much greater. Higher principles than a lot of the lithographers.

HOFFMAN: What do you think caused that? Was it the influence of Matt Woll?

SCHROEDER: No. They give him credit for some of that, but I don't read that. I read it just as the craft and members, themselves. Tremendous pride. They believed, you know, they really believed it.

HOFFMAN: Well, they had been active through the years, much more than Lithographers typically had, in the Allied Printing Trades.

SCHROEDER: That's right. And they had the photoengraving industry locked up tight. They really did, you know. They had good control, particularly in the major cities--New York, Chicago, St. Louis--they had it pretty tight. So they could really swing the way they wanted to swing. (laughter)

HOFFMAN: Well, how did you go about campaigning?

SCHROEDER: I didn't throw my hat in the ring, again I should point out. What happened--well, I'm fifty-four now--everybody knew that I would have liked in the first instance to have been involved in the policy-making arm of the organization rather than be education director, although I put everything into the educational job and stuck within my niche and stayed there. But still, I must say, I harbored that desire to get in other areas.

So it was in Philadelphia [that] I was with Milt Williams one day. I was in there for a meeting with their trustees, and we went to a restaurant late at night and we're sitting in this Italian restaurant. He said, "Bill, if you'd run for vice president, I'd support you." I said, "I don't know. I've got a lot of work to do yet in this educational program.

These guys, you know, are a couple of years from retirement." He says, "Hell, they're ready to retire now" as far as he was concerned. He says, "Take your pick. You run, and I'll back you. I'll be your campaign manager." We'd had a couple of drinks, you know, over dinner. I said, "You know, you make it sound interesting." I said, "I don't approve of what's going on with some of these guys dragging their feet." I didn't think they were doing their job right, so I tentatively agreed. I said, "Let me give it some thought, but I'll get back." So I went to Chicago where Gundersen got ahold of me, apparently they had been talking.

HOFFMAN: What do you mean 'they'? Gundersen and Williams?

SCHROEDER: Gundersen, Williams and Don Biedenbach, and a couple of other guys, had been talking. It was apparent. So Gundersen talked to me and said, "If you ever hope to get out of that job and move into the policy arm, you better do it this time or forget it."

So I go to Rochester and I hear virtually the same story from Don Biedenbach. He said, "I'll support you this time, but not next time. You'll be too old." (laughter) And he was right because I'm fifty-four now, and you're not going to break in a vice president at age fifty-six or fifty-seven. So the more they talked about it, the more I got enthused. I said, "Okay. Let's go. Let's do it."

The word was kind of leaking out, bit by bit, and it was somewhat before the convention. They had a council meeting. In fact, it was the meeting when Walter Risdon died--the same council meeting that Walter Risdon passed away. I met Gus Petrakis and told Gus--he had heard it by way of the grapevine--that I was going to run against him. I said, "Gus, let's go to lunch" but he didn't want to go to lunch. I said, "Come on, Gus. We're both grown. You know you're in an elected office. Let's go and have lunch together and let's talk about it. I'll tell you what's behind all this." I said, "You know, there are a lot of people dissatisfied with what you're doing." He argued, "Aw, they don't appreciate what I'm doing," etc. But that's neither here nor there. I said, "Gus, I'm going to run against you, but I'd like to know what your position is, your financial situation, what retirement you'll have, if I defeat you." I still hated to knock the guy off, you know, and leave him without an income, without a job. So we sat down at the table and figured out how much pension he was going to have. It turned out he was going to get somewhat over $9,000 a year.

HOFFMAN: How old was he?

SCHROEDER: Sixty. So that soothed my conscience somewhat. So I said, "Well, Gus, I'm going to run." He said, "Well, I'm going to run hard against you." "That's certainly your absolute right and I wish you well, but I'm going to try to beat you." So we worked on a campaign.

HOFFMAN: Now, how do you pick which one of the vice presidents you're running against?

SCHROEDER: Well, as far as I was concerned, it was either Ted Brandt or Gus Petrakis.

HOFFMAN: Now, this was the election where Donahue ran against Brandt?

