INTERVIEW WITH TED BRANDT

January 28, 1975
Los Angeles, California

Interviewer: Alice M. Hoffman

INTRODUCTION

Ted Brandt came from a trade-union family of cigar makers in New York City. He had to go to work at the age of fourteen in a lithographic plant. He worked his way up from lunch boy to hand transferer and became active in the union--Local One of the Amalgamated Lithographers--as a shop steward. He describes his aggressive group of young local union members who opposed their president, John Blackburn--Ed Swayduck, Ed Stone, Ed Hansen, and other "Young Turks."

Ted Brandt was a member of the negotiating committee in the important 1946 negotiations in New York which resulted in a union-run pension plan. He recalls the involvement and growing dominance from an early date of Ben Robinson, local and International counsel, in the affairs of the union and pinpoints some of the mistakes that Robinson made, especially in his insistence on uniformity of contract language.

In 1947 Ted Brandt procured a job in a Los Angeles lithographic company as a plate maker, moved his family to the West Coast, and soon became full-time president of the Los Angeles local. He describes the organizational techniques that he used in this essentially non-union town. He shows how the affiliation of the A.L.A. with the CIO in 1946 affected his organizing efforts in California and describes his active involvement in the California CIO, the Central Labor Council, and the State Labor Federation. Brandt relates how his Los Angeles local came to participate in the Inter-Local Pension Fund. He describes his relationships, as president of Los Angeles Local 22, with Local One, New York City, and Local Four, Chicago. He discusses International union politics in some detail and, in a general discussion about merger, talks about relationships with other printing trades in Los Angeles.

Ted Brandt served one term as International councillor under the presidency of George Canary. He was then elected to the position of International vice-president from the West Coast. Later on, when regional vice-presidents were eliminated, his areas of expertise became negotiations, the subsidy program, and political action. Brandt explains why he has always been opposed to the elimination of regional vice-presidents.

Ted Brandt tells about the withdrawal of the A.L.A. from the AFL-CIO

in 1958 and its subsequent consequences for President George Canary. He recalls the ten-week strike over language of Local 17 in San Francisco in 1959 when he was International vice-president from the West Coast. He traces the rise of Ken Brown to the presidency of the union. He talks about the withdrawal of New York Local One from the International over the issue of merger with the Photoengravers and his own defeat, engineered by Ed Swayduck, for re-election to the vice-presidency.

Brandt continued on as International representative and returned to the vice-presidency a year later where he served until 1972 when he was defeated for re-election. He concludes the interview with a discussion of the issues confronting his union during the years from 1964 to 1972.

Oral History Interview

with

TED BRANDT

January 8, 1975
Los Angeles, California

by Alice M. Hoffman

INTERVIEWER: We are in Los Angeles, California, and today is January 26. Will you just say your name and your date and place of birth, and then we'll play this back and check the level.

BRANDT: My name is Theodore Brandt, and I'm called by Ted Brandt. I was born on June 24, 1907.

INTERVIEWER: Ted, I know, when we were downstairs, you were telling me about coming from a trade-union family, that your mother and father were both cigar makers. And I wonder if you could just describe that a little bit, and something about your youthful experiences in school and your first job in New York.

BRANDT: Well, as I said before, I was born in 1907. My parents both worked for the cigar industry. They worked as cigar makers in the New York local.

INTERVIEWER: What was their job?

BRANDT: They were cigar makers, rollers.

INTERVIEWER: They were rollers.

BRANDT: Rollers, yes.

INTERVIEWER: Both of them?

BRANDT: I believe so. I know my mother positively was. I have never seen my father roll the cigars home, but my mother was doing it all the time, even home, making cigars. So I know she was a roller.

I'm not positive about my father. But I remember the stories my mother would tell me, regarding work in the cigar industry. For instance, as they worked, there would be a person in the middle of the floor, up on a high stool, reading to them during the day, giving them the topic of the day and stories of what was taking place. They did that to keep them working and interested, and, at the same time, recognizing the fact that these people were highly illiterate and couldn't read and write. I believe it must have been the Cigar Makers Local that brought that in as a condition to, you know, benefit the workers.

INTERVIEWER: Right. Were your parents immigrants?

BRANDT: They were immigrants from what was considered Hungary at that time. As I told you, I remember oh, I was perhaps six or seven years of age when my mother and father took me to a meeting on the street--the street was, as I can remember, Houston Street (pronouncing it Howston), which is pronounced really "Hewston" Street; but we back in New York pronounced it "Howston" Street--to listen to Samuel Gompers speak. I remember that incident vividly, and I remember years later my mother a number of times saying to me, "You listened to Samuel Gompers speak out on the street."

So I came from a trade-union background. I can also remember. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Were your parents Socialists?

BRANDT: No. As far as the political field was concerned, they were followers. I can't remember. . .they would be, no doubt, in the Democratic Party at that time because the Democratic Party, as Tammany Hall was concerned, was very powerful. There were representatives of Tammany that would come around the neighborhoods, and I can remember that, and take care of the people, perhaps give them a few dollars, tell them who to vote for, help out, and so forth. That was very common in New York City.

INTERVIEWER: Did you live in an immigrant neighborhood?

BRANDT: Yes, absolutely. I lived for awhile on a street called Goereck Street. . . .

INTERVIEWER: What?

BRANDT: G-O-E-R-E-C-K, something like that. A heck of a name, but perhaps it has a Hungarian background. I remember years later my father became a laundry worker, and I can remember him coming home with his head bashed with a big bandage over his head. They were in a strike. Now, that could have been. . . .I was eight years of age, so what would it be. . . .

INTERVIEWER: 1915?

BRANDT: It could be approximately sixty years ago. And so that's sort of the background I came from, and that's the background I sort of maintained all my life. You know, when you're indoctrinated into the labor movement or trade unionism, it stays with you; there's no question about that. So that was my background. . . .

INTERVIEWER: What was the school like? Did you go to public school?

BRANDT: My father was a very sick man as far back as I could remember. He acquired asthma and then a terrible cough. I guess he got that working in a laundry, coming home with his wet clothes in the winter time, and became an asthmatic. So we had lots of trouble economically in our home. I can remember living up near Harlem, Yorkville. There were some people in Mt. Sinai Hospital, a social service department there, that decided to send my father to the Adirondack Mountains with his family to work up in the mountains, thinking that it would help him. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Help the asthma.

BRANDT: Help the asthma condition. And actually it was the wrong move on their part because it made it worse for him. So we worked up there as farmers for about a year and a half. My father had to go back to New York. We moved back immediately to the East Side. We had six children and my mother and father. We moved into a one-bedroom apartment on the sixth floor on the East Side! It was a difficult time. Of course, we couldn't recognize it. We were a happy family. I mean, this is the way people lived. We were just one of the many that lived that way.

INTERVIEWER: Right. All the kids in the neighborhood were the same.

BRANDT: They were all the same, and that was the way I lived. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Were you the oldest son?

BRANDT: I was the oldest son, yes, of the six.

INTERVIEWER: So now, you had told me that at fourteen your mother felt that you needed to go to work.

BRANDT: Well, at fourteen. . .as I said before, my father was an asthmatic and didn't work too much. Money was needed for the family. My mother tried to help out as much as she could. After giving up cigar making--I don't remember why at the time--I can remember her peddling cloths, you know, buying material and selling it out on the streets to make a go of things. So they needed help. I was a big boy of fourteen weighing a heavy ninety pounds. My mother decided that I had to help out, and I agreed. I had just finished elementary school, graduated from elementary school, and started to enter high school. I was going to Harren High. I can remember that--Harren High in New York City. And I had to leave.

So I left school, got my working papers, and my mother brought me The World. That was a newspaper at that time that had the most employment ads. And I found this job. It listed, "Lunch boy wanted." A plant called Troutman, Bailey, and Blampey.

INTERVIEWER: Troutman. . . .

BRANDT: Bailey, and Blampey. 1315 Leight Street, New York City. And I applied for that job. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Is that Lampee? L-A-M-P-E-E?

BRANDT: Blampey (spells it). I applied for that job and got it, became a lunch boy there.

INTERVIEWER: Now, what's a lunch boy?

BRANDT: Well, it was a boy who had to sweep up. . .had to do all the sweeping, do the errands, and get the lunch for the workers there. That was the accepted thing for boys to do in those days.

I remember my first or second day working there, during lunchtime we went down to the street to sit around and get some fresh air. It was the pressmen and the workers. And Al Castro, who was president of Local One--of course I didn't know at that time--came up to the place where we were all sitting around and spoke to the men about coming back into the union. What had happened was that at that period there was the big strike within the lithographic industry (that) was taking place, and the workers in Troutman, Bailey and Blampey had signed the. . . . what was that contract called?

INTERVIEWER: The yellow dog contract?

BRANDT: The yellow dog contract. Went back to work. They all had been members of Local One. And I can remember Al Castro speaking to them, virtually imploring them to come back into the union and all would be forgiven. And that's the place where I started to work.

Within a year and a half I became a stone boy there. This is interesting. I had to provide the hand transferers with the stones when they were making a job. The stones were the equivalent of our negatives and positives today, and the hand transferer was the person who did all the work between the artist and the press. In other words, he was the equivalent of the cameraman, the stripper, and the plate maker. He prepared the plates that went right to the pressroom. And at the age of sixteen I had to get those stones, which were indexed so that you could find them very easily. They all had numbers, and we had thousands of stones. The stones were kept in the cellar. Troutman, Bailey's and Blampey's plant was on the sixth floor. So I would have to go down to the cellar with these trucks which you pulled and get the stones and bring them up. They were quite heavy. I could handle stones at that age, (and I don't think I was no more than one hundred pounds) some were much heavier than me and I could handle them very easily. I would put them on a little dolly and roll them along, and they were maybe almost as tall as I was. That's how big they were. As I look back at it, I just can't believe that I could have handled those stones!

INTERVIEWER: That you could do it, right.

BRANDT: So I was stone boy for a year or two, and then I became an apprentice.

INTERVIEWER: Did the workers at Troutman, Bailey, and Blampey go back into the union?

BRANDT: No, not as long as I can remember. Many years later they went back, many years later.

But I became an apprentice, and I was an apprentice about three and a half years. I had some feelings I had acquired about the union, and I decided I would join the union. At that time I also was boxing, boxing in the amateurs. I believe I had one or two professional fights, and I decided I was going to become a boxer, a professional boxer. I wanted to get into the union so I could come back into the trade if necessary.

So I went up to Local One--it was on Fourteenth Street and Seventh Avenue--to talk to the officers regarding becoming a member. I remember meeting the vice-president, his name was Paddy Hanlon. I told him what I wanted. I said, "I'll join the union, provided you will immediately give me that extra half year so that. . . ."

INTERVIEWER: So that you could be a journeyman.

BRANDT: I could be a journeyman, and I could go out and come back in again. Well, Paddy was the sort of guy, easy going, that (said), "Sure, we can do that!" And I went out with that understanding, I thought I had an understanding. He suggested I come back again and speak to Castro. Al Castro was the local president.

Well, I told Al what I wanted. I knew that they needed members in those days, and I thought, "I've got it made. Al will certainly agree." Well, he didn't agree. He said, "No way. You'll have to go back and serve your apprenticeship and then come back to us." I guess I got quite angry and said, "Hell, no, I'm not going to do that." And I left.

Thinking it over, I came back the next day, and I agreed to do that. In my opinion, that was to the great credit of Al Castro, that he stood his ground.

INTERVIEWER: Right, he wasn't going to let this young boy drop out of school, so to speak.

BRANDT: Right.

INTERVIEWER: Right.

BRANDT: And I was forever grateful for that. I went back and served my apprenticeship and then. . . .

INTERVIEWER: What made you change your mind?

BRANDT: I had the feeling of wanting to belong to the union and recognizing, you know, that it was a good future, the lithographic industry was a good future. And I could see no other way than being in the union because I had studied enough, knew enough about the union movement.

The peculiar part was that, when I came back into the plant and told the men working in the plant--and I wasn't a bit bashful about it--that I had joined the union, there was no criticism. They respected me for it. Believe me, they were tough Dutchmen; it was virtually all Germans in the plant. And I happen to be of the Jewish faith, and there were very few Jewish people in the industry at that time. I knew of none.

They treated me very well, and I was able to serve out my apprenticeship and learned the trade very well. I boxed and busted up my hands and eventually came back into the trade on a full-time basis. That was during the depression. The depression hit us very badly in the lithographic industry. I can remember the lines that were formed on Fourteenth Street and Seventh Avenue at Local One to get our ten dollars, which was our unemployment benefit in those days. You would have a line from the fourth floor--I believe it was the fourth floor where the local was--down into the street. That ten dollars was very important to us in those days. It was a lot of money! (Laughing) And the dues, if I'm not mistaken, was three dollars. You had to maintain your dues to get your ten bucks. So out of your ten dollars, you'd pay the three dollars, you know.

INTERVIEWER: Ten dollars a what, a month?

BRANDT: A week. Oh, yes, that was a lot of money in those days. The fellows who were unemployed looked forward to that ten bucks.

INTERVIEWER: Now, were you unemployed?

BRANDT: Yes, I was about twenty-one or twenty-two years of age, and I was unemployed for approximately a year. I was a hand transferer. There was no jobs for workers as hand transferers because at that time the photocomposing machine came into being, and management was buying these photocomposing machines as rapidly as they could. At the time I was laid off, I was working at United States Printing and Lithographing Company in Brooklyn, New York. We

might have had thirty-five hand transferers around the floor. When I say "around the floor," a hand transfer machine was always set up by a window so that you could have good light, pulling your impressions and working. And within a short period, I may say--the short period could have been 1930 or so--the hand transferers were decimated. There were very few working.

The unfortunate part of the situation was that, when management brought these machines into the plant, they would put them under lock and key, pick a nice, young, intelligent apprentice and put him in with the machine to learn it and keep us in ignorance of it. It created a lot of resentment on our part. So what happened was that we just didn't cooperate with this innovation. We did everything in our power to hold it back. For instance, when a plate was shot on that machine, they would come out to us with the plate, asking us to roll it up, because it had been finished and developed in the photocomposing room, brought out to us to roll it up and to make sure that it would be sound and. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Right, so that you could pull a test. . .you could run a few copies.

BRANDT: Yes, that's it. So you could run it on a press. Well, we made sure that it would go blind. We had our ways of rolling it up, putting a little acid on, doing many other tricks to it, and , let me say, holding back progress. It was a matter of survival for us, in our opinion, survival. Had management been enlightened in those days as they are today, this would not have happened. They would have taken it upon themselves to give all of us an opportunity to learn, which they didn't do. We knew that this machine was going to take away our jobs and put us out on the street in a depression where there was no possible way of getting another job. So we did what we could to hold it back, but of course it didn't work, as it shouldn't have.

So I was out of work and made it a point to get as much information as I could about the photocomposing machine. I visited a few places and I read about it and I went to school, got a little knowledge regarding the photocomposing machine.

