

DETROIT REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT RECORDS

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The Russian working class is able to wage its economic and political struggle alone, even if no other class comes to its aid. But in the political struggle the workers do not stand alone. The people's complete lack of rights and the savage lawlessness of the bashi-bazouk officials rouse the indignation of all honest educated people who cannot reconcile themselves to the persecution of free thought and free speech; they rouse the indignation of the persecuted Poles, Finns, Jews, and Russian religious sects; they rouse the indignation of the small merchants, manufacturers, and peasants, who can nowhere find protection from the persecution of officials and police. All these groups of the population are incapable, separately, of carrying on a persistent political struggle. But when the working class raises the banner of this struggle, it will receive support from all sides. Russian Social-Democracy will place itself at the head of all fighters for the rights of the people, of all fighters for democracy, and it will prove invincible!

These are our fundamental views, and we shall develop them systematically and from every aspect in our paper. We are convinced that in this way we shall tread the path which has been indicated by the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in its published *Manifesto*.

OUR IMMEDIATE TASK

The Russian working-class movement is today going through a period of transition. The splendid beginning achieved by the Social-Democratic workers' organisations in the Western area, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, and other cities was consummated by the formation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (spring 1898). Russian Social-Democracy seems to have exhausted, for the time being, all its strength in making this tremendous step forward and has gone back to the former isolated functioning of separate local organisations. The Party has not ceased to exist, it has only withdrawn into itself in order to gather strength and put the unification of all Russian Social-Democrats on a sound footing. To effect this unification, to evolve a suitable form for it and to get rid completely of narrow local isolation—such is the immediate and most urgent task of the Russian Social-Democrats.

We are all agreed that our task is that of the organisation of the proletarian class struggle. But what is this class struggle? When the workers of a single factory or of a single branch of industry engage in struggle against their employer or employers, is this class struggle? No, this is only a weak embryo of it. The struggle of the workers becomes a class struggle only when all the foremost representatives of the entire working class of the whole country are conscious of themselves as a single working class and launch a struggle that is directed, not against individual employers, but against the *entire class* of capitalists and against the government that supports that class. Only when the individual worker realises that he is a member

of the entire working class, only when he recognises the fact that his petty day-to-day struggle against individual employers and individual government officials is a struggle against the entire bourgeoisie and the entire government, does his struggle become a class struggle. "Every class struggle is a political struggle"⁹⁰—these famous words of Marx are not to be understood to mean that any struggle of workers against employers must *always be* a political struggle. They must be understood to mean that the struggle of the workers against the capitalists inevitably *becomes* a political struggle *insofar as* it becomes a class struggle. It is the task of the Social-Democrats, by organising the workers, by conducting propaganda and agitation among them, to turn their spontaneous struggle against their oppressors into the struggle of the whole class, into the struggle of a definite political party for definite political and socialist ideals. This is something that cannot be achieved by local activity alone.

Local Social-Democratic activity has attained a fairly high level in our country. The seeds of Social-Democratic ideas have been broadcast throughout Russia; workers' leaflets—the earliest form of Social-Democratic literature—are known to all Russian workers from St. Petersburg to Krasnoyarsk, from the Caucasus to the Urals. All that is now lacking is the unification of all this local work into the work of a single party. Our chief drawback, to the overcoming of which we must devote all our energy, is the narrow "amateurish" character of local work. Because of this amateurish character many manifestations of the working-class movement in Russia remain purely local events and lose a great deal of their significance as examples for the whole of Russian Social-Democracy, as a stage of the whole Russian working-class movement. Because of this amateurishness, the consciousness of their community of interests throughout Russia is insufficiently inculcated in the workers, they do not link up their struggle sufficiently with the idea of Russian socialism and Russian democracy. Because of this amateurishness the comrades' varying views on theoretical and practical problems are not openly discussed in a central newspaper, they do not serve the purpose of elaborating a common programme and devising common tactics for the Party, they are lost in narrow study-circle life or they lead

to the inordinate exaggeration of local and chance peculiarities. Enough of our amateurishness! We have attained sufficient maturity to go over to *common action*, to the elaboration of a common Party programme, to the joint discussion of our Party tactics and organisation.

Russian Social-Democracy has done a great deal in criticising old revolutionary and socialist theories; it has not limited itself to criticism and theorising alone; it has shown that its programme is not hanging in the air but is meeting the extensive spontaneous movement among the people, that is, among the factory proletariat. It has now to make the following, very difficult, but very important, step—to elaborate an organisation of the movement adapted to our conditions. Social-Democracy is not confined to simple service to the working-class movement: it represents "*the combination of socialism and the working-class movement*" (to use Karl Kautsky's definition which repeats the basic ideas of the *Communist Manifesto*); the task of Social-Democracy is to bring definite socialist ideals to the spontaneous working-class movement, to connect this movement with socialist convictions that should attain the level of contemporary science, to connect it with the regular political struggle for democracy as a means of achieving socialism—in a word, to fuse this spontaneous movement into one indestructible whole with the activity of the revolutionary party. The history of socialism and democracy in Western Europe, the history of the Russian revolutionary movement, the experience of our working-class movement—such is the material we must master to elaborate a purposeful organisation and purposeful tactics for our Party. "The analysis" of this material must, however, be done independently, since there are no ready-made models to be found anywhere. On the one hand, the Russian working-class movement exists under conditions that are quite different from those of Western Europe. It would be most dangerous to have any illusions on this score. On the other hand, Russian Social-Democracy differs very substantially from former revolutionary parties in Russia, so that the necessity of learning revolutionary technique and secret organisation from the old Russian masters (we do not in the least hesitate to admit this necessity) does not in any way relieve

us of the duty of assessing them critically and elaborating our own organisation independently.

In the presentation of such a task there are two main questions that come to the fore with particular insistence: 1) How is the need for the complete liberty of local Social-Democratic activity to be combined with the need for establishing a single—and, consequently, a centralist—party? Social-Democracy draws its strength from the spontaneous working-class movement that manifests itself differently and at different times in the various industrial centres; the activity of the local Social-Democratic organisations is the *basis* of all Party activity. If, however, this is to be the activity of isolated “amateurs,” then it cannot, strictly speaking, be called Social-Democratic, since it will not be the organisation and leadership of the *class* struggle of the proletariat. 2) How can we combine the striving of Social-Democracy to become a revolutionary party that makes the struggle for political liberty its chief purpose with the determined refusal of Social-Democracy to organise political conspiracies, its emphatic refusal to “call the workers to the barricades” (as correctly noted by P. B. Axelrod), or, in general, to impose on the workers this or that “plan” for an attack on the government, which has been thought up by a company of revolutionaries?

Russian Social-Democracy has every right to believe that it has provided the *theoretical* solution to these questions; to dwell on this would mean to repeat what has been said in the article, “Our Programme.” It is now a matter of the *practical* solution to these questions. This is not a solution that can be made by a single person or a single group; it can be provided only by the organised activity of Social-Democracy as a whole. We believe that the most urgent task of the moment consists in undertaking the solution of these questions, for which purpose we must have as our immediate aim *the founding of a Party organ that will appear regularly and be closely connected with all the local groups*. We believe that *all* the activity of the Social-Democrats should be directed to this end throughout the whole of the forthcoming period. Without such an organ, local work will remain narrowly “amateurish.” The formation of the Party—if the correct representation of that Party in a

certain newspaper is not organised—will to a considerable extent remain bare words. An economic struggle that is not united by a central organ cannot become the *class struggle* of the entire Russian proletariat. It is impossible to conduct a political struggle if the Party as a whole fails to make statements on all questions of policy and to give direction to the various manifestations of the struggle. The organisation and disciplining of the revolutionary forces and the development of revolutionary technique are impossible without the discussion of all these questions in a central organ, without the collective elaboration of certain *forms and rules for the conduct of affairs*, without the establishment—through the central organ—of every Party member's *responsibility* to the entire Party.

In speaking of the necessity to concentrate *all* Party forces—all literary forces, all organisational abilities, all material resources, etc.—on the foundation and correct conduct of the organ of the whole Party, we do not for a moment think of pushing other forms of activity into the background—e.g., local agitation, demonstrations, boycott, the persecution of spies, the bitter campaigns against individual representatives of the bourgeoisie and the government, protest strikes, etc., etc. On the contrary, we are convinced that all these forms of activity constitute the basis of the Party's activity, but, without their unification through an organ of the whole Party, these forms of revolutionary struggle lose nine-tenths of their significance; they do not lead to the creation of common Party experience, to the creation of Party traditions and continuity. The Party organ, far from competing with such activity, will exercise tremendous influence on its extension, consolidation, and systematisation.

The necessity to concentrate *all* forces on establishing a regularly appearing and regularly delivered organ arises out of the peculiar situation of Russian Social-Democracy as compared with that of Social-Democracy in other European countries and with that of the old Russian revolutionary parties. Apart from newspapers, the workers of Germany, France, etc., have numerous other means for the public manifestation of their activity, for organising the movement—parliamentary activity, election agitation, public meetings,

participation in local public bodies (rural and urban), the open conduct of trade unions (professional, guild), etc., etc. *In place of all of that, yes, all of that, we must be served—until we have won political liberty—by a revolutionary newspaper, without which no broad organisation of the entire working-class movement is possible. We do not believe in conspiracies, we renounce individual revolutionary ventures to destroy the government; the words of Liebknecht, veteran of German Social-Democracy, serve as the watchword of our activities: "Studieren, propagandieren, organisieren"—Learn, propagandise, organise—and the pivot of this activity can and must be only the organ of the Party.*

But is the regular and more or less stable establishment of such an organ possible, and under what circumstances is it possible? We shall deal with this matter next time.

AN URGENT QUESTION

In the previous article we said that our immediate task is to establish a Party organ, one that appears and can be delivered regularly, and we raised the question of whether and under what circumstances it is possible to achieve this aim. Let us examine the more important aspects of this question.

