Q: Hello, is Mr. Reuther in?

R: Yes, speaking.

Q: Hi, this is Judy Stepan-Norris.

R: Hi, Judy, I have been expecting your call. How are you this morning?

Q: Good, thank you. How are you?

R: All right, fine, recovering. Listen before we get into the interview may I raise just a couple of short points.

Q: Sure.

R: First, I have an ongoing arrangement with the Labor Archives at Wayne State University in Detroit to try to put in their collection such interviews as I give, and I would appreciate it if you could either have a copy of this tape made or when you finished with it, send it on to the Labor Archives and they will be glad to send you a clear new tape in exchange.

Q: Fine, no problem.

R: All right, the other point is I'm curious and this is for background information as to what prompted your selecting this question, whether it's just academic curiosity or whether a family member was involved in the unionization at Ford or what.

Q: For me myself it was academic, but the professor I'm working with, Professor Maurice Zeitlin, grew up in Detroit and his father and brother both worked at the Rouge.

R: All right, that's understandable then. So he sort of suggested this subject.

Q: Yeah.

R: All right, now, before you put your first question, please give me your definition or your understanding of what you mean by Left and Right.

Q: Well, I think that, that was one of the questions I was going to ask you. I was going to ask you to define what groups you saw composing the Left and Right during the late 1930s through the '50s because I think probably that answer depends on the particular historical situation. I think it could have been different in different places.

R: All right, so that's a good beginning.

Q: Okay, now we're ready.

R: All right, fine. Well, I raised that question because I've had occasion over the years to read papers of that era and similar ones in which the author had what I consider a totally distorted and unrealistic definition for the terms Right and Left. As far as I recall, there was only one short period in the history of the UAW where the opposing forces could clearly be described and accurately described as the struggle between the Left and the Right, and that was the period during the initial struggle against the irresponsible leadership of one Homer Martin.

Q: Uh-huh.

R: Homer Martin clearly was a leader of the Right. He had private dealings with the Ford Motor Company. He pursued a policy of trying to take the fledgling UAW, a CIO union, back into the conservative AF of L. He pursued policies inside the union that were worked out in harmony with one Harry Bennett who was a hired gangster of the Ford

Motor Company whose main thrust at that period was to break the insipient UAW so Martin was truly the symbol of the Right. Opposing Martin was a very broad collection whom I would more accurately describe as militant unionists rather than Left, for the great bulk of them had no political leanings of any kind. They were typical of the work force of the auto industry, people out of the hills of Kentucky and Tennessee and they were not political sophisticates. However among the leadership of the Unity Caucus which opposed Martin were young Socialists, young Communists, young members of the Proletarian Party, some Catholic Action trade unionists, some older ex-Wobblies, quite a collection of political activists of the so-called Left.

Q: Would you say that foreign-born were highly represented among that leadership?

R: Only insofar as--are you speaking now strictly of Ford or UAW in general?

Q: Well, you can give me an answer for both if you know it.

R: Well I think your question could be more positively answered vis-a-vis Ford because the ethnic community groups played a very very important role in the unionization of Ford. We had special leaflets and papers distributed in various Slavic languages--Yugoslav, Polish primarily, Italian--and there was a great collection of ethnic groups at Ford's, much more so than was true in Chrysler and General Motors and certainly much more so than in Flint, Michigan, during the sit-down which was heavily a Southern-oriented work force. Anyway, these foreign-born groups brought with them some trade union experience but much more a political experience, and they tended to support much more

the Unity Caucus or the more militant group, the so-called Left group as I think in your context you would use it as against the Right, the Martin forces.

Q: Uh-huh.

R: Now that distinction ceased to have any meaning when Homer Martin was ousted and any events that transpired after that date could no longer define the pro-administration and anti-administration in Left and Right terms and I'll tell you why. One group that presumed to be Left, I say presumed because when it served their purposes they were militant and anti-Right but when it served the purposes of Moscow, when the Hitler-Stalin Pact was signed they were very militant. It was an imperialist war and they were sabotaging defense production. Suddenly when the Hitler-Stalin Pact was broken and Hitler's troops marched east, that segment of the Unity Caucus known as the Communist group suddenly became the most rightist group in the union. Why do I say that? They advocated a reintroduction of piecework, the hated system which led to the sit-down strike. They advocated an end to the 8-hour day and the 40-hour week because of overtime penalties, they said you must give everything to the war effort. They said, in effect, don't process grievances about women or blacks it might trigger a strike and we must have no strikes during the war. So suddenly what was a very militant group became a very right-wing group.

Q: Would you characterize Communist behavior in that way absolutely, or do you think that it may have varied between the plants or the different individual Communists themselves.

R: It was absolute around the whole world and that's why many Communists in France and elsewhere tore up their membership cards when--the authoritarian nature of the Party which tolerated no internal discussion or no internal dissent led, of course, to many many of their members tearing up their cards and deserting their leadership and it triggered the ousting of the Communists. Now let me correct a distortion of history that many young historians have concluded. There was no purge of Communists in the UAW. There were elections and Communists who had clearly identified themselves with that right-wing policy during the war were voted out. You cannot call a democratic secret election a purge. Now there were some CIO unions where there were purges, where Philip Murray as a good lieutenant of John Lewis did it the easy way--we'll just oust them.

Q: Uh-huh.

R: And charters were lifted, etc. That was never done in the Auto Workers Union and hence any study of UAW whether it's Local 600 or anywhere else cannot speak of a purge of the so-called Left. I was a young Socialist; I was purged by Homer Martin long before the war.

Q: Uh-huh.

R: Bob Travis the leader in Flint who was associated with the Communists was purged by Homer Martin long before this wartime crisis came. So that purge which was a purge by the Right occurred long before there was a showdown with the Communists in the UAW. The Communists in the UAW if anyone can speak of a purge, it was a purge by Moscow because what destroyed their influence in the UAW was the sudden flipflop by the Moscow line during the war. And they were betrayed by, of course,

their own godfather and not by John Lewis or Walter Reuther or anyone else. So I trust I've made a clear distinction by what I mean between Right and Left because during that period when the war was on and the Soviet Union was an ally and the Communists who called themselves Left but were in effect Rightists were advocating an alliance with corporate America in order to hasten wartime output, and it was left to the rest of us to fight battles during the war to defend gains that we had made previously.

Q: Uh-huh.