I remember Al Castro calling me up one day and saying, "I got a job for you!" I said, "What is it?" He says, "running a photocomposing machine." I won't even mention the name of the plant. I said, "Well, I never ran a photocomposing machine. I have the knowledge of it." "It makes no difference. You go out and run it."

I went to this place and applied for the job, and I was immediately put on a night shift all by myself on this job.

I'll never forget it. It was a big job, and I struggled and I struggled. And I was doing fairly well shooting the job until I shot one out. . . .

INTERVIEWER: What does that mean, you shot one out?

BRANDT: Well, we were shooting negatives. We were making an albumin plate. Albumin was an emulsion, a sensitive emulsion that was placed on a plate, and it was the equivalent of a negative emulsion. You know, it could receive light. It was like film except it was on a plate, a metal plate.

So I shot one out. Say it was a four or a five-color job. Each shot fit into a certain position; and if you, by mistake, shot one out, say, a sixteenth of an inch or a thirty-second of an inch, the whole thing was destroyed.

INTERVIEWER: Right, the whole thing was destroyed because the rest of it wouldn't fit.

BRANDT: Right. So I had been shooting all night. Come six o'clock in the morning I shot that one out, and I had to give up and go home. I came in the next night, and I was ready to be fired; but they didn't fire me. I was given some advice, and from then on I began to make plates. They gave me simple plates to make. I began to make plates, and eventually I taught the operation of the photo-composing machine in New York and that was perhaps in 1940.

As a matter of fact, I even collaborated with a fellow by the name of Masatari, who I'm pretty sure is well known in the industry, on a book. Albumin Plate Making was the name of the book, put out by the Lithographic Technical Foundation. My name is in the book; and if anyone wants to do research, they can find it.

I had quite an interesting career in the industry. I worked in Local One, New York City, became quite active in Local One, and was fortunate enough to work with some of the fellows who were extremely active on the top front of Local One. I was the sort of a fellow that was active in the background as a shop steward, as a leader in the plants that I worked in.

INTERVIEWER: Now, did you move around much? Or did you. . . .?

BRANDT: Yes, I moved around a good deal.

INTERVIEWER: Why was that?

BRANDT: It seemed to me that I was always in the front of problems--let's put it that way--where the men would be complaining. Sonehow or other Ted Brandt would be put up in front and was the guy that would lead the group and represent the group. Of course, then, he was considered a trouble maker, and you were the kind of guy that, at the first opportunity that management had, you were out on the street. So I had lots of changes in my jobs.

INTERVIEWER: Okay, well, this must have been about the period of time that Eddie Swayduck and Ed Stone were beginning to assume some kind of leadership role or spokesman's role, Marty Grayson, in Local One.

BRANDT: That's right.

INTERVIEWER: Do you want to describe that. . . .?

BRANDT: Well, they were a young group, oh, in my age range. Eddie Stone I remember coming back as a marine, had been in World War II. I remember Eddie Swayduck as a rank and filer. Ed Hansen, I worked with Ed Hansen. And then there was another fellow who was a good writer, a good speaker. I can't remember his name--Goldsboro or something. He later on became a full-time organizer of Local One.

So there was about eight or ten of us who, let's say, were the opposition to John Blackburn and the local officers at that time.

INTERVIEWER: Now, one of the things that an outsider looking at this situation would find peculiar is that there is a considerable amount of opposition to John Blackburn, and the young Turks are dissatisfied with his leadership. And yet the next time you look at the record he's the president of the International. I wonder if you want to comment on that. How does John Blackburn emerge as the president of the International?

BRANDT: Well, I guess it's because of the ambitions of a number of the young Turks. No question about that. I remember John Blackburn saying that he was going to have no part of being International

president, and for some reason he changed his mind. He must have recognized the strength of the young Turks, especially Ed Swayduck, and found it very difficult to live with that continuous opposition, to a degree vicious opposition, that existed in the local.

Really to be honest, I can't place my finger on a reason except that it was to get rid of Blackburn, who they thought perhaps wasn't moving fast enough for them, but, who in my opinion, as I look back on it now, was doing a comparatively good job. Blackburn must have recognized that it was impossible to stay in that position and, seeing the opportunity to move up and perhaps away from this group, took the opportunity and became international president. At that time the vice-president of the local became president. I can't remember his name.

In that period I moved away from Local One to California, Los Angeles. I remember Swayduck calling me up. . . .

(End of Tape I, Side 1)

BRANDT: . . . .in Los Angeles, regarding coming out here and working in Los Angeles, and at the same time telling me that he had a great opportunity to become president of the local because the man who had become president just felt that he wasn't up to it because he wasn't about to combat this group of young Turks, which included Swayduck. He was willing to step down as president and allow Swayduck to come up as president. I had great respect for Swayduck's ability, and I said to Eddie, "You just stay back in New York. That's where you belong. You can become president of the local, and you can do a lot of good for the organization."

This is what Swayduck did. I don't say that he did it because of what I said, but I'm sure I had some influence because, to the very last contact that I had with Eddie, talking about his coming to Los Angeles, he always openly stated that he was going to Los Angeles with Ted Brandt.

INTERVIEWER: Well, if we can back up a little bit, it strikes me that one of the things that must have been operating here is that, in the minds of the membership of Local One, Local One must have been more important than the International. Is that a fair statement? If they felt that they wanted to kick John Blackburn upstairs, it must have been because they felt that the presidency of Local One was more important in their eyes somehow than the presidency of the International Union.

BRANDT: There's no question about that, absolutely no question! During that period Ben Robinson was the general counsel to the International and also general counsel to Local One. As I remember it, my contacts with Robinson and Swayduck, Robinson paid more attention to Eddie Swayduck than he paid to the Local One president, who was in effect paying his [Robinson's] salary and who was supposed to be his boss. That was John Blackburn. But he didn't seem to have any respect for John Blackburn because he must have recognized the strength and support that Swayduck had in the local and he used it. So Swayduck and Robinson teamed up, and it was to the detriment of John Blackburn, no question of that.

INTERVIEWER: Well, now, to back up. I believe that before you came to Los Angeles in 1946 you were involved in negotiations on behalf of Local One. Is that right?

BRANDT: Right. Prior to the start of the 1946 negotiations, John Blackburn called me up, asking if I would serve on the negotiating committee, called me up in the plant that I was working in. Oh, I was working in a plant called Zeise Wilkinson of Long Island City, and working with me were a few of the so-called eager beavers or young Turks. One of them was Ed Hansen and a fellow that later became an organizer for Local One. When John called me up and asked me to serve, I was quite surprised because I was also in the opposition corner to Blackburn; and I didn't want to accept immediately because I just had the feeling maybe John was trying to put something over. The excuse I gave to John was, "Look, John, you've got to give me a day to think it over. I must talk it over with my wife because I know it's an important step to take. I'll be involved a lot and away from home. I'll let you know tomorrow." What I really wanted was time to speak to the opposition and find out, "Look, will it be all right to join with our so-called enemy?" They said, "Fine, we'd like you to be in there, too."

So it was Swayduck and myself on that 1946 negotiating committee, and it was quite an experience for me. That was the year that we negotiated roughly ten percent in wages and five percent for the pension plan. It was the pension plan that we were going to conduct [local] ourselves. It wasn't labor-management. The only reason that we could think of at that time was that management felt that it would fall on its own face if we conducted it, so they left us have it. I supposed years later they regretted it.

And we broke the hours. I think we went to thirty-six and a quarter hours. I'm not positive, but I know that we had something to do with hours.

During these negotiations it was Swayduck and Robinson that took the leadership in the negotiations, not Blackburn. As I look back at it, it was rather an unfortunate thing. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Why unfortunate?

BRANDT: Because I really feel, as I look on it, that John was a good local president. He had good ability, a good ability to communicate; and if he were helped by people rather than having obstacles thrown in his way, he would have been a very capable man. As I look back at it, too, I learned later what a terrible mistake it was to allow an attorney to dominate the organization as Ben Robinson did for years. I look back at it with distaste, and I'm going to use a very nice word--distaste. Because later on I learned, as an International vice-president, moving around and speaking to other officers in other unions, what a terrible mistake it was to allow an attorney to dominate trade unionists. So through our history, the History of the Lithographers Union,* you will see the statement that Ben Robinson stepped into the breach because of ineffective leadership. That's a lot of crap as far as I can see it today. He was abetted by men like Swayduck and others and, no doubt, myself because of our ignorance. We came into the movement, and there was Robinson. We knew nothing else; we knew no better and accepted him and accepted his educated statements. He kept us away from the rest of the labor movement. He had a way of doing that.

Now, in this History of the Lithographers Union, you see the mention of ineffective leadership and Robinson had to step in. Well, that isn't so. These officers who were considered ineffective were not ineffective, but he was so dominant and could get his way that he held back trade unionists who were elected and no doubt had the leadership capabilities, which had to be proven if they were elected, and he worked against them and subjugated them. He gave the leadership an inferiority complex, and that's exactly what we had. We looked up to Ben Robinson in those days as an educated god, and he looked down upon us as rather uneducated people, virtually illiterate. This is the way he thought. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Children whom he had to guide. . . .

*Munson, Fred C., History of the Lithographers Union. The Wertheim Committee on Industrial Relations, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1963.

BRANDT: There's no question about that. I remember Ben saying to me and a few others, "we're going to have to work up some kind of a test for the International officers and representatives." He just didn't have any faith in us and tried to involve himself in the negotiations.

INTERVIEWER: What sort of a guy was Ben Robinson politically? Now, I know that he had at one time worked for the Employers' Association. Is that not correct?

BRANDT: Yes.

INTERVIEWER: But now you see him moving into the union side of things. Of course, in a lot of these interviews a lot of people have talked about Ben Robinson, but I haven't had the opportunity to talk to someone like yourself who knew him intimately from the early days. Would you describe him as liberal or radical politically? You know, where was this guy coming from?

BRANDT: Well, he came out of the employers' group. During the war he served on some committee of the Wage Stabilization Board and became friendly with the International president, Andrew Kennedy. No doubt Andrew Kennedy offered him this opportunity to work with us, and Ben certainly took the opportunity and made the most of it--no question about that--to become a dominant factor in our organization. He dominated them at the point that he came in. He was able to convince Kennedy of his powers and moved into a position that no attorney should have taken working within the trade union movement. He had that position with Reihl [William] who became International president when Kennedy died. He had that position with Blackburn. He tried to assume that position with Canary, but it didn't work. That was the start, in a sense, of Robinson's. . . .I don't say failing, in any way. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Well, his disassociation.

BRANDT: Robinson sort of having to take a backward step.

INTERVIEWER: Right, now, you mentioned that you felt that he kept you apart from other unions. Now, at this time, if you read what Robinson was saying and if you look at the record in terms of what he was doing, he was very successful in carving out a lithographic

jurisdiction before the National Labor Relations Board. Quite fantastically successful, I would say, I don't know if you would agree.

But was this a part of keeping you apart from other unions, kind of this narrow definition of "organize lithographers where lithographers are."

BRANDT: No question that Ben Robinson was a brilliant man and a great attorney but in my opinion did not have the feeling for trade unionism. He didn't recognize his position, but took advantage of his position to dominate the organization, the leaders within the organization, to a great degree; to a degree that we wouldn't move--we were like children. We wouldn't move on our own as trade unionists are supposed to move, as I learned later on from other attorneys, as I recognized later, on becoming International vice-president moving around in the labor movement, hearing what was said about our organization and seeing how other attorneys acted, seeing how other attorneys acted within our own organization, representing us in other states, seeing their attitude. I then recognized that Robinson to a degree sort of offset his great ability by the damage that he was doing to us as individuals, not allowing us to go out and to do things as trade unionists, which I believe, no doubt would have helped us in many ways.

During my period on the International Board and as an International officer, I recognized that we were considered by management all over the country as -- I don't know what sort of a term to use -- as an organization they had to fight. Robinson developed language, security language, which was fine, but what Robinson insisted upon was that in no way could we amend that language to one word, not even add a comma or anything. We had to go out and negotiate that language. In essence we went into negotiations with an ultimatum to management, "You take it or you don't. We're laying it on the line." And that was an unfortunate period for our organization because we built up enemies all over the United States and, I believe, unfairly because in many instances management would agree to our language but would ask for some change and keep the essence of that clause intact. We weren't allowed to make that change! It was unthinkable to change any of Ben Robinson's language!

And I said that to Ben Robinson at one time. "What is it? Pride of authorship?" "Oh, no, you make a change, you don't understand, you'll destroy the intent of that clause!"

I believe I was one of the first to revolt as an International vice-president and negotiated language which contained a change in the clause. I remember calling Matty. . .I can't think of his name. . .calling Matty up who was Ben Robinson's associate attorney. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Silverman.

BRANDT: Matty Silverman, right. I said to Matty, "Matty, I can get this language now, and I'll be damned if I'm going to strike over it. This language contains in essence what we want, gives us our security." "Oh, no, Ted, you better not do that. Ben won't like it!" "Well, I'm going to do it." And I did it.

Meanwhile it turned out it was a better clause than what Ben Robinson had written up. It turned out well for us.

Robinson created problems for us all over the United States and strikes. We, as International officers, had to go into areas that were highly unorganized where we had the nucleus of a local, for instance in Miami and Texas and other areas, and strike over language, which really in those places didn't mean too much. Language meant very little because what the members needed was economic benefits. And even if they got the language, they couldn't enforce it; they weren't strong enough in a little local. Ben Robinson couldn't understand that; Swayduck couldn't understand it. Perhaps later on they could understand it because we went through a hell of a. . .well, we had strikes and problems and made enemies. It was completely unnecessary, and all because of Robinson's insistence that we must adhere to every word and comma of his language. That was a great mistake in those years. No question about it. We learned later on.

INTERVIEWER: Well, now, to get back to the 1946 negotiations where you negotiated this pension that would be completely run by the union. How do you feel about that? It seems to me that union-operated pension funds historically have been a source of considerable difficulty for unions in that most of the ethical practices cases that unions have had have arisen out of mismanagement of the pension or the health and welfare fund. How do you feel now, looking back on a completely union-run pension fund? Do you think it's a good idea or a bad idea?

BRANDT: Well, on an International basis I'm not too sure, but on a local basis it just doesn't work. You can't have that many people that can make it a viable pension plan. On an International basis perhaps the union could maintain its own pension plan, but then again you think of the tax aspect and perhaps it wouldn't work out too well.

INTERVIEWER: How is Swayduck's pension plan in Local One managed now? Is it a completely union plan?

BRANDT: Yes, completely local plan, no question, but Swayduck and Robinson dominate it; and I'm not going to in any way make any inference as to whether it's run properly or not, but I do know they guard it very zealously. In my opinion, what held back Local One from merging with the Photoengravers was the fact that in Swayduck's mind the pension plan was endangered as to Local One conducting it because he knew that we intended to eventually have an International plan and he also knew that, if we grew larger with the merger with the Photoengravers, his plan would be looked into and perhaps taken out of his hands. Swayduck was not about to countenance that.

INTERVIEWER: Right, and he was not, of course, at that time a part of the Inter Local Pension Plan.

BRANDT: No, no.

INTERVIEWER: Right.