The main objection that may be raised is that the achievement of this purpose *first* requires the development of local group activity. We consider this fairly widespread opinion to be fallacious. We can and must immediately set about founding the Party organ—and, it follows, the Party itself—and putting them on a sound footing. The conditions essential to such a step already exist: local Party work is being carried on and obviously has struck deep roots; for the destructive police attacks that are growing more frequent lead to only short interruptions; fresh forces rapidly replace those that have fallen in battle. The Party has resources for publishing and literary forces, not only abroad, but in Russia as well. The question, therefore, is whether the work *that is already being conducted* should be continued in "amateur" fashion or whether it should be organised into the work of one party and in such a way that it is reflected in its entirety in one common organ.

Here we come to the most urgent question of our movement, to its sore point—organisation. The improvement of revolutionary organisation and discipline, the perfection of our underground technique are an absolute necessity. We must openly admit that in this respect we are lagging behind

tively and sometimes negatively. But as a definite sphere in the division of labour, the philosophy of every epoch presupposes certain definite thought material handed down to it by its predecessors, from which it takes its start. And that is why economically backward countries can still play first fiddle in philosophy: France in the eighteenth century as compared with England, on whose philosophy the French based themselves, and later Germany as compared with both. But in France as well as Germany philosophy and the general blossoming of literature at that time were the result of a rising economic development. I consider the ultimate supremacy of economic development established in these spheres too, but it comes to pass within the limitations imposed by the particular sphere itself: in philosophy, for instance, by the operation of economic influences (which again generally act only under political, etc., disguises) upon the existing philosophic material handed down by predecessors. Here economy creates nothing anew, but it determines the way in which the thought material found in existence is altered and further developed, and that too for the most part indirectly, for it is the political, legal and moral reflexes which exert the greatest direct influence on philosophy.

About religion I have said what was most necessary in the last section on Feuerbach.*

If therefore Barth supposes that we deny any and every reaction of the political, etc., reflexes of the economic movement upon the movement itself, he is simply tilting at windmills. He has only got to look at Marx's *Eighteenth Brumaire*,** which deals almost exclusively with the particular part played by political struggles and events, of course within their general dependence upon economic conditions. Or *Capital*, the section on the working day,***, for instance, where legislation, which is surely a political act, has such a trenchant effect. Or the section on the history of the bourgeoisie. (Chapter XXIV.****) Or why do we fight for the political dictatorship of the proletariat if political power is economically impotent? Force (that is, state power) is also an economic power!

But I have no time to criticise the book²⁹³ now. I must first get Volume III**** out and besides I think that Bernstein, for instance, could deal with it quite effectively.

* See pp. 372-75 of this volume.—Ed.

** See present edition, Vol. 1, pp. 398-487.—Ed.

*** K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1955, pp. 231-302.—Ed.

**** See present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 109-45.—Ed.

***** Of *Capital*.—Ed.

What these gentlemen all lack is dialectics. They always see only here cause, there effect. That this is a hollow abstraction, that such metaphysical polar opposites exist in the real world only during crises, while the whole vast process goes on in the form of interaction—though of very unequal forces, the economic movement being by far the strongest, most primordial, most decisive—that here everything is relative and nothing absolute—this they never begin to see. As far as they are concerned Hegel never existed....

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ENGELS TO F. MEHRING IN BERLIN

London, July 14, 1893

Dear Herr Mehring,

Today is my first opportunity to thank you for the *Lessing Legend* you were kind enough to send me. I did not want to reply with a bare formal acknowledgement of receipt of the book but intended at the same time to tell you something about it, about its contents. Hence the delay.

I shall begin at the end—the appendix on historical materialism,²⁹⁶ in which you have lined up the main things excellently and for any unprejudiced person convincingly. If I find anything to object to it is that you give me more credit than I deserve, even if I count in everything which I might possibly have found out for myself—in time—but which Marx with his more rapid *coup d'œil* and wider vision discovered much more quickly. When one had the good fortune to work for forty years with a man like Marx, one usually does not during his lifetime get the recognition one thinks one deserves. Then, when the greater man dies, the lesser easily gets overrated and this seems to me to be just my case at present; history will set all this right in the end and by that time one will have quietly turned up one's toes and not know anything any more about anything.

Otherwise only one more point is lacking, which, however, Marx and I always failed to stress enough in our writings and in regard to which we are all equally guilty. That is to say, we all laid, and *were bound to lay*, the main emphasis, in the first place, on the *derivation* of political, juridical and other ideological notions and of actions arising through the medium of

these notions, from basic economic facts. But in so doing we neglected the formal side—the ways and means by which these notions, etc., come about—for the sake of the content. This has given our adversaries a welcome opportunity for misunderstandings and distortions, of which Paul Barth²⁹³ is a striking example.

Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, it is true, but with a false consciousness. The real motive forces impelling him remain unknown to him; otherwise it simply would not be an ideological process. Hence he imagines false or seeming motive forces. Because it is a process of thought he derives its form as well as its content from pure thought, either his own or that of his predecessors. He works with mere thought material, which he accepts without examination as the product of thought, and does not investigate further for a more remote source independent of thought; indeed this is a matter of course to him, because, as all action is mediated by thought, it appears to him to be ultimately based upon thought.

The historical ideologist (historical is here simply meant to comprise the political, juridical, philosophical, theological—in short, all the spheres belonging to *society* and not only to nature) thus possesses in every sphere of science material which has formed itself independently out of the thought of previous generations and has gone through its own independent course of development in the brains of these successive generations. True, external facts belonging to one or another sphere may have exercised a codetermining influence on this development, but the tacit presupposition is that these facts themselves are also only the fruits of a process of thought, and so we still remain within that realm of mere thought, which apparently has successfully digested even the hardest facts.

It is above all this semblance of an independent history of state constitutions, of systems of law, of ideological conceptions in every separate domain that dazzles most people. If Luther and Calvin "overcome" the official Catholic religion or Hegel "overcomes" Fichte and Kant or Rousseau with his republican *Contrat social* indirectly "overcomes" the constitutional Montesquieu, this is a process which remains within theology, philosophy or political science, represents a stage in the history of these particular spheres of thought and never passes beyond the sphere of thought. And since the bourgeois illusion of the eternity and finality of capitalist production has been added as well, even the overcoming of the mercantilists by the physiocrats and Adam Smith is accounted as a sheer victory of thought; not as the reflection in thought of changed economic facts but as the only achieved correct understanding of actual conditions sub-

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sisting always and everywhere—in fact, if Richard Cœur-de-Lion and Philip Augustus had introduced free trade instead of getting mixed up in the crusades we should have been spared five hundred years of misery and stupidity.

This aspect of the matter, which I can only indicate here, we have all, I think, neglected more than it deserves. It is the old story: form is always neglected at first for content. As I say, I have done that too and the mistake has always struck me only later. So I am not only far from reproaching you with this in any way—as the older of the guilty parties I certainly have no right to do so; on the contrary. But I would like all the same to draw your attention to this point for the future.

Hanging together with this is the fatuous notion of the ideologists that because we deny an independent historical development to the various ideological spheres which play a part in history we also deny them any *effect upon history*. The basis of this is the common undialectical conception of cause and effect as rigidly opposite poles, the total disregarding of interaction. These gentlemen often almost deliberately forget that once an historic element has been brought into the world by other, ultimately economic causes, it reacts, can react on its environment and even on the causes that have given rise to it. For instance, Barth on the priesthood and religion, your page 475. I was very glad to see how you settled this fellow, whose banality exceeds all expectations; and him they make professor of history in Leipzig! I must say that old man Wachsmuth—also rather a bonehead but greatly appreciative of facts—was quite a different chap.

As for the rest, I can only repeat about the book what I repeatedly said about the articles when they appeared in the *Neue Zeit*²¹: it is by far the best presentation in existence of the genesis of the Prussian state. Indeed, I may well say that it is the only good presentation, correctly developing in most matters their interconnections down to the veriest details. One regrets only that you were unable to include the entire further development down to Bismarck and one hopes involuntarily that you will do this another time and present a complete coherent picture, from the Elector Frederick William down to old William.* You have already made your preliminary investigations and, in the main at least, they are as good as finished. The thing has to be done sometime anyhow before the shaky old shanty comes tumbling down. The dissipation of the monarchical-patriotic legends, while not directly a necessary preliminary for the abo-

* Wilhelm I.—Ed.

lition of the monarchy which screens class domination (inasmuch as a *pure*, bourgeois republic in Germany was outstripped by events before it came into existence), will nevertheless be one of the most effective levers for that purpose.

Then you will have more space and opportunity to depict the local history of Prussia as part of the general misery that Germany has gone through. This is the point where I occasionally depart somewhat from your view, especially in the conception of the preliminary conditions for the dismemberment of Germany and of the failure of the bourgeois revolution in Germany during the sixteenth century. When I get down to reworking the historical introduction to my *Peasant War*, which I hope will be next winter, I shall be able to develop there the points in question. Not that I consider those you indicated incorrect, but I put others alongside them and group them somewhat differently.

In studying German history—the story of a continuous state of wretchedness—I have always found that only a comparison with the corresponding French periods produces a correct idea of proportions, because what happens there is the direct opposite of what happens in our country. There, the establishment of a national state from the scattered parts of the feudal state precisely at the time we pass through the period of our greatest decline. There, a rare objective logic during the whole course of the process; with us, more and more dismal dislocation. There, during the Middle Ages, foreign intervention is represented by the English conqueror who intervenes in favour of the Provençal nationality against the Northern French nationality. The wars with England represent, in a way, the Thirty Years' War,²⁰⁷ which, however, ends in the ejection of the foreign invaders and the subjugation of the South by the North. Then comes the struggle between the central power and vassal Burgundy, supported by its foreign possessions, which plays the part of Brandenburg-Prussia, a struggle which ends, however, in the victory of the central power and conclusively establishes the national state. And precisely at that moment the national state completely collapses in our country (in so far as the "German kingdom" within the Holy Roman Empire¹⁸² can be called a national state) and the plundering of German territory on a large scale sets in. This comparison is most humiliating for Germans but for that very reason the more instructive; and since our workers have put Germany back again in the forefront of the historical movement it has become somewhat easier for us to swallow the ignominy of the past.

