

DETROIT REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT RECORDS

BOX 11 OF 16

FOLDER 14

PEOPLES PEACE TREATY F
JOYCE MEMORANDUM

Jan 22
TO: David Dellinger, Bob Greenblatt, Lydia Sargeant, Sid Peck, John Froines,
and Hilda Hein

FROM: Frank H. Joyce

The telephone and the airplane operate against the discipline involved in writing which is one of the reasons our theoretical production is so meager and abstracted from the work we do. In any case, since I won't be able to be at the PCPJ meeting this weekend, there are some matters I would like to raise, partially in response to Sid's memo.

First, I oppose the initiation of a new petition drive which states our position on the war and favor the reactivation of the People's Peace Treaty for the following reasons:

--The Treaty is a useful and succinct statement of our position on the war. It is easily adapted to electoral use if that is what people desire. It is easily related to the seven points. It focuses, as does the seven points, on not only the strategy being used by the U.S. but on the objectives being pursued as well, at least insofar as it deals with the Thieu government. This is, in my view, very important since we seem to be committing the same error as the trots in focusing on the barbarity of U.S. tactics rather than why one tactic, equally or more barbaric, follows another. Simply switching from Bring the Troops Home to Stop the Air War, once again underestimates the potential of people, given the Pentagon Papers, etc., to understand imperialism and the purposes, no different today than twenty years ago, for pursuing U.S. capitalist interests in Asia. Moreover, the Treaty lends itself to great flexibility in organizing; where appropriate, one can emphasize the "People's", anti-government quality; elsewhere the points themselves can be the focus of educational efforts; people who do not wish to become involved in electoral activity can use it just as effectively as those who wish to confront candidates; for example, emphasizing the notion of circumventing the government can be done with an implementation strategy focusing on Medical Aid for Indo-China; educational efforts through implementation of anti-corporate actions emphasizing war-profiteering, or city council and state legislature debates over ratification of the provisions of the Treaty of which only a tiny amount has been done. Finally, as was done with McGovern, the Treaty can be used as a candidates and voters pledge and could easily be printed with such a provision.

--Some people apparently contend that what is wrong with the PPT is that it is "over". While conceding that serious national organizing around the Treaty has ceased, owing to our own errors. I submit that this argument is now exactly what it has been all along--a self-fulfilling prophecy. If PCPJ says it is over, then it is; if they don't, it isn't. It is certainly true that the anti-war movement has emphasized the gimmick and the event over organizing. Assuming however, that we all agree on the limitations of just such an approach, then persisting with the PPT becomes a self-conscious break with our episodic, mercurial past.

--There does exist some PPT momentum; there is a film, there are thousands of signed treaties which could, for example, be taken to the World Peace meeting in February, there is the Detroit City Council ratification

(where we will be going back shortly with an implementation proposal) Certainly no more activity is necessary to "re-activate" the PPT than would be involved in any new effort.

--Because we have stuck with the PPT in Detroit as an organizing rather than mobilizing strategy, it would be detrimental to the work we have done to have the Treaty declared officially to be "over"; and/or for there to emerge a major new national focus that would make Detroit seem isolated. Although we are not involved in a formal PCPJ structure in Detroit, the fact remains that we have provided substantial support for PCPJ (and its ancestors) programs as far back as the Pentagon, Chicago, the Student Youth Conference, Mayday, and October 13th. I have yet to be persuaded of the compelling reasons for abandoning the PPT, given that it would sooner or later hamper our work here. I fail to see why we should be penalized for having pursued a conscious, serious, organizing strategy.

So much for the PPT, the balance of this is loosely devoted to a response to Sid's memo basically in two parts, first dealing with do we need an "election year strategy" (?) and is it appropriate for PCPJ to become a membership organization (?).

On elections, it is my view that to have any strategy whatsoever in 1972 is to have an election year strategy. In addition, the following realities seem to apply to our situation:

1. Presumably, because we are radicals of one sort or another, we agree that in fact, the people don't run the government, no matter who is in office and secondly, the government doesn't run the country anyway; because under capitalism, particularly in the stage of Imperialism, the State is a "committee of the bourgeoisie". Further, in an Imperialist society with parliamentary democratic forms, the very function (of course unstated) of elections is to delude the masses into an illusory sense of participation and control, and to insure that non-electoral forms are not pursued this year or any other.