BRANDT: If I'm not mistaken, Local One's plan. . . .yes, I'm positive that Local One, we--and I can say "we" because I was one of the first trustees of that plan--we negotiated that plan before there was the Inter Local Pension Plan. So we had no experience. Perhaps if it had come later on, 1950 or 1951, I'm sure that we would have been part of an inter local plan or an International plan. But it happened that we were one of the first to negotiate a pension plan and also a health and welfare plan. I remember that, too. If I'm not mistaken, in 1946 we also negotiated a health and welfare plan at the same time that we negotiated the pension plan. We negotiated two dollars a week for a health and welfare plan. I remember Robinson discussing with the negotiating committee. . . .(long pause). . . .

INTERVIEWER: You were saying that Robinson discussed with the negotiating committee something about. . . .

BRANDT: Getting an insurance company to underwrite the plan.

INTERVIEWER: Oh, no.

BRANDT: Yeah. I remember making some suggestions, and Ben Robinson stated to me personally, "oh no. What we're going to do is we're going to keep

it positively away from any connections with any members." You know, for instance, I said, "I know somebody who is an insurance agent, and I bet I can get him to talk to us. Maybe he could represent us." Ben Robinson said, "Oh, no, we're going to go directly to an insurance company. We don't want no taint. . ." Which was to his credit. . ."no taint and no suspicion that anyone might tamper with this plan."

INTERVIEWER: Or benefit. . . .

BRANDT: "Or benefit from it. And we're going to go right to an insurance company, right to the top." And this is what he was supposed to have done. I'm sure he did it; he went to the Aetna Life Insurance Company. If I'm not mistaken, we were one of the first health and welfare plans that Aetna had. I mean the first! They later became the largest underwriters of health and welfare plans. That in itself has a long story attached to it, too.

INTERVIEWER: You mean as to how Aetna became so heavily involved in union pension plans or health and welfare plans?

BRANDT: Not really. Later on, many years later in discussions of the premiums and the percentages that we had to pay out to agents, we learned that there was a certain individual that was benefiting by bringing business from our organization to Aetna. The name of the man that was given to us was a Brown. We used to kid Ken Brown about it. It must have been Brown. We learned later that it had its origin somewhere in Connecticut, and somehow or other Ben Robinson was tied in with it. A certain percentage was given out from receiving local plans from Milwaukee and Twin Cities and many other locals.

INTERVIEWER: So that you are saying that Robinson in fact personally benefited from this relationship with Aetna?

BRANDT: Well, that was said openly; that was said openly. I don't want to get into no lawsuit over this.

INTERVIEWER: No, but you don't have any direct knowledge that that was in fact true.

BRANDT: Well, we said it openly about it and were given information from Aetna that a certain individual received perhaps you'd call it finders' . . . .

INTERVIEWER: A finders' fee.

BRANDT: Finder's fee. And it amounted to a lot of money because it came from a lot of locals. I also at that period--well, in perhaps 1951--I negotiated two dollars for a health and welfare plan in Los Angeles. So I became quite knowledgeable with health and welfare plans and later on, under the International, when we began discussing the health and welfare plans, it became quite a big item with us in negotiations. When negotiations opened up, health and welfare was one of the very most important items on our list in negotiations. We had to get more money each year because the rates were continually going up.

INTERVIEWER: And also there was a demand from the membership, I'm sure, for . . . .

BRANDT: For more benefits.

INTERVIEWER: Benefits, yes.

BRANDT: More benefits. So we had to go out and get that money. We came to a period where we began talking of having an international health and welfare period. And at that time we began to delve into the workings of this insurance company and some of our council board members and officers became very knowledgeable regarding the working of the insurance company. At that time in our research we came up with these items that tied Robinson into something that had to do with the finder's fee and that he or somebody very close to him made lots of money. Robinson, as far as I was concerned and other officers were concerned, never came up with a good answer to that.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah. Okay, well, let's go back to 1946. You're still in New York. How did you happen to move to Los Angeles? In 1948 you moved to Los Angeles?

BRANDT: 1947.

INTERVIEWER: 1947.

BRANDT: It had always been my desire to go to California as far back as I can remember, to go to California. I made up my mind I would go.

INTERVIEWER: Why did you want to go to California? Just kind of a "Go West, young man" or. . . .?

BRANDT: I think it was just as simple as that. I just wanted to go somewhere, you know, I'd get away from the snow. I was born in New York. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Did your wife want to go to California?

BRANDT: No, absolutely not. It was a disaster for me for quite awhile regarding getting her to agree and leaving my parents and her parents. It was a pretty rough ordeal for me. Nevertheless I decided I would go and I inquired.

With my vacation pay--I had no savings--that I received from my employer, I took my vacation three months earlier, and I had to promise my employer that I would come back to him because there was a shortage of mechanics in those days. It was shortly after World War II. This was 1947. . . .

(End of Tape 1, Side 2)

INTERVIEWER: Okay. You were saying that you came out here on your vacation and promised your employer you would come back.

BRANDT: That's right. So when I came out here, I immediately visited the local president. He was the first full-time president in Los Angeles. His name was Ken Canning. This was in early 1947. I might have stated that before. So I asked Ken Canning if there was a possibility of getting a job.

INTERVIEWER: C-A-N-N-I-N-G?

BRANDT: Right. He gave me the names of a number of plants to go and visit. At that time I doubt very much if the Los Angeles local had more than. . . .well, they didn't have more than one contract, and that contract was with Mission Engraving, which was a trade shop and had lithographers in its plant. That was the only contract that we had at that time. So I had to go around and find my own job.

I was lucky in getting a job, and that job was with a company called Durachrome, which was a decal house. I even got a pretty good offer. As a matter of fact, as a plate maker it was the highest salary in Los Angeles, one of the highest salaries on the West Coast as an ordinary plate maker. Before I accepted that job, I put on a big show with management. They held a board meeting as to whether or not they'd hire me. I was going to be the head of the plate making department which would be a matter of myself and another man. They made me a very fine offer, as a matter of fact giving me more money than I was getting back in New York City. I said, "All right, I'll accept it providing the local president agrees." They knew nothing concerning the union. I said, "He has to agree before I can come out here, and he has to agree with what you've offered me." I knew beforehand that it was a foregone conclusion that he would agree and that he would be delighted with it! They were concerned about my accepting because I had proven to them that I was capable. I made some plates for them and saved a very big job for them. I won't go into that; it's unnecessary.

So they gave me this offer; and I told them, as I said before, that I had to go back to the local president and advise him of their offer and have him give me permission to accept. I knew it would be a foregone conclusion that he would agree, the local president. They said, "Fine. We'll even have our chauffeur drive you over to the local." And they did! They sent me over with this chauffeur (laughter). I went into the local office, and I told Ken Canning that my chauffeur was waiting outside and I had this job. We had a great big laugh, and I went to work for Durachrome.

I worked for six weeks and asked for a leave, which they gave me--one month--to go back and settle my business and bring my family out. So I came back to Los Angeles in July, drove across the country with my family in July of '47, and went to work at Durachrome.

I worked at Durachrome for approximately two years, and during that period I did everything in my power to assist the local. I was very active in the local. Our elections for local officers were each year. Before Ken Canning's first year was up, he stated that he would not run again; and he came out to see me and asked me if I would become president. I told him, "No. Ken, you're doing a great job. Why don't you stay

on? I believe this area has great potential, and you're doing a good job. I'll do anything I can to help you." He said no, he's quitting, he's going back to the bench. He was a pressman.

So they (got) a fellow by the name of Les Lindeman to run. And Les lasted approximately six months. The job was too much for him. The man was breaking down, really, mentally.

INTERVIEWER: Now, was a lot of organizing going on in this period?

BRANDT: No. Which I'll come to later. So he also asked me to run, and I said that no, I wasn't interested. Nevertheless I really was, but I just felt that I couldn't make enough money to live and it would involve me too much. It would require a man's free and full time, nights, days, and Saturdays and Sundays. I didn't know whether or not my wife would agree. I felt she wouldn't.

So a delegation came out to see me, a few members of the local, asking me to become president, not even having to run! Then I decided that I would be interested in the job; but I stated that, if I were to become president, it would have to be through an election in order to show me that the members were behind me and that I would receive their cooperation.

It finally evolved that there were two candidates--myself and another member whose name was Ed Allman, who had been a very active man in the local and an officer (he spells the name for the interviewer). I remember Ed Allman stating that, inasmuch as he was about to retire, he would be willing to take this job as president of the local without any compensation. Of course, I couldn't match that. I had a family to support, and I was quite young.

So the election was held, and I won, became local president. Then my problems began. In checking into the books, I found that, instead of the three hundred members that we were supposed to have, we actually had one hundred paid-up members on our books. So I recognized there would be a hell of a problem for me. The fact that I had taken a wage cut in accepting this job, over the protests of my wife, and recognizing now that I had given up a good job and taken this thing which looked like it wasn't going to go, I felt pretty up-tight about it. And the fact was that my executive board, local executive board, all of a sudden became very strong and very vocal and demanded that any member that doesn't pay up we expel, which gave me the feeling, if we listened to the council board members,

I'd be left with no local at all, the way things were going in the city.

So I prevailed upon the council board members to give me an opportunity to speak and visit and write to all of the members that we had on the books to see what I could do to bring them back into the fold as full-time, paid-up members. So I began to work on the problem. The fact was we only had one local contract--Mission Engraving, a trade shop, no other contracts--made it much more difficult because the average members said, "What can I get out of this local?" I had to convince them that they all had to get together, and by being together we could work up something to where we could eventually negotiate for decent wages and conditions. So it required a lot of talking, and I was quite successful. I was successful to the degree that, in the ten years that I served, we worked up to one hundred contracts, and 1,200 members and became a local that was recognized as a very strong local within our complete International. Our wages and conditions were among the best in our International. We just felt that we didn't have to take second place to any other local in the country.

As far as language in our contracts, every piece of language that the International recommended, I got in our contracts, because I was an organization man. I believed in our organization. When they said, "Get this," I got it! It was virtually to the degree that, if they said, "Squat," I squatted. Management, in this town, understood it was no use negotiating language with me, and I convinced management here that it should make no difference to them, that they should be interested just in the wages and conditions and forget about language. The International wanted it and we had to have it and that was it and I got it. There was no local--and this is not bragging, just facts--no local in the country that could exceed our contract in the matter of attaining language.

INTERVIEWER: Well, let me ask you this. First of all, if we can talk a little bit about this matter of affiliation and disaffiliation and so forth, which maybe jumps us ahead chronologically, but I think we can talk about this as a topic. In 1945, while you were still in New York, the Lithographers disaffiliated from the AF of L. Right?

BRANDT: Yes.

INTERVIEWER: Right. And in '46 affiliated with the CIO. I'm wondering how you felt about that and how the affiliation with the CIO might have affected your organizing efforts here in California.

BRANDT: Well, as far as the 1945 disaffiliation was concerned, I had no part of that. I wasn't that active and wasn't in any way part of it actively. Let me say that about the disaffiliation. So when I came to Los Angeles, we were part of the CIO; and I immediately became active in the CIO to the extent that I was a board member of the CIO here in Los Angeles and was active also on the state level. Even though we had a very small local going from 200, 300, 400, and up, and I was shown great respect by local officers, top men in the CIO, heads of the Auto Workers, the Steelworkers, the head of the local of the Aircraft Workers, Oil Workers, all of them showed me a great respect to a degree that I was on a level in speaking with them. They listened to me. Our local, which was Local 22 at that time in Los Angeles, cooperated to every degree. Every program that the CIO put out, especially in Los Angeles CIO and the state CIO, we complied with.

INTERVIEWER: You were active in PAC (Political Action Committee) and. . . .?

BRANDT: I was very active in PAC. I attended all conventions and conferences and was quite known in Los Angeles and perhaps on the state level. We received great cooperation from the CIO. We were recognized as the only craft organization within the CIO. As far as I was concerned, we were held in great respect. If ever I needed any help, I got it immediately.

At that time the secretary-treasurer of the Los Angeles CIO was a man called Blackie Lunceford. He became a very dear friend of mine.

INTERVIEWER: What union was he out of? Was he a Steelworker, an Auto Worker or. . . .?

BRANDT: I'm not too sure, but I think he came out of the Oil and Chemical Workers. As a matter of fact, in one year the International Council Board, upon being newly elected, came to Los Angeles; and I got Blackie Lunceford to swear us all in, which also included Ken Brown. What else can I say?

INTERVIEWER: Well, one of the things I'm wondering is how this might have affected your organizing efforts, because there is on the part of the rank and file a kind of feeling, in some places, at least in Pennsylvania, that the CIO was the more

dynamic, the more liberal, the more radical of the two labor organizations. And depending upon how radical your membership is, they will either be attracted or unattracted to the CIO on that very account. I'm wondering if you felt that being a CIO union was a factor in helping you to make this tremendous drive or whether it didn't make any difference, that your members were thinking more in terms of lithographers.

BRANDT: Well, it had its drawbacks somewhat, but that was in regards to management. When I would come in to organize and they recognized that we were affiliated with the CIO, they would immediately get up tight, thinking that we were with a radical organization. So it took a lot of talking on my part to convince them that we were an independent group. The CIO was not as radical as was stated by many people; it was a good organization, an organization that represented the workers in a very fair manner and was very fair to management and no different than the AF of L. Of course I had my problems, but Los Angeles was completely unorganized, absolutely unorganized.

As I look back on it, I went about organizing in perhaps an unorthodox manner. I had no organizing experience from anywhere. I had to depend on my own initiative, ability, and I became somewhat of a salesman for our organization.

INTERVIEWER: Now, when you say Los Angeles was unorganized, you mean the lithographers were unorganized or do you mean that this was sort of a non-union town generally?

BRANDT: I would say this was generally a non-union town. The spirit that pervaded in Los Angeles was a spirit that perhaps was brought about through the times, or through Chandler, The American Way of Life, you know, being a rugged individual. "The American Way of Life" was an idea that was put out by the Chandler family that a worker should be on his own; he didn't need a union; and so forth. Consequently that kept the workers here in Los Angeles in quite a depressed condition. Their wages and their conditions were very poor. Organizing was very difficult.

Nevertheless, as I stated before, I went about organizing in a manner that I could understand. I walked into the front doors and introduced myself to management, to the owner! I'd do that! My first approach was to introduce myself, give them a card, advise them that I was with the union and we were out here to help them. We knew he needed the know-how; we had the mechanics, and we had the know-how, and so forth; and we would do everything in our power to help him.

My approach was also that he didn't have to worry about a contract in the beginning. "Just call us up and we'll provide people for you and we'll help you and you'll have no problems with us."

INTERVIEWER: You were able to do this, of course, because the technology of lithography was expanding so rapidly.

BRANDT: And the know-how here in Los Angeles was poor in comparison to where I came from, New York City. The knowledge wasn't here.

INTERVIEWER: Now, were you developing training programs for your members?

BRANDT: No, not in the beginning, but we had members who were good, skilled mechanics. And I also knew that there were members all over the United States who were eager to come to Los Angeles, very capable men. I knew that, and I was able to convince management that, if they allowed us to cooperate with them, I could bring these people in to help them. So they sort of tested the waters, and I produced.