SCHROEDER: Yes. I wasn't satisfied with what either one of them was doing as a vice president. But when I looked at the two, I considered Gus the weakest of the two, because Teddy had done some good bargaining in a number of cities like Milwaukee and Kansas City, and did a good job in Hawaii. So I thought if I'm going to have to make a choice, I'll pick Gus because I think I have a better chance of beating him. So that's how I made the decision. A number of people put up money to finance a campaign. I think I put in $350 for mailings. Gundersen put up money. Harry Spohnholtz put up $500 in Chicago. Don Biedenbach, Milt Williams. Came the convention, and boy, I was really dirt on the stick for running against an incumbent! (laughter)

HOFFMAN: It wasn't done in those days!

SCHROEDER: No, it hadn't been done. It was really brutal. But I just let it run off. It frankly didn't bother me too much because I was determined that this was the way it had to be. It got really ugly in some situations. Gus almost got into a fight with Wickersham, for instance. [He] called Wickersham a traitor because Wickersham was supporting me. Wickersham said, "You and Teddy Brandt are making my job more difficult because you're not doing your job."

HOFFMAN: What was his job, specifically? Was he chairman of the Committee on Education, for example?

SCHROEDER: Gus? Metal Decorating Committee at this time. He had at one time, however, been chairman of the T.D. Committee. The committee was disenchanted. He had committee after committee. I hate to talk about him because it sounds like you're just downgrading the guy, but he really did have problems in conducting meetings, couldn't keep the committee with him. They were never satisfied.

HOFFMAN: Now, when you were successful, you took over all these committee assignments? Or was that all reorganized?

SCHROEDER: All reorganized.

HOFFMAN: Does that happen typically after every election?

SCHROEDER: Yes. Or reassignments. But the thing that came to pass that I didn't expect [was that] at the convention Walter Creel came to me, and said, "Well, Bill, we'd like to support you, but I see little sense of just replacing one vice president when everybody knows there's two of them need to be replaced. And if they're not going to run two candidates, I'm not going to support one. And I'm going to go along with the incumbent." I couldn't believe it! I said, "Walter, here I'm putting my head on the block and willing to take the chance, and you're telling me you're not going to support me."

HOFFMAN: Where was he from, by the way?

SCHROEDER: St. Louis. But Walter was using a lever. You see, we still have regions in the country for the sake of electing councillors. He's in the Mountain Region. So the Mountain Region had a meeting on Wednesday night of the convention, and Walter Creel told all the delegates of the Mountain Region, that he was not going to support a candidate to run against Petrakis unless there was some candidate running against Ted Brandt. So Eddie Donahue says, "Well, damn it, you run, Walter. I'll support you." He [Walter] says, "No, I've got my local and I intend to stay in the local." Eddie says, "Well, damn it, I'll get a delegate to run and if I can't get anybody better, I'll run." I didn't know this had taken place.

After the meeting Donahue talked to Jack Greer. We had a meeting at lunch time in Gundersen's room. That was on Thursday. I get into the room and we were seated around. There's Spohnholtz, Gundersen, Conlon, Jack Greer, Milt Williams, Don Biedenbach, Harold Larson from Kansas City. Ed Donahue came in--I didn't know anything about what had taken place the night before--and he says, "I just want to tell you that I'm a candidate as vice-president against Ted Brandt." (laughter) Everybody thought he was kidding. I said, "You got to be kidding!" He says, "No, I'm serious!" Then he related the story that had taken place at the Mountain Region meeting. So this was Thursday. Thursday night was the banquet, and word began to leak out that Eddie was running against Ted Brandt.

HOFFMAN: A lot of buzz sessions at the banquet.

SCHROEDER: Yes. And Ted Brandt was at the banquet unaware of what had taken place until the end of the evening when someone told him that Eddie was going to run against him. Brandt said, "Never. That's not true. Eddie would never do that. Eddie would never run against me." So he couldn't believe it.

The following morning the convention was opened, the Friday session. The vice presidents always sat on the top level, and the councillors sat on the lower level. Ted Brandt was at the end of the table on the high level, and Eddie comes in at the lower level and he stops in front of Teddy and he looks up and he says, "I just want to tell you, Teddy, it's true." (laughter) He didn't say another thing, just "It's true." I didn't see exactly what his expression was, I was away from the table on the other side, but they tell me he had a pained expression.