2. Consciousness among the masses about the futility (or limits) of elections, often expressed through passive cynicism, is very high as a result of the treachery revealed by successive administrations around the war and other issues.

3. Since 1956, the percentage of those theoretically eligible to vote in national elections has gotten lower every four years. Whether the same general effect will apply this year and/or to 18-year-olds is not clear. (Election-year hoopla and "consciousness" has of course soared because of a politicization of the country and because of the taking over of campaigns by advertising and T.V.)

4. There have been two previous mass enfranchisements in U.S. history analagous to the 18-year-old vote, one in this century increasing the electorate by 100 per cent. No revolutionary change followed in either previous instance which, of course, was exactly what was intended.

5. Our own experience suggests that our role is to assume that politicians are opportunistic, that in election years their opportunism extends more toward the masses than in non-election years (when it extends to corporations, junkets, etc.) and that our accomplishments have been to create the conditions in which "opportunity" seems to lie in vigorously opposing the war.

6. The Vietnamese in 1968 did not express a preference for Nixon or Humphrey (which is not to say they didn't have one). They did have a TET offensive.

7. Most of the Democratic candidates have and will continue to make strong anti-war statements as a result of the anti-war consciousness which we have helped to create. Frankly, I don't know what any of them would do if they took office. For reasons not having to do directly with the war, those making the strongest anti-war statements are least likely to be nominated. The democratic party is sufficiently fucked up that it is not clear to me that they can win under any circumstance; and while not conceding the election by any means, we have an obligation to ourselves and others to begin thinking about a strategy for four more years of Mitchell and Kissinger.

8. There is enough election year mania created by the media and the candidates without our doing anything; I don't see why it follows that we have an election year strategy per se. It seems to me that even if a democrat like Muskie wins we have to have a strategy that is projected beyond the election itself, given the treachery of all preceeding administrations; if Nixon wins, all the more reason to have a persevering, far-sighted strategy. I do not mean by this that elections should never be related to, nor candidates run, nor for that matter that I begin to understand all the complexities of revolutionary strategy in a parliamentary democracy, advanced monopoly capitalist society in decline such as ours. I am certain, however, that one should not run a line on elections or anything else which one has not yet developed the organizational apparatus to pursue and enforce--and we clearly do not yet have the organizational forms even locally let alone nationally to say that come on everybody lets just relate to the elections as a tactic. What the hell are the objectives, strategy and forms for which an election year strategy is the tactic? Which brings me to the second issue of Whittier PCPJ ASA form? Again some points:

The more I learn, the more I am appalled at how little the "old left", those with presumably more experience and a superior analysis and theory, have passed on to us who have had to learn things the hard way; two examples are relevant here.

--Virtually nothing was done to prepare us for the period when public opinion was successfully organized against the war and it didn't end anyway--one would think that experience and an analysis of even the general conditions of imperialism would have made it possible to anticipate, if only as a strong possibility that there would need to be a second stage to the anti-war movement.

--Complete capitulation to spontaneity. The sixties was, of course, a decade of spontaneity, of protest. We stayed in it far far too long. Gill Green is correct in describing the limitations of the hare; but he mostly demolishes a straw man in assuming that there are none of us tortises out here and that objective conditions would not take us beyond spontaneity into serious

struggle for power. The question is, why did that book take so long to write anyway--it wasn't that no-one was ready to listen. Why did we go from a sense of the organizer in 1962, 63, and 64, into the media trip which put the emphasis on the impresario who produces the bi-annual event rather than the organizer--remember Lake Villa. (Rennie's development is the symbol of the whole process)

Some of the reasons are important:

--Apparently there was deep "gratitude" from the old left that after the fifties there was any energy whatsoever and therefore an anti-struggle attitude let it drift. I'm not saying incidentally that the youth weren't ahistorical, arrogant, bull-headed, immature, naive, etc. only that the struggle against all those tendencies was less sharp than in retrospect it should have been.