R: Now it is true that the whole union supported the no-strike pledge during the war, but you will find that that element in the union that some historians still refer to as the Left meaning the Communists they only favored the no-strike pledge after the Stalin-Hitler Pact was broken and Hitler's troops marched into Poland. So their judgment on Right and Left in the United States had nothing to do with what was happening here, it had everything to do with what was in the interest of the Soviet Union. I say this as one who has long defended the rights of Communists to participate and to enjoy all the civil liberties within our society that anyone else has. I just helped elect one who was a former Communist, president of the big electromotive diesel works of the UAW in Chicago, a young woman, the daughter of Bob Travis.

Q: Oh yeah.

R: Lynn Strikleader. I went personally out there and campaigned for her when they engaged in red-baiting. I have never believed in smearing people by a label. I don't think it's smearing someone to say if they

run for office on the Communist Party ticket that you're a Communist and I said that of one John Anderson who ran for governor. He was a leader in the UAW and I said, John, you are a Communist, you have a right to be, but the workers have a right to know you are a Communist and that you must be judged by the policies of the party you support. But insofar as membership rights I've always advocated they have the right of anyone else. Now I must warn you my name is Reuther and I have the same trait as my brother. If you ask me what time it is I'll tell you how to build a watch, so you'll have to cut me off if I'm getting too long-winded.

Q: When you discussed your views on, that it's your belief that membership rights should be exclusive for everyone, did that mean that you were against the constitutional amendment that the UAW passed?

R: No, I supported that, that was a wartime provision and I considered and very genuinely so that those who had betrayed the union by advocating giving up all that we had fought for merely because of a wartime alliance with the Soviet Union were not suitable for leadership. They were certainly suitable for membership but not leadership in the union and I supported it then with a very clear conscience.

Q: Okay, another thing that came to mind while you were speaking is that, what was called the Progressive Caucus at the Rouge which consisted of Communists and nonaligned left-wingers were not defeated electorally after the war. Do you have an explanation for why that might be? Were their policies different or were the workers that were voting for them different?

R: Well, you know, when alliances exist whatever the reasons are that may lead to the crumbling of that alliance, it doesn't necessarily mean that all people at every local union level are equally affected by that. And there were pockets in the UAW where the old--shall I refer to it as the George Addes coalition because he was the sort of titular head of that caucus--where the framework of that old alliance remained in effect, whether it's personal loyalty, personal ambitions or what. And of course international officers have personal ambitions and sometimes that affects their alliances, but one can't expect that because a caucus deteriorates because of the actions of a segment of it such as the Communists that that automatically reflects itself in every local. The Rouge Local 600 was so huge at that time that it was almost a small international within itself and you had ethnic alliances and you had local alliances built on political ambitions. And may I say you had a sizable influence on the part of the corporation in the union, for you'll remember when the vote was finally taken on whether the UAW would represent the Ford workers, approximately 60,000 voted for CIO and 20,000 voted for Homer Martin and Harry Bennett's slate. Now it was an open secret that Bennett and Martin had made a commitment to try to get as many of Bennett's Ford servicemen in as committeemen in the UAW once the UAW was recognized.

Q: Uh-huh.

R: Hence it is reasonable to assume that in the local union politics on both sides, on both sides there was a corporate influence. That is difficult to measure but one would be naive to assume that Harry

Bennett suddenly gave up his intentions of penetrating the UAW from within.

Q: I have a heard a story, I don't know if this is true. Let me tell it to you and see if you have ever heard of this.

R: Yes.

Q: That the very first contract that was negotiated between the UAW and Ford, it's been noted that that was a great contract.

R: Yes.

Q: That it had provisions way above what was standard.

R: Yes.

Q: And I've heard from some of the people that I have done oral histories with that one of the reasons why Ford agreed to such generous terms was that the UAW had a list of spies who had infiltrated the union and had threatened to publish this list and that it was kind of a trade-off between the company and the union to get rid of that list and to get a better contract rather than to publish the list and get a not so good contract.

R: No, I have never heard that story, but let me tell you one from real life after the attack on Walter's life. There had been several attempts on his life but one of them in particular where two thugs very close to Harry Bennett, one on the list of his payroll, broke into Walter's little home and tried to waylay him. Some months afterwards when the contract was signed with the Ford Motor Company, one of those thugs phoned me and said, you know, our boss is now signed. You're not mad at us any more are you? He wanted a meeting to talk and what he was saying was so obvious--if you can't lick'em,

you join'em. And since his boss had just joined us so to speak these thugs felt, hey, we better get on board too. So that throughout the whole Bennett organization there was that feeling, okay now, the boss is signed with the UAW. We're going to get in and get involved there.

Q: Uh-huh.

R: So that the union was confronted with enormous pressure to penetrate our ranks by company people.

Q: And they made it an open fact, huh?

R: I beg your pardon.

Q: They made it openly.

R: Oh yes, yes, no, this was very open. That's absolutely right. And, of course, Bennett later in his, some of his memoirs, interviews at least that he gave from Vegas shortly before he died, admitted much of this but dumped it in the lap of Gillespie who was only an underling to Bennett so this was really Bennett's doings. But anyway getting back to the basic question, the Rouge local union reflected this very complicated relationship between a company that tried openly with armed thugs to break us, and then suddenly embraces us to such an extent they put the union label on the car and, you know, you wonder whether it was the all-embracing bear hug of one who wants to suffocate you.

Q: Yeah.

R: Now don't expect that under those kinds of circumstances you're going to have a clean clear separation between Left and Right or militant unionist and pro-company unionist. It was a very confused situation and remained one for quite a few years, much longer than 90 percent of

the union. There was one local in Flint that remained very confused for long years, but the rest of the union shaped up very quickly.

Q: What do you prefer to call the factions?

R: What do I prefer to call them?

Q: Yes.

R: There have always been in organized labor a faction that wants to compromise with the boss and I consider them right-wingists or conservative trade unionists, and I call those who seek progressive change militant unionists. I don't like Left and Right because it's lost its meaning, it's so easily misunderstood. When you have militant Catholic trade unionists working in the same caucus with Socialists and ex-Wobblies you can't call it a left-wing coalition because the Catholics are not left-wingers. They may be militant unionists, they may be against the boss, but usually the term Left means almost Marxist.

Q: Uh-huh.

R: And that has absolutely no meaning in the trade union movement because 90 percent of the members of each of these caucuses were what we used to call, well not originally but almost, scissorbills. That's an old trade union expression of a Jimmy Higgins who doesn't know up from down but he knows who the boss is and fights him. So that Marxist terminologies, believe me, they're very misleading, extremely misleading.