HOFFMAN: Altar boys are not supposed to talk that way to cardinals!!

SCHROEDER: Right. (laughter) So the campaign was on. And, of course, the alignment was somewhat divided along lines of, what would you say? an infight that concerned the Photoengravers Pension Program. Bill Hall . . . what's his name up in Toronto? . . Les Young, and Charlie Thomson in Cleveland Photoengravers. The Photoengravers, by and large, aligned themselves with Petrakis and Brandt, while the Lithographers lined up with major locals going with Donahue and myself.

HOFFMAN: Now, did this grow out of the concern at the time of merger that much greater discrepancy in average age of the Photoengravers was going to deplete your merged pension plan? Or was this some other issue?

SCHROEDER: No. The Lithographers wanted the Photoengravers' pension merged with them. The Photoengravers, Bill Hall, resisted successfully, you know, and prevented the merger of those two funds. I would say that it was for some reasons known really only to Bill Hall why he never wanted those programs merged. Part of it was his own desire to lead something himself, and his own photoengraver's pride, which would be a main factor.

HOFFMAN: And Petrakis and Brandt supported him on that?

SCHROEDER: Yes. Right. Well, they associated socially and otherwise, you know, with him. That was the alignment. Donahue and I won handily in the election, but I always felt that Donahue, by throwing his hat in the ring, was a major factor in my own election. I'm not so sure I would have done as well, you know, without his throwing his hat in the ring. So that's how it came about. We made trips to major locals and spoke to the memberships and council boards. It was interesting.

HOFFMAN: You went together?

SCHROEDER: We had only one where we went together. In fact, Gabbard was with that, too. Gabbard, Donahue and I spoke at the Washington, Philadelphia, and New York meetings three nights in succession. We had a ball, it was really fun, you know, campaigning. (laughter) I really got a sample of it, you know. It was really fun. Debating the issues on the floor, and there were some real issues brought out. I spoke to the members in St. Louis. We had a lot of members [who] questioned what I would do. A really challenging experience. So I never regretted it.

HOFFMAN: Did Petrakis and Brandt campaign, too?

SCHROEDER: Oh, yes. In fact, they got some literature that was supported by funds donated by Thomson and Les Young and a photoengraver from Detroit, and a number of other people. I suppose Hall was in it, I'm sure, you know. His name wasn't attached, but I felt that he probably was. They got out literature, and we got out literature. I think I had just one mailing, but some of the locals picked up the campaign in their letters, in their own letters to their members. Of course, I had a big local in back of me in Chicago.

But Chicago runs a very, very democratic kind of an election. You can never expect a real one-sided vote. No matter who you are, if you can get 3-1, you're doing real well. You're not going to get any 99 99/100 percent vote like they swing out of New York. It's a real level vote.

HOFFMAN: What kind of questions did the photoengravers ask you where you campaigned with Photoengraver locals?

SCHROEDER: I would say that in Photoengraver locals the main thing was: "How can you run against Gus? He's been a vice president so long."

HOFFMAN: He was a lithographer though, wasn't he?

SCHROEDER: Yes, he was a lithographer. Well, my answer to that was that I don't think he's doing the job and I think it's like taking money away from our members to permit that to continue. And very frankly, I'd level with them: "If I don't run now, I'll never be able to do that job."

HOFFMAN: So the issues really kind of resolved themselves around the relative competence between . . . .

SCHROEDER: Yes, it really did. One of the major arguments against me on the part of the opposition was that I was an education director and had no experience at negotiating. I had stayed away from it deliberately, you know, for the two years of doing research work plus six years, about eight years that I didn't really negotiate. But my argument was, "Look, I've been negotiating, but not with employers. I've been negotiating to extract equipment from them and manufacturers for free." (laughter) So don't say I'm not an experienced negotiator. When I was an organizer, I negotiated only first-time contracts, which is the most difficult.

HOFFMAN: Sure.