Another especially significant feature of the development of Germany is the fact that neither of the partial states which in

the end partitioned Germany between them was purely German—both were colonies on conquered Slav territory: Austria a Bavarian and Brandenburg a Saxon colony—and that they acquired power *within* Germany only by relying upon the support of foreign, non-German possessions: Austria upon that of Hungary (not to mention Bohemia) and Brandenburg that of Prussia. On the Western border, the one in greatest jeopardy, nothing of the kind took place; on the Northern border it was left to the Danes to protect Germany against the Danes; and in the South there was so little to protect that the frontier guard, the Swiss, even succeeded in tearing themselves loose from Germany!

But I have allowed myself to drift into all kinds of extraneous matter. Let this palaver at least serve you as proof of how stimulating an effect your work has upon me.

Once more cordial thanks and greetings from

Yours,
F. Engels

First published in abridged form in the book: F. Mehring. *Geschichte der Deutschen Sozialdemokratie*, Bd. III, Th. II, Stuttgart, 1898, and in full in Russian in the *Works of Marx and Engels*, first edition, Vol. XXIX, 1946

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ENGELS TO N. F. DANIELSON IN ST. PETERSBURG

London, October 17, 1893

...Many thanks for the copies of the *Очерки*²⁹⁷—three of which I have forwarded to appreciative friends. The book, I am glad to see, has caused considerable stir and indeed sensation, as it well merited. Among the Russians I have met, it was the chief subject of conversation. Only yesterday one of them^{*} writes: у нас на Руси идет спор о "судьбах капитализма в России."^{***} In the Berlin *Sozialpolitisches Centralblatt*^{***} a Mr. P. v. Struve has a long article on your book; I must agree with him in this one point, that for me, too, the present capitalistic phase of development in Russia appears an unavoidable consequence

^{*} Goldenberg.—Ed.

^{**} We have an argument going on about the destiny of Capitalism in Russia.—Ed.

^{***} Third year of publication, No. 1, October 1, 1893.²⁹⁸ [Note by Engels.—Ed.]

> POLITICAL AGITATION AND "THE CLASS POINT-OF-VIEW"

We shall commence with an illustration.

The reader will probably remember the sensation that was caused by the lecture delivered by M. A. Stakhovich, the marshal of the nobility of the province of Oryol, at a missionary congress in the course of which he urged that *liberty of conscience* be recognised by law. The conservative press led by *Moskovskiye Vyedomosti* is conducting a furious campaign against Mr. Stakhovich. It cannot find names bad enough to call him, and almost goes so far as to charge all the nobility of Oryol with high treason for having re-elected Mr. Stakhovich as their marshal. Now, this re-election is indeed very significant and to a certain degree bears the character of a demonstration of the nobility against police tyranny and outrage.

Stakhovich, says *Moskovskiye Vyedomosti*, "is known not so much as marshal of nobility, but as jolly Misha Stakhovich,* the soul of good company who possesses the gift of the gab. . . ." [1901, No. 348.] ¹⁴⁰ The worse for you, gentlemen, you champions of the big stick. If even your jolly landlords begin to talk about liberty of conscience, then the despicable conduct of the priests and the police must indeed have exceeded all bounds. . . . "What concern has the 'intellectual,' frivolous crowd that instigates and applauds the Stakhoviches, for the affairs of our sacred orthodox faith and our time-honoured attitude towards it?" . . . Once again: All the worse for you, gentlemen, champions of the autocracy, of the orthodox faith and of nationalism. A fine system our police-ridden autocracy must be indeed, if it has permeated even religion with the spirit of the jail to such an extent that the "Stakhoviches" (who have no firm religious convictions, but who are interested, as we shall see, in preserving religion) become completely indifferent towards (if they do not actually hate) this notorious "national" faith! ". . . They call our faith a delusion!! They mock at us because, thanks to this 'delusion,' we fear and avoid sin and carry out our obligations uncomplainingly no matter how severe they may be; because we find the strength and courage to bear sorrow and priva-

* Misha—the diminutive for Michael.—Ed.

tions, and forebear pride during success and good fortune. . . ." So this is what it is, is it?! The orthodox faith is so dear to them because it teaches to bear misfortune "uncomplainingly"! What a profitable faith it is indeed for the governing classes! In a society so organised that an insignificant minority enjoys wealth and power, while the masses constantly suffer "deprivation" and bear "severe obligations," it is quite natural for the exploiters to sympathise with the religion that teaches "uncomplainingly" to bear the woes of hell on earth for the sake of an alleged celestial paradise. But in its zeal *Moskovskiy Vedomosti* becomes too garrulous. So garrulous in fact, that *unwittingly it spoke the truth*. Listen further: ". . . They do not realise that thanks to this 'delusion' they, the Stakhoviches, eat well, sleep peacefully, and live merrily."

This is the sacred truth! This is precisely the case. Precisely because religious "delusions" are so widespread among the masses of the people, that the Stakhoviches and the Oblomovs,* and all our capitalists who live by the labour of these masses, and even *Moskovskiy Vedomosti* itself, "sleep peacefully." And the more education spreads among the people, the more religious prejudices will give way to Socialist consciousness, the nearer will be the day of victory of the proletariat—the victory that will emancipate all oppressed classes from the slavery they endure in modern society.

But having blurted out the truth on one point *Moskovskiy Vedomosti* goes entirely off the mark on another interesting point. It is obviously mistaken in believing that the Stakhoviches "do not realise" the significance of religion, and that they demand liberal forms, simply because they are "frivolous." Such an explanation of the conduct of a hostile political tendency is too childish! The fact that, in this instance, Mr. Stakhovich came forward as the herald of a definite liberal tendency was proved best of all by *Moskovskiy Vedomosti* itself; otherwise, why did it raise such a campaign over a single lecture? And why did it speak, not about Stakhovich, but about the Stakhoviches, about the "intellectual crowd"?

Moskovskiy Vedomosti's error was, of course, deliberate. It no more desires than it is able to analyse the liberalism it hates, from the class point-of-view. That it does not desire to do so goes without saying; but its inability to do so interests us ever so much more, because this is a complaint that even very many revolutionists and Socialists suffer from. For example, the authors of the letter pub-

* The indolent hero of Goncharov's novel of the same name.—Ed.

ed in No. 12 of *Iskra* accusing us of departing from the "class point-of-view" because we, in our newspaper, strive to investigate all manifestations of liberal discontent and protest, suffer from this complaint; as also do the authors of *The Proletarian Struggle*¹⁵⁰ and of several pamphlets in *The Social-Democratic Library*,¹⁵¹ who imagine that our autocracy represents the autocratic rule of the bourgeoisie; and the Martynovs, who are trying to persuade us to abandon the universal exposure campaign (*i. e.*, the widest possible political agitation) against the autocracy, and to concentrate our efforts mainly upon the struggle for economic reforms (to give something "positive" to the working class, to put forward in its name "concrete demands" for legislative and administrative measures "which promise certain palpable results"); and the Nadezhdins who, on reading the correspondence in our paper about the statistical conflicts ask in astonishment: "Good lord, isn't this a Zemstvo organ?"¹⁵²—they all suffer from this complaint.

All the above-mentioned Socialists forget that the interests of the autocracy coincide only with certain interests of the propertied classes, and only under certain circumstances; frequently it happens that its interests do not coincide with these classes as a whole, but only with the interests of certain strata of them. The interests of other strata of the bourgeoisie, and the more widely understood interests of the whole of the bourgeoisie, of the development of capitalism as a whole, necessarily give rise to a liberal opposition against the autocracy. For example, while the autocracy guarantees to the bourgeoisie opportunities for employing the crudest forms of exploitation, it, on the other hand, places a thousand obstacles in the way of the wide development of productive forces and the spread of education, and by this, rouses against itself, not only the petty bourgeoisie, but also the big bourgeoisie. While the autocracy guarantees (?) the bourgeoisie protection against Socialism, this protection, however, in view of the disfranchisement of the people, is transformed into a system of police outrage that rouses the indignation of all and sundry. The results of these antagonistic tendencies, the relative strength of conservative and liberal views, or tendencies, among the bourgeoisie at the present moment, cannot be learned from a couple of general postulates; they are determined by all the special features of the present social and political situation. To be able to define them, one must study the situation in detail, and carefully watch all the conflicts that take place with the

government, no matter by what social strata they are initiated. It is precisely the "class point-of-view" that prevents a Social-Democrat from remaining indifferent to the dissatisfaction and protests of the "Stakhoviches."

The above-mentioned Socialists, by their reasoning and activity, show that they are indifferent to liberalism, and by that reveal their failure to understand the fundamental postulates of the *Communist Manifesto*, the "Bible" of International Social-Democracy. Recall what is said there about the bourgeoisie itself providing material for the political education of the proletariat by its struggle for power, by the conflicts of various strata and groups within it, etc.¹⁵³ Only in politically free countries has the proletariat easy access to this material (and then only to part of it). In slave-ridden Russia, however, we Social-Democrats must work hard to obtain this "material" for the working class, i. e., we must ourselves undertake the task of conducting general political agitation, of carrying on a public exposure campaign against the autocracy. And this task is particularly imperative in periods of political ferment. We must bear in mind that in one year of political animation, the proletariat can obtain more revolutionary training than in several years of political calm. That is why the tendency of the above-mentioned Socialists consciously or unconsciously to restrict the scope and content of political agitation is particularly harmful.