Q: When you said the word Jimmy Higgins, that reminded me of a quote in your book, that you describe Bill McKie as a Jimmy Higgins in the organizing unit.

R: Indeed he was. Now here was a died-in-the-wool Party member, a Communist, made no mistake about it. But that, in the days of unionization at the Rouge plant, that was not a handicap for him because the Communists at that stage when we were organizing the union had a damn good reputation of being a militant group, a group that would be up in the morning early to distribute leaflets and would not shirk their responsibilities, would take any task. They were not alone in that, there were many others who did the same and for them to imply that they were the only ones who did that is utter nonsense. I give them full credit for what they did, but I know they were but one small part of a much bigger group. The young Socialists and the young Proletarian Party members and some Trotskyites and some old-time ex-Wobblies, they worked just as hard and just as dedicated and made just as great a contribution.

Q: Uh-huh.

R: And I never thought of any of them as Left because that name didn't mean anything then and it means even less today. They were militant unionists. Bill McKie did a great job, so did Dave Miller. Dave Miller was a known Communist; he was <u>the</u> opposition man to Walter and me in our own local 174, which early in the drive included the Rouge plant. Walter as President of the UAW while Dave Miller was still alive asked that the great retiree center in Detroit be named after Dave Miller. Now this is the guy who some Communists say purged the Communists from the UAW, believe me there was no purge unless Joe Stalin purged them by his flipflops. That's why they lost, not because of anything that Walter Reuther did.

Q: Do you think that there were some Communists like McKie or Dave Miller or whoever that may have taken a more principled stand during the war or do you think they all went along with the CP line.

R: Well those who were most prominent and hence put the label on themselves so to speak remained very disciplined members but they lost their following--that's the point. They stood alone from that point on when they tried to sabotage the Lend Lease to Britain and the early war efforts, and then suddenly made it into a great patriotic war and then said, hey, you know, yesterday you said we were warmongers, today you say it's a great patriotic war, which one of you do we believe. And they lost their following in droves, in droves.

Q: And that includes McKie?

R: No, McKie remained very loyal, Dave Miller remained loyal. It wasn't until the Soviet troops marched into Hungary that Dave Miller had grave questions about his membership. I remember talking with him at great length about it during--you see there were some Communists and Dave Miller is typical of them and McKie also who were philosophical Communists as well as disciplined Party members. It was possible to have an intellectual discussion with them. It was possible to retain a personal friendship with them despite violent differences on Party policies, and I and Walter also still felt a great personal friendship for McKie and Dave Miller because of the early contribution they made even though we had to break very sharply with them during the war.

Q: Uh-huh. Some of the interviews that I've done have come up with a statement that during World War II at the Rouge plant because of the cost/plus contracts there were more people around to do a job than was

necessary, and that, therefore, the work pace was very relaxed and the supervision was not that tight. They contend that maybe one reason why the Communists were not as unpopular at the Rouge, that, here they were not being as militant, but there wasn't as much a need to be militant during the war.

R: Yes, what you're saying is that whatever leadership was in power at that time had it sort of easy going because there was no great pressure on the union, people were hired whether they were needed or not. That's--what was true of Rouge then was true of many defense plants. I was in charge of defense conversion in the UAW during the war and one of the things I had to fight against was the fact that corporations were hiring people that were not needed and hanging onto them long afterwards because they could send the bill onto Uncle Sam. And yet there were urgent defense jobs that were short of manpower and I had to work out with the companies and with the Air Force or Navy, whoever had the contract, the transfer agreement. We negotiated the famous six point OPM labor transfer agreement during the war to facilitate all this. But what you're saying is an indictment not only of management at the Rouge, but most companies who loved the wartime profits they were making and they just hired people. Well there used to be a joke, you know, they just felt them and if they were warm they put them on the payroll, you know, whether they knew anything about the job or not.

Q: Yes.

R: And they kept them longer than they were needed.

Q: So you think that's a common phenomenon in ....

R: Well, that was a common phenomenon in most wartime plants, especially those that were exclusively defense and we stopped making cars so the Rouge was exclusively defense.

Q: And what would you say to the argument that initiating incentive pay would be the only way to get a raise, given the restrictions by the War Labor Board?

R: Well that was a problem and when you have a wage freeze and an ostensible price freeze which is not policed there are great pressures, of course, to use other devices for raising your income. There is overtime and, of course, there's a return to piecework. The union, however, had come through a very bitter fight initially in General Motors' sit-down strike against the whole concept of piecework which was very hated throughout the industry. One expected that having won that battle that there would be little or no pressure to return to it but such is not the case. There is an element in every labor force that's terribly hungry and wants to get as much overtime as it can, even though there may be seniority workers out on the street unemployed. They would love to work 60 hours a week and get the overtime and they would like to go to piecework if they can augment their income. This has to be resisted. We thought we had legislation, we thought we had union contracts to protect the labor force against it, but when you have a segment of the membership saying, hey, what's wrong with our getting this. Strong union leadership will say, well, you've got seniority people out of work and if there's to be ...

END OF SIDE A

SIDE B

R: ...there was a great clamor for all the work hands that you could get. That segment of the work force that wanted to press for a return to piecework as a device for increasing their earnings had leverage which normally they wouldn't have. There were incidents where the union sort of slipped back during this period and permitted a return to piecework, and they returned to overtime under circumstances that normally you would not have permitted.

Q: Okay, can I get back to discussing the Ford organizing drive?

R: Yes, please.

Q: Okay, in your book you mention that in the early efforts back in '36 and '37 that Local 174 was very active in this drive.

R: Yes.

Q: And that it was your brother's idea to open up small branch offices in neighborhoods that were remote from the Ford plants in order to avoid the problem of Ford's domination around the plant.

R: Yes.

Q: Can you tell me who would staff these branch offices? Were they Ford workers? Were they workers from 174? Were they organized along nationality lines?

R: Well, I would say it was a combination of former Ford workers who were fired or laid off, a combination of them plus ethnic workers. The ethnic workers were very prominent in that drive, they had the support of some local language newspapers like Glos Ludowy, the Polish newspaper. There were some modest radio programs that we used to plug the Ford drive. Then, of course, there were some organizers that were

attached to the westside local like Stanley Nowak, Bob Cantor, Bill Chemsly, myself, who would help provide a degree of supervision over these scattered local recruiting offices.

Q: Uh-huh.

R: My wife is hearing me talking and she mentions the name George Edwards who was an early UAW organizer and now a federal judge in Ohio.

Q: Uh-huh.