SCHROEDER: So, I'm not without experience in that area. And other people would say, "Well, you did a good job as educational director and you should stay there." (laughter) So that's one of the arguments. I said, "But I don't want to stay there!" I really did feel that if I had stayed on as educational director, I'd have been bored to tears, because all of the development was out of it and it takes a different kind of a guy to carry the program on. I think the program will benefit by having a new director, because there's no use kidding yourself, when you start a program and it works out well, you finally get the idea that you, and only you, know the answers. The times change; the needs change; you better understand that. So I think a new director in there with new ideas at a time after the program has been set up pretty well, where he doesn't have to struggle with all of the problems of developing the framework, I think the program will benefit.

HOFFMAN: How did the people around the International office view you as you were running?

SCHROEDER: You mean the other officers?

HOFFMAN: Right.

SCHROEDER: Oh, we got along fine. I can't say there was any outward bitterness, or rivalry. Even when I bumped into Gus, we talked and were friendly enough. But I have a feeling that Gus is still bitter. I don't know, but I think he is. I may be wrong. People tell me I'm wrong, but I don't know. I hope I'm wrong, because I'd hate to see that. When you take the chance and you run in an elected office, you better accept that possibility. I only hope I can fill the job to the point where I can be reelected, because I don't intend to just be a politician. I hope to be able to do what I did in Chicago--just do the job well and stand on my record.

HOFFMAN: Let the chips fall where they may! I was a little curious as to why Spohnholtz resigned. He just resigned in what . . . ?

SCHROEDER: He's sixty-two or sixty-three years old. He would have been required to retire at sixty-five in any case, but he has the early retirement. He hasn't admitted it, but I've heard that his health isn't the best.

HOFFMAN: I see. So it was purely for personal reasons.

SCHROEDER: Oh, yes. No pressure for him to resign. Not at all. There would have been no question about him staying until sixty-five had he chosen.

HOFFMAN: Well, I think it's important to get that on the record.

SCHROEDER: No question about that at all. He had officers behind him--Gundersen and Conlon--who would have supported him right to the end. It should be noted, however, that traditionally, in Chicago, the officers could have great differences of opinion, fight like a son-of-a-gun amongst themselves, but it would never be in the slightest way apparent to the members, and that's been the way as long as I know. And I know, because I've been involved in some of the fights when I was an organizer in Chicago.

HOFFMAN: It's very, very curious to me to make these regional observations because, you know, that's kind of characteristic of the labor movement in Chicago, in a number of significant Internationals that I can think of. Whereas in a city like Philadelphia, you have the exact opposite of the spectrum. They're fighting with each other; they are unable to merge; they're in all kinds of difficulties. It doesn't really matter whether you're talking about Photoengravers

and Lithographers or whether you're talking about the failure of the AFL and CIO to merge on a city basis. I wonder if you have any thoughts about what the climate was in Chicago that would make the cohesiveness.

SCHROEDER: Well, I think it's midwestern attitude. I think there's a great difference in midwestern attitude. That's disappearing, you know, as things do change in the country, but I think that's basically the reason. People on the East Coast were considerably--at least in the past--considerably different in their attitude. The compactness of the population. . . .

HOFFMAN: Right. Streetcar districts.

SCHROEDER: That's right.

HOFFMAN: [It] encourages a lot of politicking.

SCHROEDER: That's right. There's less politicking in the Midwest. As you stretch it out farther, there's less politics. Something I wanted to make a point of that's curious, going back to one of the earlier statements about knowing Spohnholtz and Gundersen. I worked in shops with Gundersen, worked in shops with Spohnholtz and with Timmel, but none of these things really had any effect other than just the initial things with Gundersen to get started in the school as to the position I've got today.

HOFFMAN: In other words, you're saying it wasn't the old shop tie.

SCHROEDER: No, not at all. It was strictly independent thinking. Timmel's job at the local level is more of a shop tie. Spohnholtz had really great admiration for Timmel and recognized him as a very loyal type of a person, the kind of a guy he'd want as an officer in the union under him, somebody he could trust.

HOFFMAN: Well, there has to be a shop tie to a certain extent because you can't encourage somebody you don't know.

SCHROEDER: Oh, sure. But I mean, like myself, there was never any shop tie associated with any of the things I had done other than that one instance where I went into the school. But it was just work from there on out.

HOFFMAN: Well, I guess in conclusion we might say something about these various committee assignments, if you feel there is something you want to put on the tape.