Recall also what is said in the *Communist Manifesto* about Communists supporting every revolutionary movement against the present system.¹⁵⁴ [Those words are often interpreted too narrowly, and are not taken to imply support for the liberal opposition.] It must not be forgotten, however, that periods come when every conflict with the government arising out of progressive public interests, no matter how small they may be, may, under certain conditions (and our support is one of these conditions) flare up into a general conflagration. It is sufficient to recall the great public movement which grew up in Russia out of the conflict between the students and the government over academic demands, or the conflict that arose in France between all the progressive elements and the militarists, over a trial in which the verdict was given on the basis of forged documents.¹⁵⁵ That is why it is our bounden duty to explain this to the proletariat, and to widen and support, with the active participation of the workers, every liberal and democratic protest, no matter what it is connected with: Whether these be

conflicts between the Zemstvo and the Ministry of the Interior, between the nobility and the police-ecclesiastical authorities, or between the statisticians and the bureaucrats, between the peasants and the Zemstvo chiefs, between the religious sects and the rural police, etc., etc. Those who contemptuously turn up their noses at the pettiness of some of these conflicts, or at the "hopelessness" of the attempts to fan these into a general conflagration, forget that universal political agitation is a focus in which the immediate interests of political education of the proletariat coincide with the immediate interests of social development as a whole, of the development of the whole of the people, that is to say, of all the democratic elements of the people. It is our bounden duty to intervene in every liberal problem, to define our, Social-Democratic, attitude towards it, to take measures to secure that the proletariat takes an active part in the solution of this problem, and to compel it to solve it in its own, proletarian way. Those who refrain from intervening in this way (no matter what intentions they have for doing so) leave the liberals in command, place in their hands the task of politically training the workers, and concede the hegemony in the political struggle to elements which, in the final analysis, are leaders of bourgeois democracy.

Every aspect of liberation

[The class character of the Social-Democratic movement must not be expressed by restricting our tasks to the direct and immediate needs of the "purely labour" movement.] It must be expressed in our leadership of every aspect and every manifestation of the great struggle for liberation that is being conducted by the proletariat, the only genuinely revolutionary class in modern society. Social-Democracy must constantly and unswervingly spread the influence of the labour movement to all spheres of public and political life of modern society. It must not only lead the economic struggle of the workers, but also the political struggle of the proletariat. It must never for a moment lose sight of our ultimate goal and always carry on propaganda for, protect from distortion and develop further, the proletarian ideology—the theories of scientific Socialism, i. e., Marxism. We must untiringly combat all bourgeois ideology, no matter what fashionable and striking garb it may wear. The Socialists we have mentioned above retreat from the "class" point of view also because and to the extent that they remain indifferent to the task of combating "criticism of Marxism." Only the blind can fail to see that this "criticism" has taken root more

rapidly in Russia than in any other country, and has been more enthusiastically taken up by Russian liberal publicists than by any other, precisely because it is one of the elements of the bourgeois (and now consciously bourgeois) democracy that is growing up in Russia.

It is particularly in regard to the political struggle that the "class point-of-view" demands that the proletariat shall push on every democratic movement. <The political demands of working-class democracy do not differ in principle from bourgeois democracy, they differ only in degree.> In the struggle for economic emancipation, for the social revolution, the proletariat stands on a different basis of principles from that upon which the bourgeoisie stands, and it stands on that basis by itself (the small producer will come to the aid of the proletariat only to the extent that he comes over, or is preparing to come over to the ranks of the proletariat). In the struggle for political liberation, however, we have many allies towards whom we simply cannot remain indifferent. But while, in fighting for liberal reforms, our allies in the camp of bourgeois democracy will always glance behind, and try to arrange things so that they may be able to continue as before "to eat well, sleep peacefully, and live merrily" at other people's expense, the proletariat will march forward to the end, without looking back. While the confrères of R. N. S. (the author of the preface to Witte's Memorandum) haggle with the government over the rights of the Zemstvo, or over a constitution, we shall fight for a democratic republic. We shall not forget, however, that in order to push somebody on, we must continually keep our hands on that somebody's shoulders. The party of the proletariat must learn to catch every liberal just at the moment when he is prepared to move forward an inch, and compel him to move forward a yard. If he is obstinate and won't—we shall go forward without him, and over his body.

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ON
ORGANIZATION

BY
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ON PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP

Some people think that it is sufficient to draw up a correct Party line, proclaim it from the housetops, state it in the form of general theses and resolutions, and take a vote and carry it unanimously for victory to come of itself, spontaneously, as it were. This, of course, is wrong. It is a gross delusion. Only incorrigible bureaucrats and red-tapists can think so. As a matter of fact, these successes and victories did not come spontaneously, but as the result of a fierce struggle for the application of the Party line. Victory never comes by itself—it usually has to be attained. Good resolutions and declarations in favour of the general line of the Party are only a beginning; they merely express the desire for victory, but not the victory itself. After the correct line has been laid down, after a correct solution of the problem has been found, success depends on how the work is organized; on the organization of the struggle for the application of the Party line; on the proper selection of personnel; on the way a check is kept on the fulfilment of the decisions of the leading bodies. Otherwise the correct line of the Party and the correct solutions are in danger of being seriously prejudiced.

Furthermore, after the correct political line has been laid down, organizational work decides everything, including the fate of the political line itself, its success or failure.

As a matter of fact, victory was achieved and won by a stern and systematic struggle against all sorts of difficulties that stood in the way of carrying out the Party line; by overcoming the difficulties; by mobilizing the Party and the working-class for the purpose of overcoming the difficulties; by organizing the struggle to overcome the difficulties; by removing inefficient executives and choosing better ones, capable of waging the struggle against difficulties.

What are these difficulties; and wherein are they lodged?

They are difficulties attending our organizational work, difficulties attending our organizational leadership. They are lodged in ourselves, in our leading people, in our organizations, in the apparatus of our Party, state, economic, trade union, Young Communist League, and all other organizations. . . .

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Bureaucracy and red tape in the administrative apparatus; idle chatter about "leadership in general" instead of real and concrete leadership; the functional structure of our organizations and lack of individual responsibility; lack of personal responsibility in work, and wage equalization; the absence of a systematic check upon the fulfilment of decisions; fear of self-criticism—these are the sources of our difficulties; this is where our difficulties are now lodged.

It would be naïve to think that these difficulties can be overcome by means of resolutions and decisions. The bureaucrats have long become past-masters in the art of demonstrating their loyalty to Party and government decisions in words, and pigeon-holing them in deed. In order to overcome these difficulties it was necessary to put an end to the disparity between our organizational work and the requirements of the political line of the Party; it was necessary to raise the level of organizational leadership in all spheres of the national economy to the level of political leadership; it was necessary to see to it that our organizational work guarantees the practical realization of the political slogans and decisions of the Party.

In order to overcome these difficulties and achieve success it was necessary to *organize* the struggle to eliminate these difficulties; it was necessary to draw the masses of the workers and peasants into this struggle; it was necessary to mobilize the Party itself; it was necessary to purge the Party and the economic organizations of unreliable, unstable and demoralized elements.

What was needed for this?

We had to organize:

- ① Extensive self-criticism and exposure of the defects in our work;
- ② The mobilization of the Party, state, economic, trade union, and Young Communist League organizations for the struggle against difficulties;
3. The mobilization of the masses of the workers and peasants to fight for the application of the slogans and decisions of the Party and of the Government;
4. The extension of emulation and shock work among the working people;

5. A wide network of Political Departments of machine and tractor stations and state farms and the bringing of the Party and Soviet leadership closer to the villages;
6. The division of the People's Commissariats, head offices, and trusts, and the establishment of closer contact between the business leadership and the enterprises;
7. The elimination of lack of personal responsibility in work and the elimination of wage equalization;
8. The abolition of the "functional" system; the extension of individual responsibility, and a policy directed towards doing away with collegium management;
9. The exercise of greater control over the fulfilment of decisions, while taking the line towards reorganizing the Central Control Commission and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection with a view to the further enhancement of the work of checking up on the fulfilment of decisions;
10. The transfer of qualified workers from offices to posts that will bring them into closer contact with production;
11. The exposure and expulsion from the administrative apparatus of incorrigible bureaucrats and red-tapists;
12. The removal from their posts of people who violate the decisions of the Party and the Government, of "window-dressers" and windbags, and the promotion to their place of new people—business-like people, capable of concretely directing the work entrusted to them and of tightening Party and state discipline;
13. The purging of state and economic organizations and the reduction of their staffs;
14. Lastly, the purging of the Party of unreliable and demoralized persons.

These, in the main, are the measures which the Party has had to adopt in order to overcome difficulties, to raise our organizational work to the level of political leadership, and in this way to ensure the application of the Party line.

You know that this is exactly how the Central Committee of the Party carried on its organizational work during the period under review.

In this, the Central Committee was guided by the brilliant thought uttered by Lenin to the effect that the main thing in

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organizational work is—choosing the right people and keeping a check on the fulfilment of decisions.

Choosing it and
check + control.

In regard to choosing the right people and dismissing those who fail to justify the confidence placed in them, I would like to say a few words.

Apart from the incorrigible bureaucrats and red-tapists as to whose removal there are no differences of opinion among us, there are two other types of executives who retard our work, hinder our work, and hold up our advance.

One of these types of executives is represented by people who rendered certain services in the past, people who have become aristocrats, who consider that Party decisions and the laws issued by the Soviet Government are not written for them, but for fools. These are the people who do not consider it their duty to fulfil the decisions of the Party and of the Government, and who thus destroy the foundations of Party and state discipline. What do they count upon when they violate Party and Soviet laws? They presume that the Soviet Government will not have the courage to touch them, because of their past services. These over-conceited aristocrats think that they are irreplaceable, and that they can violate the decisions of the leading bodies with impunity. What is to be done with executives of this kind? They must unhesitatingly be removed from their leading posts, irrespective of past services. (Voices: "Hear, hear!") They must be demoted to lower positions, and this must be announced in the Press. (Voices: "Hear, hear!") This must be done in order to knock the pride out of these over-conceited aristocrat-bureaucrats, and to put them in their proper place. This must be done in order to tighten up Party and Soviet discipline in the whole of our work. (Voices: "Hear, hear!") (Applause.)

And now about the second type of executives. I have in mind the windbags. I would say, honest windbags (*laughter*), people who are honest and loyal to the Soviet Government, but who are incompetent as executives, incapable of organizing anything. Last year I had a conversation with one such comrade, a very respected comrade, but an incorrigible windbag, capable of drowning any living cause in a flood of talk. Here is the conversation.

I: How are you getting on with the sowing?

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He: With the sowing, Comrade Stalin? We have mobilized ourselves. (*Laughter.*)

I: Well, and what then?

He: We have put the question squarely. (*Laughter.*)

I: And what next?