R: All of the people who were more experienced organizers and a part of the westside structure helped provide it supervision. Now one might ask the question, how come 174 had jurisdiction over the Ford's? Well, 174 when it was organized was a catchall amalgamated local, and since there was no unionization in Ford the first jurisdiction of the westside local included the whole westside of Detroit. It was only when the factional fight and the struggle against Martin began, that Martin tried to separate the Ford drive away from Walter's influence, away from the control of Local 174 and even resorted to putting Dick Frankensteen who was beating up with Walter in the distribution of leaflets. He put him in charge of the whole drive for a short period as a way of trying to isolate Walter. But these were all internal machinations that had little to do with what was actually underway about signing up workers.

Q: Uh-huh.

R: These scattered sort of branch offices continued to sign up people and, of course, each new success which the UAW had whether it was at Chrysler or Ford or in a parts plant all gave impetus to the Ford drive. Then finally, of course, when Ford overplayed his hand the way

he did in beating up Walter and Frankensteen and the adverse nationwide publicity which they got from that brutal attack, then the NLRB disclosures, what Ford and Bennett were doing down in even far-flung Texan plants, all this put the Ford Motor Company on the defensive and gave more courage to Ford workers to sign up. Finally, I must add that a crucial part of the drive at Ford's was reaching black workers, and I mentioned half a dozen names in my book of some of the early black workers who formed a committee and began working through black churches. Now that's a strange way to get Ford workers but it really isn't. Harry Bennett used to hire most blacks through preachers in black churches and the Bennett crowd would subsidize some of these black churches with modest little gifts. So we had to reach the black community and I remember the day that I got Walter White, then the head of the NAACP, to come out and we made the rounds of the Rouge plant with a sound truck and he would speak as the workers gathered. And the final breakthrough with the blacks was a very crucial victory in winning Ford workers, because Ford had a much higher concentration of black workers than did Chrysler and General Motors.

Q: Uh-huh. The organizing efforts that you're talking about in the early days, did they coordinate with the internal Rouge people like Walter Dorosh, Percy Llewellyn, Paul Boatin, Nelson Davis, the people that later became local leaders?

R: Yes. The word coordinate implies a much more formal relationship than what actually existed. To a greater and lesser degree, some of the people who were still working inside the plant were able to involve

themselves in activities outside the plant, attending meetings and so on; others had to remain very much undercover for a while. But it is fair to say that people like Percy and Walter Dorosh and others had sort of won their credentials during that early period and had been sufficiently identified as initiators and early supporters that it gave credence to their efforts to win election.

Q: So were they directly under the supervision of the 174 Local or were they pretty much doing independent work?

R: Well they were doing pretty much independent work because it wasn't until a full-time director of the Ford drive was set up and we had full-time organizers assigned to organizing Ford and it became a big open campaign. It wasn't until then that there was a high degree of coordination and efforts within the plant and without during the period that 174 had jurisdiction, and the coordination with forces inside the plant had to be kept very q.t., very much undercover, because as fast as we signed them up they would be fired. So it was a clandestine operation from within and the more open one through these recruiting offices on the outside.

Q: When you say was formally set up, you mean in 1940 with Woodman as the Assistant Director?

R: That is correct.

Q: At that time when Woodman was assigned as Assistant Director, who was the Director?

R: Well I thought he was the Director. I don't recall that--

Q: Yeah, I thought he was too. I read in your book that he was Assistant Director of Organization.

R: No I don't think so. Did I say Assistant? I don't have my book before me but he was made Director of Organization. I don't know, maybe Homer Martin was still titular head. I really don't know.

Q: What kind of role did John L. Lewis himself play in the organizing drive? I've heard that there were a lot of coal miners involved as organizers and that of course his--

R: Not in the Ford organization. Miners were used as occasional speakers who would come in. I was Director of Organization in the State of Indiana during the tail end of the great General Motors strike after the Battle of the Running Bulls in Flint, when I had to get out of town, and there were some miners that were assigned to my staff in Illinois and there were some who were sent in to speak like Powers Hapgood and John Brophy and others. They were top people, but they were sent in much as the Amalgamated sent in Leo Krzycki and Rose Posota came in from the ILG and these early people. That was a part of their contribution to the national CIO, but the Ford drive came so late in the great wave of unionization of CIO. Steel and rubber and auto were already well underway. But I don't recall any mine worker organizers having been sent into Ford's. Now this is true, that many auto workers came out of hill country where the miners had some unionization and they brought that union experience with them. That was true in Flint, it was true in Anderson, Indiana, it was true in River Rouge too.

Q: What kind of influence do you think they had, those people who used to be in the coal miners union?

R: Well, they knew enough about unionism to know that that's what they wanted. They wanted a strong organization and they knew what solidarity meant, sticking together.

Q: Uh-huh.

R: And those were important lessons to be learned in those days because the corporation was so bent on dividing them through fear and intimidation and open brutality, that anyone who had the experience of fighting mine companies in the hills knew what was involved so it gave them a degree of seasoning so to speak. Preparing them for a very difficult struggle it was important.

Q: Yeah, the mine workers union has never been considered a very democratic union, do you think that the structure of the mine union itself, the experience of being in a union that was more hierarchically structured with Lewis pretty much dominating the union policy, did that have any effect on their views toward unionization do you think?

R: Well, John L. sent some of his people out to the UAW at times when we got a little rambunctious and wanted a little more democracy. Some of our people they would applaud John L., they liked his show of strength and determination, but they said there's a hell of a difference between a ton of coal and an automobile and by god we're going to have a democratic union.

Q: Yeah.

R: I, you know, the miners never had much democracy up to that point and they weren't thinking in terms of democracy. They were just thinking

really in terms of someone who was strong and powerful that would be on their side and Lewis epitomized that.

Q: Uh-huh.

R: One of the strange things is that the Communist elements in most of the CIO unions who always tried to picture themselves as militant, pro-democratic, progressive groups were never disenchanted with John Lewis. He remained their hero all during this period even though he was an autocrat. And most of us in the auto union lost interest in John L. after the early days because we knew he helped us but we didn't want a union like his.

Q: Uh-huh. Why do you think he remained so popular at the Rouge? I know that when they had their tenth anniversary--

R: Well the same thing was true in Flint. I think part of this was an effort by local politicians in Local 600 who wanted to latch onto John L. and to use the memory of his great struggle and his assistance during the CIO days. They used that as a political asset in their struggle against the new administration of the UAW, so they wanted to associate with him to serve their own local politics.

Q: Uh-huh.