SCHROEDER: Well, the work that I've been involved in since I've been a vice president has really been interesting. I think I would say that the center of interest has been in the area of technological development, education and labor relations. I've been involved in a lot of labor relations work. As chairman of the Education Committee, that turns out to be somewhat of a public relations and labor relations project, in meeting with employers and meeting with manufacturers of equipment and people who are leaders of the industry. I also meet with some of the top corporations, for instance, Mead Corporation. I was invited to a conference held by Mead Corporation for the top corporate executives and plant managers to discuss labor relations, one representative from the United Paperworkers International Union and myself were the only two unions there. There were about thirty to forty people there from the president of the corporation to the chairman of the board, plant managers, division heads, division presidents, because they had such a miserable labor relations problems in their plants, and they couldn't understand why. They wanted to hear what our views were, what my views were of their operations.

As a result of that, we have developed a real good relationship with Mead Corporation. The conclusion that I'd given them was that they had a lot of contracts, in many cases sweetheart contracts with labor unions, that don't in fact represent their people. So instead of having a labor union solve their labor relations problems, they've compounded their own problem because the people are dissatisfied, not only with their company, [but] they're dissatisfied with their union. Oddly enough, they agreed.

HOFFMAN: A little dose of democracy wouldn't hurt! (laughter)

SCHROEDER: So I've also been involved in negotiations in a number of cities. I've been responsible for registering the new union label with the various states and the United States government.

HOFFMAN: Has [George] Meany approved the new union label?

SCHROEDER: Yes.

HOFFMAN: He has.

SCHROEDER: By the way of a little "waltz around", saying that he approved, saying that they have noted the change in the organization's name. (laughter)

HOFFMAN: Take note and put it in the file!!

SCHROEDER: It doesn't say that they approve. Regarding the job in general, I'd say I've never been busier in my life than I have been this last year, but it's been an exciting year.

HOFFMAN: Are you responsible for legislative concerns, too?

SCHROEDER: I'm on the committee. Donahue is the chairman of the committee. I asked to be put on that committee. I was assigned to assist Donahue during the campaign because he had such a load of work, and they asked if I would help him.

HOFFMAN: The McGovern campaign, you mean?

SCHROEDER: Yes. And [they asked] if I'd help him with the COPE [Committee on Political Education] fund. I said, "Okay, provided you put me on the committee permanently, because I'm interested in politics too, and legislation." So I've been also involved with the Occupational Safety and Health Act [OSHA]. Right now we're starting a new cooperative program, the first in the country in any industry, a three-way cooperative program between the union, the company, and the government.

HOFFMAN: To implement OSHA?

SCHROEDER: For voluntary hazard evaluation covering 1400 employees; there are no fines or citations against the company for violations. Do a complete test, hazard evaluation throughout the operations, and conduct a safety training program for the employees.

HOFFMAN: I didn't really know that was possible under the provisions of the law, to do this without a citation.

SCHROEDER: Well, we got a letter (laughter) that it's off-grounds. OSHA won't come in during this NIOSH test [National Institute on Occupational Safety and Health], which is under HEW [Health, Education & Welfare]. OSHA is under the Department of Labor, so NIOSH has asked OSHA to not make any random inspections of their operations. The only time they would come in [would be] in case of complaints of imminent hazards, imminent dangers. Then they would come in, but other than that they will not come in. So they're going to make an evaluation of the whole plant.

They're also going to do a health study. This will involve submission on a voluntary basis on the part of the em-

ployees to health examinations--spot, you know, an employee here, one there--and then these same employees will go through subsequent health examinations periodically, probably for the rest of their lives. They are also going to interview people who have retired from the company. They are also going to go through the health records of people who have left the company, interview people who are working in other industries, if they have left the graphic arts. Also, the death certificates of people to determine how people died who were employed with the company, those who died after leaving the company, to see if the employment in the graphic arts had any adverse effects on their health.

HOFFMAN: As compared with the population who weren't.

SCHROEDER: So we feel that this will really be of benefit to the industry in determining the effect of graphic arts employment on the health of the individual. Also it will tend to develop a set of standards that can be applied in the graphic arts all over the country, because we've got such a perfect laboratory. You've got a situation where you're not adversaries; you're in there cooperatively. They must make all of the changes that are required; and it's going to cost them hundreds of thousands of dollars probably to make the changes that are necessary.