--Absence of a theory which explained the sixties, vis-a-vis media, rock and roll, dope, race, sex, Nader, etc. meant the old left was as surprised as everyone else; and therefore, able to do nothing other than drift with the tide.

--a very very comfortable, symbiotic semi-pseudo conflict with the Trots which was a convenient substitute for real struggle and which objectively capitulated to their interest in retarding the development of the anti-war movement because it suited their own organizational interest to do so. I have felt, and expressed, for a long time that we somehow inherited an utterly debilitating wierd hassle of scarred personalities and politics going back to way before anyone ever heard of Viet Nam from which we have only begun to rid ourselves. It has produced astoundingly metaphysical politics in all forms including a belief in PCPJ's moral as opposed to political superiority--as evidenced by the fact that we claim our line has more mass appeal than theirs and that we aren't ravid; but they consistently out organize us. We have accepted some very mechanical amalgamations of issues and organizations not because they were dialectically related to struggles of an element among the people but rather because it proved to ourselves that we really are different from them, thank goodness. (This also explains, I think, some of why there is such a superficial notion about how having the correct line will somehow substitute for day-to-day contact in attracting people to us). The result has been an excessively paper coalition and gratuitous alienation of some strength and resources.

The question now, however, is whether to be stampeded by NAM and our rediscovered opposition to spontenaity into grafting a pre-party form onto a coalition which is fucked up to begin with. At best, I believe that it will create another piece of dead wood which will have to be cleared away a year or so from now, if it works at all. This is not to deny that the level of consciousness of the masses far exceeds the available revolutionary or even reformist forms. That requires the most serious analysis of what forms are appropriate and possible.

I am completely confident that on the local level, at least in Detroit, those questions are being dealt with in theory and practice in a way which will dialectically lead to new national forms in the future. We are in a pre-revolutionary-revolutionary situation in this country.

To make PCPJ a membership organization, however, strikes me as odd in many ways; a youth arm which will institutionalize spontaneity as a concession to Rubin et al who never will leave the sixties (struggle creates its own anachroisms--the media keeps them around because it suits their purposes to do so) and which will espouse some wierd revolutionary-armedfuckingmarijuanavoting notion to a pro-working class line which is utterly undifferentiated by race, geography, sex, age, occupation or any other category essential to real organizing. How given the present composition of PCPJ can a presumably even "transitional line" be arrived at which is simultaneously to the left of the social democrats in NAM and yet acceptable to McGovern be supported? And equally important, where are we one year from now even if it somehow works?

To approach it from another perspective, how can there be a very advanced secondary membership organization plus coalition form which includes totally individualistic personalities with access to the media as there base, some local coalitions with a following, special interest groups with a membership such as WRL, AFSC which in the past has only been able to pull off massively approximately every other event which it has attempted and whose meetings are incredibly diverse (which is the best that can be said about them--the last one in Chicago in particular having been the most sexist meeting I have attended in the last five years among other things) become a mass membership organization with an ongoing program combining elements of Common Cause, NAM, the NLF, NSA, ASG, Yippies, Tupemaros, the Old Mobe, and a non-existent mass based revolutionary party with disciplined, experienced cadre. It is after a minor miracle and tribute to enormous work by many people that the thing has held together as long as it has. But we should not press our luck; it is one thing for an organizational form that is neither fish nor fowl to pull off some successful national actions; it is quite another to try to convert it as part of an election year strategy into a _____--whatever it is. More importantly, it can only divert from the need to build the local, regional, and national forms which do assist the process of base building which will allow us to struggle around the contradictions between the people and the ruling class instead of pursuing some imaginary strategy of ju jitsing the media into resolving the so-called contradiction within the ruling class in the right direction. Simply stated, I do believe that a form which is at one and the same time astoundingly narrow and ingrown AND incredibly broad in politics, age, etc. can become the kind of pre-party form we need in this period. Nor do I feel that we can afford to be pressed for time by Nixon or NAM.