R: That same thing happened in Flint, but it was very short-lived. John L. was very poorly advised to permit his name to be used in that kind of a petty factional way. He dropped it after a short time.

Q: After all the input that Local 174 had in organizing the Rouge, it finally comes out to be in the early years a pretty anti-Reuther local. Can you explain how that phenomenon developed?

R: Well, yes, there was the factional split and the Rouge had identified with the Addes group, and that allegiance at least among themselves within the Rouge plant remained strong enough to survive the national disintegration of the Addes caucus. So for some time after Addes and his supporters were defeated in the International union there remained this local coalition still loyal to the views which he held and still carrying on a sort of anti-International crusade. That's not unusual for local political reasons that are not very substantive. You have a coalition and a relationship persisting long after its national purposes have disintegrated. But I think despite that caucus conflict there Walter as a former Ford worker of many long years--I think six or eight years altogether at Highland Park and Rouge--had many personal contacts, and I think his success with the tool and die strike which reunified the UAW on a national basis and saved it from disintegration really. And then the great militant General Motors strike at the end of the war I think reestablished his credentials with the rank and file.

Q: Uh-huh.

R: After all, we don't elect presidents in the UAW by rank-and-file vote. It goes through convention delegates and convention delegates reflect policies of the local political leadership and whatever their political interests are reflects itself in the convention, but not what the feeling of members are towards top leadership in the union. I don't think there ever was a question about what the union workers themselves thought about Walter as a trade union leader. He became,

of course, extremely popular in latter years of his life with the Ford workers.

Q: Just a side question. You mentioned the difference between electing a president by referendum versus through the convention, which do you think is the more democratic method?

R: Well either one of them can be used to strengthen democracy and either one can be corrupted, neither one is a guarantee of genuine membership democracy. There are some unions that have had the referendum vote for many years and that are not an epitome of a democratic influence and control, and I refer to the mine workers and steel workers and the machinist union. The UAW I think with all of its shortcomings remains one of the most democratic unions in the whole history of the American trade union movement.

Q: Uh-huh.

R: And it has always had a delegate structure. On the other hand, there is a strong movement towards greater internal democracy inside the steel workers and inside the machinist union despite the fact that they have the referendum system. The Steelworkers in its initial years was almost a carbon copy of the United Mine Workers' structure and that's because of Lewis and Philip Murray who was the first president of the Steelworkers reflected the mine workers' tradition. But I think, it's missing the whole point to assume that if in a union like the UAW one were to advocate a referendum vote that in itself would guarantee a more democratic selection of national officers. It might not, it could lead to a greater influence by the public press in corporate America in the choice of who the officers of the union will

be. I can just imagine corporate America and the auto industry today and the public press saying, hey, it's in the interest of the whole nation to adopt the Japanese system. Let's have Saturn agreements all over the United States. It would be damn difficult to elect a president who stood against Saturn because our membership read the daily press and they listen to TV and we don't have a media means to challenge it.

Q: Do you think that would have been a real threat back in the forties and fifties or less so?

R: Oh, I think it would have been a great handicap back in those days. I think the delegate debates and we had debates then we have less of them today. When the delegate system was really committed to function, when debate and discussion was encouraged, I think the chances of testing leadership on the floor and getting a direct response from them other than through the mails is a much better way of implementing internal democracy.

Q: Okay, I have a few questions about the caucuses again.

R: Yes.

Q: At the Rouge they were called the Progressive and the Right-wing Caucus.

R: Yes.

Q: How important would say the ACTU was in the Right-wing Caucus?

R: I really can't speak to that from personal knowledge. I know that nationally the role of the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists was important but not decisive. It was a factor helping to strengthen the Reuther leadership if I may put that label on it. Whether it was a

greater factor in the Rouge than it was nationwide I cannot speak to that with accurate information. Since, however, there was a very high percentage of ethnics in the Rouge, one could draw the conclusion perhaps that publications over the name of prominent Catholic trade unionists may have had a greater influence in the Rouge than was true nationally in the efforts of the two competing caucuses.

Q: And are you speaking of Polish workers or Irish Catholic?

R: Well, Polish, Italian, oh I think probably the ethnic groups were more under the influence of Catholicism than were other groups.

Q: It seems like most of the Italians in the Rouge, from what I could gather so far, were aligned with the Progressive Caucus.

R: You may be right. I really can't speak to that. That may reflect a personal loyalty to several people, Stellato and others who became rather prominent. These are always questions, you know, whether a sense of personal loyalty, political loyalty, inside outweighs the influence of church. I don't know, they were all competing elements. But if one could generalize I would conclude that because of the higher percentage of ethnics in the Rouge the ACTU may have had a greater influence in that campaign than was true in Chrysler or in General Motors.

Q: Okay, and how closely would you say the Rouge right-wing, their caucus, was aligned with the international caucus?

R: Well, here I don't think there was anyone from the International union who undertook a screeening process and said, now only those of you who we give our blessings to may join the administration caucus. I don't think the administration ever referred to its own caucus as a

right-wing caucus. That would have been incredible, of course, in view of the fact that we had just come through a strike, I mean a struggle in which the forces that became the international leadership were the true militant and progressive unionists against a much more right-wing and conservative group that suddenly blossoms out now as progressive. You see how misleading titles and words can be.

Q: Uh-huh.

R: They are misleading and any effort to pin Left and Right and Progressive and Right on the two caucuses at Rouge merely adds confusion to it. You had a pro-administration caucus and you had an anti-administration caucus and to put progressive labels on them is to add confusion to it. Now they may have put those labels on but that was deliberate of course.

Q: Yeah. In your book there's a quote about a report to the president after your brother was first elected, and it said that it had raised a stir in every shop and union hall and that at that moment you made intensive efforts to strengthen your caucus at the Rouge. You mention that it had been a Thomas Addes stronghold but was fair game for conversion, and you said that Emil Mazey, Ken Bannon and Jack Conway did magnificent work with the help of the personal contacts that Frank Winn had built up over the years. Can you explain exactly how you went about strengthening your caucus at the Rouge?

R: Well I think you're referring to the 500 planes a day if I'm not mistaken. This was a plan that Walter put forward to spark and stimulate defense production during the period when labor was deeply involved in Lend Lease to Great Britain, and there were the Addes

forces and his followers in River Rouge who were trying to block these kind of proposals and actually reduce military production. There were many instances where wildcat strikes were pulled in defense plants during that period. So it is fair to say that Walter's leadership and those who supported him were supporting Roosevelt's efforts towards Lend Lease. That was also an effort, of course, to convert huge plants like the Rouge from peacetime production to wartime production. We knew that an end would have to come to car production and what the hell do these workers do for jobs unless they are involved in defense work. So that a part of this whole struggle was to try to convince the Rouge workers and many others that their job future lay in this direction also.