HOFFMAN: Who does the physical exam? The company doctor?

SCHROEDER: No, no. NIOSH will do that. There is a new society that will probably be involved. It's called the Society for Environmental and Occupational Health. It's a society of doctors and scientists with no axe to grind. They are not associated with any organization other than the medical profession to determine the effects of environment in occupational situations.

HOFFMAN: Well, that's very interesting. That will provide a real set of standards.

SCHROEDER: So we're hoping to get some public relations out of that, too, because it's a significant change.

HOFFMAN: It has applicability to any industry that's involved with chemicals.

SCHROEDER: So the IUD, the Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO, was instrumental in working with us. Shelley Samuels, who works in liaison with NIOSH and OSHA and the AFL-CIO, and I talked about this kind of a project. Then I went up to Banta and got Banta to agree to it; they were very cooperative. They're very progressive and very, I'd say, understanding.

HOFFMAN: What kind of dreams do you have about the development of the educational programs?

SCHROEDER: What do I see for the future in it?

HOFFMAN: Yes.

SCHROEDER: Well, there's a pattern developing already. Because of the economic situation in the country, there are fewer apprentices attending the schools, and more journeymen. In fact, in the last two years the situation has completely reversed itself. Where we had two-thirds apprentices and one-third journeymen, now we have two-thirds journeymen and one-third apprentices. We've got about 3,000 people attending. We have now fifty-six schools in operation, fifty-six active programs. In the last year there have been four more added--smaller programs--but that's all that was left to pick up. All the major cities have their programs established now. But I see in the future, if we can keep the drive and keep the interest of management, and get the cooperation of management and some of the management associations, that we can put things in the curriculum that are far different than we've got there now.

HOFFMAN: You mean workers' education type of thing?

SCHROEDER: Yes. I think that one of the things that would be helpful would be if we had courses in economics. Economics, not only of the country, of the world in general, but of the graphic arts industry in particular. Or another thing that we should be teaching is the outside influences upon a man's job situation. Because I contend that the individual worker understands too little about his own union, too little about his employer, too little about employer associations, to understand where he really fits as an individual in the industry. So we'd like to see courses like that introduced into the curriculum. But it takes great cooperation. We've attempted to get a course in economics prepared, but we didn't have much luck with Printing Industries of America which is the employers association.

HOFFMAN: Yes, I can imagine the employers would balk at that.

SCHROEDER: Yes, well, our argument is, "Well, look, if you want the people to really work hard and save money on the job, you better teach them the economics of the industry." Because getting to the more simple aspects of it, does a worker know, let's say, in the camera department, how much a sheet of film costs and how much his time amounts to the total cost of the finished product? But if they are telling us the truth on what their profit margin is, they should have no compunctions about giving us the facts.

HOFFMAN: Right. Will the Education Department move in any direction towards the Bookbinders?

SCHROEDER: Oh, definitely. In fact, we intend to give the report of the Technological Developments Committee. One of the conclusions of the committee is that programs must be developed for Bookbinders. So if we're a merged organization, we have to take the view that the same benefits, the same programs must be available to every member. Or else it isn't a true merger.

HOFFMAN: Right, plus the fact that other potential mergees are watching.

SCHROEDER: Absolutely. And if they see somebody come in as a second-class citizen, they'll say, "We don't want to be a third class."

HOFFMAN: Right. Well, do you have anything that you think we ought to tie this together with?

[Apparently some discussion about merger with the IPP&AU [International Printing Pressmen and Assistants Union].

SCHROEDER: I really have some questions whether it will come to pass. At least I feel confident that part of the IPP&AU could merge with us without a problem, but the possibility of the whole thing coming intact . . . . because the Printing Pressmen are divided into two sections--the printing specialty workers' division, and the craft division. The craft division, which includes the web-offset pressmen and crew, I don't think there would be any question. . . .

HOFFMAN: They're more likely to come with you?

SCHROEDER: But the specialty workers, the leadership of that group in the IPP&AU would prevent that, I feel. They would fight to keep that apart. But if we could take them intact and merge with us, it would be a great help. All we can do is wait and see what happens.

END OF INTERVIEW

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William Schroeder