This is not to say that PCPJ should not go on; there are many important things which it can and should to including the staging of a number of events around Honeywell, San Diego, and Miami and possibly even some primaries although about that I am sceptical; I agree with many of Sid's and other proposals; the objective should be in my view to put together the broadest possible united front around a primarily anti-war strategy which is dialectically connected with other issues and the real PCPJ constituency whatever that is. At least that would be the most useful and complimentary to the program of PPT ratification and implementation around anti-corporate actions (we have demonstrated locally at Honeywell and would support a national action), medical aid and so on which we intend to pursue in Detroit.

The major problem facing the anti-war movement is not as had been previously supposed, that people think the war is over. All available data suggests that few people are bamboozled by Nixon's strategy. Some do believe, correctly, that he is doing more to "end the war" than his predecessor.

What people do believe is that there is little they can do to change anything about ~~the~~ Viet Nam and in particular nothing that has been suggested by the anti-war movement makes any ~~xxx~~ sense in terms of actually having an ~~x~~ effect.

Partly this is the result of perceiving, ~~correctly~~ against correctly that Richard Nixon is most intransigent on the question of the war--that he is amenable to change on his China policy or the economy of whatever, partly ~~because~~ as a means of avoiding a change on his Viet Nam policy. Hence, people, to the extent they overcome political passivity at all are not likely to expend energy on the war which would seem to be an exercise in ~~fix~~ futility (it is the anti-war movement which seems to think that protesting the war is an end in itself)

Other believe that it is futile to expect Richard Nixon to do anything about anything and therefore are attracted either to electoral politics or "revolution" (the SWP does both which is why their participation this year will be minimal).

One consequence of this state of affairs is that the anti-war movement ^{and "revolutionaries"} should ~~move~~ move beyond its fixation with the contradictions ~~xxx~~ within the ruling class and be more concerned about the contradiction between the ruling class and the government. There is no issue other than the war ~~which~~ around which

there is more antagonism both active and latent.

Given that many people, especially revolutionaries ~~whix~~ will, however, chose things other than the war to organize around because of the problem of effectiveness defined earlier, it should be understood that including discussions/^{and focus} of the war is a political asset--not just a political obligation. If the war is as unpopular as ever then nothing will be lost and much may be gained by pointing out what the war means for the wage freeze, inflation, unemployment or whatever. It may seem obvious but there is virtually no organizing situation in which it is not possible to make a connection with the war which will not strengthen our effort.

Secondly, there is a political (as ~~opposed to~~ ~~dis-~~ obligation distinct from moral) ~~xxxxxx~~ to continue explicit opposition to the war for the following three reasons.

First only a tiny fraction of those against the war have been reached by the anti-war movement in any ongoing or direct way. There are many who can be gotten politically involved around the issue of the war itself --as oppose to food co-ops, strikes etc.

Second, any apparent reduction in anti-war sentiment can be used by the Nixon administration to justify what they are doing and to fail to make changes in other areas which are ~~substitit~~ "comensation" for not changing of the war. "hever attention can be focus on the perpetual costs of continuing the war as in the demonstration against Ford's South Vietnamese expansion plans, it is to the good. Similalry, demonstrations which force deomcratic candidates such as Muskie etc. to

make explicit exactly what they would do about the war are also to the good. The same is true of struggles to ratify the treaty etc.

Finally, there is a danger of backsliding; of people coming to in some sense support the war as frustration about not being able to do anything about ~~it~~ ending it grows. This can be combatted through continued education programs as well as the incorporation of the war into other organizing efforts and other anti-war actions.

The fact is, ~~it~~ if the end to the war is defined as self-determination for the Vietnamese--that is getting rid of Thieu and Ford, the war is not going to end in the next nine months. There is no guarantee whatsoever that even were a democrat to be elected that it would end. Public opinion is not, after all public power in this society and we must be as prepared for protracted struggle as the Vietnamese. (Something the anti-war movement did virtually nothing to prepare us for).

We must remember that to oppose the war is to express solidarity with the masses around an intensely antagonistic contradiction.