Q: Uh-huh.

R: Walter dispatched his key lieutenants like Jack Conway and Ken Bannon and Emil Mazey who was a part of this, and Frank Winn who had done yeoman work handling publicity during the very early days of the Ford drive had numerous contacts inside the plant. He turned them loose to meet with small groups in every department in every building on every shift around the clock to bring this story to them so that the hand of those who supported Walter inside the plant, that their hand would be strengthened. You know, building meetings were called and people were lined up to hit the floor and discuss these issues so the fight was carried inside the Rouge plant by those who supported Walter. That's how any political organization functions and trade unions are political organizations.

Q: Do you think that that effort was successful at the Rouge?

R: Well I think it was moderately successful. I think it bore fruit in later years after Ken Bannon became National Director of Ford's it began to be successful. But here again I think Walter brought forward a number of plans that had a strong appeal for Ford workers: Bomber City which he sponsored and finally got government approval to build, the Willow Run plant. All of these kind of ideas which meant better housing, better protection during the war when people were thinking about rationing just about every damn thing and efforts had to be made to protect the interests of the wage earners and their wives during this period. Many thousands of new women workers were brought in. I remember when we hired Millie Jeffreys for the first time to come in and help organize the women. Lillian Hatcher, a black woman, was one of the early women on the staff who was brought forward.

Q: What years were they brought in?

R: Oh, they were brought in early in the war effort and their job was primarily to take note of all the new problems that were cropping up for the union with the enormous increase in the number of women workers and I think both of them made an enormous contribution during that period.

Q: What kind of impact do you think that the introduction of women in the plants had during World War II?

R: Impact in what regard? In terms of--

Q: In terms of union functions.

R: In terms of union strength?

Q: Yeah.

R: Oh, I think the women were very easily unionized. I have always felt from the very first days of the UAW when I got involved in organizing the Ternstedt plant which had a very large number of women workers on the westside of Detroit, the women were the easiest to unionize and were the most strong supporters of the solidarity concept. I think that's because while they may not have understood too much about economics, they knew what justice and the denial of it meant and they quickly saw in the union a force that was 1) fighting to get jobs for them and 2) insisting that they be treated with the same consideration as the men workers. I think the very fact that we moved quickly to get a staff that was sensitive to the women's needs made it very easy to unionize them. I think they brought a great strength to the union in--

END OF TAPE #1

VICTOR REUTHER INTERVIEW
September 13, 1986
Tape #2

Q: Okay, now I want to ask you a few questions about Carl Stellato.

R: Yes. I don't know too much about him personally, I hope I don't disappoint you in that regard because the nature of my responsibilities at that time didn't bring me into too much direct contact with him. One Ken Bannon who is still around, retired in Florida, would be a much better source of information for you.

Q: Yeah, I'm going to interview him tomorrow morning.

R: Oh great, all right, well he can give you much more valuable information than I about Carl Stellato as an individual and as a personality.

Q: Let me just ask you some general questions.

R: Yes.

Q: He came from Local 600 in the Motor Plant where he was known as being affiliated with the Progressive Caucus and he came--

R: He was known what?

Q: He was affiliated with the Progressive Caucus.

R: Progressive Caucus, yes.

Q: And he came to the International staff and worked under Percy Llewellyn, right?

R: Yes.

Q: Okay, when your brother gets elected in 1946 Llewellyn leaves the International and Stellato stays. Was this the point when he switched his affiliation to the Reuther caucus?

R: I really can't speak to that. I don't really know at what point Carl Stellato switched and to what degree it was a switch. I really think Ken Bannon or Jack Conway who is still around, I think either one of them could speak much more knowingly about that.

Q: Okay. How about--do you know anything about his campaign when he was first elected in 1950. He came from the International on the Reuther-backed slate and--

R: No, I don't know the details of that campaign, not really.

Q: Okay.

R: And I'm not really familiar with the notes going to your questions too about the actual administratorship of the local. I'm not that personally familiar with what the circumstances or the issues were at the time. I do know that the UAW has always moved very cautiously, appointing administratorships, we had in a strong constitutional convention which limits the time of administratorships may be in effect. All of this reflects a great fear and suspicion which early CIO unions had about some of the things that went on in the old mine worker and old AF of L locals where administrators were handpicked and remained in control for many years. But we were very sensitive and I think both factions in the UAW were very sensitive to that. It was very rare that the UAW resorted to putting administrators in charge of locals, but I think you'd best get the details of that from someone like from Ken.

Q: Uh-huh. Do you know the general sentiments around the administratorship over the Rouge?

R: No, I'm not really that familiar with it. I was given so many other assignments during that particular period that I was not privy to all that really went on.

Q: Okay.

R: And I don't want to mislead you by implying that I know when I don't.

Q: Okay, how about in 1952 when the House Un-American Activities Committee came to Detroit and it focused its investigation on Local 600? Do you recall that?

R: Not the details of it, but I know that throughout the history of the UAW and certainly throughout Walter's activities that I know, we never welcomed the House Un-American Activities Committee sticking their nose into any internal matters of the labor movement. We always looked upon them as the reactionary force they were. They were more interested in grabbing headlines and smearing people than they were in being helpful in getting out the facts. So we are not one to encourage the House Un-American Activities Committee.

Q: In the Wayne State archives I found a letter which was part--it was only the second half of the correspondence between your brother and Chairman Wood of the Committee. It was Wood's reply and he had said that your brother had requested to appear before the Committee but that he couldn't fit him in the schedule during the Detroit hearings but he could schedule him in Washington. Do you know if he ever testified?

R: I don't know whether he did or not, but I know that when the McClellan Committee had its hearings underway Walter had to fight to get a hearing before them. They were constantly smearing the UAW by various

references to the Kohler strike and so on and Walter had to really raise hell and insist on a hearing. I don't think the House Un-American Activities Committee was ever anxious to have Walter Reuther be a witness because he would have been too effective in exposing them and what their anti-labor smear actions always led to.

Q: So that's the kind of thing that he would want to bring up at such a testimony.

R: Oh, I'm sure he would have been a hostile witness. He would have said, you know, the record of our union on dealing with the Communist issue doesn't need any assistance from the House Un-American Activities Committee. We are quite capable of dealing with that ourselves and don't welcome your sticking your nose into it. I think that would have been the general tenor of what he would have said had he been privileged to testify.