After I would get to know the plant, get members in there, began to get more and more members in there and to organize, eventually I began to talk about the union label and convinced them, "Look, you're paying all the conditions . . . ." And I would get them to pay the conditions and advise them that, if they wanted good men, they had to pay. And they agreed. Later on I said, "Look, you're paying the conditions, you're paying the wages. Why don't you take advantage, get the license for a union label? With the union label you'll be able to get more work--political work and so forth. It's no extra cost to you." And they agreed.

There were other plants that, even before I had them sign a contract, I would get them to agree to put into effect a health and welfare plan, two dollars a week. And I had the okay from management in this town. I usually got my way--that they would accept employees from a plant that had no contract, into our health and welfare plan. Once I get these people to our health and welfare plan from a non-union shop, I had a line; I had a direct line. After I had them into the plant, after I got them paying the wages and conditions. . . .now, I'm not talking of a few months; it had to take a year, two years. I would convince management that it was to their benefit to sign a

contract, to get the union label, also to their benefit to get together with other plant owners so that we could negotiate a common contract.

INTERVIEWER: Now, in the meantime were you sending organizers to talk to the men who worked in the plant? Or did you do that at some later level?

BRANDT: For the first few years, I would say for the first five years, it was almost a one-man operation although I received the cooperation of my members to a great degree. They would call me up and say, "Ted, there's a non-union shop here and I know this guy and I'll make a contact for you. Come on down and visit." Many of them brought members in to see me, to speak to them. There was a lot of cooperation in those days. I was able to convince our members they had to help me in order to help themselves. I needed help. It was up to them to do it if we were to achieve better conditions and wages. So I received their cooperation, and it worked. We grew to the extent of 100 members or better a year while I was president of the local.

INTERVIEWER: Well, you were saying that you had this method of organizing which was really sort of unique, that is, you walk in the front door and guarantee that you have something to offer that management needs. . . .

BRANDT: I remember, for instance, our International vice-president at that time, Pat Slater, came down. I said, "Come on, Pat. Take a ride with me. I want to show you how I organize." We picked a plant out, and I went in the front door. I was in there for quite awhile, and I came out smiling. Pat just couldn't understand it. He called me all kinds of names and laughed. It just was beyond him. But it worked!

INTERVIEWER: Okay, well, along about this time as a local union president, you obviously started to attend conventions and started to become involved at an international level. Right?

BRANDT: Yes. And like I say I was involved, too, in the CIO activities and in the merger activities of the state CIO and the Los Angeles CIO, AF of L and CIO. Very much so. As a matter

of fact, I was given the privilege of reading the new constitution of the merged state AFL-CIO in San Francisco from the convention floor. At that time I represented perhaps 400 members, and I think that's quite an honor.

INTERVIEWER: I should say.

BRANDT: I had to stay up there I don't know how long, a couple of hours, reading.

INTERVIEWER: What was your relationship with Johnny Despol?

BRANDT: Very good. Oh, yes, very good. Johnny Despol, in my opinion, later turned out pretty sour for us. He went with Reagan. I was an admirer of Johnny Despol. We were a very vibrant organization here in California.

INTERVIEWER: How would you account for a guy like Johnny Despol who had at one time actually been a radical, I think. Is this fair to say?

BRANDT: Absolutely, absolutely.

INTERVIEWER: And he finally ends up his career as a so-called labor supporter of Governor Reagan.

BRANDT: To me it was a great shock. John was exactly what you say, a real radical and a very able man in the labor movement. No question but what he had great ability.

I remember an incident that I think is worthwhile repeating. We were holding a CIO convention in, perhaps it was Sacramento, during the period that [William] Knowland was running against [Edwin L.] Brown for Governor. Do you remember that?

INTERVIEWER: Yes.

BRANDT: As the Political Action Committee we sent out invitations for candidates to speak before our convention. We had a request from Knowland to speak. Now, we didn't

want that so-and-so no how to speak to us for the simple reason that he was running on a right-to-work platform.

(End of Tape II, Side 3)

BRANDT: Then we informed our members that in no way were they to be discourteous to Senator Knowland, but they were to sit on their hands.

Knowland came in with his entourage, and Johnny Despol was to introduce him to us. We had a plan. Johnny Despol introduced the members to Knowland. Consequently, we didn't have to applaud. Do you understand that?

INTERVIEWER: Um-hm.

BRANDT: And Knowland began to speak. And he spoke. He spoke quite at length. His wife was up there and his children. There was a dead silence all the time he spoke, and you could see his face redden as he spoke. Then he finished, and there was dead silence when he left. That was to the great credit of our state CIO. We took care of that one. Consequently, not for that, but we did a job that year; and I think Knowland lost by a million votes and went down to complete obscurity where he belonged. That was the end of Knowland.

I remember another time when we had just merged, and I was attending a state political action meeting. It was a committee to endorse candidates. It was at the same period that "Goody" [Goodwin] Knight, who had stated unequivocally that he was going to run for the governorship, had to back off because he had been called back to Washington. As I remember, Nixon advised him that he'd better back off and allow Knowland to run; that if he ran, there would be no financial backing. This is what we understood. So instead of keeping his word and running for the governorship--the labor movement, including the CIO, had lots of respect for "Goody" Knight and had he run for the governorship, no doubt there would have been a split or we would have backed him up. But he decided that he would run for the Senate and allow Knowland to run [for Governor], and he would run against Clair Engle.

I remember at this endorsement meeting some of the members--it was an AFL-CIO endorsement committee meeting--got up and spoke in favor of "Goody" Knight, and that was including the regional director, Dan Flanagan. That was the name of the regional director at that time. He made quite a tremendous talk on the virtues of "Goody" Knight.

I know I was up tight about "Goody" Knight over the fact that he reneged on his promise. And so were others, especially in the CIO. One of the remarks that Dan Flanagan made was that, "Samuel Gompers said we have to reward our friends and punish our enemies." Words to that effect.

I couldn't wait to speak. I jumped up right after Dan Flanagan spoke, and one of the first remarks I made was, "I'm sure that Samuel Gompers was not blind that he wouldn't make a remark like that concerning "Goody" Knight and what he has done." Anyway, I made quite a talk and others did, and Clair Engle was endorsed over the state AF of L recommendation. We, in the CIO, really pushed for Clair Engle, and he was endorsed. I'm delighted to say that Clair Engle won the election, which was to the credit, I feel, of the CIO, their recommendation.

INTERVIEWER: Let me ask you this, Ted. It's been my impression as a rank outsider that San Francisco was much more a labor town, dominated by the AF of L, and that Southern California, to the extent that there was organized labor, was more dominated by the CIO. Is that a fair statement or not?

BRANDT: Well, in my opinion, as I look back at it, San Francisco was the finest labor city in the United States, as far as I'm concerned, and dominated, in my opinion, by the AF of L and the Longshoremen and Harry Bridges. Harry Bridges, believe me, had a lot to say in San Francisco. Whether the AF of L was dominant or the Longshoremen, you know, is a tossup. But it was a labor city par excellence.

INTERVIEWER: Was Harry Bridges able to talk to people in the AF of L and, after 1949, in the CIO? Now, obviously at the national level he was anathema; you know, nobody could talk to Harry Bridges. Phil Murray certainly wasn't talking to Harry Bridges. But what about the local level? What about in San Francisco? Was he able to cooperate with the local labor movement?

BRANDT: I believe, and to the credit of the Longshoremen, San Francisco was kept as an intact labor city because of the Longshoremen's attitude. Their attitude was "no scab comes into San Francisco, period!" Believe me, I have firsthand knowledge of that, because during the San Francisco strike--and I was in charge of that strike of the Lithographers. . . .

INTERVIEWER: In 1961?

BRANDT: 1961.

INTERVIEWER: Yes.

BRANDT: I was in charge of that. I needed help. I went up to see Harry Bridges to request his help, and I received it to the greatest degree.

We were advised, management had put out the word that they were bringing scabs into town to take our jobs. It was understood they were coming in. So I knew I needed help, and I wasn't going to get help from the AF of L because we were still in the CIO. I went to see Harry Bridges who was an independent. . . .

INTERVIEWER: That is, statewide you were still not merged? This is '61. Merger of the Internationals was in 1955.

BRANDT: Oh, that's right.

INTERVIEWER: I know it took several years to merge the state. . . .

BRANDT: Perhaps it wasn't that we weren't merged. Somehow I can't remember appealing to the AF of L, to their Council Board, or to their membership.

INTERVIEWER: Well, in any case, the Longshoremen would certainly be critical. . . .

BRANDT: But they were not critical of my conduct.

INTERVIEWER: No, no, I mean they would be critical in the sense of what moves in and out of San Francisco.

BRANDT: Right. I can't remember. . . .you say 1955. But I know it took a few years, as far as California was concerned, as to merger here, a few years. We were finally forced to it . . . .

INTERVIEWER: Oh, I know what the situation probably was. The Lithographers had withdrawn from the AFL-CIO and were not back in yet in 1961. Right? You withdrew from the AFL-CIO. . . .

BRANDT: What year was it?

INTERVIEWER: 1958.

BRANDT: Right.

INTERVIEWER: 1958 you withdrew.

BRANDT: Because I have no memory of going before the AF of L-CIO Executive Board or the membership, because they wouldn't provide. . . .

INTERVIEWER: A forum for somebody who had withdrawn.

BRANDT: No. We had lots of opposition of the Printing Pressmen, the ITU, and so forth.

INTERVIEWER: Right.

BRANDT: So I went up to see Harry Bridges, and I got a beautiful audience with him. I remember speaking to him, and I brought along with me the attorney that we used in San Francisco. McTernon his name was.

INTERVIEWER: McTernon?

BRANDT: McTernon. For a moment his first name slips me. McTernon. Now, our strike was due mainly over language, but in no way could I allow Bridges to know that because he'd have no use

for an organization that struck just for language, none at all. I know that.

INTERVIEWER: Hm-hm, yes.

BRANDT: You had to strike for economic reasons. So I remember going up with McTernon, and McTernon started to talk, and he immediately mentioned something about language, and I had to kick him under the table but fast! He stopped quickly, and I took over and talked to Bridges and advised him that we had a serious strike, an economic strike, and so forth. Never mentioned language. He said to me, "Don't worry about it. There's no scab coming into San Francisco." That's all I needed to know. We got some good help from him, and I believe it helped to, without question, bring about an end to that strike in San Francisco.

There were some other instances that took place in San Francisco during that strike that wasn't to the credit of our organization. It was a matter of Swayduck coming to San Francisco, and he was a local president and a member of the International Council Board coming to San Francisco and bringing along with him Ken Brown. Ken Brown then was assistant to the president. At that moment he was assistant.

INTERVIEWER: Right, when Patrick Slater was president.

BRANDT: Right. But during the strike he became president, but at that moment he was assistant to the president. They both came up there and met with the employers on the side without informing the local negotiating committee and treating the local president and myself in a very shameful manner, excluding us completely, and negotiated a contract that they thought was beautiful and would be accepted. (Laughter)

I remember walking along the street with Swayduck, and Swayduck informed me of what the package was that we were to recommend to the membership at a ratification meeting. When I heard the results, I told Swayduck right on the street, "Eddie, I don't think it's going to go. I don't think the members are going to buy it."

The San Francisco local was a very sensitive local. The negotiating committee was a very sensitive committee and knew what their. . . .

INTERVIEWER: They knew their own minds.

BRANDT: They knew their own mind and also what they were supposed to do and knew what their responsibilities were.

INTERVIEWER: Now, what was Eddie Swayduck willing to give away that they were not willing to give away?

BRANDT: Well, it was something that he gave away on language and didn't get the economics as we believed we should have had.

INTERVIEWER: Right.

BRANDT: And this language that we were fighting for, that I had built the local up that it was a must to attain, just wasn't in the package. He had given a lot of it away, including what we thought we were entitled to in wages and conditions. Here was a strike that was now in its sixth week.

So when I told Swayduck that I didn't think they would accept it, on the street, he really came at me. So we went for one another, I mean to a physical degree. I had a number of arguments with him up there. As a matter of fact, Ben Robinson had to separate us at one point. I think that was at the Palace Hotel. Ben was beside himself because he hated to see two great friends in a battle, and that was his two supposed-to-be buddies, Brandt and Swayduck. Here we were having a falling out.

The local did turn it down, and I'll never forget the placards that were waved around the hall: SELLOUT. We were really concerned. I know that Ken Brown was so concerned he thought there would be physical activities. I wanted to speak, you know, in favor of the package. I believe it was Matty Silverman who stopped me. He must have recognized that I would have to live another day, so I didn't speak.

Swayduck at that time came out with some money from his local to give to Local 17 to help them in their strike, and I believe it was $100,000.00. He threatened from the platform that, if they didn't accept this package, he was seriously thinking of taking that $100,000 back. If anything ever hit the fan, that did! It's a wonder that they really didn't take him on physically because there was a lot of threats. I had to keep a tight rein on that local during the strike.

So anyway, it was turned down. Swayduck did leave the money there. The strike continued on for four more weeks. We made it so tough; nothing ran in any of our plants. There was no scabs. And we were receiving a lot of help from different labor organizations. On their own they came out there with the pickets.

Then Ken Brown came again to San Francisco. Negotiations continued. I didn't lose face with the committee, thank goodness, and we negotiated hard and fast. Nevertheless, as far as the language was concerned, it was under a deep cloud. Management had preferred charges against us to the board that we had illegal demands. It was consequently held up by the Federal court, a judge by the name of Sweigert presided.

INTERVIEWER: By the name of what?

BRANDT: Sweigert. It's in the history book. Judge Sweigert declared some of our language, or most of it, illegal. So we had a strike virtually for ten weeks that. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Resulted in nothing.

BRANDT: . . . .resulted in virtually nothing. And it took me a long time to live that down with the members of Local 17, but I did what I had to do. What had happened previously was that our Council Board, in a meeting in New York City, had decided that. . . .and when I say Council Board, I ought to pinpoint it down to Ben Robinson and Eddie Swayduck, who decided that the National Lithographers Association was going to take us on regarding language. As I look back at it, Swayduck always liked to have some other local as the focal point or scapegoat. They decided that San Francisco's a strong town. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Let's try it there!

BRANDT: And let's try it there. So we had this discussion, and I was given orders to go to San Francisco and get that local to go out on the street.

Now, I had to contend with radicals, and I mean radicals, but great trade unionists. There was Buchwald [Joe] and Moscovian. I don't know if Witthoft [Oscar] and Noce [Dave]. . . .yes, Witthoft was there. Witthoft was certainly there because he attended the court proceedings.

When I spoke regarding language, recommending that this local fight for this language was necessary, even to the degree of fighting for it, I remember some of the so-called radical members--and when I say radical, perhaps I shouldn't even use that term--members who were extremely strong trade unionists would be a better term to use, asked me if the local requested strike sanction, would I go along with it. That's exactly the question I wanted to come from the floor, and it came from them. I looked down and smiled and said, "Certainly, I'll recommend strike sanction immediately."