AGENDA

Sign-in sheet

State of Memberships: Approx. 475 Memberships, 36 Table Leaders and
25 Persons on Staff

Items to be covered: Change in location
Change in Mechanics
Format for 19th Seminar
Discussion of VIETNAM WILL WIN and preparation of
Study Guide

Table Leaders Must be Familiar with details regarding: Peace Treaty
Winter Soldier
Feb. Selection

I. Physical Location Factors

Physical set-up of crowd
Acoustical
Non-smokers tables
Persons insisting on same Table Leaders / Number System
Security, Downstairs and Upstairs
Membership Card Admittance
Kitchen - Sandy & Joe Faremouth

II. New Memberships

Babs Belvitch, Fitz Simkins, Carol Belvitch, Mae Weinbaum

III. Paper Work

Book Sales - Sharon Glotta, Judy Hines, Judy Carty, Earl Simkins
Due Bills, - Kathy Hart, Sara Karfonta, Donna Bish, Judy Shea
Set-up of Tables (info and supplies) Mae Weinbaum
Sale of VIETNAM book and distribution of Leaders Folders - Louise Gregory

IV. i.e. Person Enters and Proceeds through Seminar

V. Format

Includes Announcements: Edgar Snow's Movie, sponsored by Women's
Media Co-op
Peace Treaty
Winter Soldier

VI. February Selection

VII. Literature Table - Black Star

VIII. Help still needed: News Sheet needs completion
Set-up afternoon (late) of 19th

IX. DISCUSSION OF VIETNAM WILL WIN and
Preparation of Study Guide for Orientation Discussion
Frank Joyce

BOYCOTT!

When a war as unpopular as Indo-China drags on and on and on, we believe it can only be because Nixon is more responsive to the corporations who derive huge profits from war material and overseas investment than he is to us ordinary citizens who pay the taxes, endure the inflation and unemployment, and send the boys who die.

Vietnamization is not really Vietnamization--it is HONEYWELLIZATION--the substitution of more barbaric, more technological means of slaughtering Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians for ground troops.

PHOTOGRAPHERS WHO OPPOSE THE WAR are in a unique position to powerfully register their opposition by BOYCOTTING HONEYWELL PRODUCTS. Honeywell makes strobes, cameras, projectors, developing tanks, etc. They also make:

--LARGEST MANUFACTURER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL FRAGMENTATION BOMBS

Cluster Bomb-filled with 640 small baseball-size secondary bombs called "guavas"-explode sending 250 steel pellets in all directions--the pellets tear the flesh and smash the bones of all humans in the area, while leaving buildings intact. This weapon was specifically designed by Honeywell to be used against civilian populations--maims and kills 100,000 civilians yearly in Vietnam alone--Honeywell received \$85 million in 1970 and \$75 million in 1971 for these bombs.

--RECENT CONTRACTS AWARDED BY PENTAGON

1. \$50 million for manufacture of Submarine Tactical Missile-anti personnel weapon fired onto land targets to saturate with bombs.
2. \$55,000 to refine Dart Bombs-shower area with high-velocity plastic darts designed only to destroy living creatures.
3. \$6 million for fuel-air explosive munition-ignites fuel in air causing vacuum-like explosion

--RANK 22ND AMONG U.S. GOVERNMENT WAR-CONTRACTORS - WAR PRODUCTS ACCOUNT FOR OVER ONE QUARTER OF COMPANY'S TOTAL SALES

When the majority of the people want the war to end, it continues. We believe that when the corporations conclude that their losses in markets, sales and customer loyalty exceed their war profits, the war will end IMMEDIATELY.

PEOPLE'S PEACE TREATY OFFICE, 13100 Woodward, Highland Park, TEL: 869-6775

Jan 22

BEST OF THE SHOW! 8 GREAT SHOOT 'N SHOW WINNERS FROM

CONSUMER BOYCOTT

WORLD PREMIERE



HERE'S THE NEW HONEYWELL EYE SENSOR. TIME, NO MATTER ON CAMERA, OFF-CAMERA, IN THE LIGHT!

HONEYWELL



PRODUCTS

KILL


PEOPLE



CLUSTER BOMB UNIT



Honeywell fragmentation bomb



- OVER -