Q: Uh-huh. After the adminstratorship over Local 600, some of the people who were affiliated with the Progressive Caucus in Local 600 ended up, maybe one at a time, going over to the International staff. Can you explain or do you know anything about the process by which these prominent Progressives--meaning progressive in the Progressive Caucus--went over to work on the International staff which they had been criticizing for so many years?

R: Well some people wear the cloth, say, you can't criticize people that suddenly get religion. So I don't know, I can't speak for what was in the minds of some of these individuals who had been anti-International and suddenly came over but I can tell you this. It was a very firm principle that Walter held to over the years, that you must draw a

clear line between an enemy and an opponent. An enemy is one who is seeking to destroy you and it's all right to destroy him. An opponent is one who you seek to win over and I think one of the reasons why the UAW finally established teamwork in the leadership and solidarity in the ranks. One reason why the years of internal struggle and factionalism was ended is that Walter made a concerted effort to reach people who were salvageable, who were not bitter enders who wanted to continue a factional fight just for the sake of opposition. He tried to reach them and reason with them and win them over, and the fact that a Doug Fraser who was prominent in the Progressive Caucus became a lieutenant for Walter and successor to him as President; and the fact that a Dave Miller who was the opposition spokesman of the westside local to Walter was honored by the International union in having a building named after him, the fact that Dick (Richard) Leonard who was a member of the Executive Board and prominent in the Addes caucus was hired by Walter when Walter became President of the CIO as one of his lieutenants in Washington. I could give you chapter and verse of a long long list of people throughout the whole union. So if that happened in River Rouge, don't look for some mysterious reasons, some devious reasons, that was going on in the whole union. People were finding their way to make a continuing useful contribution and to get out of the business of just bitching and griping and they were encouraged to make that change. Now some may have done it just because they wanted a nicer job.

Q: Uh-huh.

R: You know human beings do react that way, maybe some people run for the Executive Board for that reason. So the reasons why each individual did this will vary with each one. But don't look for some devious thing because it was very open, it was going on through the whole union, in General Motors, in Chrysler, in the Parts plants, in Aerospace, in (?) throughout the whole union. It wasn't peculiar to River Rouge.

Q: Do you think that there is a place for union factionalism in that it creates a--

R: I don't think there's any place for union factionalism, I think there is a place and an urgent need for a democratic opposition. I think it is a sad day for labor, when the administration of any union tries to stiffle democratic debate and discussion.

Q: Are you including caucuses in that?

R: I am including caucuses, I am indeed.

Q: So you think that the caucus system is a good structure by which to--

R: I think it's okay if it deals with issues and not just supporting people to give them jobs. When caucuses no longer are identified with issues but are only identified with keeping people on our side in office, then they no longer serve their purpose, then they become destructive. I think at a time when trade union leadership throughout the whole U.S., including the leadership of the AFL-CIO, thinks it's okay to publicly criticize Ronald Reagan and I agree with them, he deserves it, but cannot tolerate criticism of themselves and their own trade union action by members, then that's a sad day and it's a sign that internal union democracy is being trappled on and that's

happening today inside the UAW. That's why I've spoken out so often in recent months. I'm not going out to organize a progressive caucus though.

Q: Do you hope somebody else does?

R: I hope there will be a lot of voices calling attention to these shortcomings, whether it's done in the form of a caucus or not I don't know. But one way or the other those voices should be heard.

Q: Back in--I'm not sure what year this was--the anti-Reuther caucus, I don't know what to call them, at the international level suggested the idea of electing a black position to the International Executive Board and you opposed that idea. Are you familiar with what I'm talking about?

R: Yes.

Q: Can you explain why you opposed it?

R: Yeah, because I thought it sort of belittled the black membership by just selecting someone as a token representative of the black community. I think the point was made at that time that there would be others who would say that we ought to have a token woman or so and maybe a Pole or an Italian. I think if you really believe in giving all elements in the union a representation that is appropriate and if they can't win it based upon their own minority's strength in the union, and the blacks could not have won it unless there was an acceptance of their right to leadership, that educational effort must precede a political decision to put forward a slate that is truly representative of the membership composition. And as soon as circumstances permitted that in the UAW that is precisely what was

done and it wasn't done on a token basis. It was done on the basis that there had been sufficient educational work done to get the majority membership in the union to recognize the fact that you could only have teamwork in the union, you only be a truly representative union if the minority groups in the union were properly represented. Now what constitutes proper representation? The democratic process eventually takes care of that once the principle is dealt with and the principle could only be dealt with, properly so it wasn't tokenism after sufficient educational work had been done.

Q: Uh-huh.

R: And I will say this, while sometimes the caucuses of the UAW on both sides, both caucuses, wanted to use the racial situation to prove that they were the ones who were the strongest in supporting the blacks, the truth of the matter is that neither caucus could move faster than the educational work in the union permitted it and, secondly, we were damn fortunate in the UAW that both caucuses always advocated representation for blacks and for women--both caucuses always did. They may have differed on making it a part of the constitution before the educational work was done. And I don't think any black person or any woman would like the idea of being designated as the official <u>black</u> vice-president or the official <u>woman</u> vice-president. They want to be a vice-president.

Q: Yeah.

R: We didn't want it handled the way the Communists had suggested it. I think the Communists deliberately sought to proselytize the blacks on the basis, hey, look, we'll get you a vice-president. We didn't want

to do it that way, and we finally did it on the basis, if we elected x number of vice-presidents and among them was a black and among them was a woman. The number of blacks have grown now in recent years and I hope the number of women have grown in leadership.

Q: Way back in the forties the blacks were elected to positions in the Ford local before I think that they were elected elsewhere. Do you think that was because of the large numbers of blacks or more education going on?

R: Oh, I think it was because of the far larger number of blacks in the Rouge. No political grouping in the local could claim to speak for the membership once we had a sizable number of blacks that were prominent. I think numerically this was a must. Naturally every caucus that was organized in the Rouge had to be sensitive to the large groups of blacks, but we were sensitive to that from the very first stage when 174 started organizing ...(?)

Q: I've heard that, some of the people that I interviewed in Detroit mentioned that they had elected a black on their slate not necessarily as the black position, but just in order to show that they supported the election of blacks since especially their numbers were large in the Rouge.

R: Yeah, well, that's part of the democratic process of education too. You don't elect them just because they're blacks but you make them a part of the slate and they win, fine, then you build an acceptance of that. When you realize that we came out of an atmosphere in Detroit of race riots, no group contributed more to an easing of the relationship between races than the UAW and I credit both caucuses for

that. You know I am delighted that the black issue was never made a real factional issue.