When I said that, the so-called radical members said, "Now, wait a minute!" They backed off. The radical members in San Francisco were always suspicious of the intent and the activities of the International, all the way back, as far as you can remember, fifty years back. They were always suspicious. You read the history of our organization. And this is exactly what took place.

Here were radical members who would love to strike just to strike, to hit the employers! (Laughter) I mean, they could taste it! But then, when they were given this opportunity and I didn't turn them down, they didn't know what to do with it. One of the radical members who really was the power of that local, more so than Joe Buchwald, was Moscovian, Brother Moscovian. He said, "Now, wait a minute, members!" While I'm speaking, you know, and answering questions. "Now, wait a minute," he turned to the members, "Now, wait a minute! We'd better think this over!" You know, I was sweating at that point. He mentioned some German general who always took two steps back and one step forward or vice versa, general somehow of Germany, an old-time general. He didn't want the local to strike. So I had to do some extensive talking on that platform and finally got it to a vote. I must have spilled my guts on that platform, because they voted to strike, just what the International wanted.

Now, I was quite successful in view of the opposition that I was receiving. As I look back at it, it was proper opposition, you know.

INTERVIEWER: Hm-hm.

BRANDT: So they struck, and we have a ten-week strike. When Swayduck and Ken Brown came out and did what they did, it was a terrible thing. We continued to strike for four more weeks and finally negotiated a contract that was acceptable to the meeting. At that meeting I had to do some real organizing of the meeting to make sure that we would have order. Let's put it that way. We had to have quite a number of good, strong members around the floor. We had to have order. We had to make sure that before

a member spoke he had to ask for permission from the mike. We had to have people to make sure that this would be adhered to. So we had a good orderly meeting to quite a degree as far as San Francisco was concerned. It was a tough town--no question about it--and you had to be a tough guy to work in that local and be an officer in that local or to be an International vice-president to conduct yourself in that local. They had to respect you; they had to know that you were a trade unionist. Perhaps I was able to convince them of that.

The strike finally came to an end. I don't know whether. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Are they still a radical bunch?

BRANDT: Yes, to quite a degree they are a radical bunch in San Francisco--always will maintain that attitude--but perhaps not as much today as they were, because that old group has virtually died off. There's only a few left, and I doubt very much whether the newcomers can maintain that feeling and attitude of the trade unionists of those days.

INTERVIEWER: Well, Ted, that's a fascinating story about the San Francisco strike. One thing I wanted to ask you about: obviously if you're trying to develop language, you're trying to move in the direction of coordinated bargaining and to move in the direction of pattern setting. And yet, as you point out, it's very hard to get the members to strike over an issue like that as opposed to an economic issue. I wonder if you'd just talk about what you see now as the importance of language.

BRANDT: Well, I believe certain language is important. Language, in my opinion, has to do with economics. That's very important. Yet I suppose all language has to do with economics and the security of your job. But let's put it this way: a very strong local--and when I say very strong local, I mean New York and Chicago, Milwaukee, locals of that strength--could enforce language and could enforce certain conditions that they didn't have, that could be unwritten conditions that the local understood. The smaller locals and the weaker locals couldn't enforce language if they had it, word for word as Ben Robinson wrote it! Consequently, we had strikes in locals over language that, as I look back, were ridiculous. To have a strike in Texas over language, it just didn't make sense! We had a lot of organizing to do; we had the beginning of a good local; and we could have really grown in Texas. We had a strike over language.

We had a strike in Miami. These were difficult right-to-work states. It was difficult to organize in those states. Yet we were able to organize and to begin working up a viable local in many of these areas.

What happened was we went in with ultimatums, not with the idea of negotiating language but with statements that "You take it or else." We had to follow those orders. They came from Ben Robinson and Swayduck, who would convince the Board that this had to be that way.

INTERVIEWER: Well, now, you mentioned, though, that Harry Bridges would not have supported you if he had felt that the strike was over language.

BRANDT: Right. I understood that.

INTERVIEWER: Why not?

BRANDT: It was given to me to understand absolutely, because I had been talking to some people that knew Harry Bridges personally. Well, Harry Bridges, his opinion was that, if you had a union, the members themselves had to invoke security, had to bring about security, and it was through the members that you had strength and security and so forth. It just wasn't a matter of language that said, "Oh, you've got the language, that's it." Oh, no, that wasn't Harry's opinion. Harry's opinion was that economics was the basic item in a contract. I suppose there was language, too, that he was concerned about, as far as his own contract was concerned.

INTERVIEWER: Right. Right.

BRANDT: But the opinion that was given to me was that, if I mentioned language and we were striking over language and not economics in San Francisco, he'd give me no support. . . .

(End of Tape II, Side 4)

INTERVIEWER: . . . .(in mid-sentence). . . .As I go through and do research, I find that the first International convention where you show up is at St. Paul, Minnesota, in 1949.

BRANDT: That's true.

INTERVIEWER: And of course that was the convention where John Blackburn stepped down and. . . .no?

BRANDT: Oh, no, no.

INTERVIEWER: No, no, I'm wrong. John Blackburn became president in 1949, '48-'49. Is that right?

BRANDT: Yes, about then he did. Yes, absolutely, because I came here in '47 and spoke to Swayduck a few months later and had the feeling from Eddie that he had an opportunity to be president. So it was about that time.

INTERVIEWER: That Eddie thought that he was going to be president? Or that Blackburn was going to be president?

BRANDT: Of Local One. Eddie was going to be president of Local One.

INTERVIEWER: Oh, I see.

BRANDT: The name of the man who became Local One president after John Blackburn became International president was Frank Casino. Well, perhaps. . . .you haven't got the tape on now, have you?

INTERVIEWER: Yes.

BRANDT: Oh, excuse me. Well, Frank Casino became president, but from what I was led to believe Frank just felt that he wasn't up to that job. He couldn't handle it and preferred to step down to vice-president and allowing Eddie Swayduck to become president of the local. That's what happened.

INTERVIEWER: Now, let me ask you this. Were the locals in California--Los Angeles and San Francisco--

were they a part of the Inter Local Pension Fund at that time? In '49, '51?

BRANDT: Los Angeles, I was president at the time; we were among the very first to negotiate the money for the Inter Local Pension Plan. At that time it was recommended that we give $2.50 a week for the pension plan. In that period of negotiations, all we were negotiating for was money to be attained to participate in the pension plan. Our local in Los Angeles, we negotiated and got $3.00, as I remember, a week, which was above the required amount to participate in the Inter Local Pension Plan.

At the meeting that our membership ratified the package, we also brought up the matter of participating in the Inter Local Pension Plan, and we received a vote that was unanimous to participate. That was on a Sunday, if I'm not mistaken, and on Monday I called up and I spoke [illegible] Robinson. Ben Robinson said to me that there was a requirement for them to participate. I can't exactly remember the requirement, but I believe it was a matter of maintenance of membership within. . . .

INTERVIEWER: That you had to have a maintenance of membership clause?

BRANDT: In order to participate.

INTERVIEWER: Hm-hm.

BRANDT: I pleaded with Ben not to require me to go back to the local to get this, not to have another special meeting at which I would have to advise the members that this was a requirement for us to participate. Ben says, "You have to do it." I did it, and I went down in defeat. The same members that had voted unanimously to participate now turned against it.

Our local didn't get back into the pension plan for a good number of years, and we lost certain benefits that would have accrued. . . .it was fifteen dollars a month that would have been immediately given to us as participants on retirement. We lost that because we didn't vote to participate until years later.

But I learned years later that Chicago, for instance, didn't meet that requirement until many years later.

INTERVIEWER: The very heart of the Inter Local Pension Plan. . . .

BRANDT: Right!

INTERVIEWER: Right.

BRANDT: At a number of conventions I got up, and every time I bitched about that to George Canary, to Spohnholtz; they were very angry with me. They would slough me off on the floor because they didn't want to bring that out into the open.

INTERVIEWER: That they didn't require it either.

BRANDT: And later on Harry Spohnholtz advised me, "Why the hell didn't you contact me personally? I'd have told you." It was a terrible thing that happened to our local, that we lost all those years; and I lost those years myself because of Ben Robinson's statements, which he knew wasn't true, that you didn't have to acquire that. . . .

INTERVIEWER: If he knew it wasn't true, why do you suppose he insisted upon it?

BRANDT: I don't know. Well, let me say also this regarding that that ties in with this: when we had to negotiate for language around the country, and I was International vice-president, I would always have with me in the negotiations a copy of the contract of New York Local One and a copy of Chicago's contract. Now, when I would negotiate with an employer, I demanded the original language; and I would fight tooth and nail for it. When I recognized that I wasn't about to get it, I would then finally turn to either New York's language or Chicago's language.

Now, as far as Chicago was concerned, Chicago was always strong enough to say, "Look, we'll be goddamned if we're going to strike over language. If we have to make a few minor amendments, we'll do it."

Now, in New York Ben Robinson sat in always on New York negotiations with Swayduck and really guided Swayduck to quite a degree, to a hell of a degree, and Ben Robinson would meet with his counterpart on management's side, the attorney--I

can't remember his name now; no doubt he's still active there--and they would fix it up and amend the language. No doubt that the language still had the essence of the original clause, but he wouldn't allow no other locals to amend the language. Chicago would do it in spite of him, and then they would take a lot of abuse from Swayduck and Robinson when we'd meet during the Executive Board sessions.

So I would take this language into the negotiations, and then finally I'd say, "All right, I'll give in to you guys." Perhaps it would be New York. I'd feel that maybe New York's language would be better or Chicago's language was better. And I'd say to the management, "All right, okay, here's a big local--Chicago. They've amended the language, and I'm going to agree to it whether or not so-and-so will disagree." You know, I'd give them the idea I'm going to have a lot of static, and I would have static. But I would agree to it. I'd go back to New York, and I would get static from Swayduck or Robinson or to some extent from Ken Brown; but it was static, you know, I knew they couldn't hold up to. It was a matter that they couldn't keep a straight face and say, "Brandt, you made an error." So I was very successful. I used my head. So I always did that in all the years I negotiated.

Finally, as I began to see some errors, I went into some locals that were considered weak locals who were just striving to get a foothold. Where I recognized, as far as language was concerned, that it didn't mean too much, because the members were concerned with money and conditions, actually just for money, I used to say, "The hell with language! We're going to build the contract to where a member's gonna get a piece of livelihood." To the greatest degree Ken Brown backed me up, always backed me up. I'm sure that Ken had a lot of faith in me. If I said, "Ken, we've got to do this," I hardly every got any opposition from Ken Brown.

INTERVIEWER: Okay, well. . . .in 1953 you ran for regional vice-president. Is that right? Am I right about that? I'm not sure that I'm right about that. You ran against Ivan Brandenberg from San Francisco, and he won. Is that correct?

BRANDT: Oh, you mean for a member of the International Executive Board?

INTERVIEWER: For the Council, yes.

BRANDT: For the Council Board.

INTERVIEWER: From the Pacific Region.

BRANDT: Yes.

INTERVIEWER: I'm sorry. I said vice-president.

BRANDT: And what happened was that, if I'm not mistaken, I won the election. Brandenberg contested it, contested the results. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Oh. . . .

BRANDT: . . . .and there was another vote or a recount in his local, and he came up with the necessary votes. There was always a number of snickers over that. It didn't concern me too much because I knew I'd run against him again, and I did.

INTERVIEWER: You ran against him again, then, in '53?

BRANDT: And I won!

INTERVIEWER: Yeah. Okay. Now, one of the things that I wanted to ask you about was. . . .

BRANDT: Now wait a minute. Is this being taped now?

INTERVIEWER: That's all right. We can fix it up. Don't worry about it.

BRANDT: Because I tell you. . . .I wasn't too sure of the date, but you're right. . . .(pause). . . . I became International vice-president in 1959, so it couldn't be '53.

INTERVIEWER: No, but you were on the Council. . . .

BRANDT: I was on the Council only for one term.

INTERVIEWER: Oh, really?

BRANDT: I think I was.

INTERVIEWER: All right. So you ran in '51, and you were defeated, and Brandenberg took the position. . . .

BRANDT: I don't know if it was '51. No, I could never run in '51. It was years later.

INTERVIEWER: All right, this was '53 then.

BRANDT: No, even years later than that.

INTERVIEWER: Well, it was during John Blackburn's presidency, I think. Wasn't it? That you ran for the Council as an International councillor?

BRANDT: No, I think I came on about the time of Canary, at the same time.

INTERVIEWER: That would have been '55.

BRANDT: I don't remember how many years George Canary served.

INTERVIEWER: Well, he was only in for about three or four years. He came in in '55-'56, and Patrick Slater came in in '58-'59.

BRANDT: Well. I know that I served one term, then ran for International. . . .

INTERVIEWER: You served one term when George Canary was president.

BRANDT: What happened was, when Pat Slater was the International vice-president representing the West Coast, during this term he became

International president when Canary stepped down. I ran for his position with another candidate whose name was Ace Burnett to fill out the term of Pat Slater.

INTERVIEWER: I see. Okay.

BRANDT: Then when the term was finished, I ran again. If I'm not mistaken, I ran unopposed. I'm not too sure because I seem to have had opposition all the time. You know, a loud-mouthed guy usually. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Attracts opposition!

BRANDT: Attracts opposition. Regardless of how good he works, he creates opposition for himself, and that's what happened to me all the time.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. I wanted to ask you about how things were shaping up in terms of your relationships with Chicago. You had close relationships with Local One. You came out of Local One. But now, as George Canary emerges as leader and Spohnholtz begins to be very important and the Inter Local Pension Fund's in Chicago and the school in Chicago becomes important, what were your relationships with Local Five?

BRANDT: Local Four.

INTERVIEWER: Excuse me. Local Four.

BRANDT: Cold. Let me put it that way. I was always looked upon with suspicion, coming from Local One and being friendly with Swayduck and with Robinson and being very close with them. So I was looked upon with suspicion. I have the feeling that Harry Spohnholtz and George Canary respected me but, again, in somewhat of an aloof manner.

Also, being president of the Los Angeles local and coming from New York, when I attended a convention I was considered by many in the Midwest, even by San Francisco, as an upstart and a man, in a sense, that was sent out by New York to take over the West Coast. And Swayduck openly would state from

his platform, his Local One platform, in a joking manner of course, that we now have a connection on the West Coast.

INTERVIEWER: Today New York, tomorrow the world!

BRANDT: Yeah. "We've got the West Coast now because Ted Brandt's out there." I was held in, I know, good respect. I'm not blowing my horn, but I know I was well liked in New York by lots of people.

So I remember at a convention that I attended as a local president here, a delegate to the convention. It might have been the first convention that I attended in '49, which was in Minneapolis, Twin Cities, where one of the delegates from San Francisco got up after I had spoken and made some kind of remark concerning the hot shot from New York who had come to Los Angeles, meaning me! (Laughter) That's in our records. So, you know, I had a lot to overcome. But I believe that I did overcome.