He: There is a turn, Comrade Stalin; soon there will be a turn. (*Laughter.*)

I: But still?

He: We can say that there is an indication of some progress. (*Laughter.*)

I: But for all that, how are you getting on with the sowing?

He: So far, Comrade Stalin, we have not made any headway with the sowing. (*General Laughter.*)

Here you have the physiognomy of the windbag. They have mobilized themselves, they have put the question squarely, they have made a turn and some progress, but things remain as they were.

This is exactly how a Ukrainian worker recently described the state of a certain organization when he was asked whether that organization had any definite line: "Well," he said, "they have a line all right, but they don't seem to be doing any work." (*General laughter.*) Evidently that organization also has its quota of honest windbags.

And when such windbags are dismissed from their posts and are given jobs far removed from operative work, they shrug their shoulders in perplexity and ask: "Why have we been dismissed? Did we not do all that was necessary to get the work done? Did we not organize a rally of shock workers? Did we not proclaim the slogans of the Party and of the government at the conference of shock workers? Did we not elect the whole of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to the Honorary Presidium? (*General laughter.*) Did we not send greetings to Comrade Stalin—what more do they want of us?" (*Loud laughter.*)

What is to be done with these incorrigible windbags? Why, if they were allowed to remain on operative work they would drown every living cause in a flood of watery and endless speeches. Obviously, they must be removed from leading posts and given work other than operative work. There is no place for windbags on operative work. (*Voices: "Hear, hear!" Applause.*)

I have already briefly reported on how the Central Committee handled the selection of personnel for the Soviet and economic organizations, and how it pursued the work of keeping a closer check on the fulfilment of decisions. Comrade Kaganovich will deal with this in greater detail in his report on the third item of the agenda of the Congress.

I would like to say a few words, however, about future work in connection with the task of keeping a closer check on the fulfilment of decisions.

The proper organization of the work of checking up on the fulfilment of decisions is of decisive importance in the fight against bureaucracy and office routine. Are the decisions of the leading bodies carried out, or are they pigeon-holed by bureaucrats and red-tapists? Are they carried out properly, or are they distorted? Is the apparatus working conscientiously and in a Bolshevik manner, or is it running with the clutch out? These things can be promptly found out only if a proper check is kept on the fulfilment of decisions. A proper check on the fulfilment of decisions is a searchlight which helps to reveal how the apparatus is functioning at any moment, exposing bureaucrats and red-tapists to full view. We can say with certainty that nine-tenths of our defects and failures are due to the lack of a properly organized system of check-up on the fulfilment of decisions. There can be no doubt that had there been such a system of check-up on fulfilment defects and failures would certainly have been averted.

But for the work of checking up on fulfilment to achieve its purpose, two conditions at least are required: first, that fulfilment be checked up systematically and not spasmodically; second, that the work of checking up on fulfilment in all the links of the Party, state, and economic organizations be entrusted not to second-rate people, but to people with sufficient authority, the leaders of the organizations concerned. . . .

Our tasks in the sphere of organizational work are:

1. To continue to adapt our organizational work to the requirements of the political line of the Party;
2. To raise organizational leadership to the level of political leadership;

3. To see to it that organizational leadership is fully equal to the task of ensuring the realization of the political slogans and decisions of the Party.

CADRES DECIDE EVERYTHING

... The old slogan, "Technique decides everything," which is a reflection of a period already passed, a period in which we suffered from a dearth in technique, must now be replaced by a new slogan, the slogan "Cadres decide everything". That is the main thing now.

Can it be said that our people have fully grasped and realized the great significance of this new slogan? I would not say that. Otherwise, there would not have been the outrageous attitude towards people, towards cadres¹, towards workers, which we not infrequently observe in practice. The slogan "Cadres decide everything" demands that our leaders should display the most solicitous attitude towards our workers, "little" and "big," no matter in what sphere they are engaged, cultivating them assiduously, assisting them when they need support, encouraging them when they show their first successes, promoting them, and so forth. Yet in practice we meet in a number of cases with a soulless, bureaucratic, and positively outrageous attitude towards workers. This, indeed, explains why instead of being studied, and placed at their posts only after being studied, people are frequently flung about like pawns. People have learned to value machinery and to make reports on how many machines we have in our mills and factories. But I do not know of a single instance when a report was made with equal zest on the number of people we have trained in a given period, on how we have assisted people to grow and become tempered in their work. How is this to be explained? It is to be explained by the fact that we have not yet learned to value people, to value workers, to value cadres.

¹ Cadres. The word means literally a frame or framework. The comrades on whom the Party, throughout its various units of organization, can mainly depend to carry it forward are a living framework which must be constantly renewed and strengthened in the ways described here by Stalin and Dimitrov. Cadres are the new forces which must be developed and fitted for positions of responsibility in leadership.—Ed.

Ppl flung
about like
pawns.

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I recall an incident in Siberia, where I lived at one time in exile. It was in the spring, at the time of the spring floods. About thirty men went to the river to pull out timber which had been carried away by the vast, swollen river. Towards evening they returned to the village, but with one comrade missing. When asked where the thirtieth man was, they replied indifferently that the thirtieth man had "remained there". To my question, "How do you mean, remained there?" they replied with the same indifference, "Why ask—drowned, of course". And thereupon one of them began to hurry away, saying, "I've got to go and water the mare". When I reproached them with having more concern for animals than for men, one of them said, amid the general approval of the rest: "Why should we be concerned about men? We can always make men. But a mare . . . just try and make a mare".

Here you have a case, not very significant perhaps, but very characteristic. It seems to me that indifference of certain of our leaders to people, to cadres, their inability to value people, is a survival of that strange attitude of man to man displayed in the episode in far-off Siberia that I have just related.

And so, comrades, if we want successfully to get over the dearth in people and to provide our country with sufficient cadres capable of advancing technique and setting it going, we must first of all learn to value people, to value cadres, to value every worker capable of benefiting our common cause.

It is time to realize that of all the valuable capital the world possesses, the most valuable and most decisive is people, cadres. It must be realized that, under our present conditions, "Cadres decide everything". If we have good and numerous cadres in industry, agriculture, transport and the army, our country will be invincible. If we do not have such cadres, we shall be lame in both legs.

In concluding my speech, permit me to offer a toast to the health and success of our graduates from the Red Army Academies. I wish them success in the work of organizing and directing the defence of our country.

Comrades, you have graduated from institutions of higher learning, in which you received your first tempering. But school is only a preparatory stage. Cadres receive their real tempering in

practical work, outside school, in fighting difficulties, in overcoming difficulties. Remember, comrades, that only those cadres are any good who do not fear difficulties, who do not hide from difficulties, but who, on the contrary, go out to meet difficulties, in order to overcome them and eliminate them. It is only in the fight against difficulties that real cadres are forged. And if our army possesses genuinely steeled cadres in sufficient numbers, it will be invincible.

Your health, comrades!

SELECTION, PROMOTION AND ALLOCATION OF CADRES

A correct political line is not needed as a declaration, but as something to be carried into effect. But in order to carry a correct political line into effect, we must have cadres, people who understand the political line of the Party, who accept it as their own line, who are prepared to carry it into effect, who are able to put it into practice and are capable of answering for it, defending it and fighting for it. Failing this, a correct political line runs the risk of being purely nominal.

And here arises the question of the correct selection of cadres, the training of cadres, the promotion of new people, the correct allocation of cadres, and the testing of cadres by work accomplished.

What is meant by the correct selection of cadres?

The correct selection of cadres does not mean just gathering around one a lot of assistants and subs, setting up an office and issuing order after order (*Laughter.*) Nor does it mean abusing one's powers, switching scores and hundreds of people back and forth from one job to another without rhyme or reason and conducting endless "reorganizations." (*Laughter.*)

The proper selection of cadres means:

Value cadres Firstly, valuing cadres as the gold reserve of the Party and the State, treasuring them, respecting them.

Know cadres Secondly, knowing cadres, carefully studying their individual merits and shortcomings, knowing in what post the capacities of a given worker are most likely to develop.

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Thirdly, carefully fostering cadres, helping every promising worker to advance, not grudging time on patiently "bothering" with such workers and accelerating their development.

Fourthly, boldly promoting new and young cadres in time, so as not to allow them to stagnate in their old posts and grow stale.

Fifthly, allocating workers to posts in such a way that each feels he is in the right place, that each may contribute to our common cause the maximum his personal capacities enable him to contribute, and that the general trend of the work of allocating cadres may fully answer to the demands of the political line for the carrying out of which this allocation of cadres is designed.

Particularly important in this respect is the bold and timely promotion of new and young cadres. It seems to me that our people are not quite clear on this point yet. Some think that in selecting people we must chiefly rely on the old cadres. Others, on the contrary, think that we must chiefly rely on young cadres. It seems to me that both are mistaken.

The old cadres, of course, represent a valuable asset to the Party and the State. They possess what the young cadres lack, namely, tremendous experience in leadership, a schooling in Marxist-Leninist principles, knowledge of affairs, and a capacity for orientation. But firstly, there are never enough old cadres, there are far less than required, and they are already partly going out of commission owing to the operation of the laws of nature. Secondly, part of the old cadres are sometimes inclined to keep a too persistent eye on the past, to cling to the past, to stay in the old rut and fail to observe the new in life. This is called losing the sense of the new. It is a very serious and dangerous shortcoming.

As to the young cadres, they, of course, have not the experience, the schooling, the knowledge of affairs and the capacity of orientation of the old cadres. But, firstly, the young cadres constitute the vast majority; secondly, they are young, and as yet are not subject to the danger of going out of commission; thirdly, they possess in abundance the sense of the new, which is a valuable quality in every Bolshevik worker; and, fourthly, they develop and acquire knowledge so rapidly, they press upward so eagerly, that the time is not far off when they will overtake the old fellows, take their stand side by side with them, and become worthy of replacing

them. Consequently, the thing is not whether to rely on the old cadres or on the new cadres, but to steer for a combination, a union of the old and the young cadres in one common symphony of leadership of the Party and the State. (*Prolonged applause.*)

That is why we must boldly and in good time promote young cadres to leading posts.