Q: Are you familiar with the subject of the decentralization of the Ford Motor Company which started probably right in the postwar period but came to a head in 1951?

R: Not really, not really, I was not that involved.

Q: Okay, just there was a suit by the local that fell through.

R: Yeah.

Q: Okay.

R: I really don't know, but I know that the change in structure did have profound effects on the trade union, who represents what department in what building and so on, but I can't speak about that.

Q: Okay, the next subject. I came across a letter in the Wayne State archives from you at your CIO office in France as a European representative to the CIO to your brother, and it included or it enclosed a digest of information compiled from intercepted reports from various U.S. Communist trade unionists to their contacts abroad. You mentioned in the letter that you had been sending such information to Joe Curran but since there was a reference in this particular piece to Bill Hood of Local 600 you thought it would be of interest to him. You said that the source of the information was absolutely authentic and that you hoped your contacts would develop a good deal more useful information. That was dated October 1951. Did you feel that the Communists at this point were still a threat in the CIO?

R: In some unions, yes, but I was much more concerned about what the Communists were then doing in Europe to sabotage the European

recovery. I was over there to help the reestablishment of free trade unions in various European countries, unions that had been taken over either by the Nazis or completely destroyed during war years of occupation. This was the time when the organized Communist Party and their influence in the French CGT was being used to flood the mines, to sabotage mining, and were using strong arm tactics to prevent the loading of U.S. supplies in Marseilles that were crucial to the European recovery.

Q: So most of this type of information was centered around maritime trade?

R: Well maritime unions were a very key group, the whole field of transport was one in which the Communists in various countries in Europe had an unusual degree of influence, disproportionate to their influence in the trade union movement at large. They were using their transport contacts to wreck havoc on the European recovery. The free trade unions in Europe were interested in recovery, in eating again, living in homes that were decent housing again, and we were there to help them. To the extent to which some elements in various CIO unions and I was a representative of the CIO in Europe at the time, to the extent that false reports were coming from some segments of U.S. labor encouraging this kind of activity in Europe, was a matter of deep concern to me and hence it was very much my responsibility to try to keep the CIO unions here informed as to what was going in.

Q: Uh-huh. That was much too early for the CIA connection and their involvement with the labor unions over there wasn't it?

R: Well it was certainly too early as far as my own understanding was concerned. I didn't become aware of the extent to which the CIA was involved in these operations until later in my stay in Europe and when I did I lost no time in making it known.

Q: So you became aware of that in the mid-1950s?

R: I became aware of that in 1952 and I so reported to the officials in the International CIO. On one visit back home I had an interview with a certain Mr. Bernstein of the Los Angeles Times, that's the elder one, Henry, I think is his name or Harry, in which I told the story of Irving Brown and Jay Lovestone's involvement with the Central Intelligence Agency, that I considered this an effort to corrupt the trade union in Western Europe and in the process corrupting U.S. interests.

Q: You said you had a meeting with the CIO heads when you came back?

R: Yes, what was their response to this?

Q: Well some acted terribly surprised and others I think didn't want to know about it.

Q: And nobody wanted to reveal it.

R: Well I wasn't asking them to reveal it. As a matter of fact, I didn't set out to play that role myself. When one lives a number of years in Europe and what may be a deep dark secret stateside and something that everyone is talking about very openly in Europe, it is very easy when you come home and have a press conference and are asked questions and you respond in the light of what is an open secret to you. That came as a great shock, of course, to many in the United States but it was an old story in Europe.

Q: What was the attitude of the European unions to the CIO and CIA involvement? Were they welcoming any support or did they feel bad about accepting such monies?

R: Well obviously you had a mixed reaction. There were some unions that were recipients of this largess who didn't want to talk about it, didn't want to admit to it. But the responsible heads of most trade union federations and most international secretariats which were the key groups, like the International Transport, the International Metal Workers, the International Chemical Workers and so on, I think they had been aware of it and welcomed this kind of expose of it because it made their efforts to resist that kind of penetration easier. Because I think 98 percent of the trade union leadership at the European level were aghast at this intrusion by government into the trade union movement.

Q: Yeah, okay, I just have more question I forgot to ask you, going back again to World War II, and you mentioned that you were active in the revolt against the no-strike pledge. At the Rouge, Larry Yost was one of the leaders that was in that revolt against the no-strike pledge, did you cooperate with him in that effort?

R: I don't recall the name. I don't know what you mean by revolt against the no-strike pledge. Once the war was on I had no hesitancy about supporting the no-strike pledge and we held to that throughout the war. I don't know what controversy you are referring to specifically and what the date of it is.

Q: Well I think it was in the 1943 and '44 conventions if I'm not mistaken where there was a huge debate over whether the pledge should be continued.

R: I think once the war began unravelling there was, of course, a real clamor to get out from under the no-strike pledge because there had been such an accumulation of complaints during the war, and we were looking for an opportunity to settle those and we took the first opportunity. But I don't think as long as the war itself was on, there was any serious question of--there may have been some complaints that at a time we were abiding by a no-strike pledge, the employers were taking advantage of it and so on, but I don't recall that I openly campaigned for giving up the no-strike pledge while the war was in progress. But I may be confused on that. I would have to have a chance to look at my correspondence and notes.

Q: Uh-huh.

R: All right, well this has been a rather long conversation and you've got quite a telephone bill.

Q: Yeah, well, it's cheaper than the air flight though.

R: Yes, indeed, of course it is.

Q: I appreciate your participation, it was a good interview I think.

R: Well I hope it will be helpful to you and I trust that you recognize that I'm trying to respond in a very open way and an honest way.

Q: No, I think that you did a real good job.

R: Yeah, because I have nothing to hide and I have no desire to rewrite history. There it is for all to see and I'm delighted that you are interested in writing about that period. All right.

Q: Would you like a copy of the transcript yourself?

R: Yes, I would like that very much, yes. If it's easier for you to just send me a copy of the tape I do have a tape recorder, but if you'd prefer to just send a copy of the transcript when it's typed, whichever you choose.

Q: I could do both or either one. It will be transcribed so--

R: Well if you can get a copy of the tape to me, I think that will be the easiest for you and I'd like a copy of the actual tape for the Wayne State archives.

Q: All right, I'll send that over to them directly.

R: All right, fine.

Q: Okay, thanks again.

R: Right, bye-bye.

Q: Bye.

END OF INTERVIEW