The reason that I think I overcame was the fact that my local and my conditions, my organizing indicated that a job was being done and it was a solid job. I was able--and I guess because of my friendship with Swayduck--to get an organizer assigned just to the Los Angeles area. His name was Erik Carlson. . . .

INTERVIEWER: What was his first name?

BRANDT: Erik Carlson, who later became local president when I became International vice-president. He became local president of Los Angeles Local 22. And a couple of years later they even assigned another organizer to this area. I was able to convince the Executive Board that we had a tremendous potential here in Los Angeles. It was my opinion that we had the potential of being one of the largest locals in our organization, and we had the facts to prove it regarding the plants that were in existence then and that were unorganized. The fact that the International went along with my statements was that they saw that I wasn't sloughing off my job. I was producing. It was my opinion that, if I was given some help, I would produce more. It wasn't the situation that we had with other local presidents who also requested help in organizing but weren't doing anything themselves. But I was working at it.

INTERVIEWER: All right. Well, let me ask you this, then. How did you feel about Blackburn stepping down and Canary assuming the presidency?

BRANDT: Well, that again was quite a story, and I was terribly involved in that. The history was that Swayduck had run for International president, if I am not mistaken twice. He

was defeated. And he detested, for some reason, John Blackburn. And he got most of the Board to go along with his feelings. He decided he had to get Blackburn out of the way somehow in some manner, and he looked around for a candidate, and he saw George Canary, a man with great integrity, an imposing figure, white haired, and a man who had the respect of his members in a great way. George Canary--a quiet, conservative man, who was like a round ball, who had no faults. So Swayduck and Robinson decided they would talk him into becoming a candidate and to run against John Blackburn.

I remember Swayduck going to Chicago to talk to George Canary to convince him to do that, and personally I couldn't understand it. I said to Swayduck, "Eddie, this doesn't make sense to me! You're going out to convince George Canary to become International president when you're absolutely opposed (to) his conservatism, his philosophy, his way of life, the fact that he's a Republican. You're a Democrat. Eddie, I know, you've stated that you have no use for him. What's in back of your mind?" "Well," he said, "hell, he's not going to last very long Ted." I don't know how many people know this. "He not going to last very long. I'm not going to go along with him. But we've got to knock off Blackburn. That comes first." You know, fine! What could you do?

So we held the convention. The convention perhaps was in Dallas, Texas. Have you got any figures?

INTERVIEWER: Dallas, Texas, was in '51. In '53 it was in Toronto, Ontario. '55 was in Boston, Massachusetts.

BRANDT: It was Boston then. Right. Boston. I remember Pat O'Donnell, who later became an organizer, coming to me and sympathizing with me and with Blackburn. Well, what happened, at this convention. Now, here I'm part of this so-called New York group, and many of the officers were under the impression that I would back up Canary against Blackburn. But in my opinion, Blackburn was doing a fairly good job. There was criticism of some of his activities, and some of the officers made statements that he was crude sometimes in some of his remarks, that he wasn't a man big enough for the job. But it wasn't so. He was doing a good job, as far as I was concerned, going around the country, speaking. Our organization was growing during that period and was making great strides in the matter of wages and conditions, and we didn't take second place to no other union in the graphic arts. He was doing a good job, as I saw it.

I also recognized the unfairness of the situation--getting Canary to run as a sort of stopgap and using him for. . . .

INTERVIEWER: A stalking horse.

BRANDT: . . . .as a stalking horse and using this fellow to upset Blackburn, then he himself would get the axe in the near future.

So at this convention I voiced my opposition to Canary. Now, here I'm supposed to be part of the Swayduck group, but I believe I was always an independent person. When it came down to the nuts and bolts, I was independent. So I voiced my opinion. You know, I just couldn't see it. The guy was doing a job, and I couldn't tell the other officers, including Ken Brown's father. . . .(hesitation). . . .yes. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Right.

BRANDT: Who was it?. . . .others. . . .I couldn't tell anybody what the situation was, what I knew. And I never did. So they got ahold of me, Swayduck and others, and tried to convince me. I just wouldn't bend. That's all. It was just as simple as that.

I remember, when nominations were called for, I got up on the platform. . . .no, no. . . .I walked up to the mike, and I had to go past the New York group, and they said, "You son of a bitch!" They knew what I was going to do! Cause I nominated Blackburn. I was one of the very few to do that. It could have been very easy for me to go along with Canary and not make a nomination. I'd be damned if I was going to do a thing like that. So that's in the history book.

So I was always getting into trouble. I couldn't see it! It was horribly unfair. So I nominated Blackburn. Of course, Canary was nominated by a tremendous majority. Later on I went up to visit with John Blackburn. He had his wife in the room, and John broke down and he cried. He cried like a baby. I never forgot that. I told John that I sympathized with him, but I also was pretty angry at some of the things that he had done. But as I look back, they were simple things, you know, really simple statements that he had made. And he was defeated.

So Canary was elected, and it was a short time afterwards--Canary was hardly in office--when the business began against Canary by Swayduck. First they gave Canary permission, they agreed, Swayduck agreed, that Canary could operate out of Chicago. He did not have to move to New York, and Donald Stone would operate as their treasurer in New York. But very shortly after election they began finding fault with that situation, and the business started again against Canary, and it began to build. Because it was calculated somehow or other!

INTERVIEWER: Well, now, how did you feel about this great cause of where the International headquarters were to be and all this back-and-forth with one group saying it should be in New York and they should buy a building and another group saying it should be in Washington, D.C., and somebody else wants to try and submit a resolution that they should move it to Chicago?

BRANDT: Well, at that period, when he was first elected, I was still local president. And I was in sympathy--when I look back at it, I'm not very proud of it--but I was in sympathy to the goals of Swayduck and Robinson. I thought they were dynamic. They were going ahead, and this was the way it had to be; and if anyone stood in our way, forget them. I was with them. I was with them. This is what happened. I was for New York. I couldn't see Chicago. I couldn't see us going into a conservative area. I felt it was ultra-conservative. When I look back at it and the fact that we were given to understand that Canary was a Republican, you know, that was a horrible thing! When I look back at, I don't know, I was rather a naive guy. That's as simple as that. I think a lot of fellows like myself are naive in the labor movement to what's going on at a certain period like that. Again, I was operating from Los Angeles, and I was on the Board, but. . . .

(End of Tape III, Side 5)

INTERVIEWER: There has been discussion about merger all along, throughout the Amalgamated's history. But I think it's important to know what relationships were like with other printing trades in Los Angeles. What were your relationships with the ITU, with the Photoengravers?

BRANDT: See, I think I did things by (chuckling) instinct.

INTERVIEWER: By the seat of your pants?

BRANDT: Right! I had no previous experience. Our organization developed years later with Ken Brown as president with educational facilities and the ability to train a person and all that. I had to go out there and take over, period, with no background as a labor official, except from what I had read and what I had picked up myself. And I had the feeling that we all had to work together here in Los Angeles. So upon becoming local president . . . .we were in the CIO, if I'm not mistaken. . . .year, we were. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Right.

BRANDT: Yeah. I immediately contacted the AF of L. I had the guts to call up the secretary-treasurer, and his name was Bassett. He became a good friend of mine, very famous out here (L.A.). I called him up and I spoke to him about getting together with other graphic arts local presidents to discuss a cooperation program. The fellow he assigned was a man who is still an organizer for our organization (Walter Stansberry, GAIU); he was assistant to the L.A. secretary-treasurer of the AF of L at that time, and he was out of the Bookbinders. And I suggested my plan to him. And he said, "Fine, Ted, I'll call up and get ahold of all of the other officers." And that was the local heads of the ITU and the Bookbinders and the Photoengravers and the Stereotypers and all of them. . . .

INTERVIEWER: The Pressmen?

BRANDT: And the Pressmen. "We'll have them all to a meeting, and you can talk to them." Now, I was only president for a short while, but I already had an in in Western Litho, which was the biggest plant we had here at that time in Los Angeles. I had an opportunity to organize the whole plant, but I refused to organize the whole plant. I didn't want to step on nobody's toes. I didn't want to take the bookbinders, and I could have had the whole plant, period. I had the contract for the whole lithographing department.

So I met with the officers, and I suggested a plan of cooperation. I said, "Why don't we help one another? It's a serious situation here in Los Angeles. It's ridiculous to fight one another. If we fight one another, we're spending our strength on nothing and the management is benefiting by it. Why don't we get together and work together?" I was able to convince them all. I said, "You know, I've got a couple of in's here, and I can bring the Bookbinders in and the Pressmen in to Western Litho, and we can all have an opportunity to organize if we work together." Everyone agreed, except the Pressmen.

It happened at that time that an International organizer from the Pressmen. . .I'll remember his name later. . . was at this meeting with the local presidents and was just about to be voted in, and he said, "No dice. The Printing Pressmen are not going along with the Lithographers. We're going to organize wherever we can and whatever we can, and that's the way it's going to be." So it broke down.

But nevertheless, throughout my years here in Los Angeles, I cooperated with all the graphic arts and also the Printing Pressmen and kept it strictly on a craft basis. When I look back at it, had we not kept it on a craft basis, we'd be a hell of a big local today. You see?

INTERVIEWER: Hm'hm, right.

BRANDT: You know, the International, mainly through Ben Robinson, insisted on that. So my connections with the local officers to this very day are beautiful. I'm respected and called to luncheons, and we have a great relationship here in Los Angeles.

Also my instinct told me never to invite Ben Robinson to our negotiations. I many times had requests from Ben. Ben would say over the phone, "When are you going to invite me into your negotiations?" I always had to give him some excuse. "All right, when I think I'm in a tight spot, Ben, I'll call you. Don't worry, boy, you know I need your advice. I'll call you up." Well, I'd call him up on occasion, but he never got an invitation because I'd worked too hard to acquire a good relationship with the industry here to have him come out here and destroy it for me and also to relegate me into a secondary position because I knew that if Ben came out here, I'd be immediately inhibited as we all were inhibited on the Executive Board by Robinson.

INTERVIEWER: Right. By his fast footwork.

BRANDT: Right.

INTERVIEWER: Well, I think we are about to come to that famous meeting in the Poconos where, on the basis of jurisdiction and on the basis of protecting the label, it's my understanding--and please correct me if I'm wrong--Ben Robinson kind of wrote this resolution of disaffiliation from the AFL-CIO. I guess you were involved in that meeting in Philadelphia. . . .

BRANDT: I sure was.

INTERVIEWER: . . . .because you were certainly on the Council by then. I wonder if you could just describe it from your point of view.

BRANDT: Well, to a degree, of course, it will be hazy. What year was it, did you say?

INTERVIEWER: It was 1958.

BRANDT: Yes, I was on the Board then. Ben Robinson wrote up this resolution, and that was due to the fact that we had received opposition from the AF of L in regards to what we believed was some of our jurisdiction. I believe in one instance, or perhaps two, we were advised by Ben Robinson and some others on the Board that the AF of L had paid for attorneys to oppose us

in certain. . . .on a few different occasions where we were seeking jurisdiction in opposition to the Printing Pressmen. The AF of L backed up the Printing Pressmen.

So Ben Robinson decided--and I can say he decided--that it was time that we leave. Swayduck of course was right there in back of him, and Swayduck could do a hell of a job selling. And myself being a member of the Board from Los Angeles three thousand miles away, you know, I just went along with them. But I don't think my heart was really in it because I was the sort of a guy that believed it was better to stay in and fight it out than be on the outside.

INTERVIEWER: Moreover, you've already stated that you were very active in the Central Labor Council and in the State Labor Federation. Withdrawal had to mean that you were going to have to withdraw from that activity. Right?

BRANDT: Yeah. Well, then you remind me of something else. I had a good idea what was going to happen. At our convention--we had a Los Angeles convention--it was a merger convention of the Los Angeles AFL-CIO; we were one of the last in the AFL-CIO to merge, and that was in Los Angeles. I got up on the floor of the CIO convention in Los Angeles. I had a premonition of this taking place, and I sort of made a farewell speech and advised them that, if they were merging, this was our farewell because going back into the AF of L meant that we would be in the same position we were before we had disaffiliated from the AF of L. We would meet the same opposition and so forth, and we could see no future. And I thanked Blackie Lunceford right there from the floor and thanked the CIO and all the members for their wonderful cooperation with our organization. I knew what was happening.

INTERVIEWER: So this was your swan song.

BRANDT: That was my swan song, and that was in Los Angeles.

(Interruption in tape.)

INTERVIEWER: We've taken a break to have dinner. Ted, I believe what we were discussing was the withdrawal from the AFL-CIO and its subsequent consequences for Canary. You had made the point that this was to some extent engineered by Robinson. I don't think that you had gotten around to describing that meeting in the Poconos. What was your impression of the way that Canary handled the conference with Mr. Meany?

BRANDT: Well, as I look back at it, I remember that Canary just didn't have the desire to do what he was instructed to do by the Board. And it showed; it was very apparent to us. It was my impression that Canary had no feelings regarding leaving the AFL-CIO. His preference would have been to remain in. As I look back at it, I recognize that it was also a mistake on our part to leave. So he made a very poor showing to the extent that Meany berated him, and I really mean took him on.

Here was the AFL-CIO International Board sitting around the room, and I remember Walter Reuther and others sitting there. Walter Reuther was very sympathetic to us. But in this instance he couldn't in any way come to our defense because I imagine that he recognized that we were wrong, that we should have remained in. I think, if I'm not mistaken, Walter Reuther did speak up to some extent to prevail upon us to remain in. I don't remember the words that he said. But Meany had facts and figures showing that in our raiding attempts we just weren't making out. We really couldn't show any victories on our raiding projects to where we tried to carve out the lithographers.

INTERVIEWER: Although you were just saying in the car coming back from dinner that you were fairly successful in taking on Continental Can here in Los Angeles.

BRANDT: Remember that was during the period that we were in the CIO, and I carved out a lithographic department in Continental Can Company in Los Angeles, who were members of the Steelworkers who were in the CIO, had nothing whatsoever to do with Meany's records as part of the AF of L or the AFL-CIO merged. So Meany was able to cite chapter and verse regarding our efforts to organize and carve out, and we showed no successful. . . .If I'm not mistaken, he showed that we lost members in fact, and he was able to point these things out to us.

So it was a very bad presentation, and we went out of that room with virtually our tail between our legs, all of us. We all had a feeling of chagrin--let's put it that way--for the words that Meany spoke and spoke rightfully.

So when we left the meeting hall where Meany gave us short shrift. . . .boy, just like a snap of his finger. He could care less that the Lithographers were leaving. He treated George Canary like a little boy. He spoke to him in that manner. And George Canary didn't have a defense, and I don't know how he could have had a defense. Ben Robinson could no way speak up. Ben Robinson in that room was a nobody wasn't allowed to speak. I suppose, if one of us wanted to speak and asked to be heard, perhaps Meany might have recognized us; but

then I'm not too sure of that. He knew George Canary very well and spoke to George Canary like he was his father.

INTERVIEWER: Well, now, subsequent to that, I understand that there was a Council meeting which was very, very bitter in which George Canary attempted to resign. Would you say something about that?