One of the important achievements of the Party during the period under review, in the matter of strengthening the Party leadership is that, when selecting cadres, it has successfully pursued from top to bottom, just this course of combining old and young workers.

Data in the possession of the Central Committee of the Party show that during the period under review the Party succeeded in promoting to leading State and Party posts over five hundred thousand young Bolsheviks, members of the Party and people standing close to the Party, over twenty per cent of whom were women.

What is our task now?

Our task now is to concentrate the work of selecting cadres, from top to bottom, in the hands of one body and to raise it to a proper, scientific, Bolshevik level.

ON PRACTICAL WORK

(*Extracts from "Seven Questions Answered"*)

HOW THE PARTY'S POLITICAL WORK IS TO BE STRENGTHENED

It is to be supposed that all have now understood, have realized, that to become excessively engrossed in economic campaigns and economic successes while underestimating and forgetting Party-political questions leads up a blind alley. Consequently it is necessary to turn the attention of our workers towards Party-political questions, so that economic successes will be combined with and accompany successes in Party-political work.

How in practice is the task of strengthening Party-political work, the task of freeing Party organizations from economic details, to be carried out? As can be seen from the discussion, some comrades are prone to draw from this the incorrect conclusion that we should now get away altogether from economic work. At any rate, there

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were voices sounding the note: Well, now, thank God, we shall be rid of economic matters; now we can busy ourselves with Party-political work. Is this conclusion correct? No, it is not. When our Party comrades, carried away with economic successes, moved away from politics, this was an extreme which cost us big sacrifices. If some of our comrades, taking up the task of strengthening Party-political work, now think of moving away from economy, this will be the other extreme, which will cost us no less sacrifices. You must not jump from one extreme to another. You must not separate politics from economics. We cannot move away from economy, just as we cannot move away from politics. For the convenience of study, people usually separate the methodological questions of economics from the questions of politics. But this is done merely from the standpoint of method, artificially, only for the convenience of study. But in life, on the contrary, politics and economics are in practice inseparable. They exist together and act together. And he who thinks to separate in our practical policy economy from politics, to strengthen economic work at the cost of belittling political work, or contrarywise, to strengthen political work at the cost of belittling economic work, will find himself in a blind alley . . .

HOW WORKERS SHOULD BE SELECTED

What does it mean—to select workers correctly and correctly to distribute them to work?

This means to select workers, in the first place, according to a political criterion, i.e. are they worthy of political trusts, and in the second place, according to a practical criterion, i.e. are they suitable for such-and-such concrete work.

This means not to convert a business-like approach into a "business-man's" approach, when people are interested in the practical qualities of workers, but are not interested in their political physiognomy.

This means not to convert a political approach into the single and all-embracing approach, when people become interested in the political physiognomy of workers, but are not interested in their practical qualities.

Can it be said that this Bolshevik rule is carried out by our Party comrades? Unfortunately, this cannot be said. It has already been

spoken of here at the Plenum. But not everything was said. The fact is that this well-trying rule is violated right and left in our practice, and moreover in the grossest way. Most frequently, workers are selected not according to objective criteria, but according to fortuitous, subjective, narrow and parochial criteria. Most frequently, so-called acquaintances are chosen, personal friends, fellow-townsmen, people who have shown personal devotion, masters of eulogy to their patrons, irrespective of whether they are suitable from a political and a business-like standpoint.

Naturally, instead of a leading group of responsible workers, a family group, a company, is formed, the members of which try to live peacefully, not to offend each other, not to wash their dirty linen in public, to eulogize each other, and from time to time to send inane and nauseating reports to the centre about their successes.

It is not difficult to understand that in such conditions of kinship, there can be no place either for criticism of the shortcomings of the work or for self-criticism by the leaders of the work. . . .

HOW THE WORK OF COMRADES IS CHECKED

What does it mean—to check-up on workers, to check-up on the fulfilment of tasks?

To check-up on workers means to test them, not on their promises and declarations but on the results of their work.

To test the fulfilment of tasks means to test them, not only in the office and not only according to formal reports, but first and foremost at the place of work according to the actual results of fulfilment.

Do we need such a check-up in general? Undoubtedly we do. We need it in the first place, because only such a check-up will make it possible to know a worker, to determine his real qualities. We need it, in the second place, because only such a check-up will make it possible to determine the good qualities and shortcomings of the executive apparatus. We need it, in the third place, because only such a check-up will make it possible to determine the good qualities and shortcomings of the tasks themselves.

Some comrades think that people can only be tested from above, when the leaders examine subordinates on the results of their

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work. This is not true. Verifying from above is necessary, of course, as one of the effective measures for testing people and the fulfilment of tasks.

But testing from above far from exhausts the whole business of checking-up. There is still another kind of check-up, the check-up from below, where the masses, the subordinates, examine the leaders, point out their mistakes, and show them ways of correcting them. This kind of verification is one of the most effective methods of testing people.

The rank and file Party members verify their leaders at meetings of active Party workers, and conferences and congresses, by listening to their reports, by criticising their defects, and finally by electing or not electing some or other leading comrades to the leading Party organs. Precise operation of democratic centralism in the Party as demanded in our Party statutes, unconditional submission of Party organs to election, the right of putting forward and withdrawing candidates, secret ballot, freedom of criticism and self-criticism, all these and similar measures must be carried into life, in order incidentally to facilitate the check-up on and control over the leaders of the Party by the rank and file Party members.

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(p. 2 CLP 6/5)

The non-Party masses verify their economic, trade union and other leaders at meetings of non-Party active workers, at all kinds of mass conferences, where they hear reports of their leaders, criticize defects, and indicate ways of correcting them

TRAINING CADRES ON THE BASIS OF THEIR OWN MISTAKES

What does it mean—to train cadres on the basis of their own mistakes? Lenin taught that one of the surest means of correctly training and educating Party cadres, of correctly training and educating the working-class and the masses of the working people, is conscientiously to disclose the mistakes of the Party, to study the causes that have given rise to these mistakes, and to indicate the paths necessary for overcoming these mistakes. Lenin said:

“ The attitude of a political party to its mistakes is one of the most important and surest criteria of the seriousness of the Party and of its fulfilment in practice of its obligations to its class and the masses of working people. Openly to admit error, to reveal its causes, to analyse the situation that gave rise to it,

attentively to discuss the means of correcting the error—this is the sign of a serious Party, this is the fulfilment by it of its obligations, this is training and educating the class, and then the masses."

This means that the Bolsheviks are duty bound not to gloss over their mistakes, not to dodge the question of their mistakes, as often happens with us, but honestly and openly to admit their mistakes, honestly and openly to indicate the way of correcting these mistakes, honestly and openly to correct their mistakes.

I would not say that many of our comrades undertake this business with satisfaction. But if the Bolsheviks really wish to be Bolsheviks they must find sufficient manfulness in themselves openly to admit their mistakes, to reveal their causes, to indicate the ways of correcting them and thereby to give the party cadres correct training and correct political education. For it is only on this path, only in circumstances of open and honest self-criticism that Bolshevik cadres can really be educated, that real Bolshevik leaders can be educated.

Some comrades say that it is not advisable to speak openly of one's mistakes since the open admission of one's mistakes may be construed by our enemies as our weakness and may be utilized by them.

→ This is rubbish, comrades. Downright rubbish. The open recognition of our mistakes and their honest rectification can on the contrary only strengthen our Party, raise its authority in the eyes of the workers, peasants and working intellectuals, and increase the strength and power of our State. And this is the main thing. As long as we have the workers, peasants and working intellectuals with us all the rest will settle itself.

Other comrades say that open admission of our mistakes can lead not to training and consolidating our cadres, but to weakening and disconcerting them, that we must spare and take care of our cadres, that we must spare their self-esteem and tranquility. To this end they propose to slur over the mistakes of our comrades, to weaken the vigour of the criticism, and still better to disregard these mistakes. Such a line is not only fundamentally incorrect but also dangerous in the highest degree, dangerous first and

foremost for the cadres whom they want to "spare" and "take care of". To spare and preserve cadres by slurring over their mistakes means of a certainty to ruin these very cadres.

TEACHING THE MASSES—AND LEARNING FROM THEM.

Lenin taught us not only to teach the masses, but also to learn from them.

What does this mean?

It means, firstly, that we leaders must not become conceited, and we must understand that if we are members of the Central Committee or are People's Commissars this does not mean that we possess all the knowledge necessary for giving correct leadership. An official position by itself does not provide knowledge and experience.

This means, secondly, that our experience alone, the experience of leaders, is insufficient to give correct leadership, that consequently it is necessary that one's experience, the experience of leaders, be supplemented by the experience of the masses, by the experience of the rank-and-file Party members, by the experience of the working-class, by the experience of the people.

This means, thirdly, that we must not for one moment weaken, still less break our connections, with the masses. This means, fourthly, that we must pay careful attention to the voice of the masses, to the voice of the rank-and-file members of the Party, to the voice of the so-called "small men," to the voice of the people.

WHAT DOES IT MEAN—TO LEAD CORRECTLY?

This does not at all mean sitting in one's office and compiling instructions.

Correctly to lead means:

Firstly, to find a correct solution of the question. But a correct solution cannot be found unless account is taken of the experience of the masses who test the results of our leadership on their own backs.

Secondly, to organize the operation of the correct solution, which, however, cannot be done without direct aid from the masses.

Thirdly, to organize a check on the fulfilment of this decision which again cannot be done without the direct aid of the masses.

We leaders see things, events and people, from only one side, I would say from above; our field of vision consequently is more or less limited. The masses, on the contrary, see things, events and people from another side, I would say from below; their field of vision consequently is also in a certain degree limited. To receive a correct solution to the question, these two experiences must be united. Only in such a case will the leadership be correct.

This is what it means—not only to teach the masses, but also to learn from them.

Thus it transpires that our experience alone, the experience of the leaders, is still far from adequate for the guidance of our affairs. In order to guide correctly, the experience of the leaders must be supplemented by the experience of the Party masses, by the experience of the working-class, by the experience of the toilers, by the experience of the so-called “small people”.

And when is this possible?