BRANDT: Subsquent to that?

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, hm,hm. The Apple Valley Conference and the Cleveland convention.

BRANDT: Well, let me say, too, to finish up this. When we left the meeting, the AFL-CIO meeting, we went back to the conference room in the hotel we were all staying at to discuss what had taken place. Going back I remember very vividly how uptight some of our Board members were, in particular Eddie Donahue. Eddie Donahue took Canary on and really abused him verbally in a manner that was unbelievable.

INTERVIEWER: Abused him for what reason?

BRANDT: For his staying and for the way he took the remarks of Meany.

INTERVIEWER: I see. In other words, he didn't abuse him substantively. Eddie Donahue agreed that you should have gotten out of the AFL-CIO. . .

BRANDT: Oh, yes!

INTERVIEWER: But he didn't feel that George Canary had handled himself properly.

BRANDT: That's right. That was the opinion of Robinson and Swayduck and I guess all of us. We all felt to a degree a shame because George Meany treated us like we were a group of children making a terrible mistake and we shouldn't be doing this. And in spite of that we did it, got out, and George Canary had to take quite a verbal beating from many of the members of the Executive Board. As I remember it, there was virtually nobody that came to George Canary's defense. I guess that, in George's opinion, we should not have left the AFL-CIO; and he didn't have the heart in approaching Meany for that purpose but had to follow out the dictates of the Executive Board. So it was a disastrous. . . .

INTERVIEWER: In your opinion, what was behind this Cleveland convention that was so bitter where George Canary was re-elected and then subsequently resigned?

BRANDT: Well, there was a lot of criticism of George Canary staying in Chicago, living in Chicago and acting out of the Chicago office, and Don Stone operating out of the New York office, which was the main office that we had. According to Robinson and Swayduck, they felt that a proper job wasn't being performed for the International by our president. So on that basis they really took George Canary apart. George Canary wasn't able to defend himself in any strong manner; he wasn't that sort of a man that could really step up and fight back.

At the same time there was a move afoot. They bought a building in New York, and that was the building on 49th Street. And they finalized buying that building in spite of George Canary, in spite of the Chicago local. Harry Spohnholtz was on the Board. They were in favor and there were a number of others who were in favor, a number of other executive Board members were in favor, of moving the International to the Midwest. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Right, to Chicago. . . .

BRANDT: . . . .or to some neutral area in the Midwest. And Robinson, of course, and Swayduck opposed that. To make sure that this wouldn't happen, they got the International to buy this building. I remember an edition that came out of our journal where a phony. . . .The photograph of the building was on the main page, on the front cover, and they inserted this big sign as if the sign was on the building--it wasn't on the building; they painted it in--"Amalgamated Lithographers of America" and so forth. This wasn't even on the building. It was a phony. They put that on the front page. There was a lot of shenanigans that were going on at that time.

Again, the program, you know, the plan that had been devised prior to Canary's being elected the first time was now in high gear, and that was to get rid of him. I remember Swayduck saying to me, "We've got a candidate, a young man, who's got a lot of great ability, highly intelligent, and we're going to move him in."

INTERVIEWER: Now, this was Ken Brown.

BRANDT: And that happened to be Ken Brown. At the same time they were promoting, they were beginning to promote the idea of doing

away with regional vice-presidents. There's a lot of things going on at that time, but it was beginning to gel.

INTERVIEWER: How did you feel about this regional vice-president issue?

BRANDT: Oh, I was dead against it, and I'm still against it. Ken Brown knows I was against it. According to Ken--he perhaps might even say it to this day--it made the International vice-presidents more important to the International, working as a group and not representing individual regions. But I believe it was a mistake. As I look back at it, it is my feeling that Swayduck and Robinson engineered this for the purpose of taking away the so-called powers of the International officers and putting them strictly under the president's direction. And it was their impression that this was a young man who they could dominate and guide and at the same time take away the powers of the International officers so they'd have one ball of wax. They could dominate it as they pleased. It was their impression that they could maneuver Ken Brown to any degree that they so desired.

But to Ken Brown's credit, after he became president, he was a strong personality and developed his own attitudes or developed his own independence. . .(Interruption). . .

What really happened was that Ken Brown rose to the occasion. He immediately grew with the job. In essence, Ken Brown must have agreed to go along with them; but shortly after becoming International president, he turned tables on Swayduck and Robinson and showed clearly that he was an independent guy and that he was going to go along as he saw fit, which was proper.

INTERVIEWER: Well, now, one of the critical issues that begins to develop is whether Ben Robinson can represent both Local One and the International Union as counsel. This came up before the Council. I'm wondering what your position was on this.

BRANDT: Well, my position was absolutely against--with all the things that I saw taking place--my position was against Ben Robinson serving both. I was very strong in my position, and I so advised Robinson and Swayduck. I just couldn't see how he could serve two groups who were in essence opposed to one another. It was Robinson's opinion that he could serve both very easily very well, but that wasn't ever indicated by his activities on the Board. On the Board he and Swayduck were always in conference; he'd prep Swayduck in presenting positions that were contrary to most of the Board and put him a position

to take officers apart, which included Canary. Later on this also happened to Ken Brown. It was very apparent that Robinson was concerned with Local One to the sacrifice of the International. There was always turmoil; there was always problems and bickering and fighting. It was a week that nobody relished when we had to attend an Executive Board meeting. It was an awful ordeal for the International officers to attend one of these meetings.

INTERVIEWER: Well, I think we've pretty well covered the whole business of the '61 strike in San Francisco, which occurred shortly after George Canary had resigned and Ken Brown came into San Francisco to represent the International.

But he was also moving forward with merger, and I was wondering if you would discuss your involvement in that.

BRANDT: With the Photoengravers?

INTERVIEWER: With the Photoengravers, right.

BRANDT: There's one other item that, because Henry's here, I'd like to put that down on record. It might get me into a difference with Henry, but that's my opinion.

HENRY: You're talking about a period of time when I wasn't even around, Ted. . . .

BRANDT: No, all right. That ought to be blocked off, but let it go. At the time that the regional vice-presidents were done away with, the International and Ken Brown decided that each International officer would be given a certain project and. . . . (pause). . . .what was I going to say?

INTERVIEWER: Well, that each International vice-president . . . .

BRANDT: . . . .would be given a certain project that he would become an expert in.

INTERVIEWER: Right. Somebody would do contracts; somebody would take on education, etcetera.

BRANDT: Right. It was my opinion that a vice-president . . . .

(End of Tape III, Side 6)

INTERVIEWER: . . . .(in mid-sentence). . . .be able to do all of these. . . .

BRANDT: That's right, virtually be a jack of all trades. But if he attained that position as International vice-president, he should be capable of performing these duties. Now, when we represented a region, each vice-president got to know his region virtually on a first-name basis; and he could serve his region to a degree that wasn't being served any more when the regional basis was done away with.

I know that, for myself, on the West Coast, I kept in contact with all the locals, attended their meetings, prodded them into organizing, became involved with organizing up and down the West Coast, including Vancouver, involved in all their negotiations up and down the West Coast. We had regional conferences which to this day are still continued on the West Coast. And as far as I was concerned, during the period of 1949 to 1959 we showed lots of good results on the West Coast and throughout the country as far as organizing was concerned and progress in negotiations. Even in that period we were ahead in our wages and conditions, we were ahead of the graphic arts unions nationally and even internationally, in our hours, our conditions, our money. So we were doing the job and a good job.

It's also my opinion that we organized between '49 and '59 to a greater degree on a percentage basis, and also, I'm quite sure, on a man-to-man basis, than we organized with an International vice-president assigned to a specific duty as an organizer, than what we organized from 1959 to 1969. That can be checked out, and I don't think I'd be far off in stating that in numbers we organized as many; and on a percentage-wise basis, no question that we were ahead of what we organized when we had an expert in the field. Because it just didn't work like that. One man couldn't take care. . . .an International vice-president couldn't just stick to a project such as organizing and cover the organization on an international basis. This couldn't be done.

INTERVIEWER: Okay, but what was your specific assignment, then, in terms of these various areas of expertise?

BRANDT: Well, I had lots of negotiating to do all over the country. Ken Brown saw to it that we moved around. . . .well, I covered the West Coast and also covered areas in the Midwest. I remember Milwaukee, for instance. That is a story in itself, too. I had to negotiate in Milwaukee, in Twin Cities, and other cities in the Midwest and also covered all the West Coast negotiations, organizing, going into locals where there

were problems, going into locals and speaking on various projects we had and programs that we had. I was put in charge of a subsidy program in which the International would subsidize a small local that showed it had a potential in membership to provide a full-time man as local president. It was called our subsidy program. I was put in charge of that, and that took up a lot of my time.

I was the political action chairman, which, I must state, I didn't put too much time into. But I believe that our organization missed the direct contact of International officers visiting them and meeting with them on an intimate basis. This was eliminated. We didn't have the time to do these things any more. I would say that that showed in the next ten years. We worked on lots of programs. Swayduck and Robinson projected lots of programs, and we went through lots of problems from '59 to '69 due to mainly negotiating language that Ben Robinson offered, language that he wouldn't allow us to, in any manner, amend. And although we had to go into locals and negotiate for language, even if the local was a very weak local and a local that needed economics to the greatest degree rather than language, language that, even if it were negotiated, could not be enforced in some of these small and weak locals, in locals such as I had mentioned before--Texas and Florida and Arizona in right-to-work states. . . .well, actually the Los Angeles local had jurisdiction over Arizona and I organized members in Phoenix to a degree that we had approximately one hundred members at one time in Arizona.

I was able to get the wages and conditions that we had in Los Angeles. But as I look back at it, it was an unfair thing. They just couldn't compete with the unorganized shops and shops that were organized by the Printing Pressmen and the other graphic arts unions.

INTERVIEWER: Now, at this period of time after disaffiliation, did there begin to be a kind of stepped-up attack against the label? Did you experience a stepped-up attack against the label on the West Coast?

BRANDT: There was a terrible attack against the label, and it was difficult to combat it. Here on the West Coast I would visit personally with AF of L. . . .We're speaking now of the period that we were. . . .

INTERVIEWER: We're talking about what? '59, '60, '61?

BRANDT: We were in the CIO but out of the AF of L?

INTERVIEWER: No, you were out of both after 1958.

BRANDT: Oh, 1958. Yes, it was a very difficult period for us, and I felt that I was justified in protecting our label and speaking to AFL-CIO memberships and officers and trying to convince them that our organization was doing a job, a good job, that we were true trade unionists.

INTERVIEWER: Where were the attacks coming from primarily? The Pressmen?

BRANDT: Primarily the Pressmen, the ITU. . . .

INTERVIEWER: But now, at this same time, there was a considerable amount of merger talk with ITU. Right?

BRANDT: Yes. What period are we speaking of. . . .?

INTERVIEWER: Well, let's see. In the '59 convention there was a report on merger efforts with ITU. . . . (checking records). . . ."a memorandum of understanding between ALA and ITU was read, entailed recognized jurisdiction. This was to be the basis of a meeting with ITU following the convention. . . ."

BRANDT: I think both sides put up some money, if I'm not mistaken. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Right.

BRANDT: Perhaps it was $20,000 apiece. I can't remember the exact amount, but that comes to my mind. Actually that money was put up, meetings were held, but really nothing ever came about. The ITU, without question, gave out the impression that, if we were to merge, it was in the sense that we would not be taken back as an equal. In essence it would be like the ITU were prior to the time that other organizations broke away from the ITU and became independent. So the discussion was that we would be taken back into the fold.

INTERVIEWER: Now, were you an advocate of this merger?

BRANDT: I've always been an advocate of merger but not with conditions such as that. I was an advocate of merger always to be on an equal basis. Absolutely. And I was always an advocate of merger as far back as I can remember. I believe it was necessary for the graphic arts unions because we spent lots of time and money fighting with one another and , let's say, legally scabbing on one another; and it was just a disastrous period for us. So there was no question in my mind that merger

with all the graphic arts unions was necessary. So I did whatever I could to advocate it.

INTERVIEWER: Well, when it came down to merger in Los Angeles, how did you attempt merger on a local. . . .

BRANDT: With the ITU?

INTERVIEWER: Right.

BRANDT: Well, I was very friendly with the ITU people, and we just met on a very friendly basis and discussed the matter of merger; but not much came about. I guess there was a feeling on both sides that there wasn't going to be an honest effort regarding merger, and both sides were skeptical, regarding that merger.

INTERVIEWER: Well, as things developed at the International level, the conversations with the Photoengravers with respect to merger, and you came up to that famous convention at Montreal, were you surprised at the reaction of Robinson and Swayduck, the questions that they raised about the pension plan and so forth?

BRANDT: Oh, there was terrible opposition to merging with the Photoengravers from Local One and from Swayduck and Ben Robinson, horrible opposition to it, and that's when I really split with Robinson and Swayduck. But prior to that, when we first initiated the thought of merging with the Photoengravers, I believe it was the Photoengravers that requested a meeting with the Lithographers, mainly Ken Brown to meet with their president on a personal basis. Ken brought that to our attention, I believe, in Miami. I'll never forget that occasion, and, boy, we just took Ken apart for thinking that he had the right to meet on his own without Ben Robinson along. That's how naive we were in those days! I know I was right in the midst of it, and I really let, I must say, poor Ken have it. That's how naive I was! I remember his father, who was International vice-president, Arthur Brown, sitting there and just staying quiet and never defending his son or speaking because he knew he was in a very poor spot and couldn't in any way defend his son if he wanted to. He also had a lot of respect for Robinson, like we all had at that time. We were rather naive because we did not move around on a trade union level with other unions. Our officers didn't move around with them. We thought that was the thing you had to do; you couldn't trust other trade unionists; you had to be very careful or you would be double-crossed. I don't know what we were worried about.

So we prevented the meetings from taking place with Ken Brown. I guess it was Bill Hall at that time, or maybe it even started just before Bill Hall became president (of the Photoengravers). It did. It started with his predecessor. What was his name? Prior to Bill Hall.

INTERVIEWER: The president of the Photoengravers?

BRANDT: Yeah. I think it started when he was in office.

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, well, Bill Hall actually opposed merger. . . .

BRANDT: Right, right.

INTERVIEWER: . . . .when he became president.

BRANDT: So whenever there was a meeting held, there were officers along, and we did meet with some of the Photoengravers. Then I remember later on meeting with Bill Hall and myself and other officers along. But we just didn't allow Ken Brown to meet on a personal basis alone without Ben Robinson along. It's not that we didn't trust Ken Brown personally; we just thought that he wasn't up to that kind of a meeting, that we would get the short end of the stick. This is the impression Robinson gave us and Swayduck gave us, and we believed it. We knew no better.

INTERVIEWER: Well, when it came down to Local One's withdrawal over this issue, did you attempt to try to use your past friendship with Eddie Swayduck to persuade him to stay in?

BRANDT: Oh, yes, absolutely. But he and I, we had quite a fallingout over the matter of merger. I guess I was very vocal on that matter at the Board meetings. As I look back at it now, the officers really sicked me into Eddie, and I really took Swayduck on, and we had some really all-out fights.