It is possible only if the leaders are closely connected with the masses, if they are bound up with the Party masses, with the working-class, with the peasantry, with the working intellectuals.

Contacts with the masses, the strengthening of these contacts, readiness to listen to the voice of the masses. In this lies the strength and impregnability of Bolshevik leadership. It may be taken, as a rule, that so long as Bolsheviks keep contact with the broad masses of the people, they will be invincible. And contrary-wise, it is sufficient for Bolsheviks to break away from the masses, and lose contact with them, it is sufficient for them to become covered with bureaucratic rust, for them to lose all their strength and to be converted into nothingness.

In the system of mythology of the ancient Greeks, there was one famous hero, Antæus, who, as mythology declares, was the son of Poseidon, the god of the sea, and Gaea, the goddess of the earth. He was particularly attached to his mother, who had borne, fed and brought him up. There was no hero whom this Antæus did not vanquish. He was considered to be an invincible hero. Wherein lay his strength? It lay in the fact that every time he was hard pushed in a struggle with an opponent, he touched the

earth, his mother, who had borne him and fed him, and obtained new strength. But, nevertheless, he had a weak spot—the danger of being separated in some way from the earth. His enemies took account of this weakness of his and lay in wait for him. And an enemy was found who took advantage of this weakness and vanquished him. This was Hercules. But how did Hercules defeat him? He tore him from the earth, raised him into the air, deprived him of the possibility of touching the earth, and throttled him.

I think that Bolsheviks remind us of Antæus, the hero of Greek mythology. Like Antæus, they are strong in keeping contact with their mother, with the masses, who bore them, fed them and educated them. And as long as they keep contact with their mother, with the people, they have every chance of remaining invincible.

This is the key to the invincibility of Bolshevik leadership.

Appendix One

L. M. KAGANOVITCH ON PARTY TRAINING AND INNER PARTY DEMOCRACY

When people are overburdened with office work and the writing of general resolutions, they overlook "trifles," they overlook human beings. They fail to see a new foreman, a new engineer, a new technician, they fail to see new heroes of labour, they fail to see the Young Communists, who are growing up, who could be promoted to new work.

People say that we are short of men, but this is not true. We have the men, able men, but we must be able to promote them, to put them into their proper place. We must be able to lead them properly. The man who is put into a job must be trained, must be raised in the process of his work; care must be taken that he does not become emasculated and dusty. From time to time we must take a rag and wipe away the dust that has accumulated on him. . . .

The organization of the proper acceptance of members in the Party is only half the business. We must see to it that the newly adopted Party member, when he is already in our ranks, properly equips himself ideologically, that he grows, that he should feel everyday guidance in his activity, that he be actively drawn into the work of the Party, and that he become politically hardened.

educational practical work

When we speak of Marxist-Leninist training, we not only mean class-room training, we mean the ideological equipment of the Bolshevik. The Party member must be trained in the Party school, but principally he must be trained in practical political work. That means that we must raise the Marxist-Leninist training of the Party members to a high level and improve the work of our Party organization.

Lenin always linked up theoretical problems with everyday practice. Stalin gives us examples of how to combine the most complicated theoretical problems with the everyday struggle. And yet many of our Red professors put theory into one compartment and practice into another, and are quite unable to combine these two compartments. Unfortunately, instead of combining theory with practice they, like the philosopher in the fable, write very profound treatises upon "The Nature of a Rope", and as Marx and Engels have not said anything on this subject, they think they are making a wonderful contribution to the treasury of Marxism.

A number of our Soviet Party schools suffer mainly from the fact that the education is organized precisely on school lines. A Bolshevik is not a schoolboy, he is being trained politically and his schooling should be combined with the everyday political and practical struggle. He must be ideologically equipped both at school and at Party meetings. Hence, as you have no doubt observed, the new draft of the rules does not simply speak about training, but about ideologically equipping the Communist. Every Party member must be equipped with the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

Specialization

If we put these demands to every Party member, how much more must we put them to the Party leaders? There must not be any sharp division between expert propagandists and expert organizers. Specialization is a very good thing, we are in favour of it, but we must not carry it to extremes. And excessive specialization is particularly unsuitable in Party work. Very often an organizer fails to carry on propaganda and agitation not only because he has not the time for it, but let us speak frankly, also because he is unable to. We say that a director of a factory must master knowledge. All the more reason therefore why we should

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demand of every Party Committee secretary, of every district committee secretary, and of every Party organizer that they acquire the ability to use the compass of Marxism-Leninism. A Party leader must not only be an organizer and administrator in the best sense of the term, but he must also be a propagandist and an educator of the Party members.

We know that the level of our Party meetings has risen. Party members learn and should learn Bolshevism as much, if not more at Party meetings, as in the Party school. Everyone understands that.

Internal Party democracy and self-criticism have been and are the most important pivot of our whole Party work and education of the Party members. Internal Party democracy has risen to a new stage. Internal Party democracy is now understood in a new way. When you attend meetings of Communists now, you realize that they cannot be compared with what the position was a couple of years ago.

We cannot deny, however, that we could have done much more had we succeeded in combining the work of the organizers and the propagandists. This would have raised the Marxist-Leninist ideological equipment of the Communists to a new stage. Cases occur when Party meetings are carried on in a stereotyped manner without serious preparation. People are called together and they are told: Comrades, we have tasks, we must fulfil so-and-so. Or they discuss some campaign or anniversary. In such cases, of course, all you get is mere tub thumping or else mere "business," and naturally, such meetings do not help to educate the Party members. And yet, every Party meeting should help to raise the ideological level of the Communists. The discussion of internal Party questions, of questions concerning the politics and practice of building up socialism, raises the intelligence of the Party members to the level of understanding the vanguard role of the Bolsheviks, as the organizers of the masses.

The Party member grows, becomes educated and hardened in the conditions of internal Party democracy, amidst the free and business-like discussion of all the questions of Party policy. At the same time he becomes hardened and educated in the struggle against all those who depart from the fundamental problems of

Every meeting raise ideological level of the Communists

Party policy, who want to take advantage of the discussion of these problems in order to sabotage this policy, in order to undermine the Party leadership, and in order to shake its iron ranks. The experience of our internal Party life shows that our Party ranks have grown up, have become strong and hardened in the struggle against all those who depart from the policy of the Party, from Leninism, in the struggle for the compactness and unity of our Party ranks.

That is why we must continue to raise and harden these Party members in the struggle against the slightest manifestation of opportunism in our ranks.

The growth of the Party member depends upon the way internal Party work is organized, it depends upon the amount of attention that is paid to the Party member, and on the way he is led. . . .

Appendix Two

G. DIMITROV ON CADRES

Comrades, our best resolutions will remain scraps of paper if we lack the people who can put them into effect. Unfortunately, however, I must state that the problem of *cadres*, one of the most important questions facing us, received almost no attention at this Congress. The report of the Executive Committee of the Communist International was discussed for seven days, there were many speakers from various countries, but only a few, and they only in passing, discussed this question, so extremely vital for the Communist Parties and the labour movement. In their practical work our Parties are still far from realizing that *people, cadres, decide everything*. They are unable to do what Comrade Stalin is teaching us to do, namely, to cultivate cadres "as a gardener cultivates his favourite fruit tree," "to appreciate people, to appreciate cadres, to appreciate every worker who can be of use to our common cause".

A negligent attitude to the problem of cadres is all the more impermissible for the reason that we are constantly losing some of the most valuable of our cadres in the struggle. For we are not a learned society but a militant movement which is constantly in the firing line. Our most energetic, most courageous and most

class-conscious elements are in the front ranks. It is precisely these front-line men that the enemy hunts down, murders, throws into jail, puts in the concentration camps, and subjects to excruciating torture, particularly in fascist countries. This gives rise to the urgent necessity of constantly replenishing the ranks, cultivating and training new cadres as well as carefully preserving the existing cadres.

The problem of cadres is of particular urgency for the additional reason that under our influence the mass united front movement is gaining momentum and bringing forward many thousands of new working class militants. Moreover, it is not only young revolutionary elements, not only workers just becoming revolutionary, who have never before participated in a political movement, that stream into our ranks. Very often former members and militants of the Social-Democratic Parties also join us. These new cadres require special attention, particularly in the illegal Communist Parties, the more so because in their practical work these cadres with their poor theoretical training frequently come up against very serious political problems which they have to solve for themselves.

The problem of what shall be the *correct policy with regard to cadres* is a very serious one for our Parties, as well as for the Young Communist Leagues and for all other mass organizations—for the entire revolutionary labour movement.

What does a correct policy with regard to cadres imply?

First, *knowing one's people*. As a rule, there is no systematic study of cadres in our Parties. Only recently have the Communist Parties of France and Poland and, in the East, the Communist Party of China, achieved certain successes in this direction. The Communist Party of Germany, before its underground period, had also undertaken a study of its cadres. The experience of these Parties has shown that as soon as they began to study their people, Party workers were discovered who had remained unnoticed before. On the other hand, the Parties began to be purged of alien elements who were ideologically and politically harmful. It is sufficient to point to the example of Célor and Barbé in France who, when put under the Bolshevik microscope, turned out to be agents of the class enemy and were thrown out of the Party. In Poland and in

Hungary the checking up of cadres made it easier to discover nests of provocateurs, agents of the enemy who had sedulously concealed their identity.

Second, *proper promotion of cadres*. Promotion should not be something casual but one of the normal functions of the Party. It is bad when promotion is made exclusively upon the basis of the ability of the various Party workers to discharge particular functions, and of their popularity among the masses. We have examples in our Parties of promotions which have produced excellent results. For instance, we have a Spanish woman Communist, sitting in the Presidium of this Congress, Comrade Dolores. Two years ago she was still a rank-and-file Party worker. But in the very first clashes with the class enemy she proved to be an excellent agitator and fighter. Subsequently promoted to the leading body of the Party she has proved herself a most worthy member of that body.

I could point to a number of similar cases in several other countries, but in the majority of cases promotions are made in an unorganized and haphazard manner, and therefore are not always fortunate. Sometimes moralizers, phrasemongers and chatterboxes who actually harm the cause are promoted to leading positions.