INTERVIEWER: Now, what was his defense to you? I mean, what was his argument for taking this position?

BRANDT: A great part of his argument was that we were going to merge with a dying organization that couldn't in any way do us any good. It would just be a hindrance to us and a

liability. This was his argument. Again, as I stated before, I think the idea in the back of his mind was that here would be another group that would come in and make the International a stronger organization to the degree that Local One would be relegated to a lesser position and less importance and perhaps his pension plan would be involved in some manner because we would insist on local mergers. He was not about to have anyone tamper with Local One's. . . .

INTERVIEWER: . . . .pension. . . .

BRANDT: . . . .situation. No way.

INTERVIEWER: Well, in 1963 you were defeated for. . . .

BRANDT: Well, what happened, at this convention. . . .

INTERVIEWER: In Montreal.

BRANDT: . . . .in Montreal, Ken Brown decided that Ted Brandt would be chairman of the Resolutions Committee that had to deal with the merger resolutions, and in his opinion there was no other officer that could handle Swayduck like he believed I could handle him. And I did. I put Swayduck in his place at the Resolutions Committee meetings. He sat up in the front, and he would argue and fight; but if he got out of line, I'd call him to order. He argued extensively during our resolutions meetings. Nevertheless, every one of the resolutions that we wanted to go through, I mean the majority of Board members that had voted for the resolutions that we wanted to go through, went through; and the merger resolutions went through, too.

Swayduck then vowed that he would get me. He said, "I won't forget this." And he made good his vow. So he had an International representative nominated--his name was James O'Neill--against me. James O'Neill came from the Twin Cities, and he had been appointed as an organizer for Twin Cities and then moved to Portland, Oreg n, from which he operated. Local One members didn't know Jim O'Neill virtually at all. I would say the membership of the local didn't know this man at all, and they knew me very well. I remember at this convention the delegates from Local One coming to see me and saying to me, "Don't worry, Ted. It's gonna be all right." Swayduck vowed that I wouldn't get 100 votes, and he made good. So out of virtually 9,000 members, I wound up with 100 votes. It's my opinion that, if Hitler would have run in that local, he would have gotten more than 100 votes! So I leave that up to history as to what happened. But I got 100 votes. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Out of Local One you mean?

BRANDT: . . . .out of Local One, and that was the deciding factor. The other deciding factor, that come out later, was that the officers of the Amalgamated Lithographers really let me down, horribly so. That came to light later on, and that included Ken Brown who used to kid me by saying. . . .I'd say, "Ken, how are you going to get along with Jim O'Neill?" He said, "Oh, don't worry, if Jim's elected, he'll rise to the occasion, he'll play ball because he'll want to maintain his position."

Well, it turned out that Jim O'Neill did not cooperate, did not take his assignment seriously, did not perform, and, as I remember, even walked away from a set of negotiations. But let me say that, previous to that, when I was defeated and back in Los Angeles, Ken Brown called me up to advise me. He said, "Ted, I want you to know that I wanted to be the one to advise you that you have been defeated, but you're a symbol to our organization. Consequently, you're not going to lose one day of tenure so that your seniority, as far as the pension plan is concerned, will not be disturbed. So you are hereby being appointed to the position as International representative, immediately, no break in your position as being on the International."

Well, I appreciated that because I felt pretty bad over being defeated. So I continued on as an International rep, but in essence I was doing the same job that I did before as an International vice-president. Within a year's period O'Neill resigned.

INTERVIEWER: Why?

BRANDT: Well, because he just wasn't producing and he was opposing merger and he was really under the supervision of Swayduck. And it was very apparent.

INTERVIEWER: What happened to him? Where did he end up?

BRANDT: When Local One had disaffiliated from the Amalgamated and affiliated in a peculiar manner. . . .when I say a peculiar manner, it wasn't on a full-fledged basis, with the ITU, Swayduck got the ITU to appoint O'Neill to the position of organizer with the ITU. So O'Neill really did a turnabout on the Amalgamated just as Swayduck did. He was without question a tool of Robinson and Swayduck.

INTERVIEWER: So that, once he resigned, there was a special election, and you then returned as the regional vice-president.

BRANDT: Yes, and I remember at that time. . . .I don't know if I had opposition. I just can't remember whether or not I had opposition. But I do know that Brandenberg wanted to run against me, and he came from Local 17 in San Francisco, Ivan Brandenberg. I went up into that local, and they were calling for nominations to the International. They held an election that night as to who they would nominate from Local 17. So I ran against Brandenberg in his own local and defeated him. So that Local 17 in San Francisco endorsed me in spite of the fact that I was the fellow who put the local out on strike in that earlier period. So it seemed that I had overcome a lot of opposition in the local for them to agree to nominate someone other than a Local 17 member.

INTERVIEWER: And this was just three years after that strike. . . .

BRANDT: And I took him on in his own local. This was just three years after that (strike). It was unbelievable that they would do this. I won by a small majority. As a matter of fact, Brandenberg contested that election, too, that endorsement. So they had a recount, and I won by a few votes.

Later on, months later or maybe years later, some of the fellows that were counting the ballots confessed to me that they did everything in their power to help Brandenberg and gave him every break possible, but he just couldn't get the majority of the votes. That was told to me by a fellow, Dinty Moore, who was an active member and I believe vice-president of the local at that time. He was the one that told me that. That was, in my opinion, a great thing for me--to have this local who detested the International, and I have to use that word, endorse me who was a symbol of the International.

INTERVIEWER: Okay, Ted. Well, I think that we might want to say something about the period of time from '64 to '72, what issues you thought. . . . there was movement now to merge with the Bookbinders. . . .and what kinds of roles you were playing now with Local One out and. . . .

BRANDT: Let me also say this. I always advocated strongly to Ken Brown reaffiliation with the AFL-CIO, and I'm sure Ken will remember that, and had many talks with him on that point. As I said before, I was in favor of merger, merger with all graphic arts unions. As far as the Bookbinders were concerned, I doubt very much if ever I had any other ideas than to merge with any organization, regardless of the fact that members might have said that here was a dying organization. If they were dying,

it was up to us to come in there and help them and preserve the jobs and do what we could to help those members and perhaps retrain them. And if they were dying, they were dying because we, to a large degree, were taking their jobs. Our process was taking their jobs to a large degree. So I had sympathy for merger and for the Bookbinders and any other graphic arts organization.

(End of Tape IV, Side 7)

BRANDT: And all the International officers and representatives were involved in bringing about local mergers. In the beginning we effected some mergers quickly, virtually overnight some of them. Slowly but surely it became tougher and tougher and tougher because we were coming down to the hard core locals. It could perhaps be that the Photoengravers for one reason or other refused to merge; in some others it was the Lithographers that refused to merge. So we had our work cut out to bring them together.

Jack Wallace and Henry Dillon were chairmen of the merger committees, and we all had lots of work to do. We brought that about; it took a number of years. It finally came down to just a few hard core locals. At the period that I left the organization, just about all of them were merged, just about. There were just a few mergers left to be effectuated.

INTERVIEWER: Now, do you want to say anything about the election in '72 between you and Eddie Donahue?

BRANDT: Well, I don't want to leave no bitter feelings, but I think that, to a degree, I was treated in a manner that was shoddy, because I was given no previous notice whatsoever that I was to have an opponent. When I say an opponent, (I mean) a member coming from the Executive Board. I wasn't given any notice until the night before the nominations at the convention, and so it struck me as a tremendous shock that night that I was to have opposition. I had lots of local officers. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Were you particularly suprised at who the opposition was?

BRANDT: To a degree, yes. To a degree I was. I held Eddie in high esteem; I still hold him in high esteem. But the reason I was shocked was that I considered him a fine trade unionist, a compassionate man; and I just felt that I just didn't deserve that treatment from our organization because all the way down the line, for twenty-five years as a local officer and as an

International officer, I was an organization man, all the way down the line. Everyone knew me for that, to the very last moment that I was in office. I believe that I should have been given an opportunity to retire in dignity, but that opportunity was not given to me. I would say that, in my opinion, all the officers knew it but I, that this was going to take place. I didn't know until the night previous to nomination. So I wasn't prepared for it.

INTERVIEWER: Would you have resigned if you had known it?

BRANDT: I would not have resigned, but there's a possibility things (would) have been explained to me, we would have talked it over. There's a great possibility I might have retired because I was going through problems at home. And also the fact that Ken Brown put through a program whereby every International officer had to move into Washington, and I doubt very much if I would have moved my family. But it was put to us in such a manner that we had to agree, right on the convention platform. A paper was given to each one of us that we had to sign. Ken Brown handed it out to us right there before the convention. The paper was handed out to us, and we had to sign, agreeing to that resolution. So that when he spoke to the membership, he could state that the officers unanimously agree to this program of leaving their homes and moving into Washington. So, really, such pressure was put upon all officers, whether they liked it or not, they signed. So I had that also to face.

The night previous to the nominations, Milt Williams came to me and bluntly told me that he was going to oppose me. Harry Spohnholtz of Chicago told me that he was going to oppose me, and that also was a shock to me. Their attitude, really their crudeness, I didn't deserve that. It was uncalled for. I just couldn't understand that kind of treatment from these fellows, knowing how hard I had worked, the situations that I had gone through, you know, in previous years in defending the International, defending them against Swayduck and Robinson, taking Robinson and Swayduck on personally.

Going back to one other period, to give you an idea, at that period when Swayduck was threatening to disaffiliate from the Amalgamated, he tried to put Ken Brown in a bad light. So negotiations were taking place in Local One, and he requested Ken Brown to enter into his negotiations. Swayduck had arranged that all the employers would be there, and there was a large group of employers, perhaps more than the employers' negotiating committee. Ken knew that he had to go into a lion's den, that things were stacked up against him. We talked about it, and I volunteered--that was another thing that I did--I volunteered to Ken, "Why don't you take me in there? I know the fellows in Local One, and I can handle them." Actually I

was his bodyguard. He welcomed that! "Oh, fine, Ted, certainly." And I was sounding my own death knell.

I went into negotiations, and so there was . . . .

INTERVIEWER: Now, when was this? In '63?

BRANDT: No, I think it was after the. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Or in '64?

BRANDT: . . . .convention.

INTERVIEWER: After the convention? In the winter?

BRANDT: Oh, no, it couldn't be after the convention because I had opposition. . . .no, it was previous to that. We were going through a hectic period. I guess it was talk of the merger then, and Swayduck was in opposition to it.

INTERVIEWER: So it was prior to the Montreal convention?

BRANDT: Yes, it was of course prior to Montreal.

INTERVIEWER: Right.

BRANDT: So I volunteered to go in with Ken Brown. So there we were lined up against the employers and to a degree against our own local committee which included Robinson and Ed Swayduck and so forth. Because when the employers began to take on Ken Brown, Swayduck and Robinson just sat back and virtually said to the employers, "Go on, sic him! Take him apart!" What they wanted to point out to Ken Brown was that we were not doing a job on the national front and that we were putting Local One in a bad position. Local One was doing a great job of negotiating, and their conditions and wages were much higher than locals all over the country. It wasn't true! The locals tothe greatest degree were catching up with Local One, some of them on a par with Local One, for instance, Chicago, also Milwaukee. And that in itself is another story.

One of the employers--I'll never forget that--was an employer from Schlegel's who was on the committee; perhaps he was even chairman of the employers' group. He got up and said to Ken--and I remember that; there is where he made his mistake--he said, "You know that Schmidt Lithograph Company from San Francisco has installed an office here in New York City and is taking work out of our city!" I turned to him. I said, "Now, wait a minute. I just can't understand how they can do that.

There must be something wrong with you fellows because Local Seventeen's wages and conditions are much better than what you have here in Local One. Now, how can they afford to take work out of your city? There's something wrong with you fellows."

Because we had at that time 31¼ hours on the first night shift, the whole West Coast. We still have it. No one else east of the West Coast has 31¼ hours on the first night shift. And we all had thirty hours on the second night shift. New York didn't have that. And the wages were higher, the hourly rate was higher, in San Francisco.

So when I took this employer on, he was embarrassed. Immediately the attorney representing the Local One employers took on and said, "Now, wait a minute, wait a minute. We just didn't mean that. . . ." And he flim-flammed all around.

But from that point on the employers were in a very bad position. I really got in very bad with Swayduck and . . . .

INTERVIEWER: Because, in other words, their plan backfired.

BRANDT: Actually Ken Brown put on a beautiful presentation and came out smelling like a rose. I remember receiving a call from Ben Robinson in which he intimated that I had done the wrong thing by coming in with Ken Brown. They had it all slated to really do a job on Ken Brown.

The other item was that, in my second year, perhaps, as International vice-president, I was assigned to negotiate in Milwaukee, which at that time was being critized by Chicago and perhaps Twin Cities and other locals, especially New York, regarding their poor contract, that they were much below Chicago and other locals and their language was poor and the job had to be done in Milwaukee. The fact was that Ben Robinson himself had tried to negotiate in Milwaukee and got no place, no place. So I was sent to do a job.

I came out of that local doing the kind of a job that was unbelievable! When I look back at it, I was pretty rough, perhaps brutal. I gave the employers no latitude. Very shortly after negotiations began, I advised an overtime man--we put on an overtime man--and I recognized that I had the employers over a barrel and I used it for all it was worth. We came out of that local with a contract that matched the very best; it eventually would match the best--a contract that would catch up with Chicago in all items. That was language, money, and so forth.

INTERVIEWER: What was it? A three-year period?

BRANDT: I think it was a two-year period. But we made tremendous strides where the gap was actually closed between Chicago, and that removed forever the problem of Milwaukee. But what happened in the next set of negotiations in Milwaukee was that Ken Brown assigned another International vice-president to go in there. And I learned from Norm Simon, who was the local president at that time, that the employers had objected to Ted Brandt coming in there; and so Ken Brown agreed to that. I thought it was a terrible mistake, and it didn't give me an opportunity to get back in there and show them that I wasn't the devil, that I didn't have horns growing out of my head and that I was sent in to do a job and I had to do it and I did it.

So eventually I was sent back in, and I negotiated in Milwaukee practically until the period that I retired. . . .

INTERVIEWER: In that second round of negotiations or in a subsequent one?

BRANDT: Oh, in a subsequent one. Not that one! And I spoke up to Ken and protested that fact, that I wasn't sent back in there again.

INTERVIEWER: So you were sent back in again in what? About '67?

BRANDT: About perhaps. . . .it could be '66, yeah. About '65, '66, that period. Again, I then negotiated a contract that matched anything that Chicago got and at the same time established a good relationship, believe it or not, with management in Milwaukee, in spite of what had happened in my previous negotiations there. So in every negotiations afterwards I would go back in there again, and it was really, if you can say it, on a friendly basis. Nevertheless we always came out with a contract that matched the very best. When we had to get the pension plan, we got the pension plan; whatever program we were after, we would get during the periods that Chicago would get them or Twin Cities would get them. So that was another situation that was a bad situation when I first went into Milwaukee. I had a job to do, and it was done.

THEODORE BRANDT

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