Third, *the ability to use people to the best advantage*. We must be able to ascertain and utilize the valuable qualities of every single active member. There are no ideal people; we must take them as they are and correct their weaknesses and shortcomings. We know of glaring examples in our Parties of the wrong utilization of good, honest Communists who might have been very useful had they been given work that they were better fit to do.

Fourth, *proper distribution of cadres*. First of all, we must see to it that the main links of the movement are in the charge of strong people who have contacts with the masses, have sprung from the very depths of the masses, who have initiative and are staunch. The more important districts should have an appropriate number of such militants. In capitalist countries it is not an easy matter to transfer cadres from one place to another. Such a task encounters a number of obstacles and difficulties, including lack of funds, family considerations, etc., difficulties which must be taken

into account and properly overcome. But usually we neglect to do this altogether.

Fifth, *systematic assistance to cadres*. This assistance should take the form of careful instructions, comradely control, rectification of shortcomings and mistakes, and concrete, everyday guidance.

Sixth, *proper care for the preservation of cadres*. We must learn promptly to withdraw Party workers to the rear whenever circumstances so require, and replace them by others. We must demand that the Party leadership, particularly in countries where the Parties are illegal, assume paramount responsibility for the preservation of cadres. . . . Remember the severe losses the Communist Party of Germany suffered during its transition to underground conditions! . . .

Only a correct policy in regard to cadres will enable our Parties to develop and utilize all available forces to the utmost, and obtain from the enormous reservoir of the mass movement ever fresh reinforcements of new and better active workers.

What should be our *main criteria* in selecting cadres?

First, absolute devotion to the cause of the working class, loyalty to the Party, tested in face of the enemy—in battle, in prison, in court.

Second, the closest possible contact with the masses. The comrades concerned must be wholly absorbed in the interests of the masses, feel the life pulse of the masses, know their sentiments and requirements. The prestige of the leaders of our Party organization should be based, first of all, on the fact that the masses regard them as their leaders, and are convinced through their own experience of their ability as leaders, and of their determination and self-sacrifice in struggle.

Third, ability independently to find one's bearings and not to be afraid of assuming responsibility in making decisions. He who fears to take responsibility is not a leader. He who is unable to display initiative, who says: "I will do only what I am told," is not a Bolshevik. Only he is a real Bolshevik leader who does not lose his head at moments of defeat, who does not get a swelled head at moments of success, who displays indomitable firmness in carrying out decisions. Cadres develop and grow best when they

are placed in the position of having to solve concrete problems of the struggle independently, and are aware that they are fully responsible for their decisions.

Fourth, *discipline* and *Bolshevik* hardening in the struggle against the class enemy as well as in their irreconcilable opposition to all deviations from the Bolshevik line.

We must place all the more emphasis on these conditions which determine the correct selection of cadres, because in practice preference is very often given to a comrade who, for example, is able to write well and is a good speaker but is not a man or woman of action, and is not as suited for the struggle as some other comrade who perhaps may not be able to write or speak so well, but is a staunch comrade, possessing initiative and contacts with the masses, and is capable of going into battle and leading others into battle. Have there not been many cases of sectarians, doctrinaires or moralizers crowding out loyal mass workers, genuine working class leaders.

Our leading cadres should combine the knowledge of *what* they must do—with *Bolshevik stamina, revolutionary strength of character and the will power to carry it through.*

Comrades, as you know, cadres receive their best training *in the process of struggle*, in surmounting difficulties and withstanding tests, and also from *favourable and unfavourable* examples of conduct. We have hundreds of examples of splendid conduct in times of strikes, during demonstrations, in jail, in court. We have thousands of instances of heroism, but unfortunately also not a few cases of pigeon-heartedness, lack of firmness and even desertion. We often forget these examples, both good and bad. We do not teach people to benefit by these examples. We do not show them *what* should be emulated and *what* rejected. We must study the conduct of our comrades and militant workers during class conflicts, under police interrogation, in the jails and concentration camps, in court, etc. The good examples should be brought to light and held up as models to be followed, and all that is rotten, non-Bolshevik and philistine should be cast aside.

Since the Leipzig trial we have had quite a number of our comrades whose statements before bourgeois and fascist courts have shown that numerous cadres are growing up with an excellent

understanding of what really constitutes Bolshevik conduct in court.

But how many even of you delegates to the Congress know the details of the trial of the railwaymen in Rumania, know about the trial of Fiete Schulz who was subsequently beheaded by the fascists in Germany, the trial of our valiant Japanese comrade Itikawa, the trial of the Bulgarian revolutionary soldiers, and many other trials at which admirable examples of proletarian heroism were displayed?

Such worthy examples of proletarian heroism must be popularized, must be contrasted with the manifestations of faint-heartedness, philistinism, and every kind of rottenness and frailty in our ranks and the ranks of the working class. These examples must be used most extensively in educating the cadres of the labour movement.

Comrades: Our Party leaders often complain that *there are no people*; that they are short of people for agitational and propaganda work, for the newspapers, the trade unions, for work among the youth, among women. Not enough, not enough—that is the cry. We simply haven't got the people. To this we could reply in the old yet eternally new words of Lenin:

"There are no people—yet there are enormous numbers of people. There are enormous numbers of people, because the working class and the most diverse strata of society, year after year, advance from their ranks an increasing number of discontented people who desire to protest, who are ready to render all the assistance they can in the fight against absolutism, the intolerableness of which is not yet recognized by all, but is nevertheless more and more acutely sensed by increasing masses of the people. At the same time we have no people, because we have no leaders, no political leaders, we have no talented organizers capable of organizing extensive and at the same time uniform and harmonious work that would give employment to all forces, even the most inconsiderable."¹

These words of Lenin must be thoroughly grasped by our Parties and applied by them as a guide in their everyday work. There are

¹ V. I. Lenin: *What is to be Done?* Little Lenin Library, No. 4, *Selected Works*, Vol. II., p. 142.

plenty of people. They need only be discovered in our own organizations, during strikes and demonstrations, in various mass organizations of the workers, in united front bodies. They must be helped to grow in the course of their work and struggle; they must be put in a situation where they can really be useful to the workers' cause.

Comrades, we Communists are people of action. Ours is the problem of practical struggle against the offensive of capital, against fascism and the threat of imperialist war, the struggle for the overthrow of capitalism. It is precisely this *practical* task that obliges Communist cadres to equip themselves *with revolutionary theory*. For, as Stalin, that greatest master of revolutionary action, has taught us, theory gives those engaged in practical work the power of orientation, clarity of vision, assurance in work, belief in the triumph of our cause.

But real revolutionary theory is irreconcilably hostile to all emasculated theorizing, all barren play with abstract definitions. *Our theory is not a dogma, but a guide to action*, Lenin used to say. It is *such* a theory that our cadres need, and they need it as badly as they need their daily bread, as they need air or water.

Whoever really wishes to rid our work of deadening, cut-and-dried schemes, of pernicious scholasticism, must burn them out with a red-hot iron, both by *practical*, active struggle waged together with and at the head of the masses, and by untiring effort to master the mighty, fertile, all-powerful teaching of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin.

In this connection I consider it particularly necessary to draw your attention to the work of our *Party schools*. It is not pedants, moralizers or adepts at quoting that our schools must train. No! It is practical front-rank fighters in the cause of the working class that must leave their walls—people who are front-rank fighters not only because of their boldness and readiness for self-sacrifice, but also because they see further than rank-and-file workers and know better than they the path that leads to the emancipation of the toilers. All sections of the Communist International must without any dilly-dallying seriously take up the question of the proper organization of Party schools, in order to turn them into *smithies* where these fighting cadres are forged.

The principal task of our Party schools, it seems to me, is to teach the Party and Young Communist League members there how to apply the Marxist-Leninist method to the concrete situation in particular countries, to definite conditions, not to the struggle against an enemy "in general" but against a particular, definite enemy. This makes necessary a study not merely of the letter of Leninism, but its living, revolutionary spirit.

There are two ways of training cadres in our Party schools:

First method: teaching people abstract theory, trying to give them the greatest possible dose of dry learning, coaching them how to write theses and resolutions in literary style, and only incidentally touching upon the problems of the particular country, of the particular labour movement, its history and traditions, and the experience of the Communist Party in question. Only incidentally!

Second method: theoretical training in which mastering the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism is based on a practical study by the student of the key problems of the struggle of the proletariat in his own country. On returning to his practical work, the student will then be able to find his bearings independently, and *become an independent practical organizer and leader capable of leading the masses in battle against the class enemy.*

Not all graduates of our Party schools prove to be suitable. There is a great deal of phrases, abstractions, book knowledge and show of learning. But we need real, truly Bolshevik organizers and leaders of the masses. And we need them badly this very day. It does not matter if such students cannot write good theses (though we need that very much too) but they must know how to organize and lead, undaunted by difficulties, capable of surmounting them.

Revolutionary theory is the generalized, *summarized experience* of the revolutionary movement. Communists must carefully utilize in their countries not only the experience of the past but also the experience of the present struggle of other detachments of the international labour movement. However, correct utilization of experience does not by any means denote *mechanical transposition* of ready-made forms and methods of struggle from one set of conditions to another, from one country to another, as so often happens in our Parties.

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Bare imitation, simple copying of methods and forms of work even of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in countries where capitalism is still supreme, may with the best of intentions result in harm rather than good, as has so often actually been the case. It is precisely from the experience of the Russian Bolsheviks that we must learn to apply effectually, to the specific conditions of life in each country, the *single international line*; in the struggle against capitalism we must learn pitilessly to cast aside, pillory and hold up to general ridicule all *phrasemongering, use of hackneyed formulas, pedantry and doctrinarianism*.

It is necessary to learn, comrades, to learn always, at every step, in the course of the struggle, at liberty and in jail. To learn and to fight, to fight and to learn. We must be able to combine the great teaching of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin *with Stalinist firmness at work and in struggle, with Stalinist irreconcilability on matters of principle towards the class enemy and deviators from the Bolshevik line, with Stalinist fearlessness in face of difficulties, with Stalinist revolutionary realism*.